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1.  SELF-EMPLOYMENT AS A CHALLENGE TO LABOUR LAW 
1.1 Introduction 
1.1.1 The Research Question 
The past two decades has seen a growing interest, from both policy makers and scholars, in the 
legal regulation of work performed by self-employed workers. Increases in non-agricultural self-
employment in industrialised countries, together with political and ideological shifts, have fuelled 
interest in self-employment as a means of increasing employment. The attractions of self-
employment are manifold. To firms, self-employment is part of a two-fold change in the way 
firms operate: the move towards more flexibility as to the size and composition of the workforce, 
marked by an increased use of atypical workers and the disintegration of firms by arranging 
production through outsourcing, subcontracting and franchising. To workers, self-employment 
offers the greater autonomy connected with being their own boss, a chance of higher returns, or, 
at least, opportunities of gainful employment in times of high unemployment. To governments, 
self-employment has been seen as a means of increasing the number of small businesses, 
supposedly beneficial to the creation of new employment. Encouraging and removing barriers to 
self-employment is, therefore, a priority for many governments. 
 
To labour law1, however, self-employment is far from unproblematic. Traditionally, the concept 
of employee or contract of employment has served to define the personal scope of labour law: 
applying labour law to employees – or at least to those under full-time permanent contracts. But 
not everyone who makes a living from performing work personally is an employee. As noted by 
Davies and Freedland, “[w]e are accustomed to say that labour law regulates the ‘world of work’, 
but it is quite clear that in no country do all relationships, which have as their objective the 
                                                 
1 Here, labour law denotes both individual labour law (employmnet law) and collective labour law. It does not include 
social security law. 
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performance of work in exchange for remuneration, fall within the scope of labour law.”2 Self-
employed workers, including those who sell labour only services, have been left outside of the 
traditional personal scope of labour law, having the relationship between them and the buyers of 
their goods or services regulated by other branches of law, most importantly commercial contract 
law. “Those which do not fall within the scope of labour law are by no means unregulated, but 
they will fall within the province of some other body of law, whose principles are very different 
from those of labour law.”3 
 
There have, nonetheless, always existed workers who do not fit neatly into this dichotomy, being 
neither the typical employees who have served as the archtype for labour law, nor the genuinely 
independent entrepreneurs forming the abstract actors of commercial law. Among the self-
employed, we find workers who share one or several important characteristics with employees. 
Like employees they may be under an obligation to perform work personally, subjected to the 
employer’s hierarchical powers, or working exclusively, or almost exclusively, for one employer. 
Still, they are not covered by labour law, despite some of the same concerns being raised by their 
relationship with the buyers of their services as those raised by the relationship between 
employees and employers. There is also the suspicion that some of these self-employed workers 
in reality are the product of deliberate attempts to contract out of labour law, or even its outright 
circumvention.  
 
The subject of this dissertation is self-employed workers and the personal scope of labour law. It 
will show how self-employment challenges the traditional boundaries of the field of application 
of labour law – the concept of employee – and how legislators and courts have dealt with this 
problem. Further, it explores various options for reforming the personal scope of labour law to 
include at least some of the self-employed workers currently not covered by it. The argument 
                                                 
2 Davies and Freedland (2000a) p. 32. 
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made is that the personal scope of labour law should be better tailored to the concerns that it 
seeks to address.  
 
1.1.2 Methodology – Comparative Law 
Methodologically, this study falls within the ambit of comparative law. The choice of a comparative 
approach has been made based on the assumption that if the study is based on material from 
several different legal systems, this will provide both a wider and deeper understanding of the 
issue at hand than a study based in a single legal system would. The study draws on material from 
the labour law of five countries – France, Italy, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United 
States. Frequent references are also made to the law of the European Union. Using material from 
several different legal systems is nonetheless not enough to qualify this thesis as comparative law. 
As pointed out by Zweigert and Kötz in their Introduction to Comparative Law, the mere study of the 
law of different countries falls short of being comparative law. 
One can speak of comparative law only if there are specific comparative reflections on the problem 
to which the work is devoted. Experience shows that this is best done if the author first lays out the 
essentials of the relevant foreign law, country by country, and then uses this material as a basis for 
critical comparison, ending up with conclusions about the proper policy for the law to adopt, which 
may involve a reinterpretation of his own system.4 
 
Comparisons come in different forms. In macrocomparisons, the structures of legal systems are 
compared, for example techniques of legislation, styles of codification, methods for statutory 
interpretation or the authority of precedent. In microcomparisons, focus is on specific legal 
institutions or problems, looking at how a particular problem has been solved in different legal 
systems.5 Examining how legislators and courts have dealt with self-employed workers at the 
boundaries of labour law requires a microcomparison.  
                                                                                                                                                        
3 Davies and Freedland (2000a) p. 32. 
4 Zweigert and Kötz (1998) p. 6. 
5 For these definitions of macrocomparison and microcomparison, c.f. Zweigert and Kötz (1998) pp. 4f. 
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In this study, legal comparisons are used in two ways. The first is as a tool to analyse a particular legal 
concept existing in a similar form in a number of different legal systems. In Chapter 3, the 
comparative analysis of the concept of employee in French, Swedish, UK and US labour law is 
used in order to further our understanding of this concept, so crucial to the personal scope of 
labour law. As the concept of employee shows great similarities across the four countries we can 
identify the most important characteristics of this concept, an exercise facilitated by the 
comparative approach as we have a better overview, and run less risk of submerging in details of 
doctrine, than what would have been the case had the law of only one country been examined. At 
the same time, we can identify the differences between the concepts, becoming more aware of 
the particular nature of each national concept. In this part, we also look at the historical 
development of the concept of employee. Apart from studying the history of legal doctrines, an 
attempt is also made at relating these developments to changes in the organisation of work, 
labour markets and society at large which seems to have had an impact on them.6 
 
The second way in which legal comparison is used is in the examination of how lawmakers in different 
countries have dealt with the same issue. Chapter 4 examines how lawmakers in France, Italy, Sweden 
and the United Kingdom have come to include in the personal scope some of those who live off 
selling their labour, but who fall outside the concept of employee. The difference between the 
type of comparison used in this part and the one used to examine the concept of employee is that 
instead of focusing on a specific legal concept existing in one form or another in all examined 
countries, we take as our point of departure a social objective – the extension of labour law to 
workers who are not employees but still deemed in need of labour law protection – and examine 
how lawmakers in different countries have tried to fulfill this objective. This technique has been 
                                                 
6 On the close relation between comparative law and legal history, c.f. Zweigert and Kötz (1998) p. 8. 
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eloquently described by one of the greatest comparative labour lawyers, Otto Kahn-Freund, in 
his 1965 inaugural lecture at Oxford, Comparative Law as an Academic Subject.  
[The comparative legal scientist] is more inclined to compare methods of fulfilling social objectives 
than legal doctrines, functions rather than structures. To take up a useful simile going back to 
Jeremy Bentham, a comparative lawyer who adopts this approach will see himself as a comparative 
physiologist rather than a comparative anatomist […] Institutions and doctrines, statutes and judicial 
decisions will have to abide his question: what is your purpose, what interest do you protect, and 
how do the various legal techniques impinge on the effective achievement of those purposes and on 
the articulation and concealment of interests?7 
 
In Chapter 5, the analysis of the concept of employee and the existing extensions of the personal 
scope are, together with scholarly writing in the field and some never adopted proposals for 
legislation, used to outline three options for reform of the personal scope. This places the study 
within the category of comparative law which Zweigert and Kötz labels applied comparative law. 
When comparative law is used in a theoretical-descriptive form, the aim is to say how and why 
certain legal systems are alike. Used to provide advice on legal policy, however, its task becomes 
different: “In its applied version comparative law suggests how a specific problem can most 
appropriately be solved under the given social and economic circumstances.”8 
 
The choice of countries has been made on the basis of two factors. First, countries for 
comparison were chosen on criteria reflecting the purpose of the comparisons. The four 
countries used for the analysis of the concept of employee were chosen on the assumption that 
there could be interesting differences in the concept of employee between four countries, which 
differed both in terms of labour market regulation and in legal traditions in a more general sense. 
To chose one Scandinavian country, one Continental country, the United Kingdom and the 
United States thus seemed appropriate. As to the comparison of extensions of the personal 
                                                 
7 Kahn-Freund (1978) p. 279. 
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scope, the quest was for countries with legal institutions which could serve as examples of 
different techniques for extending the personal scope. The suitability of the chosen countries is 
further confirmed by the fact that they differ, to varying degrees, also in terms of the level and 
development of self-employment.9 Secondly, as properly conducted comparative legal research 
requires knowledge of the language of the legal system which is to be studied, the limited 
linguistic abilities of the author – or at least the possibilities to learn new languages within the 
given temporal and spatial framework – have forced the exclusion of certain countries which 
might otherwise have been of interest to the study.10 
 
This study deals exclusively with rich, western industrialised economies. All of the five countries 
used in the comparative parts are OECD countries and four are members of the European 
Union. The issues adressed are, nonetheless, to a large extent also relevant for countries in other 
stages of development, as evidenced by the attention given to the issue by the International 
Labour Organisation (ILO).  
 
1.1.3 Earlier Research 
Research by other and more learned scholars has paved the way to the present analysis. In a 1990 
article, Collins made an influential outline of the challenge to labour law posed by independent 
contractors and the vertical disintegration of the firm.11 Already some years earlier, Collins had 
explored the theme of the difference between market power and bureaucratic power in 
employment relationships, of importance not just for understanding the distinction between 
employees and self-employed workers, but for grasping what labour law actually does.12 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
8 Zweigert and Kötz (1998) p. 11. 
9 C.f. below 1.2.1. 
10 All translations from the French, Italian and Swedish are my own, except where otherwise indicated. 
11 Collins (1990). 
12 Collins (1986).  
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Another important contribution to the debate was made by the so-called Supiot group of experts, 
led by French legal scholar Alain Supiot, which under the heading “Work and Private Power” 
identified challenges to labour law posed by self-employment and gave an overview over different 
responses from legislators and courts in the European Union member states.13 Further, in reports 
to the 6th European Congress for Labour Law and Social Security in 1999, Supiot and Davies outlined 
respectively a continental and a common law view of the issue of self-employed workers and the 
personal scope of labour law.14 In the following year, Davies, together with Freedland, explored 
the issue in two other articles including an outline of an alternative way of organising the personal 
scope.15 
 
An important source of information on the status of self-employed workers in labour law have 
been reports produced by international organisations. he issue has on repeated occassions 
received the attention of the International Labour Conference, with accompaning reports from 
the International Labour Office.16 An item called “The Scope of the Employment Relationship” 
was on the agenda of the 90th session of the Conference in June 2003.17 
 
As already mentioned, this study includes an in-depth comparative analysis of the concept of 
employee. For the historical part of the comparative analysis, works by Bruno Veneziani18 and 
Simon Deakin19 and Spiros Simitis20 have been particularly useful. Maybe a bit surprisingly, the 
concept of employee in contemporary labour law has received less attention from comparative 
legal scholars and in the last three decades, no large monographic comparative study has been 
prepared. The thesis aims to respond to this dearth of scholarly writing in this area. Some 
                                                 
13 Supiot et al (2001). 
14 Supiot (1999) and Davies (1999). 
15 Davies and Freedland (2000a) and (2000b). 
16 ILO (1990a), (1997) and (1998). 
17 ILO (2003). The outcome of the proceedings was unknown at the time of writing. 
18 Veneziani (1986). 
19 Deakin (1998). 
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scholars have, however, treated the concept of employee in national law in such a manner that 
their analysis contributes to the more general understanding of the concept of employee. 
Examples of such literature are Thérèse Aubert-Monpeyssen’s study of the notion of 
subordination in French social law21 and Marc Linder’s writings on the concept of employee in 
US labour law.22 
 
In the case of extensions of the personal scope beyond employees as traditionally conceived, 
there are important works which despite treating only national law are important contributions to 
a more general debate. Two that must be mentioned are Gérard Lyon-Caen’s 1990 Le droit du 
travail non salarié, covering the extensions in French law, and Giuseppe Santoro Passarelli’s 1979 Il 
lavoro ‘parasubordinati’ covering this particular Italian legal category. Of a different nature, but 
important to understand the grey area between employee status and genuinely independent 
businesses, is the 1999 empirical study by Burchell, Deakin and Honey of the employment status 
of individuals in non-standard employment in the UK.23 
1.2 Self-employment 
1.2.1 The Notion of Self-employment 
Self-employment, or self-employed worker, is not a legal concept. Neither is it, as will be shown later in 
this chapter, unambigous as a statistical or sociological concept. The word is most often used to 
refer to persons who work for a living without being employees, such as owners of small business 
or people in other ways working on their own-account. Although various definitions of “self-
employed”, “independent contractor”, “own-account worker” or the like exist in labour law, 
social security, tax law and other provisions of western legal orders, they do not show the same 
coherence, either within or between legal systems, as the concept of employee. 
                                                                                                                                                        
20 Simitis (2000). C.f. also the contributions by Cottereau (2000) and Hay (2000) in the same volume, Private Law and 
Social Inequality in the Industrial Age, edited by Willibald Steinmetz. 
21 Aubert-Monpeyssen (1988). 
22 Linder (1989a), (1989b) and (1999). 
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Here, the terms self-employed worker and independent contractor will both be used, with slightly 
different meanings. While self-employed worker is a broader notion including small businessmen, 
professionals and other who sell goods and services to consumers rather than to companies or 
the state, independent contractors are individuals who live off selling their labour to private and public 
employers, such as labour-only subcontractors. Under this definition, a worker who has other 
workers employed can still be considered a self-employed worker or independent contractor. 
Occassional reference is made to genuinely self-employed workers, denoting self-employed who are 
neither economically dependent or subordinated to the employer. 
 
The word worker will be used to denote anyone who performs remunerated work personally. 
Under this definition, both employees and self-employed workers are considered as workers. 
Further, in the absence of a better word, employer will be used to signify the other contracting 
party, i.e. both the employer of an employee and someone buying the services of a self-employed 
worker.24 Other than that, the term does not indicate any specific kind of contractual relationship 
between the worker and the employer. The word employee will be used according to national 
definitions and denote any individual working under a contract of employment or the equivalent.  
 
The common feature of employees and self-employed workers is that they both perform work 
personally. The distinction most commonly applied between the two is built on the independence 
perceived to be the basic characteristic of a self-employed worker. In both common law countries 
and in continental legal systems the worker’s subordination – the employers right to command 
what the worker does and the way in which she does it – has served as the core of the traditional 
concept of employee. Thus, if subordination characterises the employee, the self-employed 
worker is characterised by the freedom she enjoys as to how the work is performed. 
                                                                                                                                                        
23 Burchell, Deakin and Honey (1999).  
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1.2.1 Trends in Self-employment 
Despite earlier predictions that a concentration and centralisation of economic power would in 
the long run lead to the death of smaller units of production25, the past three decades have seen a 
“partial renaissance” in self-employment.26 In a wide range of OECD countries, the proportion 
of non-agricultural self-employment has risen and some countries have experienced a rapid surge. 
Statistics of self-employment should nonetheless be read in a very careful way. As Catherine 
Hakim has pointed out, “the statistics of self-employment are not designed to serve anyone’s 
purposes, with the self-employed category being merely the ‘residual’ group left over once 
employees were identified.”27 According to international statistical definitions, the distinction is 
between paid employment and self-employment. In practice, administrative and taxation regulations 
have come to play an important role for the surveys. Being classified as self-employed for 
taxation purposes is often decisive both for the workers self-assessment of her status and the 
administrative classification.28 This makes working owners of incorporated businesses an 
important borderline case treated differently in different countries.29 “As a general rule, statistics 
on self-employment are best used as a rough measure of change at the macro-level. But they 
provide a poor basis for explaining change due to problems of validity and meaning at the micro-
level”.30 
 
Over the past 25 years, most OECD countries have seen a growth in non-agricultural self-
employment higher than the growth in total non-agricultural employment. Taken as a share of 
non-agricultural civilian employment, the median value of self-employment for the OECD 
                                                                                                                                                        
24 For a similar use of the words worker and employer, c.f. Davies and Freedland (2000a) p. 35. 
25 For an account of the traditional view that small scale production will slowly wither away, especially the Marxist 
version thereof, c.f. Steinmetz and Wright (1989) p. 981. 
26 The term “partial renaissance” is used by OECD (2000) p. 155ff. 
27 Hakim (1988) p. 424. 
28 OECD (1992) p. 185. 
29 Of the five countries of main interest to this study, the United States, and in some instances the United Kingdom, 
do not treat working owners of incorporated businesses as self-employed workers, giving somewhat lower figures for 
self-employment. OECD (1992) p. 186. 
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countries has risen over the past 20 years. There is, however, no convergence in the rates 
between different countries and the variations remain very large.31 
 
A number of different explanations for the occurrence and growth of self-employment have been 
suggested. The OECD has identified reasons most commonly used to explain the development 
as overly rigid labour and product markets and high levels of taxation; changes in industrial 
organisation with a greater stress on out-sourcing of non-core activities and networks of small 
firms; and as a response by individuals to new opportunities becoming available in OECD 
economies.32 Steinmetz and Wright, writing about the growth of self-employment in the United 
States in the 1970s, put forward the tentative explanations that self-employment can be a 
response to higher unemployment in an economic downturn; a result of sectoral change in the 
economy towards post-industrial sectors with higher levels of self-employment; and the 
decentralisation of older sectors of the economy leading to higher levels of self-employment.33 
Mangan describes the self-employed in terms of “economic refugees” unable to find employment 
as permanent employees; “dependent contractors” who have had their employment status 
changed by employers no longer willing to carry non-wage costs; and, on a more positive note, 
persons seeking self-employment for reasons of personal flexibility or in search of tax or other 
economic advantages.34 In the following the various determinants will be grouped in four 
categories: changes in economic structure; changes in industrial organisation; attempts to escape 
tax and social regulation; and increased unemployment. The impact of government programs to 
encourage self-employment will also be mentioned. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
30 Hakim (1988) p. 425. 
31 OECD (2000) p. 157. 
32 OECD (2000) p. 155. 
33 Steinmetz and Wright (1989) p. 983ff. 
34 Mangan (2000) p. 39. 
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The categories are overlapping and considering that it has been difficult to find explanatory 
variables that are valid across countries, the determinants of self-employment presented here 
should only be considered as examples of why self-employment occurs and why it has grown in 
many countries. In an econometric analysis of determinants of self-employment made by the 
OECD, it was not possible to find a consistent set of explanatory variables for self-employment 
valid across countries.35 In general, a strong negative correlation between the level of GDP per 
capita and the share of self-employment in non-agricultural employment can be found. However, 
if GDP per capita was the only factor at work, self-employment would have tended to decline in 
all countries, which has not been the case.36 
 
Changes in Economic Structure 
The size of different industrial sectors within an economy affects the occurrence of self-
employment. If an economy has a large share of its employment in sectors where self-
employment is common (for example service industries), it will show a higher number of self-
employed workers. The distribution of self-employment by industry varies considerably from 
country to country. In general for OECD countries, non-agricultural self-employment tends to 
be concentrated in service industries of different kinds while it is rare to find self-employment in 
manufacturing. The ISIC (International Standard Industrial Classification) sectors where the bulk 
of self-employment can be found are in wholesale and retail trade (where we have self-employed 
commercial agents), hotels and restaurants; construction; and community, social and personal services.37 The 
industry sectors, which in the 1990s gave the largest contribution to the growth of self-
employment, were financial intermediation, real estate, renting and business; followed by community, social 
and personal services. The contribution of these sectors to the growth of self-employment was larger 
                                                 
35 OECD (2000) p. 174. 
36 OECD (2000) p. 173. 
37 OECD (1992) p. 156. 
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than their contribution to employment growth as a whole.38 As an example, when self-
employment grew in the United States in the 1970s, this was due both to the increasing 
importance of industrial sectors with above-average proportions of self-employment, mainly 
service industries or what has been referred to as postindustrial sectors, and the rapid growth of self-
employment in the traditional industrial sectors. In fact, some postindustrial sectors with 
traditionally high levels of self-employment, such as legal, engineering and professional services 
and medical and health services saw their level of self-employment fall while the level increased in 
fields such as construction and manufacturing.39 
 
One important aspect of the sectoral distribution of self-employment is the difference between 
self-employed workers with and without employees. Self-employed workers with employees are 
more commonly found in sectors such as wholesale and retail trade, hotel and restaurants.40 Some 
countries, among them the UK, show significant numbers of self-employed workers without 
employees providing personal services in the oil, construction and computer industries and 
among homeworkers, teleworkers and journalists.41 
 
As concerns occupational groups, self-employed workers are most commonly found as sales 
workers, accounting for one fourth of sales workers in France, over one fifth in the United 
Kingdom and more than one eight in Sweden and the United States. Some OECD countries 
show even higher figures, such as more than half in Greece, Portugal and Turkey. Apart from 
sales workers, the occupational patterns vary over countries. Clerical work tends to show below 
average levels of self-employment in all countries.42 In the 1990s, the occupational group 
                                                 
38 OECD (2000) p. 160. 
39 Steinmetz and Wright (1989) p. 1002ff. 
40 OECD (2000) p. 160. 
41 OECD (2000) p. 162. 
42 OECD (1992) p. 189. 
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professional, technical and related workers accounted for a large contribution to the growth in self-
employment, as did legislators, senior officials and managers.43 
 
Changes in Industrial Organisation 
Industrial organisation can have important effects on the occurrence of self-employment in an 
economy. If work is organised in a way that creates opportunities for self-employment, the 
proportion of self-employment will be higher. The current trend towards more flexible work 
arrangements is often accredited with an important part in the development of self-employment, 
in particular the trend to contract out activities, rather than provide them internally.44 
 
In models of industrial organisation, self-employed workers are often described in terms of being 
‘non-core workers’ or located in the ‘external sector’ of the firm. In Atkinson’s familiar model of 
the flexible firm,45 the firm has a core of workers with permanent or long-term employment, 
possessing firm specific skills. Outside the core we find different kinds of atypical workers, with a 
weaker connection to the employer, such as part-time workers and workers with short-term 
contracts. In the most peripheral layer we find self-employed workers, sub-contractors and 
workers from temporary work agencies, with no employer-employee relationship to the firm. Put 
in other terms, the firm has an ‘internal’ and an ‘external’ sector. In the ‘external sector’ of the 
firm, we typically find workers whose skills are ‘specialised but general’ in the sense that they are 
not firm specific as the skills of workers found in the ‘internal sector’. Some workers in the 
external sector supply professional or skilled services such as computer, accountancy or legal 
services (primary external sector), while others provide seasonal, casual and short-term contract 
work, often with low valued skills, such as homeworkers or unskilled construction work 
                                                 
43 OECD (2000) p. 160f. 
44 Hakim (1988) p. 438f and OECD (1992) p. 171.  
45 C.f. Atkinson (1987) and Institute for Manpower Studies (1987).  
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(secondary external sector).46 Shrinking cores or internal sectors can translate into an increase in 
self-employment. Off-loading risks to the periphery through sub-contracting work and replacing 
contracts of employment with other kinds of contracts can be a central characteristic of a flexible 
work organisation. 
 
This segmentation of the firm comes from employers’ need for different forms of flexibility, 
which serve to make the organisation more ready to adopt to changes in the environment around 
it and the supply and demand for its output. Atkinson suggest three different kinds of flexibility.47 
Numerical flexibility is concerned with enhancing the firm’s ability to adjust the level of output to 
meet fluctuations in input. Ways of achieving numerical flexibility are part-time contracts, the use 
of short-term, casual, or temporary agency workers.  In this category we also find working time 
arrangements such as varied shift patterns and overtime. Functional flexibility is concerned with the 
versatility of employees and their flexibility in and between jobs. It consists of a firm’s ability to 
adjust and deploy the skills of its employees to match the tasks required by changes in workload, 
productions methods or technology. Pay flexibility is concerned with the extent to which a 
company’s pay and reward structure supports and reinforces the various types of numerical 
and/or functional flexibility which are being sought. 
 
As an alternative to flexibility, Atkinson points to distancing, or “the displacement of employment 
contracts by commercial contracts.”48 Others see replacing contracts of employment with other 
types of contracts as a central characteristic of the trend towards greater labour market flexibility 
49 The use of self-employed workers is in many cases an alternative to hiring short-term 
employees rather than a definitive decision to let go of a part of the production. Replacing 
contracts of employment with other kinds of contracts is rather a central characteristic of a 
                                                 
46 Hakim (1988) p. 443f. 
47 Atkinson (1987) pp. 89f and Institute for Manpower Studies (1987) pp. 3ff. 
48 Atkinson (1987) p. 90. 
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flexible work organisation than an alternative to flexibility. Self-employment is sometimes used as 
a way of increasing numerical flexibility. A work organisation that experiences a temporary peak 
in the workload can use self-employed workers instead of employees. Self-employed workers can 
often be hired on short-notice and the contract between a self-employed worker and a principal 
usually is a commercial contract, not subject to regulation concerning dismissals. Functional 
flexibility is generally seen as something related to the core workers, in other words: internal 
flexibility. But self-employed workers can contribute to an organisation’s functional flexibility 
through offering a possibility to change – within the same total number of workers – the 
composition of the workforce to a workforce with other skills. Finally, the price on a self-
employed’s work is, at least in theory, determined on a market that is more free than the market 
for wage labour. If the demand for a specific type of work falls self-employed workers can lower 
their prices faster than the individual or collective wage agreements will be renegotiated. Thus, 
using self-employed workers can increase the financial flexibility of a work organisation. 
 
Describing the extraordinary growth of self-employment in the UK in the 1980s, Hakim gives 
large consideration to employers’ labour use strategies. A survey of these strategies “confirms that 
all the indications are of an increasing incidence and intensity of use of self-employed workers; 
[…] that within plants employee labour has sometimes been replaced by self-employed labour; 
and that employers’ reasons for using self-employed labour are not very different from their use 
of any other type of non-core worker, with an emphasis on the need for greater workforce 
flexibility and reduced labour costs”.50 
 
Attempts to Escape Regulation 
As the legal difference between hiring an employee and contracting a self-employed worker is the 
replacement of a highly regulated employment contract with a less regulated commercial contract, 
                                                                                                                                                        
49 Numhauser-Henning (1993) p. 272. 
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self-employment has sometimes been seen as an attempt to escape or, even circumvent, labour 
law, social security or tax regulation. It has been suggested that high and rising levels of self-
employment might be taken as an indication that the regulations governing employment 
contracts are too burdensome.51 The reasons for employers to use atypical workers with a lower 
degree of protection will be greater, the argument goes, if the legal protection afforded full-time 
permanent employees is strong. In cross-country analyses, some evidence of a positive 
relationship between the strength of job security legislation and the incidence of self-employment 
has been found. The United States and the United Kingdom, with weaker job security legislation 
than most other countries but with a higher degree of self-employment, do however stand out. 52 
 
Further, it is often suggested that tax-avoidance – by employers, workers or jointly – can be one 
reason for self-employment. 53 Self-employed workers often have greater opportunities to reduce 
their tax burden, for example through deductions for business expenses of through simply under-
reporting their income. In addition, social security contributions might vary between employees 
and self-employed workers, amounting to a difference in non-wage costs. Taxation and social 
security regulation may thus have an impact on the supply and demand for self-employment. In 
the case of taxes, nonetheless, “no appreciable correlation between the top marginal personal 
income tax rates and either the incidence of self-employment or its rate of growth”, have been 
found on a cross-country basis.54 For social security, some correlation can be found between the 
level of employers’ social security contributions and self-employment, there is however, no 
correlation between the difference in the total contribution rates and the incidence of self-
employment.55 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
50 Hakim (1988) p. 438. 
51 Robinson (1999) p. 96. 
52 OECD (1992) p. 178. 
53 OECD (1992) p. 178ff. 
54 OECD (1992) p. 180. 
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Even though the statistical evidence that attempts to circumvent labour law, tax and social 
security regulation are driving self-employment are weak, many authors argue that at least parts of 
the increase in self-employment can be accredited to this.56 Linder and Houghton argue that 
some of the growth of US self-employment in the 1970s and early 1980s comes from 
“unilaterally imposed employer scams” where formally self-employed workers are hardly 
distinguishable from employees. Hakim, writing about the growth of self-employment in the UK 
in the 1980s, cites findings that employers reported to use self-employed workers mainly as a way 
to achieve a more flexible work organisation, but also, “in a minority of cases, to avoid the tax, 
social insurance and legal obligations attached to directly employed labour”.57 Mangan describes 
‘dependent contractors’ as “workers who have had their employment status changed by 
employers no longer willing to accept non-wage costs, but who nonetheless work almost 
exclusively for the one employer or group of companies.”58 Independent of whether the desire to 
escape labour law has been a reason for the growth in self-employment or not, attempts to 
circumvent labour is one of the challenges that self-employment poses to labour law.59 
 
Unemployment 
The level of unemployment has been said to affect the level of self-employment in different ways. 
In periods when conditions are bad and unemployment high, ‘economic refugees’ unable to find 
permanent employment are “pushed” into self-employment as a measure of survival.60 In periods 
when conditions are good and unemployment low, people are drawn into self-employment by 
new opportunities.61 The two are not necessarily contradictory, as different groups of workers 
can become self-employed for different reasons. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
55 OECD (1992) p. 180 and p. 182. 
56 Linder and Houghton (1990) p. 734. 
57 Hakim (1988) p. 442. 
58 Mangan (2000) p. 39. 
59 C.f.below 1.3.3. 
60 Mangan (2000) p. 39. 
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The first hypothesis, sometimes called the “unemployment push” hypothesis, that self-
employment moves counter-cyclical and tends to rise in times of high unemployment has been 
tried by several authors. Steinmetz and Wright hold that US self-employment used to move 
counter-cyclical but that the effect has been declining over time and find it “unlikely that the 
reversal in the decline of self-employment in the early 1970s is simply a direct effect of increasing 
unemployment.”62 For the EU “there is no consistent correlation between inflows from 
unemployment to self-employment and the level of unemployment rate. In some countries, there 
may be signs that the inflows into self-employment move counter-cyclically, tending to increase, 
sometimes after a lag, when unemployment rises: in no European country is the opposite pattern 
evident.”63 The OECD concludes, “the absence of a positive correlation between the 
unemployment rate and inflows into self-employment from unemployment fails to support the 
so-called ‘unemployment push’ hypothesis: that people tend to move into self-employment in 
greater number in recessions due to the absence of wage employment.”64 
 
Even if it is hard to prove on the macro-level, employers might, however, use self-employment as 
a way of unloading risk when times get bad. Hakim reports that permanent employees are often 
recruited from non-core workers; fixed-term workers are offered permanent contracts and part-
timers full-time. Self-employment however, works the other way and is being used also to shed 
workers with a transfer from employee-status to self-employment as a first step.65 
 
Programmes to Promote Self-employment 
In the 1980s, a significant number of countries introduced schemes to help unemployed persons 
to enter self-employment. The aim of the schemes has been to encourage the start of new 
                                                                                                                                                        
61 OECD (1992) p. 175. 
62 Steinmetz and Wright (1989) p. 997f. 
63 OECD (2000) p. 166. 
64 OECD (2000) p. 167. 
65 Hakim (1988) p. 441. 
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businesses as a way for some self-employed to return to the labour market. Through providing 
some financial help the schemes have tried to ensure the worker adequate financial resources 
both for the workers own needs and for the enterprise during the difficult start-up period, often 
through converting unemployment benefits into start-up grants. In addition, some schemes have 
offered counselling and training to the workers.66 There are also examples of changes in the 
unemployment benefit regulations to make it easier for unemployed former self-employed 
workers to return to self-employment.67  
 
How effective these schemes have been is difficult to assess. The OECD has found no 
correlation between trends in self-employment and expenditures on schemes to help unemployed 
people enter self-employment. One reason why the success of the schemes is difficult to measure 
is the possibility of deadweight (workers who would have entered self-employment even if the 
scheme was not in place), substitution (a self-employment opportunity that would have been taken 
up by one person is taken by someone else), and displacement effects (a self-employed worker 
supported by a grant drives an unsubsidised business out of the market).68 Many schemes do 
nonetheless show survival rates higher than most other schemes for unemployed. This could, 
however, be due to the fact that the self-employment schemes often include a selection where the 
potential of the workers and their projects are assessed.69 
 
1.2.2 Personal Characteristics of the Self-employed 
The personal characteristics of the self-employed population vary across countries. Some 
characteristics are, however, found in most countries. In general, self-employment can be said to 
be predominantly male and more common among older than among younger workers. As 
                                                 
66 OECD (1992) p. 175ff and (2000) p. 178ff. 
67 In Sweden the rules have been changed so a formerly self-employed worker does not have to de-register and sell 
all assets in the former business in order to be eligible for unemployment benefit. Instead, the business can be 
temporarily dormant and the assets and registration used in an attempt to restart the business. 
68 OECD (2000) p. 182. 
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regards education, the highest probabilities of self-employment are found at the ends of the scale, 
among the least educated and the most educated. With the exception of the UK, individuals with 
the least education have the highest probability of being self-employed. 70 
 
In contrast to other forms of atypical work, men dominate self-employment. In OECD 
countries, between two thirds and fourth fifths of the self-employed workers are men, and the 
male self-employment rate is often double that of women.71 In France, Italy and the UK, men 
account for three-quarters of self-employment, while in the United States they account for two-
thirds. As concerns the rate of self-employment however, the United States is an exception with a 
higher self-employment rate for women than for men.72 Reading these figures one should 
nonetheless bear in mind that some of the differences in the self-employment rate between men 
and women can be explained by the fact that in a family business, the man will often be the one 
registered as the owner of the business.73 A notable exemption to the rule that self-employed 
workers tend to be men are the self-employed workers belonging to the Italian parasubordinati 
legal category.74 
 
The differences in self-employment rate between men and women can be due to many factors. 
Surveys carried out in the European Union show that the preferences for self-employment are 
considerably stronger for men than for women. Gender differences are in this respect more 
important than any other difference. Young men with above average educational qualifications 
who are about to enter the labour market express the strongest preference for self-employment. 
Research on Canada has shown that men are more likely than women to choose self-employment 
                                                                                                                                                        
69 OECD (2000) p. 182. 
70 Blanchflower (2000) p. 15f. ‘Least educated’ are defined as persons who leave school before the age of 15 and 
‘most educated’ as persons who leave school at the age of 22 or later. 
71 OECD (1992) p. 190 (Table 4.A.7 and Table 4.A.8). Figures are for 1989 and 1990. 
72 OECD (1992) p. 190 (Table 4.A.7 and Table 4.A.8). 
73 OECD (1992) p. 186. 
74 C.f. below 4.3.2. 
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for the independence it offers (47% to 32%), while women are more likely to say that it offers a 
chance to work from home (13% to 0).75  
 
Further, women may find barriers to entering self-employment which are additional to those 
faced by men. An important barrier is found in traditional conceptions of women’s role in 
society.76 The alleged greater responsibility of women for unpaid housework makes it more 
difficult for women to become self-employed, something shown by the fact that family 
characteristics such as family size, marital status and the ages of children play an important role 
for many women in the decision to become self-employed. Further, extra difficulties in attracting 
finance can arise from the views held by financial intermediaries about women as less capable of 
running a business. In recent years, however, many countries have targeted different kinds of 
start-up programmes towards women. 
 
The fact that men dominate self-employment in most countries can seem inconsistent with the 
rise in self-employment, as the increase has taken place at a time when female employment has 
grown. A possible explanation, however, is that the increase in self-employment can be an 
indirect effect of more women entering the labour market. For a two-income household, one 
member attempting self-employment while the other holds a steady income is less risky than it is 
for a one-income household.77 
 
Self-employed workers are in general older than the average for those in employment. The 
youngest age group (15-24 year olds) shows very low rates of self-employment in most OECD 
countries, often less than one third of the average rate. The rate of self-employment then 
increases and the highest rate is found among workers aged 60 and above. In France the rate of 
                                                 
75 OECD (2000) p. 172. 
76 OECD (2000) p. 183. 
77 Steinmetz and Wright (1989) p. 1009. 
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self-employment in this category is more than triple the average rate, in the United States and 
Italy, it is almost double and, in the United Kingdom, 50 percent higher than the average rate.78 
One possible explanation for the increase in self-employment is thus demographic. As a higher 
share of the workforce is found in age groups with a higher rate of self-employment, the average 
rate of self-employment increases.79 Even though young women show lower rates of self-
employment than older women, a survey of the UK shows that for women age has no effect on 
the propensity to be self-employed after the age of 25.80 In general, the transfer to becoming solo 
self-employed occurs at younger ages than the decision to start or take over a small firm.81 
 
Self-employment and entrepreneurial activity are often thought to be connected to a certain set 
of attitudes and values, sometimes described as the ideology or philosophy of self-employment.82 
This ideology emphasises individualism, self-reliance and risk-taking, attitudes that have been 
found among self-employed workers, persons who have just left self-employment and persons 
who consider becoming self-employed.83 Research on self-employed workers in the UK also 
showed them to be “more liable to excess optimism” regarding future earnings than employees.84 
Other research holds that the differences have been overstated. A British survey from the mid-
1980s found very few differences in attitudes towards work between employees and self-
employed workers.85 
 
1.2.3 Working Conditions of the Self-employed 
On the general level, the working conditions of self-employed workers differ from those of 
employees in a number of ways. The most important differences are in the hours of work and in 
                                                 
78 OECD (1992) p. 190. 
79 Steinmetz and Wright (1989) p. 1009. 
80 Hakim (1998) p. 215. 
81 Hakim (1998) p. 215. 
82 Hakim (1988) p. 433. 
83 OECD (1992) p. 170. 
84 Arabsheibani et al (2000) p. 38. 
85 Hakim (1988) p. 435. 
Engblom, Samuel (2003), Self-employment and the personal scope of labour law : comparative lessons from France, Italy, 
Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States 
European University Institute
 
 
DOI: 10.2870/68969
 28
the degree of autonomy perceived by each category of workers. There are also significant 
differences in job satisfaction. These differences are generalisations, and can be assumed to vary 
greatly not just from individual to individual, but over different branches of business and 
between countries. In addition, the statistics apply to all self-employed workers and do not 
separate labour-only subcontractors, self-employed workers without employees and others who 
inhabit the contested grey area between employees and genuinely self-employed. 
 
Self-employed workers generally report average hours of work higher than those reported by 
employees. In a 1997 survey of EU countries, 86 self-employed workers without employees (own-
account workers) reported an average of 45 hours a week and self-employed workers with 
employees 52 hours compared with only 39 hours for employees. For own-account workers and 
employees there were significant gender differences with males working longer hours than 
females. For self-employed workers with employees, average hours worked were roughly the 
same for male and female workers.87 
 
As autonomy is the most important characteristic used to separate self-employed workers from 
employees, it is no wonder that self-employed workers tend to report a greater autonomy than 
employees when it comes to how to organise their work. In a survey of EU countries self-
employed people were found to have a higher degree of autonomy concerning “their rate and 
methods of work, the order in which they perform tasks, and the pattern of breaks and holidays 
that they take”.88 Further, own-account workers are less likely than employees to complain about 
time pressure or that they are working with tight deadlines or working at very high speed. For 
self-employed workers with employees, however, the situation is different and they often feel that 
“their pace of work is ‘dependent upon direct demands from people such as customers, 
                                                 
86 1996 Second European Survey on Working Conditions, European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working 
Conditions 1997. Cited in OECD (2000). 
87 OECD (2000) p. 170. 
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passengers, pupils and patients’”.89 The greater autonomy enjoyed by self-employed workers is 
often considered one of the attractions of this type of employment. Especially self-employed men 
tend to stress the chance to be their own boss as one of the important, maybe even the most 
important, advantages of being self-employed.90 
 
Self-employed workers also tend to report a greater satisfaction with their jobs than employees. Several 
different surveys, covering different countries, have shown that self-employed workers are more 
satisfied with their jobs than employees.91 In the EU, 38 percent of own-account workers and 45 
percent of employers reported being “on the whole, very satisfied” with their main jobs, as 
opposed to 30 percent of employees. In a survey of the US, 63 percent of self-employed workers 
reported that they were very satisfied with their job, as opposed to 46 percent for employees.92 
The differences tend to persist even after the inclusion of a number of variables to control for 
the type of job.93 There are, however, some striking gender differences concerning job 
satisfaction. For employees, there are clear gender differences with male employees tending to 
report increasing job satisfaction as hours of work rise, whereas female employees do not. In the 
case of self-employed workers, there are no such differences.94 
 
While difference exist as to hours of work, autonomy and job satisfaction between employees 
and self-employed workers, other conditions of work either tend to be equal between employees 
and self-employed, or do not discern any distinguishable pattern. One example of the latter is the 
occupational health and safety situation of self-employed workers. On the one hand, more self-
employed report working in painful positions and they are less likely to wear protective 
                                                                                                                                                        
88 OECD (2000) p. 170. 
89 OECD (2000) p. 170. 
90 See for example Hakim (1988) p. 434. 
91 For an overview c.f. Blanchflower (2000) p. 17ff. 
92 Blanchflower (2000) p. 20f. 
93 OECD (2000) p. 171. 
94 OECD (2000) p. 171. 
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equipment. On the other hand, they are more able to adjust instruments and equipment for their 
own comfort.95 
 
Another example relates to income levels. Data on the income of self-employed workers tend to be 
unreliable. There is often an overlap between personal consumption expenditures and business 
expenditures and some production might be for own consumption. Further, self-employed 
workers have greater opportunities – legal and otherwise – to understate their incomes, mainly to 
avoid taxation.96 Comparisons of median earnings between self-employed workers and employees 
should, therefore, only be made with great caution. In some countries, the distribution of 
incomes of the self-employed is more polarised than that of employees, with a high proportion of 
self-employed workers in the highest and lowest income levels. Among the countries where this 
is the case is the United Kingdom, among the countries where this is not the case is the United 
States.97 Linder and Houghton, arguing that all self-employed workers cannot be considered petit 
bourgeoisie, hold that “in many low-paid occupations, the self-reported self-employed earn 
significantly less than employees.” “These self-reported self-employed account for a 
disproportionate share of full-time working poor families.”98 For women, self-employment can 
have a positive effect on attempts to reach the highest income levels as “self-employed women 
are more often found in the upper reaches of the earnings distribution than are wage and salary 
employees”.99 
 
As to the job security perceived by self-employed workers, there are important cross country differences. 
In the EU, “self-employed, particularly own account workers, are less likely to agree that they 
                                                 
95 OECD (2000) p. 170, built on the European Foundation Survey. 
96 OECD (1992) p. 162. 
97 OECD (1992) p. 162f. The findings have later been confirmed by other studies. OECD (2000) p. 169. 
98 Linder and Houghton (1990) p. 730. 
99 OECD (1992) p. 165. 
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have a secure job than employees.”100 Concerning the United States however, there are research 
showing self-employed workers and workers in family businesses tending to perceive less of a 
chance of job loss than employees.101 OECD explains these differences with the fact that the US 
result refers to possible job loss over the next twelve months, whereas the European question 
made no reference to any time period. Another possible explanation, as the figures refer to the 
perceived job security of self-employed workers as compared with employees, is that there are 
differences in the absolute levels of perceived job security as dismissal protection legislation is 
weaker in the United States. 
 
Traditionally, self-employed workers have, with few exceptions, not been unionised.102 In some 
instances, there are legal constraints on self-employed workers joining trade unions or taking 
industrial action, simply due to the fact that they are not employees and, therefore, commonly left 
outside of the personal scope of labour law. Further, there is often an unwillingness to join a 
trade union among persons who in their self-perception are businessmen.103 In addition, trade 
unions have been reluctant or had difficulties in organising the self-employed, at least outside 
occupations, such as journalists, actors and musicians, where there is a tradition of independent 
contractors being unionised. The matter is further complicated by the fact that some self-
employed workers employ other workers, making them employers as well. 
 
In recent years, there are signs that this might be about to change.104 In France, the CFDT-
Cadres, launched its Réseau Professionnels Autonomes in September 2002, attempting to organise 
well-educated and qualified independent contractors.105 In Italy, the three national trade union 
confederations have all formed sections for workers classified as parasubordinati, and even 
                                                 
100 OECD (2000) p. 170. 
101 Manski and Straub (1999) p. 17. 
102 Figures on unionisation are absent from the otherwise comprehensive statistics on self-employment provided by 
the OECD and are, even more remarkably, not covered in the ILO reports on the subject. 
103 For a telling case concerning self-perception, see the case of strawberry growers in California, c.f. Wells (1987). 
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conclude agreements with standard contracts with some public employers.106 In the United States, 
Washtech, a Seattle based trade union (part of Computer Workers of America), has been succesful in 
organising independent contractors in the high-tech sector.107 In Sweden, some professional 
unions traditionally have a large share of self-employed among their members, while other white-
collar trade unions have come to organise independent contractors to a much larger extent than 
earlier.108 Many unions that actively seek to organise self-employed workers do this through 
offering services different from those traditionally supplied by trade unions, for example legal 
advice on contracts and access to training to keep skills up-to-date, or through adapting existing 
services, such as insurance, to the new members. 
 
Summing up the advantages and drawbacks, for the individual worker, of self-employment the 
International Labour Office found that “[a]t its best, self-employment can provide a person with 
considerable autonomy, a chance to realise his or her potential and to be rewarded in proportion 
to the physical or mental effort expanded, the risks taken and the savings invested. At its worst, it 
represents survival activities at the margin of society.” 109 
1.3 Self-employment as a Challenge to Labour Law 
1.3.1 The Paradigm Labour Relationship 
Self-employment challenges labour law as it provides employers with a possibility to contract 
labour in a form which deviates from the paradigm labour relationship for which labour law was 
designed and to which it applies. The legal expression of this paradigm relationship is the concept 
of employee, in particular in its full-time indeterminate form, covering workers in large integrated 
                                                                                                                                                        
104 For an overview of the situation in Western Europe, c.f. EIRO (2002). 
105 https://www.professionnels-autonomes.net/ [Visited 27 March 2003]. 
106 C.f. below 4.3.2. 
107 http://www.washtech.org/ [Visited 26 March 2003]. 
108 Some Swedish professional unions have very high rates of self-employed in their membership, in particular 
among traditionally self-employed groups such as architechts and dentists, but with significant numbers also in other 
groups. SACO (2003) Table 7. Other Swedish white collar unions are experiencing fast increases in the number of 
self-employed members, such as the engineering union SIF which saw the number of self-employed members double 
in 2002. TCO (2002). 
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firms. The concept of employee will be given an in-depth treatment in Chapter 3, it is, 
nevertheless, necessary already at this stage to give a brief overview of this crucial concept. 
 
Even though national differences exist, it is possible to identify some common denominators of 
the concept of employee across countries, crucial to the paradigm employment relationship. 
Firstly, for a person to be considered an employee, she must perform remunerated work personally. 
Secondly, this work must be carried out under certain conditions, which effectively draw the line 
between employees and self-employed workers. The most important of these conditions, 
sometimes decisive, is that the worker has to be in a position of subordination vis-à-vis the 
employer, performing work under the employer’s orders and control, or at least as an integrated 
part of the employer’s organisation. Other factors commonly used as signs of the worker being 
an employee are the duration of the contract, whether the worker works for other employer’s as 
well, the ownership of the means of production, and the form of remuneration, with a 
guaranteed wage indicating employee status. It is, however, the worker’s subordination which has 
become the most important characteristic of the concept of employee, causing the self-employed 
workers, on the other side of the dichotomy, to be distinguished by their autonomy, and 
sometimes referred to as ‘autonomous workers’. 
 
This concept of employee came about in the early 20th century, modelled on the workers of the 
integrated industrial firm. In the words of Collins, “[l]egal regulation of the employment 
relationship […] matured alongside the growth in vertical integration of production. This 
coincidence explains in part the limited scope of legal protection for employees. Employment 
protection rights […] typically vest only in employees whose jobs fit into the complementary 
paradigm form of employment in vertically integrated production: employment which is full time, 
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stable, and for an indefinite duration.”110 In these firms, orders and control were transmitted 
through hierarchical structures, and often a rather straight forward affair of foremen and punch-
clocks. Through the close relation between the firm and the concept of employee, the 
employee/self-employed divide also came to serve as one of the boundaries of the firm. 
Simplified, management had the choice between work being performed inside their organisation 
and under their control, or buying goods or service on the market, outside of the firm and 
without control over the production process.  
 
Three issues raised in relation to self-employed workers and the personal scope of labour law 
pose particularly important challenges. The first is the status of workers engaged in relationships 
that do not fit the above mentioned paradigm. The second has to do with employers, or 
employers and workers together, intentionally trying to circumvent labour law regulation by 
classifying their relationship as something else than that between an employee and an employer. 
Finally, the third challenge self-employment poses to labour law lays in the fact that there are self-
employed workers who, bona-fide and more or less clearly, fall outside the concept of employee, 
but for whom the regulatory objectives of labour law nonetheless apply. None of these issues is 
new, in fact they have all been around since the early days of labour law, but developments in the 
organisation of work and business in later years have made some aspects of them more pressing. 
 
1.3.2 Relationships Not Fitting the Paradigm 
Legally, there is a binary divide between, on the one hand, contracts of employment or work as 
an employee, and, on the other, the commercial relationship modelled on two equal parties doing 
business at armslength distance. In reality, relationships for work do not fit this dichotomy. It is 
not uncommon that formally independent self-employed workers find themselves in a situation 
where they are dependent on and to some degree controlled by the employer buying their 
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services. In a report for the 1997 session of the International Labour Conference, the International 
Labour Office outlined the situation in which these relationships become problematic to labour 
law. 
[S]pecific problems of  social and legal protection may arise when job contracting is performed by 
individual subcontractors whose relationship with user enterprises differs from that existing in truly 
independent businesses. Such individual workers may carry out certain work or perform services for 
a user enterprise on a permanent or periodical basis and may, to a certain extent and in different 
respects, be dependent on it. The user enterprises may also exercise control over the performance 
of services provided to them by these individual workers. In spite of their formal independence, the 
latter actually have a status which is very close to that of a traditional employment relationship.111 
 
On the other side of the dichotomy, there are employees whose relationship with their employer 
resembles that of self-employed workers, in particular through the freedom they enjoy as to how 
to perform their work, often as a result of high skills, or the task nature of their assignments. In 
this sense, the difference between a typical contract of employment and a contract for services 
has become less for large groups of the labour force. The effect of this is that some that earlier 
were classified as employees run the risk of falling out of that category, and, more importantly, 
that the binary division between employees and self-employed workers has come to appear more 
and more arbitrary. 
 
This is further accentuated by the trend of ‘vertical disintegration’ of companies, the 
consequences of which was described by Collins in an often cited 1990 article. For most of the 
twentieth century, firms integrated vertically aiming to control more and more of the chain 
leading a product from raw materials to the customer. Large firms directing production through 
bureaucratic controls replaced small businesses linked by commercial contracts. Through 
integrating upstream towards the provision of raw materials or downstream towards retailing a 
                                                 
111 ILO (1997) p. 12. 
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firm could reduce its risk of a halt in production or sales or a reduction of profits due to changes 
in bargaining power between the firm and providers of raw materials or retailers. In the 1980s 
however, this trend started reversing, and firms began vertically disintegrating, once again 
organising their activities through commercial contracts with subcontractors and service 
providers. Collins explains the trend towards vertical integration as a consequence of firms’ wish 
to increase the flexibility of their organisation and reduce the risk of business through 
transferring part of it to economic actors outside the firm.112 The effect, according to Collins, is 
clear: “The recent trend towards vertical disintegration of production places many workers 
outside [the] paradigm and therefore beyond the range of employment protection laws.”113 A 
decade later, an expert meeting convened by the ILO “confirmed that changes in the nature of 
work have resulted in situations in which the legal scope of the employment relationship does not 
accord with the realities of working relationships.”114   
 
Another transformation affecting the distinction between employees and self-employed workers 
has taken place in the relationships between companies. In network enterprises, the performance 
depends on the network’s ability to generate noise-free communication between its components 
(connectedness) and the extent to which the different components share the same interests 
(consistency).115 In order to optimise the production process, it becomes necessary to enter into 
long-term dynamic relationships with suppliers and thus eliminate some of the risks, and 
distance, inherent in outsourcing and subcontracting. These relational contracts distinguish 
themselves from the discrete transaction used as the model for commercial contracts, as they 
persist over a period of time and the contract only provides an incomplete specification of the 
                                                 
112 Collins (1990) p. 360. On self-employment as a part of labour market flexibility c.f. above 1.2.1. 
113 Collins (1990) p. 353. 
114 ILO (2003) p. 10. 
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obligations.116 As parties get entwined in relational contracts, the risk of one party being more 
dependent than the other on the continuation of the contract might occur and invite 
opportunistic behaviour from the counterpart. The contract itself can also construct an 
imbalance giving one party more power over the development of the relationship than the other. 
Legally, the result is one of “hybrid organisations” in “contractual disguises” such as delivery 
networks and franchising systems and other distribution organisations. “Strange quasi-corporate 
beasts that find their ecological niche in a ‘third area of allocation’ in an intermediate area 
between organizations and markets.”117 
 
Taken together, these developments create a new situation described accurately by Supiot, as, on 
the one hand, “l’autonomie dans la subordination” and, on the other, “l’allégeance dans l’independance” 
making the distinction between subordinated employees and independent self-employed workers 
less and less clear.118 This does not only create difficulties in applying the concept of employee, it 
also makes it necessary to question whether dividing workers into employees and self-employed 
workers is still relevant. Does the old division reflect relevant differences in the conditions under 
which employees work or should new divides replace it? 
 
1.3.3 The Circumvention of Labour Law 
The second challenge to labour law involving self-employed workers is the attempt by some 
employers, and sometimes by employers and workers jointly, to circumvent mandatory regulation 
– such as labour law, social security and taxation – through disguising what is actually an 
employer-employee relationship as one between an employer and a self-employed worker. The 
ILO reports of a “disguised employment relationship”, meaning “one which is lent an appearance 
that is different from the underlying reality, with the intention of nullyfying or attenuating the 
                                                 
116 For this definition of relational contracts, but also for a critique of the theory of relational and discrete contracts, 
see Collins (1999) p. 140f. 
117 Teubner (1993) p. 211 
Engblom, Samuel (2003), Self-employment and the personal scope of labour law : comparative lessons from France, Italy, 
Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States 
European University Institute
 
 
DOI: 10.2870/68969
 38
protection afforded by the law. […] The most radical way to disguise the employment 
relationship consists of giving it the appearance of a relationship of a different legal nature, 
whether civil, commercial, cooperative, family-related or other.” 119 In its general observations 
concerning contingent workers, the Dunlop Commission, a high-level commission appointed by the 
US Clinton administration, found that current tax and labour laws gave employers and employees 
incentives to create contingent relationships “not for the sake of flexibility or efficiency but in 
order to evade their legal obligations.”120 
For example, an employer and a worker may see advantages wholly unrelated to efficiency or 
flexibility in treating the worker as an independent contractor rather than an employee. The 
employer will not have to make contributions to Social Security, unemployment insurance, worker’s 
compensation, and health insurance, will save the administrative effect of withholding, and will be 
relieved of responsibility to the worker under labor and employment laws. The worker will lose the 
protection of those laws and benefits and the employer’s contributions to Social Security, but may 
accept the arrangement nonetheless because it gives him or her an opportunity for immediate and 
even illegitimate financial gains through underpayment of taxes. Many low-wage workers have no 
practical choice in the matter.121 
 
For Western Europe, similar observations have been made by the European Industrial Relations 
Obeservatory, which notes that “there are employment relationships which can be regarded as 
‘bogus self-employment’, i.e. subordinate employment relations which are disguised as 
autonomous work, usually for fiscal reasons, or in order to avoid the payment of social security 
contributions and thereby reduce labour costs, or to circumvent labour legislation and protection, 
such as the provisions on dismissals.”122 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
118 Supiot (1999) p. 151. 
119 ILO (2003) p. 25. 
120 Dunlop Commission (1994) p. 62.  
121 Dunlop Commission (1994) p. 62. 
122 EIRO (2002), c.f. also Ds 2002:56 p. 89. 
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Fiscal reasons, including the payment of social security contributions, are likely to be the most 
important for the wrongful labelling or registration of work relationships. Fraudulent self-
employment for these reasons is also more easy as the classifications commonly are done or 
accepted ex-ante by tax or social security authorities. Once classified, the content of the 
relationship can slide towards more control on the part of the employer and greater dependence 
on part of the worker, without this affecting the tax or social security contributions due. In the 
case of labour law, the circumvention of mandatory regulation sets the tone for the relationship, a 
wrong that will only be rectified ex-post in the small amount of cases that go to courts or to other 
procedures such as arbitration. It is safe to assume that unorganised workers are particularly 
vulnerable. 
 
1.3.4 The Concept of Employee Not a Suitable Personal Scope 
The third challenge self-employment poses to labour law lays in the fact that there are self-
employed workers who – bona-fide and more or less clearly – fall outside the concept of employee, 
but for whom the regulatory objectives of labour law, which we will identify in the next chapter, 
nonetheless apply. We will come back to this argument, which is at the center of this dissertation, 
on several occasions. Here, three examples will be provided in order to give a first idea. 
 
The first example is anti-discrimination law. As not only employees can suffer from the harm to a 
person’s dignity caused by discrimination, it can be questioned whether it makes sense to limit 
the personal scope of anti-discrimination law to employees. “By what possible rationale should 
laws designed to prevent work-related discrimination against those who are other than healthy, 
young white men prohibit a plumbing contractor from refusing to hire a plumber merely because 
he or she is black, female, disabled, or old, while permitting a textile manufacturer to refuse 
services from a solo plumbing contractor on the basis of the same prejudices?”123 As we will see 
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Engblom, Samuel (2003), Self-employment and the personal scope of labour law : comparative lessons from France, Italy, 
Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States 
European University Institute
 
 
DOI: 10.2870/68969
 40
below, there are examples of countries that have given their anti-discrimination law a personal 
scope that goes beyond the concept of employee. 
 
The second example is minimum wage regulation or other legal arrangements, such as minmum 
provisions in collective agreements, filling the same function. Regardless of whether one views 
the minimum wage as a means to guarantee a decent living for all workers or as way to prevent 
underbidding, or both, the reasons for guaranteeing the minimum wage only to employees can be 
questioned. Leaving independent contractors outside the scope of minimum wage legislation, or 
excluding them from collective bargaining, opens the possibility that these workers will be 
remunerated below the level set by the law, and could provoke a race to the bottom.  
 
The final example is occupational health and safety regulation. It is not uncommon that 
employers take decisions that affect the health and safety not just of their own employees but of 
other workers as well, including self-employed. Why, then, in situations where a self-employed 
worker is in no better position than an employee to protect her own health and safety, should the 
law limit the employer’s responsibility only to employees? In fact, in many countries the law has 
already acknowledged this and has extended some of employers’ occupational health and safety 
responsibilites beyond their own employees. 
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2. THE CONCERNS OF LABOUR LAW 
The natural starting point for anyone wishing to make prescriptive statements about the personal 
scope of labour law must be in an analysis of the regulatory objectives of labour law. Without 
answering the question of what labour law is supposed to do, it is not possible to find the field of 
application either sufficient or wanting. As will be shown below, the rather comprehensive 
regulation of the relationship between sellers and buyers of labour, described as the juridification of 
labour relations, has been justified with a broad range of arguments, including human rights, 
social justice and economic efficiency. These justifications, however important, are nonetheless 
too vague to supply us with the analytical tool necessary for the task of analysing to what extent 
the current personal scope actually permits labour law to fulfil its objectives. This tool instead has 
to devised from an analysis of how labour law operates, that is, what aspects of the relationship 
between a worker and her employer it concerns itself with. Even though this study involves 
explorations into the justifications and concerns motivating the existence of labour law, the 
desireability of the regulatory objectives of labour law are taken as a given, why we will not enter 
into the much wider, and more political, debate over to what extent labour markets should be 
regulated. 
2.1 Juridification and Justifications 
2.1.1 Juridification 
Remunerated work has a key function in contemporary western societies. To individuals, earning 
a living is almost synonymous with remunerated work. To firms (and to the state in its capacity as 
employer), remunerated work, performed by employees or others, is the dominant form for 
acquiring manpower. Outside of the economic sphere, work is also often seen as one of the most 
important constituents in the construction of meaning and community. Remunerated work has 
thus become an important matter for the state and a key concern for social and economic policy. 
The consequence has been heavy regulation of the world of work – and frequent changes in that 
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regulation. Leaving something of such great importance to the individual, the firm and the state 
fully in the hands of the freedom of contract is an idea that has had few serious followers. Thus, 
through labour law, a separate set of rules, distinguishing the market for labour from other 
markets for goods and services, has been created. In particular, the contract of employment has 
been regulated as to its content and the rules for its conclusion and termination, partially 
exempting it from the freedom of contract. 
 
The development of labour law has been described as a prime example of juridification, defined by 
Clark and Wedderburn as “a process (or processes) by which the state intervenes in areas of 
social life (industrial relations, education, family, social welfare, commerce) in ways which limit 
the autonomy of individuals or groups to determine their own affairs.”124 According to Simitis, 
the word juridification “[i]s probably nowhere more justified than where the structure and 
objectives of labor regulation are being discussed.”125 
More precisely, under the impact of industrialization, the legal framework of economic and social 
processes is, as labor law reflects, reformulated. Labor is not just one of many marketable and 
marketed goods. The labor market is increasingly distinguished from the market generally, and 
subjected to specific rules. These, rather than simply aiming at the protection of individual 
contracts, lay down binding requirements carefully adopted to the particular characteristics of labor 
relations, to which all agreements concerning the supply of labor must conform. […] Each of its 
provisions deliberately interferes with the conditions of work, thus restructuring the scope of both 
employers’ and employees’ activities.126 
 
The abstract provisions of contract law – “blind to details of subject matter and person” that 
“does not ask who buys and who sells, and what is bought and sold”127 – have been replaced by 
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provisions affording utmost importance to each party’s identity. This too has been eloquently 
described by Simitis: 
Thus, for instance, all the Code Civil had to offer regarding employment relations, were two hardly 
noticeable, extremely abstract provisions.  The Code du Travail replaced these with a comprehensive 
regulatory system including a long list of protective measures, rules securing and promoting 
employment and institutionalized control of work conditions. The citoyen is displaced by the employeur 
and the travailleur. It is their particular position and comportment not the role of indifferent citizen 
that interests the legislature. Social conflicts are no longer hidden behind purely formal regulation, 
but are openly addressed through clear substantive provisions. The juridification of labor relations 
to that extent amounts to structural change in the law.128 
 
The “particular position and comportment” of the parties is what invokes the interest of the 
legislature in regulating the worker-employer relationship. It is as a field of law concerned with 
certain inherent characteristics of relationships where one party is an employer and the other a 
worker that labour law is best understood. If the lawmaker was to ignore these inherent 
characteristics the outcome would be in conflict with various policy goals of broad following. 
The main argument of this chapter is that an awareness of the ‘position and comportment’ of 
workers and employers, is one of the more useful lenses through which labour law can be 
examined. The close attention labour law affords to the ‘subject matter and person’ – at ‘who 
buys and sells’ and at ‘what is bought and sold’ – is the reason why the personal scope of labour 
law is such an important issue. 
 
2.1.2 Justifications 
Even though the argument that the labour market should be left to the law of contract hardly has 
been made in a serious way outside of the strictly theoretical arena, a common starting point for 
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justifications of labour law is to explain why the law of contract would lead to unacceptable 
outcomes or other failures if applied to the labour market. 
The regulatory agenda for the traditional field of labour law commences with a disarmingly naïve 
question: Why regulate the employment relation? Behind this question lies an implicit contrast 
between the ordinary rules governing markets and special regulation of particular markets or 
industrial sectors. The question should thus be reformulated: why would we exclude ordinary 
market principles such as the general law of contract and property from employment relations in 
favour of special rules? In short, why do we need employment law at all?129 
 
Conceptualising labour law as an ‘exception’ is far from unproblematic as it implicitly places the 
burden of justifying labour law on the party proposing this ‘intervention’ into a legal order 
perceived as ‘natural’.130 Considering the wide scope and great importance of these ‘exemptions’ 
one can argue that they should in fact not be seen as deviations from the main principles of the 
legal order, but as an order of their own, of equal status with the liberal legal order. Francois 
Ewald argues that social law (which denotes more than labour law) “has taken on a sufficiently 
wide range for one to cease regarding it as a solution brought in to fill the lacunae of shortcomings 
of classical law. It is time to approach it in its own positive being[.]”131 
 
Despite modern labour lawyers seldom accepting the ordinary law of contract as more ‘natural’, 
and labour law as a form of regulation, this is still the way in which most explanations as to why 
we have and need labour law are written.132 The justification for labour law presented below, as 
protecting human rights, promoting social justice or increasing economic efficiency, follow this 
pattern. The claim is not that these justifications explain why labour market regulation has come 
                                                 
129 Collins (2000) p. 4. 
130 This has been argued e.g. by Christensen: “The legal orders of the 18th century perceived themselves as ‘natural’. 
The right of property and the freedom of contract were ‘natural’ rights, belonging to man in his capacity of being 
‘human’. The ‘social’ becomes in this context something accidental, only valid in certain times and certain places and 
therefore cannot be included in the basic legal order.” Christensen (1999) p. 83. 
131 Ewald (1986) p. 40.  
132 For critiques of the liberal legal order and the market distributive order followed by justification of labour law in 
relations to the same order c.f.  Christensen (1999), Collins (1997) and (2000), and Klare (2000). 
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about or come to take the form it has. They are rather a short summary of discourses that have 
been used, often in a wild blend, to argue why labour markets should be regulated differently 
than other markets.133 
 
 Human Rights 
Arguments in favour of regulating employment relationships often go back to the workers as 
human beings in possession of certain inalienable human rights.. The idea has been described as 
“human beings remain human when they come to work, and are entitled to basic dignity there as 
elsewhere”134, and that human rights can be violated, not only by states wielding public power, 
but as well by employers and others who wield private power. Wheeler, in an article entitled 
Employee Rights as Human Rights, holds that “there is a longstanding contradiction between 
democracy in the political system and authoritarianism at the workplace. The question is whether 
there are democratic rights that exist in the political system that do, or ought to, exist and be 
recognized in organizational system.”135 Ewing, seeing the “protection of civil liberties” as one of 
five principles that ought to guide labour law, argues that analogies can be drawn from 
international human rights law. 
A useful starting point here is the European Convention of Human Rights, for although its 
provisions apply, as a matter of international law, mainly to regulate the activities of government, its 
principles are equally relevant to constrain those who wield private power, including the power of 
the employer over the worker. On what rational basis can it be argued that while the government 
must respect an individuals right to private and family life, an employer may be free to undermine it 
with relative impunity?136 
 
                                                 
133 For an account of how different ideologies and political necessity shaped early labour law, c.f. Hepple (1986b) pp. 
26ff. 
134 Wheeler (1994) p. 9. 
135 Wheeler (1994) p. 9. 
136 Ewing (1996a) p. 9. 
Engblom, Samuel (2003), Self-employment and the personal scope of labour law : comparative lessons from France, Italy, 
Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States 
European University Institute
 
 
DOI: 10.2870/68969
 46
On the international level, human rights arguments have frequently been used to promote labour 
standards.137 The ILO has identified a number of “fundamental principles and rights at work” –  
the freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining; the 
elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labour; the effective abolition of child labour; 
and the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation – which it holds 
to be so fundamental that all members of the organisation have the obligations to guarantee 
them, regardless of whether they have signed the relevant ILO conventions or not.138  
 
Human rights arguments have been most prominent in justifying anti-discrimination law, which has 
often been inspired by or had its content defined by international human rights instruments or 
been elaborations of constitutional norms or principles. The obligation on states not to 
discriminate against persons due to their sex, race, ethnicity or other grounds has thus been 
extended to the parties on the labour market resulting in regulation concerning access to and 
termination of employment, working conditions and equal pay. Many times, labour law goes even 
further, to promote equality of opportunity in a broader sense than just freedom from 
discrimination. 
 
It has also been argued that workers should be protected from the arbitrary exercise of power in a 
more general sense. The principle which in the field of public law is known as the ‘rule of law’ 
should apply in the relationship between workers and employers as well. This principle, according 
to one of its proponents, implies three consequences: “a requirement that the terms of the 
engagement should be clear; that they should be of equal application; and that the discretionary 
power [of the employer] should be reasonably, fairly and lawfully exercised.”139 This notion goes 
beyond prohibiting distinctions based on race or sex or other things promoted by traditional anti-
                                                 
137 On the relationship between human rights and labour law in the European Union, c.f. Sciarra (1999) and (2002). 
138 ILO Declaration of Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work. 
139 Ewing (1995) p. 128. 
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discrimination discourse, striking at “all irrational distinctions made between groups of workers, 
whether these are based on personal attributes (such as sex, sexuality or ethnic origin) or other 
factors (such as length of service or number of hours worked in any given week).”140  
 
Another human rights issue that can be raised in the employer-worker relationship is that of 
privacy. Under Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights, “[e]veryone has the right to 
respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence”. In the course of an 
employment relationship, a number of situations in which violations of the right to privacy can 
occur are present. Employers frequently monitor workers and collect personal data whereby they 
come in possession of information which if disclosed could cause harm to the worker. Some 
information can even be so sensitive that just the fact that the employer has it is enough to 
violate workers’ privacy. 
 
Parts of labour law have also been justified in terms of political rights. There is a strong 
connection between the more general Freedom of Association and the rights to form and join a trade 
union, a right which to be effective have to apply between workers and employers, and not just 
towards the state. The Freedom of Expression is another political right which has figured as a 
justification of labour regulations, safeguarding it not just towards the state but in relation to 
employers, public and private, as well. 
 
Finally, labour law can be seen as an expression of the workers’ economic and social rights.  
Minimum wage legislation, collective bargaining and other mechanisms for setting wages work 
towards realising the “right [of everyone who works] to just and favourable remuneration, 
ensuring for himself and his family an existence worthy of human dignity” found in the Universal 
                                                 
140 Ewing (1995) p. 128. C.f. also Wedderburn (1986) pp. 447ff. 
Engblom, Samuel (2003), Self-employment and the personal scope of labour law : comparative lessons from France, Italy, 
Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States 
European University Institute
 
 
DOI: 10.2870/68969
 48
Declaration of Human Rights.141 In labour law, the idea that workers enjoy economic and social 
rights, which has consequences for their relationship with the state, with employers and with each 
other, is often expressed in terms of ‘labour is not a commodity’.142 Human rights and the rights 
of workers are often seen as mutually supporting, a relationship described by Leary in an article 
concerning the importance of the ILO in promoting and enforcing human rights. 
“The extent to which the rights of workers are protected provides a touchstone for evaluating a 
nation’s respect for human rights. The rights of the individual to join a trade union and to work 
under decent conditions are among the most important human rights. Trade unions can function 
effectively only in a climate of civil and political liberties and the suppression of freedom of 
association for workers is a warning sign of the overall deterioration of the human rights situation. 
Independent trade unions often provide the only organised opposition to repressive 
governments.”143 
 
The idea that workers have certain rights is also frequently used to justify labour law beyond the 
field of human rights as traditionally conceived. As Collins points out, “[m]any interests of the 
workers are commonly regarded as rights, which signifies that these interests should be regarded 
as inalienable entitlements. These right should thus be respected and protected by the law 
independently of their allocative efficiency.”144 The rights justifications for labour has been 
accurately summarised by Klare, who holds that one of the primary regulatory objectives of 
labour law is “entrenching and protecting certain rights and entitlements that society deems 
fundamental and which are or may be threatened in the employment context. These can either be 
individual rights (e.g. protection from invidious discrimination) or collective rights (e.g. rights of 
association and concerted action).”145 
 
                                                 
141 United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 23, para 3. 
142 C.f. O’Higgins (1997). 
143 Leary (1992) p. 583. 
144 Collins (2000) p. 12. 
145 Klare (2000) pp. 68f. 
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Social Justice 
A second set of justifications of labour law has to do with social justice. The market distributive 
order – the pattern of distribution set up by the law of contract146 – is considered, if applied to 
the labour market, to establish a distribution of wealth and power in that relationship, and in 
society at large, which is in conflict with notions of justice and equality. The main source of these 
inequalities is that the worker, generally, is in a weaker bargaining position than the employer, due 
to the worker’s dependence on having work and frequent employer advantages in terms of better 
information and a higher degree of experience in bargaining. Some inequalities also stem from 
the contract itself, giving the employer’s significant control and bureaucratic power over the 
worker. These inequalities can, as explained by some of the great names of British labour law, go 
a long way to justify why most contracts for work should be governed by labour law rather than 
contract law. 
The main objective of labour law has always been, and we venture to say will always be, to be a 
countervailing force to counteract the inequality of bargaining power which is inherent and must be 
inherent in the employment relationship. Most of what we call protective legislation – legislation on 
the employment of women, children and young persons, on safety in mines, factories, and offices, 
on payment of wages in cash, on guarantee payments, on race or sex discrimination, on unfair 
dismissal, and indeed most labour legislation altogether – must be seen in this context. It is an 
attempt to infuse law into a relation of command and subordination.147 
 
Klare, in assessing the efficiency of different regulatory strategies for the employment relation, 
does this “in the light of a particular regulatory objective, which I take to be legitimate and 
capable of being pursued through labour law, namely, the redistribution of wealth and power.” 
He goes on to define distribution of wealth as “how well social groups do in satisfying their needs 
and preferences” and distribution of power as “the relative degree of influence different groups enjoy 
                                                 
146 Collins (1997) pp. 21-36. 
147 Davis and Freedland (1983) p. 18. The passage also figured in earlier versions of Labour and the Law, edited by 
Otto Kahn-Freund himself. 
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in socially-significant decisions, particularly those affecting the terms and conditions of 
employment.”148 
 
Exploring the social ideas underlying social law  Christensen distinguished between three “basic 
normative patterns”.149 The Market Functional Pattern is the normative pattern underlying the 
market economy, expressed in the freedom of contract and the freedom of trade. In the Market 
Functional Pattern distribution is the result of bartering on the individual level. The second basic 
normative pattern is Protection of Established Position. A person who has established a certain 
position in society – a job, a level of earnings or a rented home – should not be deprived of that 
position without a just cause. The Protection of Established Position is a conservative pattern 
and constitutes a barrier against redistribution of rights and resources that are a part of someone’s 
already established position. Finally, the pattern of Just distribution represents the idea that 
resources should be distributed or redistributed in accordance with some material principle of 
justice, such as equal distribution, distribution according to need or distribution according to 
seniority. The latter two can be said to reflect ideas of social justice, even though Christensen’s 
own view was that protection of established position does not belong in this category. 
 
Regulation concerning wages, collective bargaining and paid vacations can all be justified in terms 
of redistributing the fruits of the production process in a way more compatible with a notion of 
social justice based on equity, if not equality. Likewise, regulation of hiring, firing, promotion, 
discipline and other limits to the employer’s bureaucratic powers can be justified as promoting 
some notion of justice inside the relationship. Finally co-determination and worker participation 
regulation try to redistribute some of the power over the production process from the employer 
to the workers. 
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Economic Efficiency 
Labour might not be a commodity but is definitely a means of production. The influence labour 
law has over the economy can, therefore, hardly be overestimated. In economic policy, labour 
law can thus serve as an instrument to guide or channel contractual outcomes to increase the 
total amount and change the character of goods and services produced. A commonplace view is 
that labour standards are per se economically inefficient, as parties to a contract, if they are allowed 
to contract as they please and transactions costs are low, will themselves find the economically 
most efficient contract.150 This argument is sometimes supplemented with the argument that 
equity also is best served by little or no regulation, as is individual autonomy.151 Others question 
these arguments and hold that labour law regulation, properly constructed, is compatible with  
and can promote economic efficiency. 
 
Labour markets are flawed by imperfections – uncertainty, limited information and sunk costs – 
to the extent that it can never be a competitive market.152 According to this view, the labour 
market is a structural monopsony – a market consisting of a single buyer and a large number of 
suppliers – or at least a de facto monopsony, where employers benefit from the fact that commonly 
workers are not in a position to choose between different employers. In a monopsony, employers 
buy less labour, and pay them less and give them worse working condition, than they would if 
they had to compete for labour with other employers. Regulation is, therefore, necessary to 
improve the general well-being.153 
 
Further, labour markets are suffering from information asymmetries, problematic as perfect markets 
can only exist if information for both sides in the market is perfectly symmetrical. For example, 
                                                                                                                                                        
149 Christensen (1999) p. 89. 
150 Kronman and Posner (1979) pp. 1ff. 
151 Epstein (1984) pp. 953ff. 
152 Deakin and Wilkinson (1994) pp. 293f. 
153 Ichino (1998) pp. 300f and 306. 
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employers lack information regarding the worker’s personal qualities, such as the workers ability 
to adapt to new situations, chances of falling sick or reproductive plans.154 Here, labour law can 
serve as a way of distributing the risk of these negative eventualities between the parties in an 
economically efficient way.  
 
Another economic efficiency justification for labour law stems from the fact that most contracts 
for work are inherently incomplete. As it is difficult to foresee all future needs of the work 
organisation, and as constant re-negotiation of the contract would be too costly, it is necessary to 
leave some unilateral, residual right of control to the employer. In this context, labour law 
regulating the exercise of power can “offer an important basis for long-term cooperation which 
enhances the productive potential of the employment relationship”.155 In addition, long-term co-
operative relationships sometimes exposes the parties to the risk of opportunism from the side of 
the other, something that can have detrimental effects on the degree of trust within the 
relationship.156 Labour law can thus serve economic efficiency through making promises credible, 
enabling the parties to capture gains from co-operation that wouldn’t be attainable from private 
ordering alone.157 
 
Labour law does not only set the standards for the relationship between employers and workers. 
It also sets standards for the competition between different employers and between different 
workers, as it regulates what means of competition can be used to compete for business and jobs. 
In the case of competition between firms, “the ability of one firm to adopt a high-productivity 
route to competitive success is limited if its rivals are able to compete on the basis of low pay and 
poor working conditions”.158 Labour law sets a floor under which wages and working conditions 
                                                 
154 Ichino (1998) p. 304f. 
155 Deakin and Wilkinson (1998) p. 20f. 
156 Deakin and Wilkinson (1998) p. 30f. 
157 Deakin and Wilkinson (1998) p. 22. 
158 Ewing (1996b) p. 26. C.f. also Deakin and Wilkinson (1994) p. 294. 
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are not allowed to fall, forcing firms to improve and invest in product development, technology 
or management practices. Supiot, referring to “l’égalité entre employeurs”, points to placing 
different firms on an equal footing as concerns labour costs as one of the essential functions of 
labour law.159 In the case of competition between workers, labour law works the same way, 
preventing underbidding and making it easier for workers to enter a high-productivity route, for 
example through investing in training.160 
 
2.1.3 The Three Concerns of Labour Law 
Having identified the most important justifications for labour law – important as it is for our 
understanding of this branch of law – does not, however, provide us with the analytical tool 
necessary for the task of analysing to what extent the personal scope actually permits labour law 
to fulfil its objectives, and how it could be improved in this respect. The problem with the 
justifications is that they do not give us precise enough leads about the characteristics of the 
workers that ought to be included. Knowing that dismissal protection can be motivated on 
grounds of human rights, social justice or economic efficiency tell us very little about whether any 
other workers than employees ought to be covered, and in that case what the characteristics of 
these workers are. The analytical tool, instead, has to devised from an analysis of how labour law 
functions, or, more precisely, what aspects of the relationship between a worker and her 
employer different parts of labour law intervene in.  
 
According to the Oxford English Dictionary, in the English language, the word concern, as a noun, 
refers to an “anxiety or worry”, or “a matter of interest or importance to someone.”161 In the 
following, we will argue that labour law – regardless of whether its justified in terms of human 
rights, social justice or economic efficiency – has as its concern certain characteristics of the 
                                                 
159 Supiot (1997) p. 236. 
160 Ewing (1996b) p. 27. 
161 The Oxford English Dictionary 1998 edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
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relationship between a worker and his or her employer. Firstly, labour law concerns itself with the 
consequences of the worker’s subordination to the bureaucratic powers of the employer. Secondly, 
labour law is concerned with the consequences of the worker’s dependence, both economically and 
socially, on having work. Thirdly, labour law is concerned with the fact that the workers are 
human beings performing work personally. These three concerns also correspond to three important 
characteristics of different kinds of contracts for the performance of work. Most importantly, the 
accumulation of all three of them gives us the paradigm labour relationship: the employee.  
2.2 Subordination 
Without making too broad a generalisation, labour law could be described as the law of 
subordinate employment. The worker’s subordination to the bureaucratic powers of the 
employer has traditionally been seen as a key characteristic of the relationships labour law is to 
regulate. The source of the employer’s bureaucratic powers over the worker is the contract 
between the parties, either expressly stipulated in the contract or as an implied term. In fact, 
implied terms have often been more important than expressed terms in defining the employer’s 
control over the employee. In the United Kingdom, “[t]he idea that the employer possess a 
prerogative power which lies beyond the express terms of the contract […] is recognised by the 
common law of the contract of employment.”162 Likewise, in Sweden, the employer’s right to 
direct and allocate work is considered as both a general principle of law and an implied term in all 
collective agreements.163 The contract of employment in French law has been described as the 
contract which places the employee under the authority of the employer.164 It is also common 
that an employee is considered to be under an obligation of loyalty towards the employer, 
obliging the worker to act in the best interest of the employer and avoid situations where there is 
a conflict of interest between her own interests and those of the employer. 
 
                                                 
162 Deakin and Morris (2001) p. 239. 
163 For an account in English of employer prerogatives in Swedish labour law, c.f. Rönnmar (2001) p. 262. 
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2.2.1 The Employer’s Need for Bureaucratic Powers 
Why the employer’s control have come to be a central characteristic of employment relations has 
been explained in different ways.  According to one account, particularly important in the 
Continental countries, giving the employer control over the employee was necessary in order to 
make work itself, and not just the product of work, a possible object for contract.165  
Employment contracts can be seen as a form of rental agreements, where the worker rents out 
her labour to the employer. As labour power cannot be physically detached from the labourer, 
the employer cannot take physical possession of it, and therefore needs some other way of 
assuring the enjoyment of the contracted good. The employer’s control over the means and 
manner of work separates the person of the worker from her labour and substitutes for the 
employer’s possession of the rented good. 
 
A more elaborate explanation has to do with the incomplete nature of contracts for work. 
Whereas a complete contract “specifies in a manner immediately verifiable by a third party 
precisely what performances are required for all possible future conditions”166, an incomplete 
contract will not deal with all events that may occur in the relationship between the parties. As an 
employer, when a worker is hired, does not know exactly what work needs to be done at every 
single moment of the future relationship, the employer will retain the right to give the worker 
instructions as to the means and manners of work. The alternative would be to renegotiate the 
contract every time something unforeseen happens. According to Oliver Williamson, one of the 
founders of institutional economics, long-term incomplete contracts, like-employment 
relationships, “require special adaptive mechanism to effect realignment and restore efficiency 
when beset by unanticipated disturbances.”167 It has therefore become distinguishing feature of 
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165 C.f. below 3.1.2. 
166 Hadfield (1990) p. 927. 
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the employment relation that employees, implicitly and explicitly, agree to accede to the authority 
of the employer.168  
 
Along the same lines is the argument presented by Collins concerning governance structures in 
principal-agent relationships. In order to obtain the advantages of division of labour, such as the 
special skills of a worker, a principal (the employer) employs an agent (the worker) to perform 
indeterminate tasks.169 The contracts between principals and agents are, therefore, incomplete by 
design, leaving the agent a margin of discretion as to how the task is going to be fulfilled. The 
principal, however, has an interest in monitoring the performance of the agent, so that the agent 
performs the task to the best of his abilities, or at least in a satisfactory way. One common way to 
do this is through an incentive system built on profit sharing, for example through commission 
to the sales force. In many other instances, where it is more difficult to measure whether the 
agent has performed the contract to the best interest of the principal, incentive systems are not 
enough.170 The need is for supervisory and monitoring powers of the principal. This supervisory 
power is usually exercised through bureaucratic rules that, within some margins, can be subject to 
unilateral change by the principal. “The manager can direct the worker towards new tasks, and 
can manipulate behaviour by using the carrots and sticks of promotion and discipline.”171  
 
Control is not absolute and can vary in strength. In Williamson’s assessments of hierarchy, the 
fact that “the responsibility for effecting adaptations is concentrated on one or a few agents” 
points to a relatively high degree of hierarchy. If, instead, “adaptations are taken by individual 
                                                                                                                                                        
characterised by periodic contracting, shows how periodic contracting – i.e. work modes where “contract is used to 
provide framework, which is subject to reshaping at the contract renewal interval” and where “day to day operations 
are governed by an administrative process” – is in many aspects more economically efficient than continuous 
contracting which rely extensively on comprehensive contracting. Williamson (1985) p. 229. 
168 Williamson (1996) p. 33. 
169 Collins (1999) pp. 236ff. C.f. also Deakin and Michie (1997) pp. 7ff. 
170 To Williamson, the flat or low-powered incentives found in supervisory hierarchies are better suited to ensure 
greater and more long-term co-operation, than the more direct economic incentives of markets or profit-sharing 
schemes. Williamson (1996) p. 99. 
171 Collins (1999) p. 237. 
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agents or are subject to collective approval” hierarchy is considered slight.172 Various ways of 
taking decisions inside a relationship therefore give rise to varying degrees of control. 
 
The power vested in the supervisory hierarchy is commonly backed by disciplinary powers of the 
principal, ultimately the principal’s right to terminate the contract. The principal’s right to 
terminate can, in cases where the agent is more dependent on the principal than vice versa also 
make agents vulnerable to opportunism on the side of the principal, creating an unjust power 
relationship.173 It is, nevertheless, important to separate the market powers and the bureaucratic 
powers of the employer, an argument pervasively made by Collins, in an important 1986 article. 
Even where the employee enjoys improved bargaining power, either because he benefits from 
collective bargaining by a strong union in a period of high employment or because he possesses a 
special skill which the employer needs urgently, in most instances the social dimension of 
subordination remains. The source of this residual managerial power springs from the form of the 
relations of production in advanced industrialised societies. An employee normally joins a 
bureaucratic organisation. He is allocated a particular role, which is defined by the rules of the 
institution. These bureaucratic rules create a hierarchy of ranks rising from the manual worker on 
the shop floor to the highest echelons of management.174 
 
Whichever the explanation, the bureaucratic powers of the employer over the employee are, 
compared to most other principal-agent relations, both comprehensive and far-reaching. The 
employer “does not need to gain the consent of the employee to any and every change in the way 
the job is carried out; ‘functional’ or internal flexibility is built into the legal relationship, in the 
form of the employee’s implied obligations of obedience, co-operation and care. This residual 
                                                 
172 Williamson (1985) p. 221. 
173 Collins (1999) p. 238. 
174 Collins (1986) p. 1. A similar argument, that workers who are not necessarily the weaker party before the contract 
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power which vest in the employer can be seen as a layer of status ‘beyond contract’, or at least 
beyond the explicit terms of the parties’ agreement.”175  
 
Glancing back at the justifications for labour law, from the point of view of human rights, the 
employer’s control is a cause of concern as the powers can be used in ways which violate or 
endanger the civil or political rights, or rights to privacy and integrity, of the workers. The 
employer’s control also calls for intervention in the name of social justice, as broad hierarchical 
powers of one individual over another easily comes into conflict with ideas of equality. 
Regulation of the employer’s hierarchical power can also be necessary to ensure economic 
efficiency, through promoting trust and allowing the parties to capture the benefits of co-
operation. 
 
2.2.2 Labour Law and Bureacratic Power 
Labour law has come to both underpin and limit the employer’s bureaucratic powers.176 On the 
one hand, the contract of employment comes with expressed and implied terms of subordination 
and loyalty which are not up for negotiation in the individual case. On the other, labour law tries 
to reign in the same powers. As for most regulations of supervisory hierarchies, labour law does 
not eliminate hierarchy, but rather tries to prevent abuse of the powers given to the employer.177 
To this end, a number of means are applied. Some, albeit few, absolute limits are put to the 
employer’s power, and the employer’s powers cannot be used in an arbitrary manner or for 
improper motives. Further, responsibilities are assigned, adding to the considerations the 
employer has to make in his or her exercise of power. In addition, employer’s are often obliged to 
follow certain procedural requirements in the exercise of their bureaucratic powers. 
                                                 
175 Deakin and Wilkinson (1998) p. 20. 
176 According to Deakin and Morris “the contract of employment has a dual function: while underpinning the 
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Even though the contract between the parties (or the collective agreement giving the 
employment contract its actual content) plays a relatively minor role in defining the substance of 
the contract, it does normally provide some limits to the employee’s duties. A common principle 
of law is that the employer cannot order employees to perform work that lays outside the 
employment contract or give orders which are in conflict with the express terms of the contract. 
Further, an employer cannot order an employee to commit criminal acts and the employee is 
always entitled to disobey unlawful orders. Similarly, employees are normally not obliged to obey 
orders that are contrary to regulations concerning public health and safety, or that would expose 
her to dangers relating to life or health. 
 
Labour law also regulates the employer’s disciplinary powers. It defines for what reasons 
employers can apply sanctions to workers, what type of sanctions are permitted and set 
procedural rules for their application. The employer’s measures can be the object of mediation or 
negotiation procedures or be subjected to scrutiny in courts. In short, labour law can in these 
parts be described as trying to protect workers from arbitrary decisions and improper motives. 
The employer is to use her powers to the best interest of the company, not for other ends. It is, 
however, often difficult to distinguish between the abusive exercise of hierarchical powers and 
economically rational decisions. 
 
Another important expression of the employer’s hierarchical powers is monitoring of the worker 
and the work performed. The employer’s control and its need and duty to keep the workplace 
safe and to prevent crime can, nonetheless, easily come in conflict with the worker’s right to 
privacy. As an example, the European Court of Human Rights found an employer’s monitoring of 
private phone calls from the workplace to be a violation of the right to privacy as expressed by 
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Article 8 of the ECHR, at least where no prior warning of phone taps had been given.178 Among 
the issues raised in this context are employer’s right to use surveillance technology, and to subject 
employees and applicants to medical examinations, drug-testing and searches. The law in this 
field is fragmented and significant national differences exist. In general, it can be said that labour 
law does allow the employer to monitor and gather information as long as it is relevant for the 
performance of the work. Another issue is how an employer is allowed to use and process the 
collected data. Apart from general data protection legislation not specifically aimed at the labour 
market, there is in some countries special legislation concerning employers.179  
 
As mentioned above, labour law limits the employer’s bureaucratic powers in a more indirect way 
through assigning responsibilities that the employer have to take into consideration in the 
exercise of power. This type of regulation is particularly common in occupational health and 
safety regulation.180 The employer is held responsible not just for the consequences of the work 
environment (such as injuries and damages to workers’ health), but also for taking measures to 
prevent or limit occupational risks. The employer can also be assigned responsibilities towards 
injured workers, concerning rehabilitation for example. The demands put on the employer do 
nonetheless have to be balanced against other interests. In general, the interventions and costs 
have to be somewhat proportionate to the improvements sought after in the work environment. 
The employer’s possibilities to delegate responsibility, for example to managers at a lower level, is 
often limited. Occupational health and safety regulations frequently put the employer’s 
managerial powers under the scrutiny of government inspectors or of trade union or worker’s 
representatives in different types of co-determination arrangements. 
 
                                                 
178 Halford v. United Kingdom [1997] IRLR 471. 
179 An example is the UK Access to Medical Records Act 1988 which stipulates certain procedures to be observed in 
order to gain access to medical reports made for employment purposes, including a chance for the worker to correct 
or express her views over the report. 
180 C.f. below 4.5. 
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Another example of labour law limiting the employer’s hierarchical powers is working time 
regulation. The worker contracts with the employer to put a certain amount of her labour at the 
disposal of the employer, an amount most often expressed in time. Labour law limits the 
maximum number of hours that can be contracted for and puts certain limits on how they can be 
located in time. Commonly, statutory limits take the form of a maximum number of hours per 
day or week which can be worked without the employer having to increase the rate of pay. There 
can also be statutory caps on overtime. Collective bargaining plays an important role in 
determining working time and often provide both maximum hours of work, rules for overtime 
pay and caps on overtime. Labour law also regulates the allocation of the permitted working time 
through rules on breaks, minimum rest periods, night work and holidays. Within the general 
framework of maximum hours and minimum rest periods, the employer is usually free to allocate 
work. Labour law often, nonetheless, tries to ascertain the employee some influence when 
overtime, working hours and holidays are scheduled, mainly through supporting collective 
bargaining to this effect.  
 
The employer’s bureaucratic powers are also subjected to provisions granting employee 
representatives or trade unions rights to information and consultation. As mentioned above, the 
degree of control is less if decision making power is subject to collective approval. Despite the 
language of many of the statutes in the area – talking of ‘co-determination’ and ‘negotiations’ – in 
reality these are consultation procedures where the employer maintains the right to make the 
decisions she finds appropriate.181 They do, however, force the employer to motivate decisions 
and put forward reasoned proposals. It could also be argued that the inclusion, in some countries, 
                                                 
181 A partial exemption to this can be found in Swedish law, where trade unions in certain cases can veto sub-
contracting and outsourcing arrangements. In cases where “the action that the employer intends to take may be 
deemed to violate legislative provisions or the collective bargaining agreement or […] otherwise contravene generally 
accepted practices within the parties’ area of agreement” the trade union can stop the employer’s action. Lag 
(1976:580) om medbestämmande i arbetslivet § 39. 
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of workers’ representatives on supervisory or executive boards of limited corporations represents 
a limitation of the employer’s managerial powers.  
 
2.2.3 Self-employed Workers and Subordination 
The worker’s subordination to the employer is, as mentioned above, a fundamental characteristic 
of the contract of employment, and both reinforced and reigned in by labour law. This 
subordination, here defined as the worker’s subjection to the bureaucratic powers of the 
employer, expresses itself in the worker’s obligation to follow orders from the employer and to 
abide by rules laid down by the latter. These rules can, within certain limits, be subject to 
unilateral change by the employer. Furthermore, the employer has the power to monitor the 
worker’s compliance with orders and rules and to take disciplinary action against the worker.  
 
Employees are generally subjected to a significant degree of at least one of these mechanisms of 
subordination. This is the case, however, also for many self-employed workers. Developments in 
business organisation towards new forms of governance, workers have further accentuated the 
similarities between employees and self-employed, giving many employees more freedom as to 
how they perform their work. The Supiot report noted the similarities between the working 
conditions of many employees and those of self-employed workers: “A growing number of 
[employees] thus work under conditions that do not differ substantially from the terms of sub-
contracted self-employed workers. Management avails itself of the contractual metaphor to 
conceptualize this new kind of working relationship between [employees] in the same 
company.”182  
 
                                                 
182 Supiot et al (2001) p. 10. 
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As mentioned above, statistics show that sales workers is an occupational group where many self-
employed are found.183 In a study of sales workers in the British and Austrian insurance 
industries, Muehlberger distinguishes between three kinds of sales workers: the direct sales force, tied 
agents, and independent agents.184 While the first category consists of employees, the latter two are 
self-employed workers. The tied agents, who work for one insurance company only, follow 
business plans developed by or together with the insurance company, and are often given training 
and instructions on how to sell the companies products, and even on how to live up to the 
‘corporate culture’ of the company. In addition, financial support from the insurance company 
can come with stringent conditions. More direct control is also exercised, for example, through 
checking whether the products sold are appropriate for the customers or through ensuring 
compliance with regulations.185 The use of IT equipment has given increased possibilities to 
monitor tied agents, as the cost of doing so has decreased.186 In addition, incentive structures put 
in place by the insurance companies have a profound influence on the behaviour of tied agents.187 
 
Another example is franchising where the franchisor, due to the system’s sensitivity to damage to 
the brand name, needs to control each franchisee much more carefully than in standard 
undertaking-to-undertaking relationships. Before taking on a new franchisee, the franchisor has 
to make sure that the future partner has the qualifications to represent successfully the system 
concept.188 Then, the franchisor has to control how the franchisee represents the system, often 
through detailed instructions defining the process of producing the goods or rendering the 
service.189 The need for control is further accentuated by another important characteristic of 
franchising – its long-term and dynamic character. The franchising agreement is generally 
intended to last for a long period of time and must be able to adapt to changes in the market. The 
                                                 
183 C.f. above 1.2.1 
184 Muehlberger (2002) p. 9. 
185 Muehlberger (2002) p. 19. 
186 Muehlberger (2002) p. 15. 
187 Muehlberger (2002) p. 20. 
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franchisor therefore, has to have the possibilities to make changes in the business concept, and to 
impose these changes on franchisees. The development of the products or services are of course 
also in the interests of the franchisees, but when a conflict on the best strategy arises, it is the 
view of the franchisor that has to prevail while the franchisee is bound by an obligation of 
loyalty.190 
 
Finally, self-employed workers are often subject to the same health and safety risks as employees. 
Self-employed workers who work on the premises of their employer, or with machinery owned 
by the user enterprise, have their occupational health and safety situation largely determined by 
decisions taken by the employer. In this respect, the difference between this group of self-
employed workers and the employees most often found on the same worksite is minimal. As we 
will see below, this has to some extent been acknowledged in the occupational health and safety 
legislation.191 
2.3 Economic Dependence 
The second concern of labour law is that the worker is strongly dependent on having work. The 
dependence is to a large extent, but not entirely, of an economic nature. All, but a very small 
minority, survive through providing their labour on the labour market, or through living in a 
household were someone else is a breadwinner. One of the most important consequences of the 
liberal and industrial revolutions was the creation of a market for labour where, in theory at least, 
labour power was to be bought and sold on a market operating according to the logic of supply 
and demand, just like any other commodity.192 This commodification of labour is undoubtedly one 
of the most debated themes of the past 150 years of political life and social science. On the one 
                                                                                                                                                        
188 Joerges (1991) p 21. 
189 Joerges (1991) pp. 27f. 
190 Joerges (1991) p 28. 
191 C.f. below 4.5. 
192 On how contractual relations, also concerning labour power, came to the heart of the economic and social order 
c.f. Weber (1978) pp. 667ff. 
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hand, making labour a transferable commodity liberated workers from the bonds of feudal 
arrangements, increasing the possibilities of social mobility. Further, as labour became a 
commodity, every worker – at least in theory and to the extent that the worker was an adult male 
– became the owner of his own labour. As labour was the property of the worker, relationships 
simply subjecting workers to the power of their master were no longer tolerable, instead 
relationships should be characterised by the offer and payment of services.193 On the other hand, 
however, “both human needs and labour became commodities and, hence, our well-being came 
to depend on our relation to the cash-nexus”.194 Even though the commodity form was not 
absent in pre-capitalist society, people “were not dependent entirely on wage-type income for 
their survival”.195 Today, dependence on wage-type income, or other payments tied to past, or in 
a few cases future, wages is the reality for all but a very few. 
 
2.3.1 Economic Dependence and Worker Vulnerability 
Workers economic dependence on performing remunerated work has important implications for 
the relationship between workers and employers. Labour power cannot be stored and few 
workers have economic margins that allow them to withdraw from the labour market if the work 
or working conditions offered them are unsatisfactory.196 This was accurately described already by 
Adam Smith in the Wealth of Nations. 
It is not […] difficult to foresee which of the two parties must, upon all ordinary occasions, have the 
advantage in the dispute and force the other into a compliance with their terms […] Many workmen 
could not subsist a week, few could subsist a month and scarce any a year, without employment. In 
the long run, the workman may be as necessary to his master as his master is to him; but the 
necessity is not so immediate.197 
 
                                                 
193 Simitis (2000) p. 187. 
194 Esping-Andersen (1990) p. 35. 
195 Esping-Andersen (1990) p. 38. 
196 Deakin and Wilkinson (1998) p. 15. 
197 Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations, Penguin 1986, p. 169, cited in Deakin and Wilkinson (1998) p. 15.  
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Workers are thus generally more vulnerable to the opportunism of the employer than vice-versa. A 
threat to terminate the contract if the relationship is unsatisfactory is in most situations more 
credible and effective for the employer than for the worker. The threat to terminate the contract 
is particularly credible if the worker has invested in firm-specific skills and the employer can 
afford to be insensitive to the effects the termination will have on her reputation as an 
employer.198 
 
But the importance, and thus dependence, of work for the individual goes beyond being a crucial 
source of income. Work, often referred to as what a person ‘does’, determines her position in 
society far beyond economic wealth. Stråth, in a discussion of the non-economic consequences 
of employment flexibility, points out that “[w]ork can be seen as a social phenomenon that takes 
on essential and primordial proportions to the extent that it defines the very essence of the 
human being.”199 ‘Work’ creates identities and is ripe with positive connotations. “Work is one of 
the most important constituents in the construction of meaning and community. Work is a key 
element in the demarcation of us and them. Work signifies diligence, industry and prosperity, yes 
even joy and satisfaction.”200 At times, ‘work’ has come to take almost religious proportions.201 At 
the same time, however, ‘work’ comes with negative connotations. “Work is tantamount to pain, 
drudgery, sweat and hardship. Work as exploitation was at the core of the identity that formed 
the working class. It was something to be emancipated from.”202 Those negative connotations can 
nonetheless, particularly in times of high unemployment, be outweighed by more urgent 
considerations. “The negative connotation of not having a job naturally overshadows the many 
negative elements of those jobs that still exist.”203  
 
                                                 
198 Williamson (1985) p. 261. 
199 Stråth (2000) p. 68. 
200 Stråth (2000) p. 66. 
201 Bo Stråth speaks of the “deification of labour as a modern religion of existential dimensions”. Stråth (2000) p. 78. 
202 Stråth (2000) p. 66. 
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Worker’s dependence on having work creates a vulnerability vis-à-vis the employer which can 
make it difficult for the workers to enjoy and exercise certain human rights. Rather than running 
the risk of loosing their job, workers tolerate the violation. Inequalities in bargaining power 
between workers and employers, between labour and capital, is also a prime concern from a 
social justice point of view as remunerated work is the most important system for distribution of 
wealth in contemporary society. The negative effects of de facto monopsony on economic efficiency 
have been explained above.  
 
2.3.2 Labour Law and Economic Dependence 
Like in the case of subordination, labour law does not try to eliminate economic dependence as 
such.204 Instead, regulation is used to limit its negative consequences, or to impose a principle for 
the distribution of the negative consequences. Key roles in this are played by dismissal protection 
regulation and by collective labour law, in particular the right to strike and collective bargaining. 
In addition, labour law tries to keep wages on certain levels – and make sure they are paid in full 
and on time – and that there are possibilities to take time off from work. 
 
Labour law regulates under what circumstances an employer may terminate a contract with an 
employee. In the words of the ILO Termination of Employment Convention, “the employment of a 
worker should not be terminated unless there is a valid reason for such termination connected 
with the capacity or conduct of the worker or based on the operational requirements of the 
undertaking, establishment or service”.205 In western Europe, the idea that employees have a right 
not to have their employment contracts terminated without a valid reason stands out as a 
                                                                                                                                                        
203 Stråth (2000) p. 99. 
204 The partial de-commodification of labour is more a task for social security law, through unemployment benefits, 
sickness benefits and pensions.   
205 ILO Convention 158 Termination of Employment Convention 1982, Article 4.  
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principle of law so “manifest and clear” that it is “beyond question”.206 In countries following the 
just-cause doctrine, dismissal protection regulation tends to differentiate between different types 
of dismissals. Dismissals for reasons related to a particular employee are separated from 
dismissals related to the employer’s manpower requirements in general.207 The first type can be 
further divided into discriminatory dismissals and dismissals related to the worker’s behaviour or 
performance. While dismissals related to the worker’s behaviour or performance, together with 
dismissals related to the employer’s manpower requirements, belong in the current category, 
concerned with the worker’s dependence, it will be argued, below, that the prohibitions against 
discriminatory dismissals belong in the category of labour law concerned with the worker as a 
human being.  
 
When the reason for dismissal has to do with the worker’s behaviour or performance, the 
responsible court, tribunal or administrative authority generally has to engage in a fault inquiry 
with the aim of establishing whether the incompetence, misconduct or other reason claimed by 
the employer is true and justifies a dismissal.208 The interest of the employee in keeping the job is 
weighted against the employer’s interest in dismissing her. 
 
Dismissals due to the employer’s general manpower requirements have to do with the economic 
fortunes or business strategy of the company, such as downward fluctuation in demand or 
competitive pressure necessitating downsizing and restructuring.209 They are often, but do not 
                                                 
206 Hepple (1997) p. 221f. In the United States, dismissal protection is regulated mainly at the state level. 
Generalisations should be made with great caution, but it has been said that “virtually every American jurisdiction 
continue to presume that an indefinite term employment contract is terminable at will by either party”. (Verkerke 
(1995) pp. 838 f.) The employment-at-will doctrine is, nonetheless, not absolute. Apart from the limits to employer 
discretion found in federal and state anti-discrimination law, courts have created some common law exemptions to 
the at-will rule. These exemptions can be classified in three categories – the tort of wrongful discharge in violation of 
public policy; implied contracts not to terminate without good cause; and implied covenants to terminate only in 
good faith and fair dealing. Most states have adopted one or more of the three doctrines. Autor et al (2001) p 4. 
207 Writing about the UK, Collins distinguishes between three different types of dismissals, public rights dismissals, 
disciplinary dismissals and economic dismissals, where the first two has to do with the worker personally and the last with 
the manpower requirements of the employer. Collins (1992) pp. 52ff. 
208 Collins (1992) p. 54. 
209 In Collins terminology, this type of dismissal is referred to as economic dismissal. Collins (1992) p. 55. 
Engblom, Samuel (2003), Self-employment and the personal scope of labour law : comparative lessons from France, Italy, 
Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States 
European University Institute
 
 
DOI: 10.2870/68969
 69
have to be, collective in the sense that a number of workers are dismissed at the same time. In 
general, the employer’s right to decide the scope, size and direction of the enterprise is respected, 
as long as the decision has been made in the interest of the enterprise.  As economic dismissals 
are most often accepted, and the employers’ business decisions not are second-guessed by courts 
or administrative bodies, the most important question becomes how the social costs created by 
the termination of the contract should be distributed.210 Firstly, it has to be decided which 
employees are going to be dismissed. Secondly, how much of the cost of the termination of 
contract should be borne by the employer, the dismissed employee and the state respectively. The 
first question is commonly subject to collective agreements and negotiations but can also be 
subject to statutory regulation. In general, seniority is the favoured criteria for determining who is 
going to be laid off, protecting employees with many years of service.211 To the second question, 
a number of different answers exist. In order to shift part of the social cost, for example the cost 
of financial support or retraining of the dismissed workers, to the employer the state can oblige 
her to pay severance pay or to take part, through taxes or mandatory contributions, in a 
compulsory pooling of social costs.212 
 
Labour law acknowledges the employer’s right to make decisions regarding the size and 
composition of the workforce, but also the fact that most employees are dependent, 
economically and in other ways, on their job which explains why they should not be separated 
from it in an arbitrary way or for reasons deemed unjust. Dismissal protection also underpins 
other employment rights. If workers could be fired for any reason whatsoever, it would be 
difficult for a worker who is dependent on her work to insists on rights, be they contractual or 
statutory, or resist abusive treatment. The power of dismissal has been described as the “tail 
                                                 
210 Collins (1992) p. 55. 
211 On this “protection of established position”, c.f. Christensen (1999). 
212 Collins (1992) p. 141. 
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[wagging] the whole dog of the employment relation”.213 If there is no employment protection, 
the employer is free to change unilaterally the terms of employment through dismissing and re-
employing under new terms. Knowing that the contract can only be terminated for a just cause 
gives employees the possibility to exercise other rights conferred on them, without having to fear 
retaliatory termination of the contract by the employer.  In this way, dismissal protection 
legislation tries to reign in the consequences the worker’s dependence has on the relationship 
between worker and employer. 
  
Collective labour law limits the effect of the workers’ economic dependence through permitting 
and enabling workers to organise and to bargain and take action collectively. The workers are still 
dependent on performing remunerated work but their bargaining positions is strengthened by the 
fact that it is more difficult for the employer to play out one employee against another. In a 
travesty of Adam Smith, the workmen are made ‘as necessary to the employer as the employer is 
to them’. Workers’ collective action has three essential components: the right to organise, the 
right to strike or take other forms of industrial action, and the right to bargain collectively. The 
right to organise belongs to the category of labour law concerned with the worker as a human 
being and will, therefore, be dealt with in the next section. 
  
The right to strike gives workers the possibility to withdraw temporarily their labour from the 
employer in order to seek collectively a better offer from the employer, thus overcoming one of 
the negative aspects of their dependence.214 Betten, in a study of the right to strike in Community 
Law, spells out the connection between collective action and worker dependence. 
Ever since the time that workers have been employed, there have been strikes. As long as 
recognition was lacking that workers had certain rights and not just the obligation to work under 
conditions set unilaterally by the employer, the reaction to a strike action was simple: the employer 
                                                 
213 Collins (1992) p. 270. 
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considered the employment contract to be terminated because of its being violated by the employee 
and the worker lost his job. In times when social security, unemployment benefit, etc. were non-
existent, no job meant no money, and no money meant no food, no heating, no clothes for workers 
and their families. However justified a strike was felt to be by the workers, the consequences were 
hard to bear. Yet, strikes did occur and the awareness grew that the only way for workers to avoid 
these consequences, in other words, to bring pressures to bear on employers successfully was to act 
collectively and to ensure the solidarity of other workers, so that the latter would not go on working 
or take over the jobs of workers on strike. Only if work was completely stopped and if there was no 
possibility of replacing workers on strike, would the employer be affected severely by a strike; he 
would not be able to fulfil contracts with clients, nor would it be possible to make profits. These 
consequences were thought to make the employer willing to meet, or at least to negotiate, the 
demands of workers.215 
 
In this category of labour law we also find regulation of the remuneration paid to the worker. 
Labour law tries to regulate basic rates of pay in order to ensure that employees receive a certain 
minimum level of income in return for their labour. This is done either directly by minimum 
wage legislation, or indirectly through labour law supporting a system of wage setting through 
collective bargaining. Minimum wage legislation typically delegates to the government or a 
government agency to set the minimum wage level. The minimum wage is generally applicable, 
but normally with exceptions made for younger workers and apprentices. Violation of the 
minimum wage often carries a penalty that goes beyond the due wages.  In this context, we must 
also mention wage protection legislation ensuring that the worker is paid in full and on a regular 
basis. Examples of such employee protection are regulations forbidding the employer to make 
deductions from the worker’s remuneration except for in cases provided for by law, and the right 
for the employee to withhold her labour until wages due have been paid. Provisions concerning 
annual leave can be seen both as a regulation aimed at the worker’s remuneration and as an 
                                                                                                                                                        
214 Apart from the full withdrawal of labour power which constitutes a strike, in some countries there exists the 
possibility of applying less severe measures such as work-to-rule or a prohibition on overtime. 
215 Betten (1985) pp. 130f. 
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expression of the negative connotation of labour, as something to be liberated from, mentioned 
above.216 The extent of paid vacations are often tied to seniority, either through statutory 
provisions or as part of collective agreements. 
 
2.3.3 Economic Dependence and Self-employed Workers 
Even though economic dependence, as will be shown below, ranks as one of the most important 
characteristics of employees, dependence is not limited to employees. In fact, any worker who 
makes a living through performing remunerated work and who draws all or the bulk of her 
income from one employer can be considered economically dependent.  Economically dependent 
self-employed workers are far from uncommon, in particular among those selling labour only 
services. Italian statistics concerning lavoratori parasubordinati, a category of formally self-employed 
workers, showed that 91 percent of those parasubordinati who were not members of the liberal 
professions worked for only one employer and an additional 7 percent for only two different 
employers.217 
 
Self-employed workers who form part of distribution networks can also be economically 
dependent, despite the fact that they have many different clients or serve a large number of 
consumers. Often, they are tied by exclusivity clauses to sell only the products of one single 
distributor, making them dependent on the continuation of that relationship. Non-competition 
clauses, where present, add to their dependence and vulnerability. An example, represented in the 
case law on the concept of employee in several different countries, are gas-station tenants.218 A 
further example concerns franchisees who have signed exclusivity clauses granting them the right 
to distribute the franchisors goods or services within a defined geografic area. In the already cited 
study of insurance agents by Muehlberger, the tied agents, whom she also refers to as “dependent 
                                                 
216 Here, legislation concerning sick pay and parental leave are seen as a part of social security, falling outside the 
scope of this study. 
217 Borgarello and Cornaglia (2002) pp. 23f. C.f. also below 4.3.2. 
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self-employment”, are distinguished from independent agents by their dependency on the 
insurance company. Tied agents work for one insurance company only and are, despite their 
formal self-employment, organisationally tied to the company.219  
2.4 Human Being 
The third and last concern of labour law needs less of elaborate explanations: workers are human 
beings. That human beings remain human also when they come to work has already been 
mentioned in the context of human rights justifications for labour law. Workers remain human 
beings also in a less philosophical sense: toxic substances and other physical hazards are as 
dangerous to human beings at work as outside of work. What distinguishes this concern from the 
other two (subordination and economic dependence) is that it exists regardless of the character of 
the workers relationship to the principal. Hazards to dignity and health are present also in 
situations where the worker is neither under the control of the employer nor dependent on 
having work.  
 
Anti-discrimination law prohibits discrimination in employment on accounts such as race, colour, 
sex, sexual orientation, national origin, religion, disability or age and can be described as an 
expression of the principle that ‘like should be treated alike’. The problem is the difference in 
treatment between members of the protected group and the reference group.  
What an equal-treatment prescription, or a prohibition against discrimination, amounts to is that the 
group which was the object of differential treatment in an unfavourable sense shall be treated in the 
same manner as the group already covered by the norm, or at least not worse. […] Rules on non-
discrimination are always based on a comparison between the reference group and the protected 
group. A prohibition against discrimination does not set up any independent norms as to how 
                                                                                                                                                        
218 For example, see the Swedish case AD 1969 nr 31 and the French case Soc. 28 nov, 1984, Bull. civ. V no 461. 
219 Muehlberger (2002) pp. 16f. 
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certain groups are to be treated; it always refers, in some way, to the norms that apply to the 
reference group.220 
 
Large parts of anti-discrimination law deals with the entering into or termination of employment 
contracts. Labour law leaves the worker free to choose her employer, and employers are generally 
permitted an important degree of freedom in deciding who to hire. Anti-discrimination law, 
however, stipulates that “a party should not be free to refuse to enter into contracts on certain 
grounds.”221 Anti-discrimination law effectively limits an employer’s right to choose whom to 
employ in the sense that the choice cannot be based on certain criteria. In countries following the 
just cause-doctrine, discriminatory grounds can never constitute just cause for dismissal.222 In the 
case of other reasons for dismissal pertaining to the employee personally, such as productivity, 
occupational qualifications or disciplinary problems, an inquiry focused on the weight of the 
interests of the employer and the employee is made to decide whether the dismissal is justified. In 
the case of discriminatory dismissals, no weighing of interests is necessary. In the words of 
Collins, describing UK law on what he refers to as public rights dismissals, “[t]he fault of the 
employer in detracting from such public rights warrants the award of a remedy without any 
further need to balance the competing interests.”223 The detailed nature of the relation between 
the employer and the employee is of no interest, it is the discriminatory treatment as such that the 
lawmaker tries to prevent. Such discriminatory treatment can occur also in situations where the 
worker is not economically dependent on getting the job or contract: it is the refusal as such 
which constitutes the offence.  
 
                                                 
220 Christensen (2001) p. 32. 
221 Atiyah (1995) p.  22. 
222 In the United States, anti-discrimination statutes constitute the most important exceptions of the employment-at-
will doctrine, covering race, sex, age and in some states further grounds. The courts’ interpretation of Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 have only left a very narrow possibility for employers to defend discrimination due to sex or 
race in hiring on business grounds, as a bona fide occupational qualification.42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq.. C.f. Diaz v. Pan 
American World Airlines 442 F.2d  385 (5th Circ.); and Backus v. Baptist Medical Center 510 F.Supp 1191 (E.D. Ark). 
223 Collins (1992) p. 57. 
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Both European and US labour law adhere to the principle of equal pay, however differently 
defined. Under Article 141(1) of the TEC, “[e]ach Member State shall ensure that the principle of 
equal pay for male and female workers for equal work or work of equal value is applied”, whereas 
the US Equal Pay Act of 1963 is only aimed at equal pay for equal work. Employers, often 
together with trade unions, still have a margin of discretion to set or negotiate wages, but they 
cannot do it in a way that discriminates between women and men. 
The fundamental principles that govern the fixing of wages and salaries are not regulated in law and 
never have been; they belong within the field of free contract. However, structures entailing the 
differential treatment of certain groups arise in this field as well. […] The principle of equal pay 
does not say that men and women should have the same salaries (or wages) but that the salaries of 
men and women shall be established according to the same norm, namely in relation to the work 
carried out.224 
 
Obviously, the risk that employers will not always apply the same norm to men’s and women’s 
remuneration can be present regardless of whether the worker is under the control of the 
employer or in a state of dependence or not, which is why it can be argued that the concern of 
equal pay regulation is the human dignity of the men and women performing work. The problem 
in all these cases is the difference in treatment between members of the protected group and the 
reference group, a problem which is unrelated to the nature of the relationship between the 
worker and the employer. 
 
Discrimination of disabled people is a problem slightly different from other types of 
discrimination. The fact that the protected group, disabled people, frequently have a lower 
working capacity than the reference group means that discrimination against the disabled 
normally can be motivated on rational grounds. Disability discrimination law, therefore, aims at 
accomplishing “equal treatment in equal situations and unequal treatment in unequal 
                                                 
224 Christensen (2001) p. 33. 
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situations”.225 If the disabled person is not equally able to perform the work as a non-disabled 
candidate, the employer is free to select the latter for employment or promotion. Disability 
discrimination law might, however, require the employer to make “reasonable adjustments” of 
the working environment or working procedure in order to give the disabled worker a chance to 
compete.226  
 
Another issue of human dignity is the right not to be subjected to harassment in the workplace. 
The European framework directive on the equal treatment in employment defines harassment as 
“unwanted conduct […] with the purpose or effect of violating the dignity of a person and of 
creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment.”227 The US 
Supreme Court, in a 1986 decision, held that sexual harassment is present when “discrimination 
based on sex has created a hostile or abusive work environment” that is “sufficiently severe or 
pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment[.]”228 Even though litigated 
harassment cases often deal with situations where an employer or an employee in a supervisory 
position has abused his or her powers over the employee-victim, sexual harassment can also take 
place between equal parties, for example, two workers on the same worksite. The problem which 
the law on sexual harassment address is thus not limited to situations where there is a certain 
degree of control from the employer over the victim or where the victim is in a state of 
dependence. Even though sexual harassment is more likely to occur in a situation where a worker 
is subjected to the bureaucratic powers of someone else, or economically dependent, it can occur 
when power is only wielded casually, or even between equal parties, as well. 
 
Apart from discrimination due to personal factors such as sex, race, religion, sexual orientation, 
disability or age, labour law also tries to prevent discrimination due to political beliefs, the 
                                                 
225 Inghammar (2001) p. 327. 
226 Inghammar (2001) p. 331 and p. 337. 
227 Council Directive 2000/78/EC establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation, Art. 2(3). 
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exercise of free speech or trade union membership. The right to organise is recognised in 
international human rights instruments as well as in national law. Unlike the more general 
freedom of association which applies towards governments, the right to organise applies between 
private subjects as well. Among the international instruments with right to organise provisions we 
find the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) and the ILO 1949 Right to Organise and 
Collective Bargaining Convention. Under the ECHR, Article 11 “Everyone has the right to freedom of 
peaceful assembly and to freedom of association with others, including the right to form and to join 
trade unions for the protection of his interests.” The right to organise straddles the divide between 
labour law concerned with the worker’s dependence and labour law concerned with the worker as 
a human being performing work personally. Trade unions do not just fill a function in industrial 
relations but also have important political functions, which explains why the right to organise not 
can be seen just as a means of strengthening workers vis-à-vis the employer’s bureaucratic and 
economic powers. The concern of regulations permitting and protecting trade union membership 
is also to uphold the right of association in general. Protection from discrimination, in particular 
dismissals, due to trade union membership, therefore, falls into the category of labour law 
concerned with the worker as a human being, rather than the economic dependence category. 
The practical translation of the right to organise has been bans on anti-union discrimination, i.e. 
actions taken to prevent or discourage workers from trade union membership or from actively 
participating in trade union activities.229 The ILO Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention 
stipulates that workers should enjoy “adequate protection against acts of anti-union 
discrimination in respect to their employment […] particularly in respect of acts calculated to (a) 
make the employment of a worker subject to the condition that he shall not join a union or shall 
                                                                                                                                                        
228 Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson 477 U.S. 57. 
229 Regulation concerning of internal affairs of trade unions, existing e.g. in France, the UK and the US has been left 
outside of this study. 
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relinquish trade union membership; (b) cause the dismissal of or otherwise prejudice a worker by 
reason of union membership or because participation in union activities […].”230 
 
Another way in which labour law tries to protect the political rights of workers is through 
restrictions in dismissals due to the employees political beliefs or activity or exercise of free 
speech. A controversial issue is to what extent workers enjoy freedom of speech in matters that 
directly concern their employer’s business. On the one hand, contracts of employment normally 
come with an implicit loyalty towards the employer. On the other, there is often a strong public 
interest in revealing illegalities and dubious behaviour. Whistleblowing is, therefore, often 
protected by labour law. 
 
Discriminatory treatment and other violations of a worker’s human dignity are thus possible also 
in situations where the worker is not subject to the bureaucratic powers of the employer and not 
dependent on that specific employer to make her living. Undoubtedly, most of the discriminatory 
acts covered by anti-discrimination regulation require the perpetrator to possess some degree of 
power over the aggrieved worker. But the power can be of a temporary, casual and weak nature, 
significantly less substantial than the power established by the employer’s hierarchical powers or 
the worker’s dependence. Commenting on British legislation extending anti-discrimination law to 
all who perform work personally, Davies and Freedland looked to the purpose of the law: 
So, if a person sends away the local plummer who has been called to fix a leak because he turns out 
to be black, that is an unlawful act, even though the plummer has lots of clients and is not 
economically dependent upon the discriminator. And it is not difficult to see why it should be so. 
                                                 
230 ILO Convention (98) Concerning the Application of the Principles of the Right to Organise and to Bargain Collectively, Art. 1. 
This idea is echoed on the national level, e.g. in Art. L 412-2 of the French Code du Travail, §8 of the Swedish Lag 
(1976:580) om medbestämmande i arbetslivet and in the US National Labor Relations Act (29 U.S.C. § 158(a)). The United 
States can also be used as an example of a country where trade unions, in order to fall under the protection of the 
law must be recognised by the employer of the workers, either voluntarily or through winning recognition by means 
of a certification ballot. At the times of ballots employers are entitled to speak out against unionisation of their work 
force and often take measures aimed at discouraging unions. There are also possibilities for employers to demand a 
“decertification” ballot to rid the workplace of the trade union. C.f. Gould (1993) pp. 36ff and 59f. 
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The purpose of anti-discrimination laws is not simply to protect traditional employees against 
discrimination, but to protect the relevant group in all important areas of their life in society. 231 
 
Finally, parts of occupational health and safety regulation can outright forbid certain working 
conditions, for example, work without proper safety equipment or work with certain toxic 
substances. In the case of risks to health and safety arising from exposure to harmful chemical, 
physical and biological substances, these risks do not only arise for workers who are under an 
employer’s control or economically dependent. The danger is present no matter how the 
organisational or social framework of the relationship is constructed. Examples of this kind of 
regulation can be taken from the European Union where a number of directives intending to 
avoid or keep as low as possible worker’s exposure to harmful substances232 and in some cases 
even goes as far as banning the production of substances considered particularly harmful.233 
2.5 Requirements on the Personal Scope 
An issue crucial to this study is what the requirements should be on a suitable personal scope for 
labour law. The argument here is that there are three requirements according to which each 
design of the personal scope of labour law must be assessed. First, it must uphold the mandatory 
nature of labour law. Secondly, it must be constructed as to avoid unreasonable uncertainty 
concerning which legal regulations are to be applied on a work relationship. Thirdly, the 
boundaries of labour law’s field of application must be drawn as to cover all, or almost all, 
situations where the concerns of labour law are raised. 
  
                                                 
231 Davies and Freedland (2000a) p. 41. 
232 Council Directive 80/1107/EEC on the protection of workers from the risks related to exposure to chemical, physical and biological 
agents at work C.f. also directives 82/605/EEC (metallic lead); 83/477/EEC (asbestos): and 78/610/EEC (vinyl 
chloride monomer). 
233 C.f. Council Directive 88/364/EEC on the protection of workers by the banning of certain specified agents and/or certain work 
activities. 
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2.5.1 Mandatory 
Labour law is, with few exceptions, mandatory. Employees cannot, at least not individually, waive 
legal protections. An important implication of this, which we will come across in the next chapter 
where the concept of employee will be explored, is the low significance afforded to the label of 
the contract or the parties’ own intentions, when deciding whether or not a worker is an 
employee. 
 
The mandatory nature of labour law can be explained both as a matter of principle and in more 
practical terms. As far as principles are concerned, the human rights justifications of labour law, 
which we have explored above, militate in favour of a mandatory personal scope for at least parts 
of labour law In more practical terms, the mandatory nature of labour law stems from the 
necessity of preventing underbidding. Possibilities to circumvent or opt-out of the law inevitably 
will lead to a weakening of it. If employers and workers were allowed to compete for jobs with 
lower wages or health and safety standards, this will not only affect them, but other workers as 
well. The larger the possibilities to opt-out of labour law, the more difficult it will be for labour 
law to protect human rights and promote social justice, as underbidding will change market 
conditions. Likewise, labour law’s capacity as an instrument to promote economic efficiency will 
be reduced if a large number of workers are left outside the personal scope. This is also true, 
however, if some categories of workers by the design of the personal scope are left outside the 
realm of labour law.  
 
The difference between a narrow and a wide personal scope is not just quantitative but qualitative 
as well. Labour law only covering full-time, unionised employees with permanent contracts is of a 
different nature from and labour law covering all who perform remunerated work personally. In 
the first case, the regulation offers a standard contract to a part of the labour force considered 
particularly valuable to the employer. In the second case, it insists on rights or immunities for all 
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workers, filling a different role in the distribution of wealth and power in society. Thus, the 
formulation of the personal scope of labour law does not only concern the fraction of the 
workforce found in the grey area between employee-status and genuine self-employment, but 
affects the functioning of the whole system of labour law. As stated in the Supiot report: 
One of the historical functions of labour law has been to ensure social cohesion. It will only be able 
to continue to fulfil that function if it is able to accommodate new developments in the way that 
work is organized in contemporary society and does not revert to covering just the situations it was 
originally intended to address, which are becoming less typical.234 
 
In order for labour law to fulfill its regulatory objectives, it must affect the everyday behaviour of 
workers and employers and not just be something a worker can claim in court. To what extent 
this is the case is largely dependent on factors other than the legal design, such as unionisation 
rates and the resources and effectiveness of labour inspectorates. But the legal design of the 
personal scope matters nonetheless, and should preferably take a form which can be understood 
by workers and employers and which is difficult to manipulate. 
 
2.5.2 Avoid Uncertainty 
The importance for two parties entering into a contract to know what rules are to govern their 
relationship is manifest. A requirement on the design of the personal scope must, therefore, be 
that it provides a reasonable degree of certainty concerning the legal classification of work 
relationships. The demand for legal certainty does, however, easily come into conflict with the 
mandatory nature of labour law. A simple way to increase legal certainty would be to allow 
workers and employers to classify their contracts themselves, and to make that classification 
binding in courts and vis-à-vis third parties. It would, however, also be detrimental to labour law’s 
status as mandatory regulation. Also, the more the labour market moves away from the 
traditional dichotomy between the paradigm dependent, subordinated employee and the 
Engblom, Samuel (2003), Self-employment and the personal scope of labour law : comparative lessons from France, Italy, 
Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States 
European University Institute
 
 
DOI: 10.2870/68969
 82
independent contractor, the more difficult it has become for labour law to offer a high degree of 
legal certainty. As we will see, increased legal certainty has been the aim of some reforms in 
recent years. 
 
2.5.3 Relevance to the Concern Addressed by the Regulation 
The final requirement on the design of the personal scope of labour law is that it must cover all, 
or almost all, situations where the concerns of labour law are raised. Often, this is expressed as a 
desire that the personal scope should be tied to the purpose of labour law.235 Simplified, one can 
call this the personal scope’s relevance to the concern addressed by the regulation.  
 
If the degree of relevance is low, workers may fall outside the scope of labour law, despite being 
in situations where concerns should be raised about the consequences of their subordination, 
their economic dependence or the fact that they are human beings performing work. An example 
would be using subordination as a necessary criterion in the personal scope of economic 
dismissals legislation, thereby excluding economically dependent workers who are not also 
subordinated. Low relevance can, however, also have the opposite effect, making labour law 
over-inclusive, including workers untouched by the concern the regulation is to address. This 
would occur, for example, if  economic dependence was used as a sufficient criteria to make 
employers responsible for the physical work environment of homeworkers over whom they 
exercise no control. If relevance is high, labour law is neither over- or under-inclusive, covering 
only those situations where the concern the regulation is addressing are present. 
                                                                                                                                                        
234 Supiot et al (2001) pp. 22f. 
235 Examples of authors making the case for a connection between the “purpose” of the regulation and the personal 
scope are Santoro Passarelli (1979), Maltby and Yamada (1997),  Linder (1999), and Davies and Freedland (2000a). 
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3. THE CONCEPT OF EMPLOYEE 
In this chapter, we will analyse the concept of employee as it is understood in industrialised 
western countries, using comparative law as our analytical tool. After an account of the historical 
development (3.1-3.2), the different understandings of this concept in federal US labour law and 
Swedish, British and French labour law will be laid out (3.3-3.6). This analysis should then allows 
us to draw a number of important conclusions regarding the nature of the concept of employee 
and how well it meets the requirements we have identified for the personal scope (3.7-3.8). 
3.1 Historical Development 
A key to understanding the concept of employee is awareness of how the concept developed 
historically. In this section, we will follow the concept of employee throughout the nineteenth 
century, from its early historical roots in doctrines of master and servant and louage d’ouvrage, through 
the convergence forced by industrialisation, to the birth of the modern concept of employee in 
the first half of the twentieth century. The historical developments during the twentieth century 
will be dealt with separately for each of the four countries considered. 
 
The presentation of the early historical roots of the concept of employee will focus on England 
and France. Labour law is a branch of law where the distinction between civil law and common 
law generally have little or no relevance.236 Civil law (France) and common law (England) 
nonetheless represent two distinct tracks of legal development towards the modern concept of 
employee, at least until the late nineteenth century.  In addition, during the nineteenth century, 
the master and servant relationship in the United States was regulated essentially according to 
                                                 
236 An example of this view is propunded by Alain Cottereau who holds that, due to the importance of industrial 
tribunals in shaping labour law in France, the differences with common law disappeared early in the history of labour 
law. “[F]ar removed from the kind of légicentrisme that had been in place in France since the Revolution and closer to 
a typical English kind of law as seen through continental eyes: a law constituted essentially by judicial decisions, 
developing on a case-by-case basis, rationalizing itself by using precedents, and appealing more to common sense 
and the sense of justice than to interpretation of statutory texts when it came to justifying its legislative activity.”  
Cottereau (2000) p. 204.  
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centuries-old English common law doctrines.237 Sweden does not fit neatly into the civil law 
category which is why a short separate account is given of the Swedish law in the late nineteenth-
century.238 
 
3.1.1 Master and Servant 
In common law countries, the doctrinal roots of the concept of employee can be found in the 
pre-industrial concept of master and servant.239 The relationship between master and servant was 
one of the most important in defining a person’s place in society, conferring on the parties a 
predetermined set of rights and responsibilities. This was a status relationship belonging to the 
law of persons. Workers, with the exception of a small group of professional, managerial and 
clerical workers, did not have contracts in the sense of  bilateral, reciprocal rights and 
obligations.240 In eighteenth and nineteenth century England, “a large but unknown proportion 
(probably a majority) of working people” fell under the regime of master and servant.241 The term 
‘servant’, as applied by judges, magistrates and justices of the peace, was ambiguous and included 
more than what the term household servant is generally taken to mean nowadays.242 
 
A characteristic feature of the master-servant relationship was the broad authority and control 
that it prescribed to the master and the position of general subservience in which it put the 
servant. Criminal sanctions were in force against servants who left their master, which illustrates 
the status rather than contract character of the master-servant relationship.  
In England, jurisdiction seems always to have regarded the employment of workers as an 
undertaking to obey, whatever the legal justification for this: customs and statutes of varying degrees 
of age, then new statutes of nineteenth century, functional justifications of good industrial 
                                                 
237 Orren (2000) p. 315. 
238 For the argument that the Nordic countries should be treated as a separate legal family, though part of a larger 
civil law category, c.f. Zweigert and Kötz (1998) p. 277. 
239 For a comprehensive account of the development from master-servant relationships to the modern concept of 
employee in the United States, c.f. Linder (1989a) pp. 45-100. 
240 Deakin (1998) pp. 214f. 
241 Hay (2000) p. 228. 
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management, and theories of the implicit contract of obedience […]:’The servant implidedly 
contracts to obey the lawful and reasonable orders of his master withing the scope of the service 
contracted for’.243 
 
Still, subordination was not decisive for the application of the master and servant regime. The 
principal division was not between subordinated and independent workers, but between groups 
of workers with different social rank and status. Workers in putting-out systems and artisanal 
homeworkers were included among servants, and magistrates had disciplinary powers – for 
example criminal sanctions for workers leaving their work – over ‘servants’ and ‘labourers’ but 
not over higher status worker.244 Neither was subordination decisive when the master and servant 
doctrine, in the mid-nineteenth century, was first applied to the new industrial employment. 
Instead, British courts used the notion of ‘exclusive service’  under which a servant could only 
have one master and, as a consequence, workers with several employers did not qualify as 
servants.245  
 
3.1.2 Louage d’ouvrage 
In France, the Napoleonic Code civil of 1804 – and the codes that followed it in Belgium, the 
Netherlands, Italy, Denmark and Germany – placed contracts for work in the category of contrats 
de louage, leasing agreements.246 The society coming out of revolutionary France’s break with the 
ancien régime was based on Égalité, the formal equality of all citizens, and on Liberté, referring not 
only to political liberties but to economic liberties as well.247 Work, which had been regulated 
mostly through the guilds and feudal arrangements, was to be governed by contracts entered into 
between equal parties. The guilds were disbanded and servitude was abolished.248 Workers 
                                                                                                                                                        
242 Hay (2000) p. 230. 
243 Cottereau (2000) p. 218. 
244 Hay (2000) p. 236. 
245 Veneziani (1986) p. 60. 
246 For the developments in Italy, c.f. Santoro Passarelli (1979) pp. 29ff. 
247 Vovelle (1995) pp. 543ff. 
248 Slavery in the Antilles did, however, live on. Vovelle (1995) p. 543. 
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became, at least in theory, free to leave their employer, a right denied them both under the ancien 
régime and master and servant law.249 
 
The Code civil made a distinction between two types of leasing agreements: the letting of things 
(louage des choses) and the letting of work (louage d’ouvrage).250 Louage d’ouvrage was defined as a 
contract by which one of the parties undertakes to do something for the other party in exchange 
for a remuneration agreed between the two.251 The leased object was the labour power of the 
worker, not her person. As a consequence of the principle that human beings cannot be bought 
and sold, labour power could only be contracted for a definite period of time or a specific task.252 
Through the law, the person and the activity was to be treated as separate objects.253 
 
Louage d’ouvrage was further subdivided into three types of contracts.254 The first of these, known 
as louage de services, (also known under its Latin name locatio operarum)  involved the letting of gens de 
travail, workers who committed themselves to the service of someone else, a category covering 
domestic servants and day labourers. The second category, the letting of voituriers, covered 
workers involved in transport; whereas the final category, louage d’ouvrage stricto sensu, (Latin: 
locatio operis faciendi) referred to contracts under which a worker undertook to carry out a definite 
task for a quote or fixed price. Similar provisions where found in the civil codes of Italy, Belgium, 
and the Netherlands.255 
 
The distinction between louage de services and louage d’ouvrage turned on whether the object of the 
contract was considered as work or the result of work. The subordination or independence of the 
                                                 
249 Cottereau (2000) p. 208f. 
250 Revet (1992) p. 34. 
251 [U]n contrat par lequel l’une des parties s’engage à faire quelque chose pour l’autre, moyennant un prix convenu 
entre elles.” Code civil, Art. 1710 quoted in Revet (1992) p. 34. 
252 Code Civil, Art. 1780. 
253 Revet (1992) p. 31. 
254 Code Civil, Art. 1779. C.f. Revet (1992) p. 35; Morin (1998) P. 129; and Veneziani (1986) p. 58. 
255 Veneziani (1986) p. 58. 
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worker was a secondary issue and in both cases work was being done for the account of someone 
else.256 In reality, the distinction came to be one between manual and intellectual work. 
Subsections of the code dealing with louage de services referred explicitly to domestic servants and 
manual workers, while the services provided by the liberal professions were found to belong in 
the louage d’ouvrage-category.257  
 
The differences in regulation between louage de services and louage d’ouvrage, and between these two 
and other leasing agreements, were nevertheless small, all belonging to the louage-category of 
contracts and subjected to the general principles of civil law.258 The jurisdiction of the Conseil des 
prud’hommes, the local labour courts, covered all disputes between employers and workers, 
regardless of the nature of the contract between the two.259 An important difference was 
nonetheless that the louage de services did imply a submission to the employer’s orders, closer to 
master and servant doctrines, while the louage d’ouvrage did not.260 Still, to most 19th century French 
workers, the customs and professional regulations retained an important role in the relationship 
with their employers. 261 In addition, the contractual regimes of the Code civil were often 
interpreted separately for each trade or industry, and with regional differences.262 
 
In Sweden – which had neither experienced any revolution nor Napoleonic conquest but was 
nonetheless influenced by continental doctrines – the situation in the late-nineteenth century has 
been described as the parallel existence of the master-servant relationship (tjenstehjonsförhållande), 
and a free contract of employment (fritt arbetsavtal) recognised by the courts but outside of the 
status relationships regulated in statutes.263 The master-servant relationship was inspired by pre-
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revolutionary continental doctrines and formed part of family law rather than contract law. The 
1864 Freedom of Industry Act (Näringsfrihetsförordningen) included some provisions concerning 
contracts of employment but it was not until the last decades of the nineteenth century that the 
principle that contracts for employment could be based on a free contract was established. In 
this, continental doctrines were important establishing a distinction between tjänstelega and 
arbetsbeting that largely followed the louage de services/louage d’ouvrage difference between contracts 
for a certain amount of work and contracts to provide a finished product. 
 
3.1.3 Industrialisation Forces Convergence 
During the last decades of the nineteenth century, with ever increasing numbers of workers in  
industrial work, legal changes took place which precipitated a convergence between the law of 
master and servant and the civil law locatio-doctrines. The new modes of production required, on 
the one hand, more mobility from workers, and, on the other, a high degree of hierarchical 
control by the employer. “Industrialisation not only centralized and mechanized work; it also 
maximized the adaptation of the worker’s behaviour to the demands of an efficient production 
process laid down in uniform rules dictated by the employer.”264 The entrepreneur’s main 
concern was to force workers to comply with “the exigences of a production process requiring 
strict observance of equally strict standardized behaviour essentially determined by the use of the 
machines.”265 
 
The master-servant relationship, modelled on domestic servants, had little to do with the realities 
of factory work. The same was the case with the professional regulations of the old order.266 In 
addition, the contract law regime of for example the Code civil, a system based on the presumed 
equality between the parties, did not hold up when it became obvious that the reality of the 
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relationship between worker and employer was of a very different kind. In England, a process of 
liberalisation, with reforms in 1867 and 1875, turned the master-servant relationship away from 
criminal sanctions and into an essentially civil matter.267 At the same time, in France, employers 
and their organisations initiatied doctrinal changes that made all workers who had entered into a 
contract of “industrial-service” considered to have undertaken to obey the employer’s orders.268 
From a comparative point of view, it was only then that French employment law moved closer to 
English law. From this point in time, the French worker once again became a kind of ‘servant’, an 
idea that was totally incompatible with the emancipation brought about by the Revolution. […] In 
England, on the other hand, the convergence resulted from a process of liberalization: penal 
sanctions for breach of contract were abolished, complementing the development towards a purely 
contractual justification of master servant relation.269 
 
At the same time, the first modern labour law statutes came into being. “To make up for the 
constraints of  submission, workers became the object of protective legislation and supported 
legal union representation.”270 As Revet points out, “the admission of the structurally unequal 
character of the employment relation led, inexorably, to legislative intervention” introducing a 
regime less unfavourable to workers.271 What was to become labour law was, thus, born out of a 
rejection of both the old order and of the freedom of contract as the instrument by which the 
parties where to set the rules for their relationship. 
 
The late nineteenth century did not, however, see the development of any single status, type of 
contract or criteria generally defining the personal scope of regulations aimed at the worker-
employer relationship. In employer’s liability law, the worker’s subordination to the orders and 
control of the employer was decisive for determining whether the employer was liable for torts 
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committed by a worker, including towards other workers.272 In the United States and the United 
Kingdom, this was accomplished through modified versions of the master-servant doctrines, 
focusing on the employer’s control or right to control the worker.273 Another example were 
statutes aimed at protecting worker’s remuneration, in particular in case of the employer’s 
bankruptcy or insolvency. In Sweden, the supreme court used permanency as a decisive criterion 
granting workers with permanent or long-term employment priority among the employer’s 
debtors, while denying it to temporary workers.274 In the United States, state courts adjudicating 
bankruptcy and insolvency laws focused not just on workers’ formal subordination to the 
employer, but on vulnerability and economic dependence as well.275 In 1852, a US Supreme Court 
decision excluded independent contractors from the personal scope of an act aimed at securing 
payments to workers in the building industry in the District of Columbia, because they were 
considered to be capable of obtaining their own securities.276 Other regulations applied to a 
certain sector of industry covering all or most workers in that industry. An 1886 Swedish statute 
concerning responsibility for railroads assigned responsibility for industrial accidents towards all 
employees of the railroad, encompassing both manual and non-manual labour as well as both 
temporary and permanent workers.277 Special statutes for the railroad industry were also found, 
for example, in the United States. 278 
 
Still, much of social legislation from the last decades of the nineteenth century had a personal 
scope largely determined in terms of social rank and status.279 In the United Kingdom, non-
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manual workers were excluded in such a way that workers who mixed their manual labour with 
any kind of trust or skill fell outside the definition. In case law, bus conductors, tram drivers, 
sales assistants, and hairdressers were all held to fall outside the scope of the statutes. Even in 
cases where the personal scope was expressly extended to cover all those employed in a certain 
sector – such as railways, mining and factory work – courts sometimes refused to apply the law to 
some categories tbereof holding that they did not belong the working class.280  
 
3.1.4 The Birth of the Concept of Employee 
Around the turn of the century, more coherent labour law legislation was being passed. In 
France, the 1898 Industrial Accidents Act is generally considered as the first important social 
legislation. It was followed by a 1907 law on the Conseils de prud’hommes, a 1910 pensions act, and, 
the same year, the first Code du Travail.281 For the new legislation, the old distinctions between 
louage d’ouvrage and louage de services made little sense. 
[For the new organisation of work] the essential criterion was dependency and control. Both the 
piece-worker (a ‘result-based’ worker i.e. the locator operis or self-employed worker under the old 
régime) and the ‘time-based’ worker are dependent because they are subject to orders, control and 
instructions of their employer. The feature that stands out in this context is the fact that they are 
‘employed’ and bound by a contract of employment. This was the focal point of labour law around 
the end of the nineteenth-century. The contract of employment defined in terms of dependency and 
control was used in order to define the sphere of influence[…].282 
 
The contrat du travail came to encompass the old louage de services while what used to have been 
louage d’ouvrage was broken up and sometimes classified as contrat du travail, sometimes as work 
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similar to that of employees, and sometimes as economically independent work.283 This 
development was not unique to France.284 
“By the early twentieth century, the Continental countries had witnessed the establishment of the 
contract of employment as an autonomous legal category distinct from other types of contract, such 
as subcontracting, self-employment and mandate. […] The new idea which pervaded the codes was 
the understanding of employment as a broader social phenomenon which included persons 
economically dependent on others, such as workers from home and self-employed.”285 
 
In Sweden, proposals for a law on the contract of employment from 1901, 1910 and 1911 did not 
go as far as to establish a general concept of employee, but were aimed at manual work, “aiming 
at workers in the social sense”.286 The 1910 government proposal exempted contracts for work 
that was not essentially manual, listing the free professions, medical doctors and artists as 
examples of exempted workers. The personal scope of the act was to be determined by the 
nature of the work, not on the employee-independent contractor distinction.287 Two years later, 
the 1912 Worker’s Protection Act (lag om arbetarskydd), contained a definition of ‘worker’ (arbetare) 
which included “all who perform work for someone else’s account without being an independent 
contractor”. In the same paragraph, ‘employer’ (arbetsgivare) was defined as someone “for whose 
account a worker is performing work, without any third person standing between them who in 
the capacity of independent contractor contracted to arrange for the performance of the 
work.”.288 Through the definitions, the act became applicable also towards workers other than 
manual workers, including foremen and those in managerial positions. The law also covered 
temporary workers. Exemptions were made for homeworkers and others who worked under 
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circumstances that made it unreasonable to demand that the employer would control how the 
work was being performed. A similar definition, equally focused on the employee-independent 
contractor divide was used in the 1916 Industrial Accident Insurance Act (lag om försäkring för olycksfall i 
arbetet).289 Other statutes, for example the 1919 act limiting working time (lag om arbetstidens 
begränsning), were still limited to manual workers. This was, however, done through expressively 
exempting foremen and others from the personal scope, a sign that the general concept of 
employee, in which others than manual workers were included, had established itself.290 In the 
early 1930s, the term arbetare (worker) had generally been replaced by arbetstagare (employee) for 
legislative purposes.291 
 
In the United Kingdom, the first decades of the twentieth century saw the introduction of 
compulsory insurance, occupational health and safety and the first minimum wage legislation. 
The personal scope slowly extended beyond the old notions of social rank and status, “as social 
legislation became more comprehensive and more egalitarian in its outlook”.292 The development 
was also influenced by the growing number of white collar employees and consideration that a 
labour law restricted to industrial workers alone was bound to be seen as class based.293 In the 
Workmen’s Compensation Act of 1906, a ‘workman’ was defined as “any person who has entered into 
or works under a contract of service or apprenticeship with an employer, whether by way of 
manual labour, clerical work or otherwise, and whether the contract is expressed or implied, is 
oral or in writing.”294 Old distinctions were nonetheless not done away with as statutory 
exclusions were made, for example, for non-manual workers with an annual salary of more than 
250 GBP, and casual workers employed for work other than the employer’s trade or business.295  
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In health insurance legislation, similar exceptions were made, together with additional exceptions 
for example for married female workers.296 Another statute which used the broad ‘workman’ 
category was the Trade Disputes Act of 1906, laying the foundation of the right to strike.297 
 
In interpreting the concept of ‘contract of service’ found in the new legislation, British courts in 
the second and third decades of the twentieth century, came to focus their attention on the 
employer’s control over the way in which the work was done. The same development could be 
seen in the United States. Important for the subsequent development of the concept of employee 
were the state worker’s compensation statutes, enacted in the second decade of the twentieth 
century providing workers who got injured with compensation regardless of whether it was the 
employer’s or a fellow worker’s fault.298 The personal scope of these statutes was commonly 
limited to a definition of the employment relationship that was empty or circular, leaving it to the 
courts to clarify the meaning of concepts such as “employee,” “employer,” “employment,” and 
“in service for another”. In all jurisdictions, interpretation came to be dominated by a test taken 
from the common law of agency, focused on the employer’s physical control of the worker.299 
 
According to Lord Wedderburn, “[t]he judges carried over the earlier concept of service, built 
from the fourteenth century upon the status and legal imagery of a pre-industrial society with 
agriculture and domestic labourers featuring prominently, and they used it to fill ‘the empty boxes 
of the contract clauses’ […] giving to the master powers to demand obedience that derive from 
the earlier relationships.”300 The result was that obedience and control came to define the concept 
of employee. In more recent years this view has been challenged. According to Simon Deakin, 
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“the control test had little to do with a pre-capitalist, personal model of employment.”301 Rather, 
its adoption more or less coincided with early twentieth century welfare legislation. Even though 
nineteenth century cases were cited as authority by the courts, control was not the principal test 
in deciding the status of workers in nineteenth century. Instead, ‘exclusive service’, whether the 
contract was a contract for service by the party exclusively, had been the criterion setting the 
limits of the Master and Servant Act and related statutes.302 In Deakin’s view, ‘control’ was not even 
decisive in determining vicarious liability under tort law, where cases more often focused on 
other parts of the employer’s defence.303 The adoption of the control test in the early twentieth 
century, therefore, has to be ascribed to other causes. 
A more convincing explanation is that the use of the control test was a doctrinal innovation which 
enabled the courts to give a restrictive interpretation to social legislation whose element of 
compulsion […] they found repugnant. The control test narrowed the scope of the new legislation 
in two ways: on the one hand it reinforced the status-based distinction between the ‘labouring’ and 
‘professional’ classes, while on the other it excluded casual and seasonal workers to whom the 
employer made a limited commitment of continuing employment.304 
 
3.2 The Modern Concept of Employee 
As the historical overview has shown, in the first decades of the 20th century, the personal scope 
of labour law became tied to the concept of employee. In addition, the concept was also used to 
determine adherence to social security regimes and other types of welfare legislation. The 
concepts used were not always identical, with the concepts of employee used in social security 
often covering a slightly wider range of workers, but close enough to influence each other and in 
some cases eventually to converge. As a result, the distinction between, on the one hand, a broad 
class of employees and, on the other, self-employed workers or independent contractors became 
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one of the most important distinctions, both of the labour market and of economic and social life 
in a broader sense. 
 
Despite differences across countries and changes over time, a number of common features of the 
concept of employee can be identified. Firstly, for a worker to be an employee, she must be 
under a contract to perform remunerated work personally. Secondly, and crucial to the 
distinction between employees and independent contractors, the work must be carried out under 
certain conditions. Most importantly, the worker must, at least to some degree, be subjected to 
the employer’s hierarchical powers to control the work process. In a 2002 comparative report, 
the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, it was found that in all 
European Union member states and Norway,  “the key element in defining a dependent 
‘employee’ is subordination. […] It is almost invariably ‘legal subordination’ which distinguishes 
between different employment relationships.”305 As will be shown below, the same is true for the 
United States. 
 
Economic dependence tends to play an auxiliary role. Often, it can be used in close cases to tip 
the balance in favour of employee status. There are, however, also examples of economic 
dependence being a necessary criterion for a finding of employee status and of economic 
dependence, together with work performed personally, being sufficient for employee status. The 
first is the case in the United Kingdom when the ‘mutuality of obligation’ doctrine is used, while 
an example of the second relates to Sweden and the inclusion of dependent contractors in the 
concept of employee.306 
 
Despite the importance of the concept of employee, statutory definitions, which exist in far from 
all countries, give little guidance. The concept of employee has, therefore, come to develop 
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largely through case law.307 Commonly, this has been done through the development of a multi-
factor test, under which courts faced with classifying a worker probe into the relationship between 
the worker and her employer looking for circumstances that speak for or against employee 
status.308 Often, the courts have a more or less set list of factors that are to be considered, laid 
down in case law, doctrine or preparatory works. The same factors tend to appear in one form or 
another in all studied countries, under different labels. Many of the factors reflect the three basic 
concerns of labour law identified in Chapter 2 – the worker being a human being under an 
obligation to perform work personally, subordinated to the bureaucratic powers of the employer, 
and economically dependent on performing remunerated work – while other factors have a 
neglibible, if any connection to the concerns of labour law.  
 
Human Being Performing Work Personally 
For a worker to be an employee she must perform work personally: this is a basic condition or 
necessary criterion for employee status in all studied countries. This should not be interpreted as 
meaning that the worker has to perform all the work personally. Workers working alongside 
helpers, assistants or family members have been found to be employees. Neither does this factor 
require that the contract is between the employer and a physical person as courts frequently have 
‘pierced the corporate veil’ to find a working owner performing work personally. 
 
Subordination 
As mentioned, subordination – the worker’s subjection to the bureaucratic powers of the 
employer orders – is one of the most important signs of employee-status. As will be shown 
below, subordination is a necessary criterion for employee status in three of the four countries 
studied here. Expressions of the notion of subordination are the right to take decisions 
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concerning the time and place of work and the employer’s power to assign the worker to new 
tasks within the limits of their contract. Generally, the subordination requirement is less strict for 
homeworkers, highly skilled workers, and others who due to the nature of their work have to be 
given a higher degree of freedom in the performance of their work. Courts in some countries 
have looked at the worker’s position in the employer’s organisational structure rather than at 
hierarchical powers, taking into account the worker’s ‘integration into the business of the 
employer’, whether the worker forms an ‘integral part of the employer’s business’, or integrated 
into the structure of a service or an enterprise organised by the employer.  
 
Economic Dependence 
The weight afforded the worker’s economic dependence varies between countries, but similar factors 
have been used to gauge the degree of dependence. A worker working exclusively for one 
employer, or for a small number of employers, is likely to be an employee, while a worker who 
serves a considerable number of clients is likely to be an independent contractor. Another sign of 
economic dependence is a long duration or permanent nature of the relationship between the 
worker and the employer. What importance the worker’s economic dependence should be 
granted is one of the most debated issues in the jurisprudence, doctrine and political debate 
concerning the concept of employee. An often proposed, and in some instances used, solution 
when the concept of employee has been perceived as too restrictive, has been to give greater 
weight to the economic dependence factors within the multi-factor test or to extend the personal 
scope of labour law to certain categories of economically dependent workers. A stronger 
emphasis on economic dependence has at times made the concept of employee of social security 
law somewhat wider than that of labour law. As the example of the United Kingdom will show, 
economic dependence factors, if used as necessary criteria, can nonetheless also serve to restrict 
the reach of the concept of employee by leaving out temporary and casual workers. 
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Other Factors 
Of factors not directly linked to the three concerns of labour law, the method of remuneration has 
been one of the most commonly used to distinguish employees from independent contractors. 
Traditionally the difference has been that employees receive fixed salaries while independent 
contractors live off the profits of their undertakings.309 In line with this employees are often 
referred to as ”wage-earners” while self-employed are sometimes called ”own-account 
workers”.310 Payment by the hour, day or month has been a sign of employee status, while 
independent contractors have been paid by task or by commission. Today, courts treat the 
remuneration factor with great caution not affording it any decisive value. A related factor, 
whether the worker takes economic risks and has opportunities to make a profit from the sound 
management of his business, is, however, still considered indicative by many courts. In particular, 
the opportunity for profit appears to play a significant role in convincing courts that the worker is 
indeed an independent contractor. In a 1990 ILO resolution the earnings of self-employed 
workers were said to “represent a return on capital as well as labour, entrepreneurial skill and risk 
taking, whereas the wage employee receives a payment for his or her labour”311. 
 
The ownership of tools and machinery is another factor that traditionally has carried significant weight. 
If a worker invests not only her labour but also her capital in the work, this is a sign that she is an 
independent contractor. Since many of the new categories of self-employed are working with 
services directed at companies, where the need for investment in capital such as machinery or 
marketing is less than in manufacturing or consumer services, this factor has become less useful. 
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In addition, various forms of leasing agreements for equipment between workers and their 
employers have made ownership a less clear cut concept. Courts have therefore become more 
careful in their use of this factor. Still, the worker’s investment in capital has been held to 
constitute an important indicator of her being an independent contractor. The opposite, that a 
worker has made no or very small investments in capital, is generally taken as a rather weak 
indicator of employee status. 
 
A third factor that often is taken into account is the skill of the worker, with low skills being an 
indication of employee status, while highly skilled workers are more likely to be independent 
contractors. As mentioned above, non-manual workers and professionals have historically often 
been left outside of the concept of employee or exempted from the personal scope of labour law 
through special provisions. 
 
As mentioned, not all factors are of equal importance. While some even can be considered as 
necessary criteria for the existence of an employee-employer relationship, others only play a 
minor role. It is in the weighting of the factors that we see the greatest difference between 
countries (and between different concepts of employee within countries) and over time. In some 
cases, it has as its aim an overall assessment of the relationship between the worker and the 
employer, while in other cases it has a specific aim or focal point such as the degree of 
subordination. 
 
Another common feature of the concept of employee across countries is that it is a mandatory 
concept, a consequence of the ordre public nature of labour law. According to the Supiot report, 
“no European country allows the parties to an employer-employee relationship alone to define 
the legal status of this relationship, since it would make labour law optional. The general 
principle, applied everywhere, is that ascertaining whether or not a given worker is self-employed 
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is contingent not upon the existence of a conventional agreement, but rather on the 
circumstances actually prevailing.”312 Courts and others who have to decide whether a worker is 
an employee look at the real relationship between the parties and disregard labels, the wording of 
the contract and even the expressed will of the parties. The mandatory nature of the concept of 
employee also has important implications for its relation to the concept of employee in other 
fields of law, notably social security and tax law. Tax treatment and the provisions of employment 
benefits are sometimes used as factors in the multi-factor tests, but have not been seen as 
determinative as that would be to deny labour law of its ordre public status. 
 
A good summary of the general characteristics of the concept of employee, is the description of 
the  “normal employment relationship”, found in a report to the 85th session of the International 
Labour Conference: 
The normal employment relationship is based on a contract of employment (explicit or implicit, 
written or oral) under which a worker agrees to perform certain work for and under the authority of 
an employer, who in turn undertakes to provide the necessary resources, machinery, materials, tools 
and working premises and to pay the worker for the work performed, as well as to respect whatever 
obligations are laid down by law in his or her treatment of the worker. Typically, employer and 
worker are asymmetrically positioned against each other. The former, who bears the major 
ownership responsibilities and business risks, has the economic and organizational authority to 
decide how the business should be carried out, including the manner of labour utilization. To obtain 
employment in such an enterprise, the later has nothing to offer but his or her personal capacities 
and professional qualifications. Therefore, economic and organizational dependence has become 
the principal characteristic of the relationship between employers and workers.313 
  
In the following four sections, accounts of the concept of employee in the United States, 
Sweden, the United Kingdom and France will be given (Sections 3.3-3.6). The sections also 
                                                 
312 Supiot et al (2001) p. 5.  
313 ILO (1997) p. 5. 
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follow the development of the personal scope of labour law in each country, focusing on the 
second half of the twentieth century. This is followed by a comparative analysis of the concept of 
employee (Section 3.7) and an attempt to answer the question whether or not the concept of 
employee is a suitable scope for labour law (Section 3.8). 
3.3. United States 
In the United States, services in exchange for money can be rendered in either of two legal forms: 
as an employee or as self-employed.314 Commonly, the self-employed workers are divided in two 
different categories, where self-employed who are owners of unincorporated businesses315, 
farmers, and ranchers are separated from independent contractors, the majority of self-employed 
workers who live off selling services in the form of labour. This distinction does not, however, 
have any legal relevance.316 Almost without exceptions, the personal scope is limited to 
employees, without including any self-employed or independent contractors, as noted by the 
Dunlop Commission: 
The single most important factor in determining which workers are covered by employment and 
labor statutes is the way the line is drawn between employees and independent contractors. Each 
labor and employment law statute covers only those it defines as employees. The statutes do not 
protect others, notably independent contractors. 317 
 
A few exemptions from the rule that federal labour law only covers employees exist. Some still 
valid nineteenth century anti-discrimination provisions cover independent contractors, as do 
special provisions safeguarding the freedom of speech for government employees and 
contractors. A special statute on occupational health and safety in the mining industry also has a 
broader scope than just employees. 
                                                 
314 Public sector employment is regulated separately. 
315 In the United States working owners of incorporated business are legally employees of their own firms. Hyde 
(2000) p. 39. 
316 Hyde (2000) p. 39f. Prof. Hyde suggests that “[a]n independent contractor might jocularly be defined as just a 
self-employed individual who someone might consider an employee.” 
317 Dunlop Commission (1994) p. 64. 
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The New Deal, President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s program to promote economic recovery and 
social reforms, brought about federal protective labour legislation in the United States. During 
the 1930s Congress enacted the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), the Social Security Act (SSA) 
and the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). The NLRA regulated collective bargaining, the SSA sat 
up a pension system, and the FLSA contained provisions about minimum wage, working hours 
and overtime pay, and child labour. Each of the three statutes was equipped with a personal 
scope with the concept of employee at the centre. None, however, contained any meaningful 
definition of the word “employee”. The NLRA’s definition of “employee” did not address the 
issue of what an employee was and the FLSA’s definition was circular, defining employee as “any 
individual employed by an employer”. In addition to the definitions being either empty or 
circular, the legislative history gave little guidance for their interpretation.318 
 
The definitions were given their practical meaning by a series of Supreme Court decisions in the 
mid-1940s. In cases concerning three key labour and social security law statutes – FLSA, NLRA, 
and SSA – the Court held that the traditional common law agency test, developed in the context 
of employers’ legal responsibility to third persons for the acts of their servants, and, therefore, 
focused on the employer’s degree of control, did not fit with the purpose of the new social 
legislation.319 
 
In NLRB v. Hearst Publications, a case concerning the NLRA, the Court held that “the mischief at 
which the Act is aimed and the remedies it offers are not confined exclusively to ‘employees’ 
within the traditional legal distinctions separating them from ‘independent contractors’”. The 
common law test could not be “imported and made exclusively controlling, without regard to the 
                                                 
318 Linder (1989a) p. 185. For exceptions from this rule, c.f. Carlson (2001) pp. 310f. 
319 NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111 (1944); Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148 (1947); United States 
v. Silk  331 U.S. 704 (1947); Rutherford Food Corp. v. Mc Comb 331 U.S. 722 (1947). 
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statute’s purposes”.320 Independent contractors were considered to be able to suffer from the 
same inequality of bargaining power, being as dependent on their daily wages and unable to resist 
arbitrary and unfair treatment, as were employees. Therefore, if “the economic facts of the 
relation make it more nearly one of employment than of independent business enterprise […] 
those characteristics may outweigh technical legal classification for purposes unrelated to the 
statutes objectives and bring the relation within its protections”.321 The court argued that 
Congress, “[t]o eliminate the causes of labor disputes and industrial strife” had thought it 
necessary to create a balance of forces in certain types of economic relationships, not simply 
embracing “employment associations in which controversies could be limited to disputes over 
proper ‘physical conduct in the performance of the service.’”322 The reference to “physical 
conduct in the performance of the service” was an allusion to the traditional common law agency 
test separating servants from independent contractors. Further, the Court referred to Congress’ reports 
on the bill recognizing that economic relationships could not be fitted “neatly into the containers 
designated ‘employee’ and ‘employer’”, concepts that had been developed for a different purpose, 
namely in connection to an employer’s legal responsibility to third persons for the acts of his 
servants.323 
 
In Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., a 1947 case concerning the FLSA, the Supreme Court held that 
“common law employee categories or employer- employee classifications under other statutes are 
not of controlling significance” as the Act contained its own definitions, comprehensive enough 
to make the Act applicable to persons and relationships outside of traditional employee and 
employer categories.324 Later in the same year, in United States v. Silk, the Court held that the 
                                                 
320 NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111 at 126, 127 (1944). 
321 NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111 at 128 (1944). 
322 NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111 at 128 (1944). 
323 NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111 at 128, 129 (1944). 
324 Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148, at 150 (1947). 
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concept of employee in the Social Security Act had to be interpreted in a broad way in order for the 
Act to fulfil its purpose and prevent some employers and employees from circumventing it.325 
 
Instead of the common law control test, the Court favoured a test based on a number of factors 
where no one factor was controlling. In Hearst the court argued that the term employee must be 
understood with reference to the purpose of the act and the facts involved in the economic 
relationship. If the conditions of the relationship required protection, protection was to be 
given.326 In Silk, five factors were listed – the employer’s degree of control, the workers 
opportunities for profit or loss, investment in facilities, the permanency of the relationship and 
level of skill required - where “no one is controlling, nor is the list complete.”327 In Rutherford Food 
Corp. v. McComb, a case concerning the applicability of the FLSA on beef boners, the Court held 
that the determination of the relationship was not to depend on isolated factors but rather upon 
the circumstances of the whole activity and “where the work done, in its essence, follows the 
usual path of an employee, putting an ‘independent contractor’ label does not take the worker 
from the protection of the act”.328 In Bartels v. Birmingham the court stated its position as “in the 
application of social legislation employees are those who as a matter of economic reality are 
dependent upon the business to which they render service” pointing to the permanency of the 
relationship, the skill required, the investment in facilities for work and opportunities for profit or 
loss.329 
 
Congress responded to the Supreme Court’s decisions by amending the definitions of 
“employee” in the NLRA and the SSA, indicating that the traditional common law test was to be 
used. In the 1947 Taft-Hartley amendments to the NLRA, it was explicitly stipulated that “any 
                                                 
325 United States v. Silk , 331 U.S. 704 at 712 (1947). 
326 NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111, at 129 (1944). 
327 United States v. Silk , 331 U.S. 704 at 713, 714, 726 (1947).  
328 Rutherford Food Corp. v. Mc Comb , 331 U.S. 722 at 728, 729 (1947). 
329 Bartels v. Birmingham, 332 U.S. 126, at 130 (1947). 
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individual having the status of an independent contractor” was to fall outside of the statutes 
definition of employee and thereby be exempted from the coverage of the act.330 In the SSA, the 
term employee is nowadays defined as “any individual who, under the usual common law rules 
applicable in determining the employer-employee relationship, has the status of an employee”.331 
The legislative history of the amendments outlined the test preferred by Congress for deciding 
whether a worker was an employee or an independent contractor.  
“Employees” work for wages or salaries under direct supervision. “Independent contractors” 
undertake to do a job for a price, decide how the work will be done, usually hire others to do the 
work, and depend for their income not upon wages but upon the difference between what they pay 
for goods, materials and labor and what they receive for the end result, that is upon profits.332 
 
For the FLSA, however, no such amendment was made, the old case-law continuing to be good 
law with regard to the FLSA. Two different tests, therefore, developed: the economic realities test 
used in the FLSA and the common law control test applicable to the NLRA and other labour law 
statutes. The difference between the tests will be examined below. 
 
In the 1960s, a number of important non-discrimination statutes were passed.333 In 1963, the 
Equal Pay Act (EPA) was enacted, requiring employers to pay male and female employees equal 
wages for equal work. One year later, due to pressures from the civil rights movement, the most 
important legal instrument in fighting employment discrimination, Title VII of the Civil Rights Acts 
of 1964, was passed. It prohibited employers, unions and employment agencies from 
                                                 
330 29 U.S.C. § 152(3). 
331 42 U.S.C. § 410(j)(2). Through other provisions of the same section, officers of corporations, together with some 
other groups of workers, such as certain delivery drivers, certain travelling salesmen, and certain homeworkers, are 
included in the SSA:s concept of employee. 
332 House Report No. 245, 80th Congress, 1st Sess. 18 (1947), cited in Linder (1989a) p. 196. 
333 Legislative efforts to protect individuals from discrimination have a long history in the United States. In 1866 and 
1870, in the wake of the Civil War and the abolition of slavery, Congress passed the Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts. 
The acts provided, among other things, that all citizens regardless of colour were entitled in every state to the same 
right to contract as was enjoyed by white citizens, a provision potentially applicable in the employment field not only 
to employees. Apart form racial discrimination the acts have also been construed as to cover discrimination based on 
religion and national origin. Due to practical nullification by the courts, the Reconstruction Civil Rights Act was 
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discriminating on the bases of race, colour, religion, national origin and sex, with respect to a 
broad range of employment decisions, including hiring, promotions and dismissals and wages and 
other working conditions. In 1972, the coverage of Title VII was extended to federal and state 
employees. Title VII outlawed discrimination of “any individual” with respect to her “privileges 
of employment.” Initially, and as late as 1986, courts interpreted this broad language to include a 
wider range of workers than just employees as understood under the common law control test.334 
Another important anti-discrimination statute, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 
(ADEA), which contained a definition of discrimination identical to that of Title VII, was also 
interpreted as having personal scope allegedly wider than the common law control test.  Later, 
however, both statutes have come to have their personal scope defined by the common law 
control test.335 
 
3.3.1 Circular Statutory Definitions 
United States labour law contains statutory definitions of the concept of employee. The 
definitions of the word “employee” found in the statutes does, however, give very little guidance 
as to the actual meaning of the word. Rather, the definitions are empty or circular. Several 
statutes, among them FLSA, Title VII, ADEA and ADA, define employee as an/any “individual 
employed by an employer,” without providing any definition of the word employer useful in the 
context of separating employees from independent contractors. 
 
In the case of some federal statutes, the courts have had to consider language that could be 
interpreted as indicating a different scope than just employees as traditionally conceived. Title VII 
stipulates it to be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to “fail or refuse to hire or to 
                                                                                                                                                        
more or less a dead letter, at least until the 1970s. C.f. Sullivan et al (1988) Vol II, p. 468 and Friedman and Strickler 
(1997) pp. 11f. 
334 Doe v. St. Joseph’s Hospital 788 F.2d 411 (7th Cir. 1986) at  422. Maltby and Yamada reports that some courts 
applied the economic realities test. Maltby and Yamada (1997) p. 249. 
335 C.f. below 3.3.4. 
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discharge any individual, or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his 
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.”336 As late as in 1986, a circuit 
court held that “there are no indications that ‘any individual’ should be read to mean only an 
employee of an employer.”337 The physician plaintiff in the case, therefore, only had to show that 
the hospital at which she had been working met the statutory definition of employer and that it had 
interfered with her employment opportunities. Later, however, the same circuit court has 
overruled this decision holding that “the simple fact the plaintiffs were not employees […] 
rendered them without the ambit of Title VII protection and precluded them from bringing 
discrimination actions alleging violations of the act.”338 
 
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) uses language equivalent to Title VII making it 
“unlawful for an employer […] to fail or refuse to hire any individual or otherwise discriminate 
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment, because of such individual’s age.”339 The Third Circuit, in limiting the personal 
scope of the ADEA to employees, reasoned that “although the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act has such laudable title that might induce laymen to infer that the statute was 
designed to prevent all age discrimination against those who work for a living, its congressional 
purpose was far less extensive since it prohibits only some types of age discrimination.”340 
According to the court, the legislative history of the statute “evinced a clear legislative intent to 
prohibit ‘age discrimination by employers against employees and applicants for employment.’”341 
Other circuits followed the same path holding “individual” was to be interpreted as 
“employee.”342 For the Equal Pay Act, no such issue exists as the EPA definition of discrimination 
                                                 
336 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2. 
337 Doe v. St. Joseph’s Hospital 788 F.2d 411, at  422. (7th Cir. 1986). 
338 Alexander v. Rush North Shore Medical Center 101 F.3d 487, at 492 (7th Cir. 1996) . 
339 29 U.S.C §623(a)1. 
340 EEOC v. Zippo Manufacturing 713 F.2d 32, at 35 (3rd Cir. 1983). 
341 EEOC v. Zippo Manufacturing 713 F.2d 32, at 35 (3rd Cir. 1983). 
342 C.f. Garret v. Phillips Mills, Inc 721 F.2d 979 at 980 (4th Cir. 1983). In the case, the Fourth Circuit makes references 
to such decisions by the Fifth and Sixth Circuits. 
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specifically refers to employees, stating that  “[n]o employer having employees subject to any 
provision of this section shall discriminate […] between employees on the basis of sex by paying 
wages […] at a rate less than the rate at which he pays wages to employees of the opposite 
sex[…].343 
 
The Fair Labor Standards Act provides similar definitions of employee and employer as other 
labour law statutes.344 A difference, apart from the fact that the FLSA was not amended by 
Congress in the 1940s in the same way that the NLRA and SSA were, is that the statute actually 
contains a definition of the verb employ. Courts, including the Supreme Court, have at times used 
the inclusion of this definition as an argument to explain the different and allegedly wider 
concept of employee given under the FLSA. In 1992, the Supreme Court explained why case law 
pertaining to the FLSA is not valid in an ERISA context, despite the fact that the two statutes 
contain identical definitions of the word employee. 
The definition of employee in the FLSA evidently derives from the child labor statutes and, on its 
face, goes beyond its ERISA counterpart. While the FLSA, like ERISA, defines an “employee” to 
include “any individual employed by an employer,” it defines the verb “employ” expansively to 
mean “suffer or permit to work.” This latter definition, whose striking breadth we have previously 
noted, stretches the meaning of “employee” to cover some parties who might not qualify as such 
under a strict application of traditional agency law principles. 345 
  
The difference, in the eyes of the courts, between the concept of employee in the FLSA and in 
other labour law statutes has led to the development of two different employee-tests: the Economic 
Realities Test used in cases concerning the FLSA; and the Common Law Control Test used in cases 
concerning other labour law statutes, but also to make the distinction between employees and 
                                                 
343 29 U.S.C. § 206(d). As an amendment to the FLSA, the definition of employee found in this act applies also to 
EPA. 
344 FLSA definitions are also used by the Equal Pay Act and the Family and Medical Leave Act, which are 
amendments to the FLSA. In the FMLA, [t]he terms “employ” [and] “employee” have the same meaning given such terms in 
subsection […] (e) and (g) of Section 203 of this title. 29 U.S.C. §2611(3). 
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independent contractors in social security and copyright law. Logically, labour law statutes that 
are formally amendments to the FLSA, such as the Equal Pay Act and the Family and Medical Leave 
Act should also fall under the economic realities test. In the case of EPA, courts have applied the 
economic realities test.346 Below, the two tests and the question of what is the difference between 
the two, if any, will be dealt with in depth.  
 
Apart from the limits to the personal scope provided for by the employee/independent 
contractor divide, labour law statutes in the United States often have additional limitations to its 
scope, exempting certain groups of employees from protection. Requirements that a worker must 
have been employed for a certain period of time or worked a certain amount of hours exclude 
many contingent workers from coverage. Further, workers in certain industries or activites are 
exempted from some labour law provisions. Even basic provisions such as the minimum wage 
and maximum hour requirements of the FLSA have numerous exemptions, for example for 
fishing, agriculture, seamen, small local newspapers, switchboard operators and certain computer 
programmers and software engineers.347 The FLSA also make exemptions for certain categories 
of employees, regardless of which sector of the economy they are engaged in. Under the “white-
collar exemption” workers who are “in a bona fide executive, administrative, or professional 
capacity” are exempted from the minimum wage and overtime regulations.348 To classify for the 
exemption, employees have to be paid a fixed salary, i.e. a predetermined amount that may not be 
subject to any reduction due to the quantity or quality of work, which has to exceed a certain 
                                                                                                                                                        
345 Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company v. Darden 503 U.S. 318, at 326 (1992). 
346 Brennan v. Partida 492 F.2d 707, at 709 (5th Cir. 1974). 
347 Alan Hyde refers to the Section 13 of the FLSA (29 U.S.C. §213) as “the single most revealing text in US 
employment law. It rolls on for pages, listing numerous employees who need not receive overtime pay or even 
minimum wage. The exemptions are clearly drafted by lawyers for the relevant employers. No attempt has been 
made to put the exemptions into uniform style, and no logic underlies them other than the political strength of 
relevant employer groups.” Hyde (2000) p. 13, note 22. 
348 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1). 
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amount. The practical implication of the exemption is that white-collar employees do not qualify 
for overtime pay.349 
 
Other statutes, for example the NLRA350, make exemptions for supervisors and managerial 
employees. Together with exemptions for members of the employer’s family, this type of 
exemptions can be of importance for self-employed working owners of incorporated businesses. 
In the case of NLRA the exception does not make much difference as the working owner hardly 
can take part in collective bargaining with himself. The OSHA makes exemptions neither for 
working owners of incorporated business nor for members of their families and has been held to 
apply to “supervisors, plant managers, partners, stockholders, an employer’s family members and 
even the company’s vice-president and president when they are performing work for the 
employer.”351  
 
Some statutes have thresholds as to how many employees an employer must have to be covered 
by the legislation. Examples are Title VII and ADA, which only apply to employers with more 
than 15 employees,352 ADEA with a threshold of 20 employees353, FMLA with 50 employees 
threshold354 and WARN, which applies only to employers with more than 100 employees355. As 
the thresholds are formulated in terms of number of employees, the question whether a worker is 
an employee or an independent contractor has the potential to be of importance also for other 
workers working for the same employer. If an employer runs her operations with a small number 
                                                 
349 Rothstein et al (1999) Vol I, p. 403ff. 
350 The term “employee” as defined in the NLRA does not include “any individual employed as a supervisor”. The 
term "supervisor" means “any individual having authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, 
lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibly to direct them, or to 
adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend such action, if in connection with the foregoing the exercise of 
such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the use of independent judgment.” 29 U.S.C. 
152(3) and (11). 
351 Rothstein (1998) p. 14. 
352 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) and 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5). 
353 29 U.S.C. § 630(b). 
354 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4). 
355 29 U.S.C. § 2101. 
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of ‘traditional’ employees and a large part of the labour force is purported to consist of 
independent contractors, the real status of the latter will determine whether the “traditional” 
employees are to be covered by, for example, Title VII and ADA. This creates the possibility for 
cases where the status of a worker not party to the conflict has to be decided.356  
 
As the statutory definitions of employee found in federal law are empty or circular, it has been 
the duty of the courts to work out the concept of employee, giving the judiciary considerable 
influence over the personal scope of labour law in the United States. Historically, two different 
tests, relevant for different labour law statutes, have developed to decide whether a worker is an 
employee or not (c.f. Section II above). The two tests are known as the Common Law Control Test 
and the Economic Realities Test. Arguably, courts have also used a hybrid of the two. In the case law 
the two tests are largely kept separate, with very few references to economic realities cases in 
common law control cases and vice versa. The common law control test applies to all federal 
statutes except the FLSA. In Darden, the Supreme Court relied on the FLSA’s expansive 
definition of the word employ (“to suffer or permit to work”) to distinguish the concept of 
employee in the FLSA from identically defined concepts in other statutes.357 
 
3.3.2 The Common Law Control Test 
The Supreme Court has held it to be a “well established” principle that where Congress uses 
terms that have accumulated settled meaning under the common law, “a court must infer, unless 
the statute otherwise dictates, that Congress means to incorporate the established meaning of 
these terms.”358 Thus, when Congress has used the term employee without defining it, the Supreme 
Court has concluded “that congress intended to describe the conventional master-servant 
                                                 
356 C.f. Ost v. West Suburban Travelers Limousine 88 F.3d. 435 (7th Cir. 1996) 
357 Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company v. Darden 503 U.S. 318, at 326 (1992). 
358 Community for Creative Non-violence v. Reid 490 U.S. 730, at 739 (1989) 
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relationship as understood by the common-law agency doctrine.”359 Also in cases where the term 
employee is defined in the statute, but the definition gives little guidance as to how it is to be 
understood, the common law control test is to be used. In Darden, the Supreme Court found that 
ERISA’s360 definition of “employee” as “any individual employed by an employer” is “completely 
circular and explains nothing,”361 which is why the common law test was adopted for determining 
who qualifies as an employee under the act.362 
 
The common law of agency regulates the relationship between principals and agents. Agents are 
persons who have been authorised by another, the principal, to act on that person’s account and 
under that person’s control. Agents are a broad category encompassing both employees – who in 
the context of agency often are referred to as servants – and some independent contractors. In 
Restatement (Second) of Agency, the American Law Institute gave the following definitions of master, 
servant and independent contractor:363 
(1) A master is a principal who employs an agent to perform service in his affairs and who controls or has 
the right to control the physical conduct of the other in the performance of the service. 
(2) A servant is an agent employed by a master to perform service in his affairs whose physical conduct in 
the performance of the service is controlled or is subject to the right to control by the master. 
(3) An independent contractor is a person who contracts with another to do something for him but who is 
not controlled by the other nor subject to the other’s right to control with respect to his physical 
conduct in the performance of the undertaking. He may or may not be an agent. 
 
The distinction between servants/employees and independent contractors who are agents is of 
significance in cases concerning the principal’s liability for torts committed by its agents towards 
                                                 
359 Community for Creative Non-violence v. Reid 490 U.S. 730, at 740 (1989). 
360 Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1002(6). 
361 Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company v. Darden 503 U.S. 318, at 323 (1992). 
362 A variant of the common law control test is used in taxation. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has developed a 
twenty factor test which has substantial similarities with the common law control test. The twenty factors of the IRS-
test were taken from court cases and from prior taxation rulings. At least one author holds that “the IRS and the 
courts generally apply the same test.” Schwochau (1998) p. 182. 
363 Restatement (Second) of Agency (1958) § 2. 
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third persons. Principals are responsible for acts of servants/employees – whose physical 
conduct they have control over or the right to control – but not for torts committed by 
independent contractors – over which they lack such control. In its chapter on third person v. 
principal torts, the Restatement (Second) of Agency therefore gives a more elaborate definition of 
servant in order to distinguish servants from independent contractors, supplying a non-exhaustive 
list of factors to be considered:364 
(1) A servant is a person employed to perform services in the affairs of another and who with respect to 
the physical conduct in the performance of the services is subject to the other’s control or right to 
control. 
(2) In determining whether one acting for another is a servant or an independent contractor, the following 
matters of fact, among others, are considered: 
(a) the extent of control which, by the agreement, the master may exercise over the details of the work; 
(b) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct occupation or business; 
(c) the kind of occupation, with the reference to whether, in the locality, the work is usually done under 
the direction of the employer or by a specialist without supervision; 
(d) the skill required in the particular occupation; 
(e) whether the employer or the workman supplies instrumentalities, tools, and the place of work for the 
person doing the work; 
(f) the length of time for which the person is employed;  
(g) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job; 
(h) whether or not the work is a part of the regular business of the employer; 
(i) whether or not the parties believe they are creating the relation of master and servant; and 
(j) whether the principal is or is not in business. 
 
In 1989, the Supreme Court – citing precedent and the Restatement (Second) of Agency, held that “[i]n 
determining whether a hired party is an employee under the general common law of agency, we 
consider the hiring party’s right to control the manner and means by which the product is 
accomplished. Among the other factors relevant to this inquiry are the skill required; the source 
                                                 
364 Restatement (Second) of Agency (1958) § 220. 
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of the instrumentalities and tools; the location of the work; the duration of the relationship 
between the parties; whether the hiring party has the right to assign additional projects to the 
hired party; the extent of the hired party’s discretion over when and how long to work; the 
method of payment; the hired party’s role in hiring and paying assistants; whether the work is 
part of the regular business of the hiring party; whether the hiring party is in business; the 
provision of employee benefits; and the tax treatment of the hired party.”365  
 
Below, more elaborate descriptions of the most important factors of the common law control 
test are given, although they are grouped in somewhat broader categories than in the common 
law test. Distinguishing between the factors is not easy, but neither is it necessary as the 
individual factors are factors to be gauged when weighing the totality of circumstances, not 
mandatory requisites that have to be fulfilled. 
 
Subordination 
Under the common law control test, the typical case of an employer having control or the right to 
control the physical conduct of the alleged employee is the owner or manager of a business giving 
instructions as to the means and manners of work. He or she monitors the workers, and has the 
right to take disciplinary measures against workers who do not follow instructions. Another 
important part of the control of means and manner is the worker’s discretion as to the location 
of work in time. If the employer decides the working hours, this is an indication that the worker 
is an employee. A mere deadline however, does not satisfy this requirement.366 
 
The control can also be of a more subtle nature, with little of precise instructions. In this context, 
the work of professionals and highly skilled workers poses certain difficulties. A computer 
programmer has been considered to be under the control of the alleged employer, even though 
                                                 
365 Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, at 751-752 (1989). 
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the work required far more skill than merely transcribing the employer’s instructions. Despite 
being unskilled at programming, the employer was capable of directing the worker on the desired 
functions of the programme by giving input and programming limitations, which is why this 
weighed heavily in favor of finding the worker to be an employee.367 A photographer, who took 
directions as to the composition of the subjects, the mood of the lighting and the emotions to be 
given by the images, was, however, not considered to be under the supervision of the alleged 
employer.368 A physician under contract to provide emergency medical services at a hospital was 
considered to have “the manner in which he rendered services to his patients primarily within his 
own control”. He had “authority to exercise his own independent discretion over the care he 
delivered to his patients,” and was not required to admit his patients to the alleged employer 
hospital.369 
 
The instructions do not have to come by formal authority. In a case concerning driver-
distributors for a bottling company, the court found that “the record amply supports [the] 
conclusion that the company has the right to, and does, control the distributors’ performance of 
their duties – not by formal authority, but by the means of suggestions which are adhered to 
because of the company’s power to grant and revoke distributorships and to alter their value at 
will.”370 In a case concerning driver-salesmen selling food and beverages from a catering 
company, the court found that the salesmen were employees. The salesmen had been trained in 
the exact procedures desired by the alleged employer; drove according to a route set by the 
caterer; were obliged to serve only the caterer’s customers and to buy all their goods from the 
caterer; and in reality had small possibilities to set their own prices.371 Drivers owning their own 
vehicles, and under a leasing agreement putting the vehicles and their own labour at the disposal 
                                                                                                                                                        
366 Marco v. Accent Publishing Co, Inc. 969 F.2d 1547, at 1550 (3rd 1992). 
367 Aymes v. Bonelli, 980 F.2d 857, at 862 (2nd Cir, 1992). 
368 Marco v. Accent Publishing Co, Inc. 969 F.2d 1547, at 1552 (3rd Cir. 1992). 
369 Alexander v. Rush North Shore Medical Center, 101 F.3d 487, at 493 (7th Cir. 1996). 
370 Seven-Up Bottling Co v. NLRB, 506 F.2d 596, at 600 (1st Cir. 1974). 
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of a carrier company were, however, considered to be independent contractors, as they were free 
to reject loads for any reason; could chose the time and route; and where neither disciplined nor 
supervised.372 
 
The control factor is in itself a broad factor consisting of sub-factors that have to be considered 
together. The Supreme Court has found workers who fixed their own hours of work and 
performed their work away from the alleged employer’s offices and thus not under his direct 
supervision to be employees nevertheless. The workers, “debit-agents” of an insurance company, 
were expected to follow detailed instructions, file weekly reports, and attend weekly staff 
meetings. In addition, they were subjected to the alleged employer’s investigations into 
complaints, warnings in case of poor performance and could have their contracts terminated “at 
any time”.373 In a case concerning musicians in an orchestra, the alleged employer, a hotel, 
exercised control over the type, time and location of the service produced. The workers were 
nonetheless held not to be employees, as the alleged employer did not appear to have the right to 
exert any significant authority over the manner the work was done.374 
 
The Supreme Court in Reid listed the principal’s right to assign additional work as a separate factor, 
but it could as well be considered a subcategory of control. In a case where the alleged employer 
had the right to and did assign other projects to the worker, the court considered it a mitigating 
factor that the delegation of additional projects to the worker was not inconsistent with the 
worker being the company’s independent trouble-shooter.375 An employer’s right to require a 
photographer to re-shoot unsatisfactory images was considered to be merely in possession of a 
                                                                                                                                                        
371 NLRB v. Maine Caterers, Inc., 654 F.2d 131(1st Cir. 1981). 
372 NLRB v. A. Duie Pyle, Inc., 606 F.2d 379, at 382-383 (3rd Cir. 1979). 
373 NLRB v. United Insurance Co., 390 U.S. 254, at 257 (1968). 
374 Hilton. Int. Co. v. NLRB, 690 F.2d 318, at 321 (2nd Cir. 1982). 
375 Aymes v. Bonelli, 980 F.2d 857, at 863 (2nd Cir. 1992). 
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right to final approval, not a right to assign more work. The employer could not, the court stated, 
“for example, require [the photographer] to photograph its employee of the month.”376 
 
One of the boundaries of the control or right to control is towards the coordinated operations of 
a principal and a subcontractor. This boundary is relevant both in cases where the subcontractor 
as an individual is allegedly an employee and in cases concerning the employees of 
subcontractors, who can be considered employees of the principal. In cases concerning federal 
employer’s liability for death and injury to workers formally employed by subcontractors, the 
Supreme Court has held that the coordinated operations of a subcontractor and a principal, 
which naturally involves the passing of information and accommodations of the activities of the 
two entities, is not enough to make a subcontractor, or his employees, employees of the 
principal.377 If the principal exercises directive control over the individual workmen, however, 
employee status can be attributed.378 
 
If a worker performs work that is an integral part of the employer’s regular business, this is, according to 
the Court in Reid, evidence of the worker being an employee. As an example, the fact that a 
worker had been involved in producing designs for a fabric design production business was, 
considered evidence of the worker being an employee.379 If the worker performs collateral tasks, 
for example, repairing a machine or acting as a consultant, this is a sign that the worker is an 
independent contractor. Courts have also looked to factors such as the workers displaying the 
logo or colours, or wearing the uniform, of the alleged employer, and found them to be evidence 
pointing in the direction of the worker being an employee.380 Defining what is integral to the 
business of the employer is, however, far from easy. Whether driving is an integral part of the 
                                                 
376 Marco v. Accent Publishing Co, Inc. 969 F.2d 1547, at 1551 (3rd 1992). 
377 Kelley v. Southern Pacific Co., 419 U.S. 318, at 330 (1974). 
378 Baker v. Texas & Pacific R. 359 U.S. 227, at 228-229 (1959). C.f. also dissenting opinion by Justice Douglas in Kelley 
v. Southern Pacific Co., 419 U.S. 318 (1974). 
379 Langman Fabrics v. Graff Californiawear, Inc., 160 F.3d 106, at 113 (2nd Cir. 1998). 
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business of a limousine service or trucking central, depends upon whether these are viewed as 
transportation companies or providers of services to limousine or truck drivers. Further, the 
classification of work that is vertical to the alleged employer’s business, as in the case of 
distributors, easily comes to depend on vague ideas of the normal degree of vertical integration.381 
 
Economic Dependence 
Only one of the Reid-factors is a sign of economic dependence. If the duration of the job is short, 
this is considered a sign of the worker being an independent contractor rather than an employee. 
More permanent employment indicates the existence of an employer-employee relationship. 
When assessing the weight that should be given to the duration of the relationship, courts have 
seen the duration in the light of the overall closeness of the relationship. The fact that a 
photographer had for six months produced pictures for a publisher was considered only weak 
evidence, if any, of an employment relationship, as he had worked without a regular schedule or 
regular hours.382 If the short duration of the job depends upon the closing of the worksite, not 
because the nature of the work or the relationship, this should not count against the worker being 
an employee.383 Occasionally, courts have given consideration to more general notions of 
economic dependence. According to the Seventh Circuit, “financial interdependence is a factor 
that should be considered when determining whether an individual is an employee or 
independent contractor.”384 The Ninth Circuit held that the fact that a worker in the construction 
industry worked for 75-100 customers as an indication of independent contractor status.385 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
380 Short v. Central States, Southeast & Southwest areas Pension Fund 729 F.2d 567, at 573 (8th Cir. 1984). 
381 Carlson (2001) p. 348. 
382 Marco v. Accent Publishing Co, Inc. 969 F.2d 1547, at 1551 (3rd 1992). 
383 Eisenberg v. Advance Relocation & Storage, Inc. 237 F.3d 111, at 117 (2nd Cir. 2000). 
384 Knight v. United Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co., 950 F.2d 377 at 381 (7th Cir. 1991). The case concerned Title VII. 
The Court of Appeals found that the District Court, “correctly recognized the use of the ‘economic realities’ test 
which involves the application of the general principles of agency to the facts”. The Court of Appeals did, however, 
also hold that Donovan v. DialAmerica was not relevant in the case, as it concerned FLSA where the definition of 
“employee” is given a broader meaning. 
385 Associated Independent Owner-Operators, Inc v. NLRB, 407 F.2d 1383, at 1386 (9th Cir. 1969). 
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Other Factors 
Traditionally, employees have been perceived as wage earners, being paid a fixed amount per 
hour, day or month. Although the exceptions from this rule have been numerous, with many 
employees receiving pay based on a task rate and many independent contractors charging hourly 
rates, the type of remuneration does nonetheless play a role in determining whether a worker is an 
employee or an independent contractor. If the remuneration, apart from the labour of the 
worker, also is to cover the use of valuable equipment and if the worker is to pay his own 
expenses from the received remuneration, this is evidence of the worker being an independent 
contractor. This is true also in cases where workers are paid on an hourly basis.386 In a case 
concerning caterers the court also considered the workers’ risk of loss and opportunity for profit 
as an indication of independent contractor status.387 On the employer’s side, the fact that the 
alleged employer had a direct financial stake, 60 percent of gross fares, in the amounts collected 
by the workers was considered a sign that the workers where in fact employees.388 
 
Further, the ownership of tools, machinery or premises for work, the fact that the work is performed with 
the tools or machinery, or on premises owned by the alleged employer for the activity in 
question, is considered evidence of the worker being an employee. That workers own their own 
heavy equipment, such as tractors and trucks, or are paying the rental costs for the equipment, 
has been considered indicia that they are independent contractors.389 
 
If a high level of skill is required to perform the job, this is considered a sign that the worker is an 
independent contractor rather than an employee. Computer programmers, photographers, artists 
and architects have been held to independent contractors at least partly built on the fact that they 
                                                 
386 Associated Independent Owner-Operators, Inc v. NLRB, 407 F.2d 1383, at 1386 (9th Cir. 1969). 
387 NLRB v. Maine Caterers, Inc. 654 F.2d 131, at 134 (1st Cir. 1981). 
388 NLRB v. O’Hare-Midway Limousine Service, 924 F.2d 692, at 695 (7th Cir. 1991). 
389 Associated Independent Owner-Operators, Inc v. NLRB, 407 F.2d 1383, at 1385 (9th Cir. 1969) and NLRB v. Maine 
Caterers, Inc. 654 F.2d 131, at 134 (1st Cir. 1981).  
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are highly skilled.390 Being highly skilled does nevertheless not necessarily rule out the possibility 
of being deemed an employee. Already in the Restatement, the authors indicated the degree of 
skill required was more indicative in situations where the worker was hired for a short time, and 
that highly skilled workers who were in an occupation ordinarily considered as incidental to the 
employer’s business would normally be considered employees.391 
 
If the employer withholds taxes and pays benefits, such as disability insurance, worker’s compensation 
or medical insurance, this will count in favour of the worker being an employee. The importance 
of this factor is contested. In some cases it has been considered very important, in particular if 
the alleged employer, by paying or not paying taxes and benefits, has indicated a status other than 
the status claimed by the alleged employer in court.392 In other cases, concerns have been raised 
that according extra weight to this factor could render the employee-independent contractor 
divide dispositive. “Were […] benefits and tax treatment factors accorded extra weight […] a firm 
and its workers could all but agree for themselves, simply by adjusting the structure of worker’s 
compensation packages, whether the workers will be regarded as independent contractors or 
employees.”393 
 
The Supreme Court in Reid points out that its list of factors is non-exhaustive. Courts have, 
therefore, come to take a multitude of factors, some enumerated by the Supreme Court and some 
not, into account. Examples of such factors are whether the worker is operating under licenses 
and permits held by the alleged employer394, and the intent of the parties as to what kind or 
relationship they wished to create. Even though it should not be possible to contract out of 
                                                 
390 Aymes v. Bonelli, 980 F.2d 857, at 862 (2nd Cir. 1992); Marco v. Accent Publishing Co, Inc. 969 F.2d 1547, at 1551 (3rd 
1992). 
391 Restatement (Second) of Agency (1958) §220, Comment (i). 
392 In a case where the employer had not offered any employment benefits and not paid the worker’s payroll taxes, 
this counted against the employer when the employer later, for purposes of copyright, claimed that the worker was 
an employee. A corporation “should not in one context be able to claim that [the worker] was independent and later 
deny him that status” the court held. Aymes v. Bonelli, 980 F.2d 857, at 862 (2nd Cir. 1992). 
393 Eisenberg v. Advance Relocation & Storage, Inc. 237 F.3d 111, at 116 (2nd Cir. 2000). 
Engblom, Samuel (2003), Self-employment and the personal scope of labour law : comparative lessons from France, Italy, 
Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States 
European University Institute
 
 
DOI: 10.2870/68969
 122
labour and employment law, courts have accorded the intent of the parties some, even 
significant, value, in cases where the original intention of the parties was very clear.395 
 
Method for Weighting the Factors 
There is little doubt that the control factor dominates the common law test of employee. The 
other factors can tip the balance in close cases, but it is highly unlikely that any court in the 
United States would find control or right to control to be lacking but yet find the worker to be an 
employee based on the other factors.396 In Reid, the Supreme Court keeps “the hiring party’s right 
to control the manner and means by which the product is accomplished,” separate from “other 
factors relevant” to the inquiry, implying that a greater emphasis should be put on the right-to-
control factor than on the other factors. At the end of its enumeration of factors that “among 
others” are relevant, the Supreme Court adds that “none of these factors is determinative.”397  
 
Lower level courts confirm the importance of the control-factor. Circuit courts seem always to 
consider the control-factor, whereas the other factors are more or less optional. The Second 
Circuit has held that some factors will often have little or no significance, while other factors will 
be significant in virtually every situation and, therefore, be given more weight. In the latter 
category of factors, the Second Circuit finds the hiring party’s right to control the manner and 
means of work; the skill required; the provision of employee benefits; the tax treatment of the 
hired party; and whether the hiring party has the right to assign additional projects to the hired 
party.398 The same circuit has later held that not all the factors outlined in Reid will be significant 
in every case. Only those factors that are actually indicative should be considered – not factors 
                                                                                                                                                        
394 Short v. Central States, Southeast & Southwest areas Pension Fund 729 F.2d 567, at 573 (8th Cir. 1984). 
395 Mangram v. General Motors Corporation, 108 F.3d 61, at 63 (4th Cir. 1997). 
396 Larson, in his treatise on workers’ compensation law comments the relative weight of the factors of the common 
law control test: “On only one point as to the relative weight of the various tests is there an accepted rule of law: It is 
constantly said that the right to control the details of the work is the primary test.” Larson and Larson (2000) §60.03. 
397 Community for Creative Non-violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, at 751-752 (1989). 
398 Aymes v. Bonelli 980 F.2d 857, at 861 (2nd Cir. 1992). 
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that do not meaningfully support one or other conclusion.399 Other circuits may have different 
views concerning which of the other factors are more important, but would most likely agree that 
the control-factor stands out.400 
 
The degree of control has to be seen in the light of the work itself and the industry in which it is 
performed. That an emergency room physician had to comply with detailed hospital regulations 
in carrying out his services was not considered a reliable indicator of whether the physician was 
an employee or an independent contractor. Professional standards and responsibility, shared 
between the physician and the hospital, required the hospital to keep appropriate records and 
follow established procedures. In the case, the Fourth Circuit went as far as to outline a set of 
factors to be used for medical doctors.401 
 
An important issue is whether the weight given to the different factors varies depending on 
which regulation is before the court. Is there only one common law control test, or are there 
several? Most importantly, does the purpose of the statute at hand influence the weighting of the 
factors? A strong indication that the statute at hand and its purpose is of no, or only limited, 
importance is the fact that the leading Supreme Court case, Reid, is a copyright case. Copyright 
cases differ from labour law cases in that it is the employer who claims that the worker is an 
                                                 
399 Eisenberg v. Advance Relocation & Storage, Inc. 237 F.3d 111, at 114 (2nd Cir. 2000). 
400 In Aymes, the Second Circuit supplies a list of examples how other courts have considered only some of the Reid 
factors ignoring others.  Aymes v. Bonelli 980 F.2d 857, at 861 (2nd Cir. 1992). 
401 “[W]e think it relevant to consider the following factors in determining whether a doctor, performing emergency 
room services at a hospital, is an employee or an independent contractor: (1) the control of when the doctor works, 
how many hours he works, and the administrative details incidental to his work; (2) the source of instrumentalities of 
the doctor’s work; (3) the duration of the relationship between the parties; (4) whether the hiring party has the right 
to assign additional work to the doctor or to preclude the doctor from working at other facilities or for competitors; 
(5) the method of payment; (6) the doctor’s role in hiring an paying assistants; (7) whether the work is part of the 
regular business of the hiring party and how it is customarily discharged; (8) the provision of pension benefits and 
other employee benefits; (9) the tax treatment of the doctor’s income; and (10) whether the parties believe they have 
created an employment relationship or an independent contractors relationship.” Cilecek v. Inova Health System Services, 
115 F.3d 256, at 261 (4th Cir. 1997). 
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employee, and the worker who claims to be an independent contractor.402 Reid has, nevertheless, 
subsequently been cited by the Supreme Court itself in a case concerning employee pension 
benefits403 and by other courts in cases concerning Title VII404 and ADA and ADEA405. This can 
be seen as an indication that there is a uniform common law control test that is to be applied 
regardless of the purpose of the regulation for which it defines the personal scope. Several 
scholars have taken this position. According to Richard R. Carlson, in Darden “the question of 
statutory purpose [came] squarely before the court,” a question the court answered in the 
negative.406 Similarly, Marc Linder has criticised the courts for the “simulated statutory 
purposelessness” with which they treat labour law statutes.407 
 
In Eisenberg, a 2000 Title VII-case, the Second Circuit nevertheless argued for weighing the 
factors differently in copyright cases and in cases where the statute in question holds a protective 
purpose and is of a mandatory nature. “While the rights to intellectual property can depend on 
contractual terms, the right to be treated in a non-discriminatory manner does not depend on the 
terms of any particular contract. Rather, these “public law” rights were vested in workers as a 
class by Congress, and they are not subject to waiver or sale by individuals.”408 In particular the 
employee benefits and tax treatment were to be seen in a different light. “Were […] benefits and 
tax treatment factors accorded extra weight […] a firm and its workers could all but agree for 
themselves, simply by adjusting the structure of worker’s compensation packages, whether the 
                                                 
402 The common law control test has nonetheless been criticised for not providing a “good fit” in the copyright 
context, and not being in line with the legislators’ intention of a bright line between situations where the principal 
owns the copyright and where the worker does. Dumas v. Gommerman, 865 F.2d 1093, at 1104 (9th Cir. 1989). 
403 Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company v. Darden 503 U.S. 318 (1992). 
404 Cilecek v. Inova Health System Services, 115 F.3d 256 (4th Cir. 1997) and Eisenberg v. Advance Relocation & Storage, Inc. 
237 F.3d 111 (2nd Cir. 2000). 
405 Metropolitan Pilots Association v. Schlosberg, 151 F.Supp2d 511, at 519 (D. New Jersey, 2001). 
406 Carlson (2001) p. 331. 
407 Linder (1999) p. 187. 
408 Eisenberg v. Advance Relocation & Storage, Inc. 237 F.3d 111, at 116 (2nd Cir. 2000). 
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workers will be regarded as independent contractors or employees.”409 According to the court, 
such agreements were more acceptable in the case of copyright than under civil rights legislation. 
 
3.3.3 Economic Realities Test 
The Economic Realities Test has its origins in the Supreme Court’s Hearst, Walling, Silk and 
Rutherford decisions from the mid 1940s.410 In particular, the five factors listed in Silk – the 
employer’s degree of control; the worker’s opportunities for profit or loss; investment in 
facilities; the permanency of the relationship; and the level of skill required – have come to be of 
great importance in subsequent case law. As indicated by the Silk court, however, the list is not to 
be considered exhaustive, which is why other factors also have come to weigh in. “Since the test 
concerns the totality of the circumstances, any relevant evidence may be considered, and 
mechanical application of the test is to be avoided.”411 Some circuits have devised different 
versions of the tests, with the same focus but with an additional factor – whether the work 
performed by the worker is an integral part of the operation of the employer or not.412 
 
The list of factors used for the economic realities is to a large extent the same as the that of the 
common law control test. In Table 3.3.2 the main factors of the common law control test and the 
economic realities test, as expressed in Reid and Silk respectively, are summarised. Six factors – 
control, skill, permanency, capital investment, type of remuneration and the work being an 
integral part of the employer’s operations – are present in both test. In addition, the last four 
factors of the common law control test as expressed in Reid have all to some extent been used 
also in cases under the economic realities test. 
 
                                                 
409 Eisenberg v. Advance Relocation & Storage, Inc. 237 F.3d 111, at 116 (2nd Cir. 2000). 
410 NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111 (1944); Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148 (1947); United States 
v. Silk  331 U.S. 704 (1947); and Rutherford Food Corp. v. Mc Comb 331 U.S. 722 (1947). 
411 Brock v. Superior Care, Inc. 840 F.2d 1054, at 1059. (2nd Cir. 1988) 
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Table 3.3.2 Main Factors of the Common Law and Economic Realities Tests 
 Common Law Test 
As expressed in Reid 
Economic Realities Test 
As expressed in Silk* 
1. Control Hiring party’s right to control the means and 
manners by which the product is accomplished 
Right to assign additional projects to the hired 
party 
The extent of the hired party’s discretion over 
when and how long to work 
Employer’s degree of control 
2. Level of Skill Skill required Level of skill required 
3. Permanency Duration of the relationship between the parties Permanency of the relation 
4. Capital Investment Source of instrumentalities and tools 
Location of the work 
Investment in facilities 
5. Type of Remuneration Method of payment Worker’s opportunities for 
profit or loss 
6. Integral Part of 
Employer’s Operations 
Whether the work is part of the regular business 
of the hiring party 
Integral part of employer’s 
operations* 
7. Payment of Taxes and 
Benefits 
The provision of employment benefits 
The tax treatment of the hired party 
 
8. Other The hired party’s role in hiring and paying 
assistants 
Whether the hiring party is in business 
 
*The integral part of operations factor was not listed in Silk, but has been added later by other courts. 
 
The factors also seem to have largely the same meaning. Under both tests, the control-factor has 
been considered satisfied not just by the traditional exercise of employer’s prerogatives but also 
through other, less formal, limits to the worker’s options as to the means and manners of work.413 
The skill factor also takes roughly the same shape, with the difference that economic realities 
cases have focused less on the absolute level of skill and more on the nature of the skill. In 
particular, skills allowing the worker to exercise initiative affecting the success of the business 
have been considered as indicative of independence.414 The permanency-factor has also taken a 
more or less identical meaning under the two tests, looking not at the mere duration of the work 
                                                                                                                                                        
412 This factor is used e.g. in Donovan v. DialAmerica Marketing, Inc. 757 F.2d 1376 (3rd Cir 1985); Secretary of Labor v. 
Lauritzen 835 F.2d. 1529 (7th Cir. 1987); and Dole v. Snell 875 F.2d 802 (10th Cir. 1989). 
413 Applying the economic realities test in a case concerning the operator of a laundry and dry cleaning business, the 
Fifth Circuit held that “[i]t is not significant how one ‘could have’ acted under the contract terms . The controlling 
economic realities are reflected by the way one actually acts.” Usery v. Pilgrim Equipment 527 F.2d 1308, at 1312 (5th 
Cir. 1976). C.f. also Donovan v. Sureway Cleaners 656 F.2d 1368, at 1371 (9th Cir. 1981); and Doty v. Elias 733 F.2d 720, 
at 723 (10th Cir. 1984). 
414 In a case concerning nurses provided by a health care service, the court held that “[t]he fact that workers are 
skilled is not itself indicative of independent contractor status. A variety of skilled workers who do not exercise 
significant initiative in locating work opportunities have been held to be employees under the FLSA.” Brock v. 
Engblom, Samuel (2003), Self-employment and the personal scope of labour law : comparative lessons from France, Italy, 
Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States 
European University Institute
 
 
DOI: 10.2870/68969
 127
but at the nature of the relationship.415 The capital investment-factor is also more or less the same 
under the two tests. Under both tests, the type of remuneration-factor has come to concentrate 
on the workers’ opportunity for profit or loss.416 Also, the integral part of the employer’s 
operation-factor seems to be more or less identical.417 Finally, the four last factors of the common 
law test as expressed in Reid, even though not listed in Silk and not established as a part of the 
economic realities, have all been used by courts applying the economic realities test, with largely 
the same meaning. In fact, variations as to the content of the factors seem to be as large within 
each test as they have been between the two tests. Despite these similarities in how the individual 
factors have been interpreted under the two tests, courts discussing a certain factor under one 
test as a rule make no reference to cases under the other test where the same factor has been 
discussed. One of the few exceptions to this rule is the Supreme Court, which in Reid cites Bartels 
and Silk when discussing the factors other than control.418 
 
The difference, or the perceived difference, between the two tests is to be found in the method 
for weighing the factors together. The Economic Realities Test has an expressed focal point: 
economic dependence. The Fifth Circuit, speaking of the five factor test it has employed in cases 
concerning the FLSA, has stated that “no one of these considerations can become the final 
determinant, nor can the collective answer to all of the inquiries produce a resolution which 
submerges consideration of the dominant factor – economic dependence.”419 The factors are to 
                                                                                                                                                        
Superior Care, Inc. 840 F.2d 1054, at 1060 (2nd Cir. 1988). C.f. also Usery v. Pilgrim Equipment Company Inc 527 F.2d 1308, 
at 1314 (5th Cir. 1976). 
415 As an example, the relationship between a migrant farm worker hired for the harvest and the employer was found 
“permanent and exclusive for the duration of that harvest season”. Secretary of Labor v. Lauritzen 835 F.2d 1529, at 
1537 (7th Cir. 1987). C.f. also Brock v. Mr W Fireworks, Inc 814 F.2d 1042, at 1054 (5th Cir. 1987); and Brock v. Superior 
Care, Inc. 840 F.2d 1054, at 1060 (2nd Cir. 1988). 
416 “Toiling for money on a piecework basis ” one court applying the economic realities test held, is “more like wages 
than an opportunity for ‘profit’”.416 Dole v. Snell 875 F.2d 802, at 809 (10th Cir. 1989). C.f. also Rutherford Food Corp. v. 
Mc Comb , 331 U.S. 722, at 730 (1947); Usery v. Pilgrim Equipment Company 527 F.2d 1308, at 1313 (5th Cir. 1976); 
Donovan v. Sureway Cleaners 656 F.2d 1368, at 1371 (9th Cir. 1981); Secretary of Labor v. Lauritzen 835 F.2d 1529, at 1536 
(7th Cir 1987); and Martin v. Selker Brothers, Inc. 949 F.2d 1286, at 1294 (3rd Cir. 1991).  
417 For the economic realities test c.f. Donovan v. DialAmerica Marketing, Inc. 757 F.2d 1376 (3rd Cir 1985) Secretary of 
Labor v. Lauritzen 835 F.2d. 1529 (7th Cir. 1987), and Dole v. Snell 875 F.2d 802 (10th Cir. 1989). 
418 Community for Creative Non-violence v. Reid 490 U.S. 730, at 751-752 (1989). 
419 Usery v. Pilgrim Equipment 527 F.2d 1308, at 1311 (5th Cir. 1976). 
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be considered as tools to gauge the degree of dependence of the workers on the business with 
which they were connected. “It is dependence that indicates employee status. Each test must be 
applied with that ultimate notion in mind.”420 Also other circuits have recognised the worker’s 
economic dependence as the focal point in deciding whether the individual is an employee or an 
independent contractor.421 
 
The Supreme Court in Hearst, explaining why the common law distinction between employee and 
independent contractor was not suitable to determine the personal scope of the new social 
legislation adopted in the 1930s, argued that some independent contractors in the common law 
sense of the word were as dependent on their daily wages and as unable to leave their 
employment as were employees.422 This economic dependence made it difficult for the workers 
to resist arbitrary and unfair treatment. In Bartels, the Court held that “in the application of social 
legislation employees are those who as a matter of economic reality are dependent upon the 
business to which they render service.”423 
 
In their subsequent treatment of FLSA cases, the appellate courts have developed the notion of 
economic dependence. According to the Fifth Circuit, “[i]t is dependence that indicates employee 
status. Each test must be applied with that ultimate notion in mind.”424 The various factors are 
“tools to be used to gauge the degree of dependence of alleged employees on the business with 
which they were connected.”425 In another case, the same appellate court held that “[e]conomic 
dependence is not an independent variable with a life of its own—it can only be determined in 
conjunction with consideration of the economic reality of all the relevant circumstances.”426 The 
Seventh Circuit has described the economic dependence as “more than just another factor”, 
                                                 
420 Usery v. Pilgrim Equipment 527 F.2d 1308, at 1311. (5th Cir. 1976). 
421 Doty v. Elias 733 F.2d 720 (10th Cir. 1984); Secretary of Labor v. Lauritzen 835 F.2d 1529 (7th Cir. 1987). 
422 NLRB v. Hearst Publications 322 U.S. 111, at 127 (1944). 
423 Bartels v. Birmingham  332 U.S. 126, at 130 (1947). 
424 Usery v. Pilgrim Equipment 527 F.2d 1308, at 1311 (5th Cir. 1976). 
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being “the focus of all the other considerations.”427 “[T]he final and determinative question must 
be whether the total of the testing establishes the personnel are dependent upon the business 
upon which they are connected that they come within the protection of the FLSA or are 
sufficiently independent to fall outside its ambit.”428 The Tenth Circuit has held that “the focal 
point in deciding whether an individual is an employee is whether the individual is economically 
dependent on the business to which he renders service, or is, as a matter of economic fact, in 
business for himself.”429 
 
Economic dependence is not conditioned on reliance on an alleged employer as the primary 
source of income. Instead, “the dependence at issue is dependence on that job for that income to 
be continued and not necessarily for complete sustenance.”430 The fact that all workers stopped 
doing work of the kind in question when the employer ceased providing such work has been 
considered as evidence that the workers were economically dependent.431 Further, the fact that 
the work an alleged employee performed amounted to less than 30 percent of her income did not 
keep her from being considered economically dependent.432  
 
Another sign that workers are economically dependent and not in business for themselves is that 
the workers have no independent business organisations that they can market and use in dealings 
with different employers.433 If workers are not in a position to offer their services to many 
different businesses and organisations, work continuously for the same employer and have 
opportunities to work only when and if the employer is in need of their services, they will 
                                                                                                                                                        
425 Usery v. Pilgrim Equipment 527 F.2d 1308, at 1311 (5th Cir. 1976). 
426 Brock v. Mr W Fireworks, Inc 814 F.2d 1042, at 1054 (5th Cir. 1987). 
427 Secretary of Labor v. Lauritzen 835 F.2d 1529, at 1538 (7th Cir. 1987). 
428 Secretary of Labor v. Lauritzen 835 F.2d 1529, at 1538 (7th Cir. 1987). 
429 Doty v. Elias 733 F.2d 720, at 722-3 (10th Cir. 1984).  
430 Halferty v. Pulse Drug Company, Inc 821 F.2d 261, at 267 (5th Cir. 1987) 
431 Donovan v. DialAmerica Marketing, Inc. 757 F.2d 1376, at 1387 (3rd Cir. 1985) 
432 Halferty v. Pulse Drug Company, Inc 821 F.2d 261, at 267 (5th Cir. 1987) 
433 Brock v. Mr W Fireworks, Inc. 814 F.2d 1042, at 1054 (5th Cir. 1987) 
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normally be considered as employees.434 Having been an independent contractor for other 
companies, before starting working for the alleged employer, does “not preclude a finding that 
the worker might have exchanged his status for the security of the present employee 
relationship.”435 
 
Workers who do work for different employers, frequently moving from one employer to another, 
can nonetheless still be considered employees. The Fifth Circuit in Seafood, held that “[e]ven if the 
freedom to work for multiple employers may provide something of a safety net, unless a worker 
possesses specialized and widely-demanded skills, that freedom is hardly the same as true 
economic independence.”436 
 
Attention should, arguably, also be given to the negative fact of the worker not being in business 
on his own. The courts often come back, under different factor-headings, to the employer’s 
control of the determinants of profits. The employer’s control of the determinants of profits 
have been cited as evidence of the employer’s degree of control437, the worker’s opportunity for 
profit and loss438, as well as under the factor concerned with the skill required for the work439.  
 
Despite courts’ arguments to the contrary, it can nonetheless be argued that economic 
dependence as the notion has been explained here, is not the only circumstance which must be 
considered when the concept of employee under the FLSA is to be applied. Otherwise, some of 
the factors in the five and six factor tests would seem superfluous. The attention given to the 
internal workings of the relationship under control-factor, for example, has little to do with the 
                                                 
434 Donovan v. DialAmerica Marketing, Inc. 757 F.2d 1376, at 1386 (3rd Cir. 1985) 
435 Robicheaux v. Radcliff Material, Inc. 697 F.2d 662, at 667 (5th Cir. 1983). 
436 McLaughlin v. Seafood Inc 867 F.2d 875, at 877 (5th Cir. 1989). 
437 McLaughlin v. Seafood, Inc 867 F.2d 875, at 877 (5th Cir. 1989); and Donovan v. Sureway Cleaners, 656 F.2d 1368, at 
1371 (9th Cir. 1981) 
438 Martin v. Selker Brothers 949 F.2d 1286, at 1294 (3rd Cir. 1991) 
439 Usery v. Pilgrim Equipment Company 527 F.2d 1308, at 1314 (5th Cir. 1976) 
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worker’s economic dependence.440 Whether or not the worker has invested capital in the 
operation she is engaged in also says little about her degree of economic dependence. On the one 
hand, investment in tools, machinery or reputation can make it easier for the worker to take her 
business someplace else. On the other, investments that are specific to the specific employer can 
make the worker more dependent than she would be had the investment not been made. Further, 
whether or not the work performed is an integral part of the employer’s operation is a factor 
more aimed at the employer’s dependence on the worker than vice versa.  
 
3.3.4 The Hybrid Test 
In several cases, circuit courts have applied a hybrid test, combining the common law control test 
and the economic realities test, to determine whether a worker is an employee or an independent 
contractor.441 The hybrid test appears in a range of anti-discrimination cases, concerning both 
Title VII and ADEA, from the late 1970s and the early 1980s. 
 
In a 1982 Title VII-case, the Eleventh Circuit held that as there was no indication that Congress 
intended the words of the statute to have any meaning other than their ordinary one as 
commonly understood, and absent guidance from the Supreme Court, the term employee under 
Title VII was to be construed in light of general common law concepts. The court then, however, 
went on to conclude that “the analysis […] should take into account the economic realities of the 
situation[.] This does not mean, however, that the economic realities with respect to the 
dependence of the individual on the employment will control. Rather it is the economic realities 
of the relationship viewed in light of the common law principles of agency and the right of the 
                                                 
440 Maltby and Yamada go as far as claiming that courts “nominally adopting the economic realities test have, in fact, 
applied a right-to-control analysis more consistent with the […] common law test.” Maltby and Yamada (1997) p. 
250. 
441 The hybrid test has been applied, at one time or another, by the Third, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Eight, Ninth, 
Tenth and Eleventh Circuits. Wilde v. County of Kandiyohi 15 F.3d 103, at 105 (8th Cir. 1994). 
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employer to control the employee that are determinative.”442 In the case, despite having argued 
that the choice of test controlled the outcome of the case, the court affirmed the decision of the 
district court on the basis that the district court in its application of the common law control test 
had gone “beyond the simple right to control and weighed all the factors involved in the situation 
in making its decision.”443 
 
The year after, the Third Circuit had to consider which employee test was to be applied to the 
ADEA. The court noted that the Supreme Court had observed that ADEA in itself is a hybrid of 
both FLSA and Title VII, with procedures and remedies taken from the former and the 
substantive provisions from the latter. As the personal scope was a matter of substance the court 
held that “the hybrid standard that combines the common law ‘right of control’ with the 
‘economics realities’ as applied in Title VII cases is the correct standard for determining employee 
status under ADEA.”444 In the opinion of the court, the hybrid test was narrower than the 
economic realities test. 445  In the case, which concerned salesmen for the Zippo cigarette lighter 
company, the court found the employer’s low level of control over the means and manners of 
work and lack of supervision, together with the worker’s skill, the method of remuneration, the 
workers’ ownership of equipment and lack of employment benefits, was indicative of the workers 
being independent contractors. Only the duration of the salesmen’s relationship with the 
employer was considered to indicate employee status. In the end, the court nevertheless refused 
to distinguish between the tests. “Therefore, even if the appellants were required to sell only 
Zippo products, and even if they were economically dependent on the income they earned as 
Zippo [salesmen], these factors are not sufficient to establish that they were employees when 
balanced against the other factors that tend to establish their status as independent contractors. 
                                                 
442 Cobb v. Sun Paper, Inc 673 F.2d 337, at 341 (11th Cir. 1982). certiorari denied 459 U.S. 874.  
443 Cobb v. Sun Papers, Inc 673 F.2d 337, at 341-342 (11th Cir. 1982) 
444 EEOC v. Zippo Manufacturing 713 F.2d 32, at 38. (3rd Cir. 1983) 
445 EEOC v. Zippo Manufacturing 713 F.2d 32, at 37. (3rd Cir. 1983) 
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In any event, we believe that the appellants were independent contractors even under the more 
liberal economic realities standard as applied in FLSA cases.”446 
 
In another ADEA case form the same year, the Fourth Circuit agreed with the Third Circuit and 
held that “whether an individual is an employee in the ADEA context is properly determined by 
analyzing the facts of each employment relationship under a standard that incorporates both the 
common law test derived from principles of agency and the so-called ‘economic realities’ test.”447 
The case concerned a salesman working essentially unsupervised, paid by commission, with a real 
opportunity for profit and with the tax and benefit arrangements of an independent contractor. 
The court concluded that even though it was a close case, the district court had not erred in 
finding him to be an independent contractor rather than an employee. 
 
The status of the hybrid test post-Darden is unclear. Ample evidence, nonetheless, suggests that 
Darden has overruled the hybrid test. The Supreme Court, which has never applied the hybrid test 
itself, makes no mention of any other test than the common law control test, which is to be 
applied if congress has not indicated any other meaning of the word employee, and the economic 
realities test, which is to be applied in FLSA cases. The Second Circuit, in a case decided shortly 
after Darden, held, as a consequence of Darden, that “the question of whether an individual is an 
employee or an independent contractor within the meaning of the ADEA must be determined in 
accordance with common law principles.”448 The Fourth Circuit, which despite Darden used the 
hybrid test in a Title VII-case449 as late as 1993 seem to have given up the test. In two anti-
discrimination cases from 1997, concerning ADEA and Title VII respectively, the court makes 
                                                 
446 EEOC v. Zippo Manufacturing 713 F.2d 32, at 38. (3rd Cir. 1983). 
447 Garrett v. Phillips Mills, Inc. 721 F2d 979, at 981 (4th Cir. 1983). 
448 Frankel v. Bally 987 F.2d 86, at 90 (2nd Cir. 1993). 
449 Haavistola v. Community Fire Company  6 F.3d 211 (4th Cir. 1993). 
Engblom, Samuel (2003), Self-employment and the personal scope of labour law : comparative lessons from France, Italy, 
Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States 
European University Institute
 
 
DOI: 10.2870/68969
 134
no mention of the hybrid test.450 In a 1994 decision, the Eight Circuit, after having taken note of 
the Supreme Court’s Reid and Darden decisions concluded that a district court had not erred when 
it applied the hybrid test to a Title VII-case. The reason, however, was that the Circuit court saw 
“no significant difference between the hybrid test and the common law test articulated by the 
Supreme Court in Darden. […] Under both tests, all aspects of the working relationship are 
considered. The Restatement’s list of common-law factors used in both tests is nonexhaustive, 
and consideration of the additional economic factors does not broaden the traditional common-
law test. Indeed, by adding employee benefit and tax-treatment factors to the Restatement factors 
in its explanation of the common law test, the Supreme Court recognized the common-law test 
encompasses economic factors.”451 Three years later, in an ADA case, the same circuit made no 
mention of the hybrid test.452 In addition, the Seventh Circuit has, post-Darden, applied the 
common law control test in a discrimination case without mentioning the hybrid test.453 More 
explicitly, a federal district court has considered the Third Circuit’s earlier use of a hybrid test 
combining the traditional common law right to control test with the economic realities test to 
have been already overruled by the Supreme Court in the Reid decision.454  
 
3.3.5 Differences and Similarities Between the Tests 
As explained above, the personal scope of federal labour law in the United States is limited to 
employees – and in some case further restricted by thresholds or exemptions. Still, as the courts 
have used two, arguably three, different tests to distinguish employees from independent 
contractors the personal scope does not seem to be as uniform as the language of the statutes 
indicate. The crucial question is whether the different tests give different outcomes, whether a 
worker that would be considered an employee under one test would be an independent 
                                                 
450 Mangram v. General Motors Corp. 108 F.3d 61 (4th Cir. 1997), Cilecek v. Inova Health System 115 F.3d 256 (4th Cir. 
1997). 
451 Wilde v. County of Kandiyohi 15 F.3d 103, at 106 (8th Cir. 1994). 
452 Birchem v. Knights of Columbus 116 F.3d 310 (8th Cir. 1997). 
453 Alexander v. Rush North Shore Medical Center 101 F.3d 487 (7th Cir. 1996). 
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contractor under another? Is it possible to envisage cases where the outcome would have differed 
depending on which test had been used?  
 
The Dunlop Commission found that the line between employees and independent contractors 
“has been drawn differently in the different statutes, depending on the inclinations of the agency 
at the time or Supreme Court doing the drawing. These differences in interpretation mean that a 
worker might be deemed an employee for purposes of the FLSA but an independent contractor 
for purposes of the NLRA.” Similarly, many courts seem convinced that the choice of employee-
test makes a difference, a position forcefully stated by the Third Circuit in Zippo:455 
When Gertrude Stein penned her oft-quoted “A rose is a rose is a rose is a rose,” she was implying 
some universal qualities that defined and identified the 100 or 200 species of the flowering shrubs 
of Rosa. In contrast to the rose, when one examines the plethora of federal cases construing the 
varied and disparate federal statutes one discovers the notable absence of comparable universal 
qualities that define and identify the status of employee so as to fit its meaning within all common 
law and statutory definitions. Therein lies reason for the paradoxical truth that even when the same 
person performs the same acts at the same time in the same place under the same conditions 
conceivably he could not be considered an employee under some common law standards and some 
federal statutory definitions while he nevertheless could be considered an employee under those of 
others. This absence of universality in qualities and definition unavoidably breeds ambiguity and 
confusion requiring courts to assess a broad spectrum of facts in their quest to clarify and determine 
who is and who is not an employee. 
 
Others find no or only very small differences between the tests. Lewis Maltby and David Yamada 
hold that many courts have in fact “acknowledged that the distinction between the tests tend to 
be minimal.”456 Alan Hyde finds that the differences between the tests to have been “wildly 
overstated” and that the two test, together with the twenty factor taxation law version of the 
                                                                                                                                                        
454 Metropolitan Pilots Association v. Schlosberg 151 F.Supp.2d 511, at 519 (DC. New Jersey 2001) 
455 EEOC v. Zippo Manufacturing 713 F.2d 32, at 35 (3rd Cir. 1983). 
456 Maltby and Yamada (1997) p. 254. 
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common law test, “are normally applied so that a given individual who is an employee for one 
statute normally is an employee for all of them.”457  
 
There are important similarities in the methods for weighing the factors together. The Supreme 
Court has described the two methods in very similar language. The common law control test 
contains “no shorthand formula or magic phrase that can be applied to find the answer, but all of 
the incidents of the relationship must be assessed and weighed with no one factor being 
decisive.”458 Under the economic realities test, “the determination of the relationship does not 
depend on […] isolated factors but rather upon the circumstances of the whole activity.”459 
Likewise, in neither test is the list of factors to be considered as mandatory or exhaustive. 
Differences exist, however. The economic realities test has an expressed focal point – economic 
dependency – that, at least in theory, sets it apart from the common law control test. Further, the 
Supreme Court’s statement that “no one factor [is] decisive” in the common law control test 
seems to have been contradicted by reality. As mentioned above, the control factor dominates 
the common law test and it has to be considered highly unlikely that any court in the United 
States would find control or right to control to be lacking but yet find the worker an employee 
based on other factors. It can, nevertheless, be questioned whether these differences have any 
practical implications. 
 
Here, the difference between the two tests will be assessed through applying the allegedly 
narrower common law control test to the facts of cases decided under the allegedly broader 
economic realitites test. The latter test supposedly encompasses all workers who are employees 
                                                 
457 Hyde (2000) pp. 12 and 49. 
458 NLRB v. United Insurance Company of America 390 U.S. 254, at 258 (1968). 
459 Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb 331 U.S. 722, at 730 (1947). 
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under the control test (or the hybrid test) together with some workers who would not be 
considered employees under the control test.460 
 
Hearst461 was the first case where the Supreme Court applied the economic realities test. In the 
case, the respondent, a publisher of four daily newspapers in Los Angeles, had refused to enter 
collective bargaining with workers who sold their newspapers on the streets, on the ground that 
the workers were not employees under the NLRA. In Hearst, the control factor – which in the 
control test is expressed in terms of the hiring party’s right to control the means and manners of 
work and the employer’s right to assign additional projects to the hired party – seemed to be well 
satisfied. The newspaper publisher’s district managers supervised the vendors through assigning 
spots and street corners to them and could order transfers from one spot to another for business 
or disciplinary reasons. Further, the hours of work were “determined not simply by the 
impersonal pressures of the market, but to a real extent by explicit instructions from the district 
managers.”462 Sanctions, varying from reprimands to dismissals, were visited upon vendors. 
Management’s instruction in helpful sales techniques, such as the manner of displaying the 
newspaper and the emphasis of certain headlines, were to be followed. 
 
The control exercised by the alleged employer in Hearst can be compared to that exercised by the 
alleged employer in United Insurance,463 an NLRA-case decided by the Supreme Court a quarter of 
a century later under the common law control test. United Insurance concerned workers whose 
primary function was to collect premiums from insurance policy holders, to prevent the lapsing 
                                                 
460 Despite the economic realities test being described as broader than the common law control test, could it be 
possible to envisage a situation where a worker deemed an employee under the common law control test would be 
considered an independent contractor under the economic realities test? This would be a relationship, where a 
worker is temporarily under the control of an employer but does not show enough signs of economic dependence to 
be deemed an employee under the economic realities test. Here, this possibility will be left to one side. The presence 
of the permanence- and integral part of operations-factors in the common law control test and of the control factor 
in the economic realities test rules out such a possibility. 
461 NLRB v. Hearst 322 U.S. 111 (1944). 
462 NLRB v. Hearst 322 U.S. 111, at 118 (1944). 
463 NLRB v. United Insurance Company of America 390 U.S. 254 (1968). 
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of policies, and sell new policies to the extent time allowed. The workers were supplied lists of 
the company’s existing policy holders, which effectively amounted to an assignment of a specific 
geographic area, much like the street vendors. Further, the workers were given and expected to 
follow detailed instructions on selling techniques and other duties, instructions that could be 
changed unilaterally by the insurance company. Complaints against the workers were investigated 
by the insurance company’s management, which could issue reprimands and retain the right to 
terminate the relationship. In the case, the Supreme Court held that the NLRB’s decision to 
consider the workers employees rather than independent contractors did not err as a matter of 
law and should have been enforced. 
 
As to the other factors of the control test, there seem to be no important difference between 
Hearst and United Insurance. In both cases, no prior experience or skill was needed to start the 
work, the workers were not just casually employed but showed some permanency, they had made 
little or no capital investment, were paid by commission and were equally integral to the 
employer’s operation. Therefore, in particular considering the high degree of control present in 
Hearst, it is not unreasonable to think that a court, confronted with the facts of Hearst today 
would find the newspaper vendors to be employees under the control test. 
 
Marc Linder believes that Hearst, as well as Rutherford, could have been decided in favour of the 
workers being employees already under the common law test as it existed in the 1940s.464 Richard 
Carlson, commenting on congressional intervention that followed Hearst, holds that “it is 
impossible to know whether the Taft-Hartley Act has actually affected the outcome in any 
particular case or for any general classification of workers. And despite Congress’s particular 
disapproval of Hearst, it is still possible that even ‘newsboys’ are employees.”465 
 
                                                 
464 Linder (1989a) p. 201. 
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A more recent case, and one which can be considered to be at the limits of the economic realities 
test, is Secretary of Labor v. Lauritzen.466 In Lauritzen, the Seventh Circuit’s finding of employee-
status was questioned in a concurring opinion, in part based on the employer’s lack of control 
over the means and manners of work. The plaintiffs in the case were migrant farm workers 
involved in the harvesting of pickles. For most of the year, the alleged employer ran the business 
by himself and with a few regular employees involved in planting, fertilising and irrigating the 
crop. At the beginning of the harvest, pickle plots were assigned to the migrant farm worker 
families. The workers then had to decide which pickles to harvets and when to pick them, so as 
to get the maximum yield out of each plot, being paid more for pickles of a better grade. The 
alleged employer occasionally visited the fields to check on the workers and the crop and to 
supervise irrigation. The workers referred to the alleged employer as “boss” and some believed 
he had the right to fire them. 
 
Judge Easterbrook, in his concurring opinion, argued that these circumstances did not amount to 
the kind of control commonly associated with the control factor. “Lauritzen did not prescribe or 
monitor the migrant workers’ methods of work, but instead measured output, the weight and 
kind of cucumbers picked. Lauritzen did not say who would work but instead negotiated with the 
head of each migrant family. Lauritzen did not control how long each member of the family 
worked.”467 The majority, however, held that the alleged employer had not effectively 
relinquished control over the harvesting to the workers. The right to control, the court held, 
applied to the entire pickle farming operation, not just the details of harvesting. Over the 
operation as a whole, the alleged employer exercised pervasive control.468 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
465 Carlson (2001) p. 324. 
466 Secretary of Labor v. Lauritzen 835 F.2d 1529 (7th Cir. 1987). 
467 Secretary of Labor v. Lauritzen 835 F.2d 1529, at 1540 (7th Cir. 1987). 
468 Secretary of Labor v. Lauritzen 835 F.2d 1529, at 1536 (7th Cir. 1987). 
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As for the other factors of the economic realities test, the court did not find any evidence 
strongly indicative of independent contractor status. Although pickle picking did require some 
skill, it did not indicate independence. The duration of the work, although seasonal, did not 
convert the workers from employees to independent contractors. The workers had made virtually 
no capital investments and although the pickle pickers could affect their income upwards there 
was no corresponding possibility for loss. Finally, harvesting was found to be an integral part of 
the employer’s operation. Weighing it all together, the court found the workers to be 
economically dependent on the employer. 
 
Had Lauritzen been decided under the common law control test, the outcome might very well 
have been different, a point made by Judge Easterbrook in his concurring opinion. It is 
nonetheless not entirely unthinkable that the outcome would have been the same. Courts 
applying the common law control test have held that control does not have to be exercised by 
formal authority, “but can be exercised by means of suggestions which are adhered to because of 
the company’s power.”469 If the pickle pickers in Lauritzen are compared to the salesmen in 
NLRB v. Maine Caterers,470 which were found to be employees under the common law control 
test, the level of control is not very different. The salesmen were assigned districts, which they 
had to work as best they could under a system of incentives. They had a duty to report to the 
employer and were subjected to occasional supervision. In addition, the other relevant factors of 
Lauritzen seem to point in the direction of the workers being employees, potentially tipping the 
scale in a situation where the control factor does not provide enough guidance. 
 
A possible conclusion of the two examples, Hearst and Lauritzen, is that the two tests, even 
though not the same, essentially lead to the same outcomes. The possibility that a case would be 
                                                 
469 Seven-Up Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 506 F.2d 596, at 600 (1st Cir. 1974). 
470 NLRB v. Maine Caterers, 654 F.2d 131 (1st Cir. 1974). 
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considered differently under one test than under the other has to be considered as small.471 
Maltby and Yamada, concluding their investigation of the different employee-tests, states that “it 
is not altogether clear that some of the plaintiffs who have been caught in the adoption of the 
Darden common-law test would have fared any better under the economic realities test.”472 An 
important aspect mediating the difference between the two tests is the inclusion in the economic 
realities test of the control factor. The employer’s control or right to control the means and 
manners of work is arguably of little relevance for the economic dependence of the worker. 
Influenced by common law doctrines, courts have nevertheless given the control factor 
significant weight also under the economic realities test. On at least one recent occasion, a Circuit 
court applied the economic realities test without making any reference to economic dependence, 
instead giving significant weight to the employer’s lack of control over the worker.473 Some 
commentators have gone as far as arguing that the “factor of economic dependence has been 
marginalized or even swept aside by courts that have claimed to adopt the economic realities 
test.”474   
3.4 Sweden 
The uniform personal scope can be seen as one of the characteristics of Swedish labour law. Few 
workers other than employees are covered, but on the other hand, the concept of employee is 
broad and the exemptions from the personal scope are few. From a comparative perspective, the 
fact that employees are not divided into any subcategories for blue collar, white collar or 
                                                 
471 Some support for this conclusion can be drawn from appeals courts’ reluctance to change the outcome in cases 
where the lower court has applied the wrong test. The Eleventh Circuit, despite having argued that “a review of the 
record reveals, however, that the choice of tests controls the outcome of this case,” concluded that the “[p]laintiff 
argues the common law analysis of the court did not apply the economic realities orientation of the kind set out in 
Spirides and Lutcher. It is clear, however, that the district court went beyond the simple right to control issue and 
weighed all the relevant factors involved in the situation in making its determination. We must affirm this decision of 
the trial court.” Cobb v. Sun Papers, Inc 673 F.2d 337, at 341-342 (11th Cir. 1982). In a 1983 case where the plaintiff-
appellant argued that the economic realities test should be applied to an ADEA case, the Fourth Circuit chose not to 
have an opinion on whether the economic realities test, the common law test or the hybrid test ought to be used in 
ADEA cases. Instead, the court held that there was no evidence that supported the conclusion that the plaintiff was 
an employee even under “the more liberal economic realities test”. Hickey v. Arkla Industries, Inc 699 F.2d 748, at 751 
(5th Cir. 1983). 
472 Maltby and Yamada (1997) p. 254. 
473 Herman v. Express Sixty-Minutes Delivery Service 161 F.3d 299 (5th Cir. 1998). 
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executive employees stands out.475 In statutes, the personal scope is most often defined as 
‘employees’ or ‘employees in private or public employment’. An example of an act with such 
plain scope is the Annual Leave Act, which grants rights to paid leave or holiday pay to all 
“employees”.476 Other examples are the four anti-discrimination acts, applicable to all employees 
without any exceptions.477 The jurisdiction of the Labour Court is limited to disputes concerning 
collective agreements and other disputes concerning “the relationship between employers and 
employees”.478 
 
More commonly the personal scope is in some way modified, containing a short list of employees 
exempted from the personal scope. The Employment Protection Act excludes managers, relatives of 
the employer, employees working in the household of the employer, and workers in special 
labour market programmes from dismissal protection.479 These workers are, nevertheless, 
protected against certain kinds of discriminatory dismissals by the anti-discrimination acts. 
 
More rarely, other categories of workers are added to the personal scope. In the Employment (Co-
determination in the Workplace) Act, the term employee “shall also include any person who performs 
work for another and is not thereby employed by that other person but who occupies a position 
of essentially the same nature as that of an employee. In such circumstances, the person for 
whose benefit the work is performed shall be deemed to be an employer.”480 Today, however, the 
most common view is that this extension to dependent contractors does not add any category of 
                                                                                                                                                        
474 Maltby and Yamada (1997) p. 250. 
475 C.f. Källström (1999) p. 164. 
476 Semesterlagen (1977:480), §1. All direct quotes to Swedish statutes in this section are taken from the English 
translations of the statutes available on the homepage of the Swedish Ministry for Industry, Employment and 
Communications. [http://naring.regeringen.se/inenglish/info/index.htm.] 
477 The anti-discrimination acts are Jämställdhetslagen (1991:433) (Sex discrimination) Lag (1999:130) om åtgärder mot 
etnisk diskriminering i arbetslivet  (Ethnic discrimination), Lag (1999:132) om förbud mot diskriminering i arbetslivet av personer 
med funktionshinder (Disability) and Lag (1999:133) om förbud mot diskriminering i arbetslivet på grund av sexuell läggning 
(Sexual orientation). 
478 Lag (1974:371) om rättegången i arbetstvister, 1 kap. 1§.  C.f. also SOU 1974:8 p. 153. In the case AD 1978 nr 148, 
however, the Labour Court held that a dispute between two corporations could not be considered a dispute 
concerning a collective agreement when the party performing the work was a limited company. 
479 Lag (1982:80) om anställningsskydd 1§. 
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workers to the personal scope, as the dependent contractors it was supposed to capture, has 
come to fall inside the concept of employee.481 A better, but more complex, example is the Work 
Environment Act, which, on one hand, excludes certain categories of employees from its personal 
scope, but, on the other, adds persons under education, inmates of penal institutions and persons 
doing their military service to the personal scope of some of its provisions. Further, it assigns 
employers some responsibilities that go beyond the circle of her employees and that can include 
self-employed workers.482 
 
Thresholds as to the size of the employers undertaking are rare in Sweden. None of the 
important statutes has a personal scope that is dependent on the size of the undertaking or the 
number of employees. Certain obligations, such as having plans of action for equality and equal 
pay, are nonetheless only applicable to employers with more than ten employees.483  
 
3.4.1 A Uniform Scope with a Flexible Definition  
Swedish labour law statutes do not contain any definition of the concept of employee. Instead, 
the concept has developed through a combination of judicial interpretations – in particular by the 
Supreme Court (Högsta domstolen) and the Labour Court (Arbetsdomstolen) – and indications by the 
legislators in preparatory works.484 The most common starting point for any analysis of the 
concept of employee in Swedish law is a 1949 decision by the Supreme Court,485 which has been 
repeated and confirmed by preparatory works of later legislation.486 Swedish lawmakers have 
aimed for a more or less uniform concept of employee, to be used both in labour law and in 
                                                                                                                                                        
480 Lag (1976:580) om medbestämmande i arbetslivet, § 1 2st. 
481 C.f. below, 3.4.3. 
482 C.f. below, 4.5.2. 
483 Jämställdhetslagen (1991:433) §§ 11 and 13. 
484 In Sweden, preparatory works carry great weight and are used extensively by the courts. For an account in English 
of the importance of preparatory works in Swedish law, c.f. Frändberg (1998). 
485 NJA 1949 s 768. 
486 C.f. the thorough investigation of the concept of employee found in the preparatory works of the 1976 
Employment (Co-determination in the Workplace) Act, Government White Paper SOU 1975:1 pp. 691ff, in particular 
pp. 721f. 
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other fields.487 At the same time, it has been considered desirable to ensure a certain degree of 
flexibility, allowing the concept to adapt to different statutory contexts, different sections of the 
labour market, and over time.  
 
Historical Development 
Since the Second World War, the development of the personal scope of Swedish labour law can 
be described as on a trend towards a more and more uniform scope, defined by a gradually 
widening concept of employee incorporating groups of workers earlier found outside the scope. 
Different concepts of employee and a legal category of third type workers and have been made 
obsolete by the extension of the flexible private law concept of employee (civilrättsliga 
arbetstagarebegreppet). 
 
Never defined in any statute, different concepts of employee were used depending on which 
statute was to be interpreted and by what court or agency. The concept used for industrial 
accident insurance, occupational health and safety and working time regulations was wider than 
the concept used in regulations on annual leave and in collective labour law.488 The private law 
concept of employee was first developed in the 1930s. At the time, the concepts of employee 
used by the Supreme Court (Högsta domstolen), the Labour Court (Arbetsdomstolen) and the National 
Industrial Injuries Insurance Court (Försäkringsrådet) – the three authorities that had to give 
guiding interpretations of the different statutes where the concept of employee could be found – 
differed significantly, especially between the latter two. The Labour Court took its point of 
departure in contract law, examining the content of the agreement between the worker and the 
employer, whereas the industrial injuries insurance court used the social and economic status of 
the parties to classify the relationship. The Labour Court’s private law concept of employee was 
generally considered as more narrow than the social law concept of employee (socialrättsliga 
                                                 
487 C.f. Källström (1994) p. 63. 
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arbetstagarbegreppet) used by the Industrial Injuries Insurance Court, and was criticised for leaving 
workers who were socially and economically strongly resemble employees outside the scope of 
labour law regulation. The criticism, articulated by organisations representing travelling salesmen 
and gasoline distributors, led to the addition, in 1945, of a new category of workers, dependent 
contractors (beroende uppdragstagare), in collective labour law legislation. Dependent contractors 
were workers who did not fulfil the requirements for being employees under private law, but who 
were in a state of dependence in relation to the employer that made their situation essentially 
similar to that of employees. 489 
 
The distinction between dependent contractors and independent contractors, the latter still 
outside the scope of labour law regulation, was to be made based on the nature and the degree of 
the dependence between the worker and the employer. Dependent contractors where 
distinguished by a degree of subordination laying somewhere between that typical for employees 
and that of independent contractors, and by their economic dependence. The extended personal 
scope had the effect that a number of collective agreements covering dependent contractors were 
concluded, often granting them the same rights and benefits as employees.490 
 
Alongside the development of the dependent contractor category in collective labour law, the 
concept of employee in individual labour law developed. The committee preparing the 1945 
Annual Leave Act491 decided not to include dependent contractors in the personal scope of its 
proposal. As the distinction between dependent and independent contractors was difficult to 
make, the committee did not consider it possible to include dependent contractors in the 
personal scope of an individual labour law regulation as the Annual Leave Act. Including 
                                                                                                                                                        
488 SOU 1944:59 p. 52f. 
489 For an account of these developments, c.f. Prop. 1945:88 pp. 5ff,  SOU 1975:1, pp. 696ff and Adlercreutz (1964) 
74ff. 
490 For a summary of the developments the first ten years, c.f. SOU 1957:14 pp. 46f. 
491 Lag (1945: 420) om semester. 
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dependent contractors would, due to the vagueness of the concept, lead to too many disputes 
and make the application of the law problematic. This concern was less strong in the case of 
collective labour law, where litigation in reality would be limited to a small number of 
organisations, not individual workers.492 It was also foreseen that their newly granted collective 
rights would make it easier for many dependent contractors to achieve holiday benefits through 
collective agreements, instead of through statutory regulation.493 The personal scope of the 
holiday act was therefore limited to “employees in public or private service”,494 by which was to 
be understood the private law concept of employee. The private law concept of employee was, 
however, the committee stated in the preparatory works, not a static concept, but a constantly 
developing concept that in recent years had come to encompass a wider range of workers. Other 
preparatory works from the same period also expressed the idea of a concept of employee which 
was to be influenced, for example by social and economic developments. A difference was 
nonetheless still to be made between the personal scope of public law regulations with a social 
objective, such as the occupational health and safety and mandatory industrial accident insurance, 
and private law regulations. The 1945 Annual Leave Act was considered to represent a mix of 
public and private law regulation, which explains why the interpretation of the concept of 
employee should also be influenced by social and economic circumstances.495  
 
The courts picked up the idea of a rather flexible and constantly developing concept of employee, 
built on a integrated consideration of all the relevant circumstances. In the decision NJA 1949 s. 
768, concerning the right to holiday pay of three farmers who in the winters transported timber 
for a forestry company, the Supreme Court held that the question whether a person is an 
employee was to be decided on the basis of the content of the contract. No single term of 
                                                 
492 SOU 1944:59 pp. 54ff. 
493 Prop 1945:273 p. 71. 
494 Lag (1945:420) om semester, § 1  
495 Prop 1945:273 p 71, c.f. also Prop 1945:88 s 57ff. No examples of the mentioned “private law regulations” are 
given. 
Engblom, Samuel (2003), Self-employment and the personal scope of labour law : comparative lessons from France, Italy, 
Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States 
European University Institute
 
 
DOI: 10.2870/68969
 147
contract should be decisive, according to the court, but all relevant circumstances concerning the 
contract and the employment must be considered. Guidance as to the interpretation of the 
contract could come from the economic and social position of the parties, and, if the contract 
was of a kind commonly used, from the legal classification generally accepted for that type of 
contract. 496 
 
Little less than a decade later, the Labour Court too adopted the doctrine outlined in the 1945 
preparatory works and the Supreme Court’s 1949 decision, abandoning the strictly defined 
private law concept of employee it had used thus far.497 Some years later, a government 
committee concluded that the Labour Court and the Industrial Injuries Insurance Court had 
come to use the same concept of employee as the Supreme Court.498 
 
The new concept of employee, despite being wide and flexible, did not include all the dependent 
contractors covered by the collective labour law regulations of 1945. In the 1950s and 1960s, the 
inclusion of dependent contractors in the personal scope of labour law regulation was subject to 
further investigation by various committees. In a government white paper with the title Beroende 
uppdragstagare (Dependent contractors), the committee had no fundamental objections to an 
extension of the personal scope of a number of individual labour law regulations. Nevertheless, it 
deemed an extended scope of a number of regulations to be unnecessary as it would not change 
the situation for the workers. Among the regulations were the working time and occupational 
health and safety regulations, where an extended scope was considered unnecessary as most 
dependent contractors would be excluded from the scope anyway under an exception applicable 
                                                 
496 “Frågan huruvida någon i lagens mening är arbetstagare hos annan eller icke är att bedöma efter vad dem emellan 
kan anses avtalat, varvid man icke kan inskränka sig till något visst avtalsvillkor såsomt ensamt avgörande utan har att 
beakta alla i samband med avtalet och anställningen förekommande omständigheter. Härvid kan de avtalsslutandes 
ekonomiska och sociala ställning vara ägnad att belysa, huru avtalet bör uppfattas. Att förhållandena i varje särskilt 
fall bliva avgörande hindrar icke att, om avtalet är av en mera allmänt förekommande typ, ledning kan hämtas från 
den uppfattning om rättsläget som eljest mera allmänt gjort sig gällande.” NJA 1949 s 768, at 771. 
497 AD 1958 nr 17 and AD 1958 nr 31. C.f. also SOU 1975:1 p 706. 
498 SOU 1961:57 p. 192. 
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to “uncontrolled workers” (okontrollerade arbetstagare). In the case of the remaining regulations, for 
example, the holiday act, an extension of the personal scope was deemed technically too difficult, 
mainly due to the problematic distinction between dependent and independent contractors.499 
 
Another government committee tried the idea of giving the concepts of employee a statutory 
definition under which it would be possible to include certain groups of workers in specific 
industries, that otherwise would be considered as self-employed. Considering the varying 
circumstances on the labour market, not least the freedom of the parties to design their own 
relationships, it was not considered possible to come up with a definition that would give any 
useful guidance in all individual cases. A statutory definition would also soon be made obsolete 
by organisational and technological change. For the same kind of reasons, the proposal to give 
the concept of dependent contractor a statutory definition was rejected. 500 
 
Since the 1950s, the method used in labour law to determine whether a worker is an employee or 
not has remained the same – a integrated consideration of all relevant circumstances. That the 
method has stayed the same has nevertheless not prevented the concept of employee from 
developing. As foreseen already in the 1940s, the concept of employee has developed in the light 
of changes in organisation, technology and society. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the private 
law concept of employee widened to include more workers. Therefore it is no longer considered 
necessary, as it was earlier, to speak of a distinct social security law concept of employee.501 
Today, the concepts of employee used to define the scope of or the right to benefit in social 
security law are built on the private law concept of employee. In some cases, such as the sickness 
                                                 
499 SOU 1957:14 pp.52 f. 
500 SOU 1961:57 pp 208 ff.  
501 This view is expressed e.g. in the Government White Paper SOU 1975:1 p. 721 and by Källström (1994) p. 61. 
Adlercreutz expressed the view that the social law concept of employee was obsolote already in 1964. Adlercreutz 
(1964) p. 93. 
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benefit regulations, the private law concept is used practically unmodified, while other systems, 
such as unemployment benefit, have their own definition of employee. 
 
The widening of the concept of employee has also led to the inclusion of categories of workers 
earlier classified as dependent contractors. Today, many argue that the dependent contractor 
category is more or less obsolete.502 Already in the preparatory works of the 1976 Co-determination 
Act, the necessity to include dependent contractors as a separate category was questioned. Their 
inclusion was in the end more a security measure to make sure that the personal scope of the new 
legislation would not be less wide than the scope of the legislation it was to replace.503 
 
3.4.2 A Broad Multi-factor Test 
The Swedish concept of employee is the widest of the four in this study. Its reach comes from 
the construction of the multi-factor test, where no single factor is considered necessary or 
sufficient for the existence of an employment contract and a integrated consideration of all the 
circumstances has to be made. Still, for an employment relationship to exist, two essential criteria 
have to be fulfilled. The first criterion is the existence of a contract between the employer and the 
employee. In Swedish law there are no formal requirements for employment contracts. An orally 
concluded contract or a contract concluded through the actions of the parties is as valid as a 
written contract.504 The second key criterion is that the party to the contract that is to perform 
work, i.e. the worker, is a natural person. This requirement does not mean, however, that the 
existence of a juridical person on the work-performing side of the contract rules out that it can be 
a contract of employment. 
 
                                                 
502 C.f. below  3.4.3. 
503 SOU 1975:1 p 725ff. 
504 SOU 1993:32 pp 219ff. 
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In the preparatory works of the 1976 Employment (Co-determination in the Workplace) Act the 
circumstances that in legal practice and jurisprudence have been said to draw the line between 
employees and independent contractors were listed.505 
Circumstances indicating that a workers is an employee are:  
1. He is obliged to perform the work personally, whether this is stated in the contract or presumed by the 
parties to the contract; 
2. He has in fact, completely or almost completely, performed the work personally; 
3. His contract includes putting his labour to the disposal of  the other party for arising tasks; 
4. The relationship between the two parties has a more lasting character; 
5. He is prevented from performing similar work of any significance for someone else, whether this is due to a 
restriction in the contract or a practical consequence of the actual conditions of the work, such as a lack of 
time or energy for other work; 
6. He is, in the performance of the work, subject to specific orders or control as to how the work is 
performed, the working time or the place of work; 
7. He is supposed to use machinery, tools or raw materials provided by the other party to the contract; 
8. He is compensated for his expenses, for example for travel; 
9. The remuneration for the performed work is, at least in part, paid as a guaranteed salary; 
10. He has economically and socially the same status as an employee. 
 
Circumstances indicating that a worker is an independent contractor are: 
1. He is not obliged to perform the work personally but has the right to let someone else perform the work 
under his responsibility, either in whole or partially; 
2. He is in fact letting someone else perform the work under his responsibility; 
3. The work under the contract is limited to specified tasks; 
4. The relationship between the two parties is of a temporary nature; 
5. Neither the contract nor the actual conditions of the work stops him from performing similar work of any 
significance for someone else; 
6. He decides for himself – within the restrictions necessary due to the nature of the work – how the work is 
performed, the working time and the place of work; 
                                                 
505 SOU 1975:1 p 721f. The list has been repeated in later Government White Papers, i.e. SOU 1993:32 pp. 227ff., 
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7. He has to use his own machinery, tools or raw materials; 
8. He has to cover his own expenses; 
9. The remuneration for the work performed is solely dependent on the economic performance of the 
business; 
10. He is economically and socially of the same status as a self-employed worker in the concerned branch of 
business; 
11. He holds a permit or an official authorisation for his business or has incorporated his business. 
 
Performing Work Personally 
In the 1930s and 1940s, the Labour Court made attempts to use the obligation to perform work 
personally as the deciding criterion as to who should be considered an employee. This 
development limited the concept of employee to the point where it was necessary to supplement 
the personal scope of some statutes with the category of dependent contractors.506 In preparatory 
works of the late 1940s the Labour Court’s case law was criticised and the argument that no 
criterion should be decisive was put forward, a debate settled by the Supreme Court’s 1949 
decision.507 
 
The worker does not have to perform the work in its entirety, it is enough that the worker 
participates in the work, even if alongside other workers, hired by her. Neither has the presence 
of assistants stopped workers from being considered dependent contractors. Even if the wording 
of the contract or the original intentions of the parties do not indicate any obligation to perform 
the work personally, the fact that it has in reality been performed personally is of significance.508 
Even workers who have contracted with an employer to perform work together with other 
workers (assistants), provided by the contracted worker, can be considered employees (or 
dependent contractors) if other factors indicate that she is an employee (and the assistants 
                                                                                                                                                        
and is often quoted in the literature.  
506 Adlercreutz (1964) p. 74. 
507 Källström (1994) p. 61. 
508 SOU 1993:32 p 229 and Källström (1994) p. 66. 
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subsequently considered employees of the employer and not of the worker who provided them). 
More commonly, however, they will be considered as independent contractors and the assistants 
as their employees.509 
 
This provision does not mean that the existence of a corporation or other juridical person on the 
work-performing side of the contract rules out that it can be a contract of employment. It is 
possible to “see through” a juridical person to find the individual actually performing the work. 
Piercing of the corporate veil is nonetheless rather rare and mainly reserved for situations where 
the parties’ intention has been to circumvent labour law or where the employer has taken 
advantage of the worker’s weaker position.510 Nonetheless, in a case concerning a number of gas 
station managers, the Labour Court found the workers who had registered a joint-stock company 
to be independent contractors, whereas the other workers were considered employees or 
dependent contractors.511 
 
Subordination 
Two of the ten factors mentioned in the 1975 list – that “the worker is in the performance of the 
work subject to specific orders or controls as to how the work is performed, the working time or 
the place of work” and that “the worker has put his or her labour at the disposal of the other 
party for arising tasks” – are indications of the worker’s subordination to the employer. Taken 
together, the two factors summarise the employer’s prerogatives and represent the core of the 
notion of subordination. 
 
The latter factor, that the worker puts her labour at the employer’s disposal for arising tasks, does 
not indicate that an employee cannot have a rather specified task. Being at the disposal of the 
                                                 
509 SOU 1975:1 pp 728ff. In Swedish doctrine these are known as mellanmansfall. 
510 SOU 1993:32 p. 224. C.f. also SOU 1987:17 p. 94f. 
511 AD 1969 nr 31. 
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employer for arising tasks can, nonetheless, count in favour of the worker being an employee.512 
In a case concerning a journalist who continuously covered a remote part of a newspaper’s 
circulation area, the Labour Court held the fact that the worker in reality had few possibilities to 
turn down a request from the newspaper, and that it had never actually happened, as a sign of the 
worker being an employee.513 In another case, also concerning a journalist, the Labour Court 
considered it significant that the worker had not been obliged to put his labour at disposal for the 
newspaper in question for upcoming tasks when it decided not to consider the worker an 
employee.514 
 
As in the United States, the subordination factors have not been applied uniformly. The degree 
and nature of control is dependent on the type of work that is to be performed. The fact that 
skilled workers, often with an expertise not possessed by the management, work under less 
supervision than less skilled workers should not be significant when it is being decided whether 
they are employees or not.515 It should be noted, however, that in Sweden this goes as far as to 
include managing directors of companies, even if they are shareholders, within the concept of 
employee. This is, from a comparative perspective, “quite possibly unique”.516 
 
Economic Dependence 
The inclusion of factors concerning the lasting nature of the relationship and the worker being prevented 
from working for any other employer aim to establish whether the worker is economically dependent or 
not. The lasting nature of the relationship refers to the same thing that in some other countries 
are found under the headings ‘duration’ or ‘permanency’. Despite having been mentioned as one 
of the more important factors, the lack of a lasting nature has not been used to deny employee 
                                                 
512 SOU 1993:32 p 229f. 
513 AD 1989 nr 39. 
514 AD 1987 nr 21. 
515 SOU 1975:1 p. 723. C.f. also NJA 1973 s 501. 
516 Källström (1999) p. 159. 
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status to casual or temporary workers.517 As to the second factor, being restricted by contract or 
lacking the time or energy to perform other work easily makes the worker economically 
dependent on the employer. In a 1977 ruling, the Labour Court held that the fact that a worker 
for economic reasons had to be ready to work for the employer at any time and, therefore, could 
not work for anyone else to indicate employee status.518 
 
At times, the last factor of the 1975 list, referring to the economic and social status of the worker, has 
been expressed in terms of the worker’s dependence on the employer.519 Workers with a strong 
standing in the market, capable of supporting themselves even if the employer decides to 
terminate the contract, were not considered employees.520 On the other hand, workers dependent 
on the employers marketing efforts and with small possibilities to influence their terms of 
contract were considered as employees.521 Källström points to the fact that these three cases all 
concern identical agreements, a lease common within the hairdressing branch stipulating that the 
owner of the hairdressing salon rents a work space to another hairdresser.522 The Labour Court 
found in favour of employee status when the worker was young and inexperienced, and had been 
dismissed as an apprentice to the owner, but ruled against the workers when they were 
experienced and had built their own stock of clients. 
 
The degree of economic dependence necessary for a worker with a low degree of subordination 
to be considered an employee varies depending on the branch of business they are in. In a 
number of recent cases, the Labour Court has found freelancing journalists to be independent 
contractors, despite a high degree of economic dependence, with the employer as their only 
                                                 
517 SOU 1975:1 p. 723 and SOU 1993:32 p. 230. 
518 AD 1977 nr 98. 
519 SOU 1993:32 p. 233. 
520 AD 1979 nr 12 and AD 1982 nr 134. 
521 AD 1978 nr 7. 
522 Källström (1999) pp. 181f. 
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source of income and in one case more than two decades of service.523 The rulings have been 
explained by the fact that the Labour Court tends to apply, where they exist, 
employee/independent contractor distinctions established through custom in the trade or in 
collective agreements.524  
 
Other Factors 
The form of remuneration has traditionally been an important factor. It should be understood as 
employees having the right to receive at least part of their remuneration as a guaranteed wage and 
receive compensation from the employer for expenses.525 In a 1987 decision, the Labour Court 
held the fact that a worker was not ensured any guaranteed amount or payment as speaking 
against the worker being an employee.526 In a 1977 decision, the worker was considered an 
employee, inter alia due to the fact that his remuneration had the character of a guaranteed 
minimum income.527 In another decision, the Labour Court found that a worker who did not 
have a guaranteed income, but whose remuneration was calculated to be equal to that of 
employees and who received compensation for expenses, was an employee.528 
 
The ownership of the means of production, the employee using machinery, tools or raw materials provided 
by the employer whereas the self-employed worker uses his own, is a criterion whose relevance is 
strongly dependent on the branch of industry. In the Swedish forest industry, branch practice is 
such that a worker can own heavy and expensive machinery and still be considered an 
employee.529  
 
                                                 
523 AD 1994 nr 104 and AD 1998 nr 138. 
524 Ds 2002:56 p. 132. 
525 SOU 1993:32 pp. 232f. 
526 AD 1987 nr 21. 
527 AD 1977 nr 98. 
528 AD 1979 nr 155, c.f. also AD 1989 nr 39. 
529 SOU 1975:1 p 723. 
Engblom, Samuel (2003), Self-employment and the personal scope of labour law : comparative lessons from France, Italy, 
Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States 
European University Institute
 
 
DOI: 10.2870/68969
 156
A notable feature of the Swedish multi-factor test is that it does not include the worker’s taxation 
status. The distinction in taxation law between income from employment and income from business, does 
bear close resemblance to that between employees and independent contractors in labour and 
social security law.530 Yet, it is not used by courts to decide whether a worker is an employee or 
not. In the everyday relations between workers, employers and authorities, however, the worker’s 
taxation status, expressed through the holding of a business notice of assessment (F-skattesedel), is 
undoubtedly one of the most important features of a self-employed worker. 
 
Integrated Consideration 
None of the above mentioned indicators is a necessary or sufficient criterion for the existence of 
an employment contract. It is only through a integrated consideration of all the circumstances 
that the nature of the contract can be determined. The Supreme Court established this principle 
in 1949: “The question whether someone is an employee or not should be decided through the 
content of the contract between the two parties, where no single term of the agreement should 
be considered solely decisive, but all circumstances of the contract and the relationship 
considered.”531  
 
It is disputed whether any of the indicators are generally more important than the others or not. 
The technique of integrated consideration of all the indicators makes it difficult to distinguish the 
weight each individual indicator has been given in practice. In the Labour Court’s practice from 
the 1930s and 1940s the obligation to perform the work personally and remuneration in the form 
of a guaranteed income were considered as the most important indicators. In the 1975 
                                                 
530 Swedish taxation law distinguishes between two sources of income that involve remuneration for work: income from 
employment and income from business. Income from employment is primarily earnings from work as an employee but also 
serves as a residual category for earnings that do not fit into any other category. To be classified as income from business, 
earnings have to come from an independent and professionally run businesses with the aim of making a profit. 
Circumstances indicating independence are several principals, a large number of assignments, the fact that the 
worker uses his own tools or machinery, the fact that the worker is not performing all of the work personally and 
some degree of economic risk-taking. Lodin et al (1999) pp. 220ff. 
531 NJA 1949 s 768.  
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preparatory works of the Employment (Co-determination in the Workplace) Act, this opinion was 
deemed to be no longer valid.532 In the Government White Paper SOU 1993:32 the committee 
argues that normally a lasting nature of the relationship and the high degree of subordination are 
considered strong indications of an employment relationship.533 
 
From a comparative perspective, the most interesting feature of the concept of employee in 
Swedish law is undoubtedly that subordination is treated like one factor among others.534 Even 
though subordination is an important factor, it is not necessary for a finding of employee status. 
In the 1975 preparatory works of the Employment (Co-determination in the Workplace) Act, which have 
been important for the general interpretation of the concept of employee, subordination is set 
forth as a criterion carrying great weight.535 The courts have not, however, followed this, and 
subordination does not stand out as clearly more important than the other criteria.536 
 
The importance of the different indicators varies between different sectors of the labour market 
or branches of business, as indicated by the fact that the economic and social status of the worker 
in the concerned trade should be taken into account. Even if this exists in many countries, it is 
particularly strong in Sweden.537 It is, for example, in some trades natural that the degree of 
subordination is low simply because the employee is an expert with more skill than the employer 
or supervisor. Another example is the already mentioned custom in the forest industry that a 
worker can own expensive machinery and still be considered an employee. Established custom in 
the branch of business is given particular weight if it has been expressed in a collective 
                                                 
532 SOU 1975:1 p. 722f. 
533 SOU 1993:32 p. 229. 
534 This difference compared to other legal systems was noted in SOU 1993:32 p. 231. 
535 SOU 1975:1 p. 723. 
536 SOU 1993:32 p. 231. 
537 Källström (1999) p. 166. 
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agreement, as is, for example, the case with the Journalists’ union’s collective agreement for 
freelancers.538 
 
Swedish legislators and courts have also been receptive to having the purpose of the regulation to 
be applied influence the interpretation of the concept of employee. The Swedish Supreme Court 
has argued that even though a uniform definition of employee is preferable, it is not possible to 
neglect the specific purpose of the interpreted regulation.539 According to the preparatory works 
of the Work Environment Act, when the concept of employee is to be interpreted in cases regarding 
occupational health and safety regulation, this should be done in harmony with the purpose of 
the regulation. Therefore, special attention should be given to whether the employer can exercise 
a direct influence over the work environment. Responsibility should be allocated to persons who 
normally would have the organisational and economic possibilities to meet the responsibility.540 
In the integrated consideration of all relevant circumstances, subordination factors are, therefore, 
to carry more weight than for example economic dependence. Another illustration of the analysis 
of all relevant circumstances can be taken from collective labour law where the preparatory works 
of the Employment (Co-determination in the Workplace) Act, indicate that the concept of employee is to 
be interpreted widely, and, when in doubt, the presumption is for the worker being an 
employee.541 As collective agreements are at the heart of the Swedish labour market regulation, a 
broad personal scope was desired. 
 
As labour law regulation is of a mandatory nature, the concept of employee when it defines the 
personal scope a regulation is a mandatory provision. In a 1979 ruling the Swedish Labour Court 
stated that the fact that both parties to a contract wanted the worker to be considered self-
                                                 
538 Ds 2002:56 p. 121. 
539 NJA 1982 s. 784 and Arbetarskyddsstyrelsen’s opinion in NJA 1974 s 392. 
540 SOU 1976:1 pp. 274f. 
541 “I tveksamma fall bör även vid tillämpningen av medbestämmandelagen bedömningen vara att fråga är om ett 
arbetstagar-förhållande.” Prop. 1975/76:105 Bilaga 1, p. 324.   
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employed, and that the concerned worker might have voluntarily agreed to this, did not have any 
deciding effect on the ruling.542 The Labour Court has also stated that the concept of employee is 
outside what the parties can dispose of in a collective agreement, even though a collective 
agreement can be an important indication of practice in the relevant branch of business.543 The 
label the parties have chosen for their relationship is considered to be of no, or only a limited, 
importance. In deciding the content of the contract the wording of the contract is considered to 
be of less importance than the actual practice between the two parties.544 In a 1977 ruling, the 
Labour Court stated that a worker was to be considered an employee despite the existence of a 
contract labelled “entrepreneur contract” and with a wording indicating that the worker was self-
employed.545 Along similar lines, the Labour Court later held that the status of two hairdressers 
who rented space in a hairdressing-saloon to carry out their business, with a contract stating that 
they were self-employed, should be decided on the basis of the practice between the parties, not 
the wording of the contract.546 If the worker has formerly been an employee of the employer, this 
will typically create an inference that the worker is an employee.547 
 
If it is the initiative of the worker to label and word the contract as something other than an 
employment contract, however, and if it is clear that the worker was not in a dependent position 
when the contract was concluded and that the contract is not an attempt to circumvent social 
protection legislation, the intention of the parties should be considered as an important factor 
when the nature of the contract is decided.548 In the case, the Labour Court argued that 
subcontracting and the use of self-employed workers should not be used as a way to circumvent 
legislation applying to employees.  
                                                 
542 AD 1979 nr 155. 
543 AD 1987 nr 21. Still, as already mentioned, trade practice, in particular if expressed in a collective agreement, is 
important for deciding the employment status of a worker. 
544 SOU 1993:32 p. 225. 
545 AD 1977 nr 39. 
546 AD 1979 nr 12. 
547 SOU 1987:17 p. 94f.  
548 AD 1979 nr 12. 
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An illustration of the Swedish multi-factor test is the case of franchisees. Franchisees are not 
given any special status in Swedish labour law and the question whether franchisees fall inside the 
personal scope of various regulations has to be decided on a case by case basis, according to the 
same principles as in all other cases. In a 1987 government white paper on franchising, the 
committee listed circumstances characteristic of franchising relations indicating whether the 
franchisee is an employee or an independent contractor.549 Speaking in favour of franchisees 
being employees are the facts that franchisees typically are obliged to perform work personally 
and that they in fact perform work personally; that franchisees are subject to directives and 
monitoring from the franchisor; that the relationship between the parties is of a lasting nature; 
and the franchisee typically is prevented from performing similar work for someone else, whether 
this is a part of the agreement or a consequence of the conditions of work. Arguing against 
franchisees being employees, the committee found the facts that franchising relationships 
typically give the franchisee the right to use his own machinery, tools and raw materials and to 
employ other workers; that the employee has to pay her own expenses; that the remuneration is 
entirely dependent on the profit created by the enterprise; and that the franchisee typically holds a 
permit or other official authorisation or has incorporated the business. As franchising contracts 
vary greatly, it is not possible to make any general statements about the status of franchisees. If 
the franchisee is considered an employee of the franchisor, consequently, the employees of the 
franchisee are employees of the franchisor too.550 
 
3.4.3 Dependent Contractors 
As mentioned above, from the 1940s Swedish labour law contained provisions concerning 
dependent contractors (beroende uppdragtagare) which in later doctrine was sometimes referred to as 
jämställda uppdragtagare, signifying contractors who have been put on an “equal footing” with 
                                                 
549 SOU 1987:17 pp. 182f. 
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employees. Originally, the idea was that there were three types of workers: employees, dependent 
contractors and independent contractors.551 The boundary for the personal scope of labour law 
thus came to lie between dependent and independent contractors. According to the preparatory 
works, the point of departure for distinguishing between the two was to be taken in the nature 
and degree of dependence. In particular, the existence of instructions for and monitoring of the 
work (i.e. limiting the worker’s freedom) was considered to indicate dependence. Limits to the 
worker’s freedom as to the pricing or terms of payment for goods and services provided to 
consumers and other third parties were, however, not considered enough to make an 
independent contractor dependent as they were normal practice between independent 
enterprises. For the worker to be a dependent contractor, the employer had to have some control 
of the running of her businesses. In addition, the worker’s social and economic status was to be 
considered, including the worker’s self-perception expressed, for example, through membership 
in an organisation built “according to the principles of a trade union”.552 
 
The current legal status of these third-type workers is not entirely clear. The most commonly held 
view is that the widening of the concept of employee has led to the inclusion of categories of 
workers previously classified as dependent contractors, and many argue that the dependent 
contractor category is more or less obsolete. Already in the preparatory works of the 1976 Co-
determination Act, the necessity to include dependent contractors as a separate category was 
questioned. The committee drafting the legislation described their inclusion as a security measure 
to make sure that the personal scope of the new legislation would not be less wide than the scope 
of the legislation it was to replace.553 In the government bill, the inclusion of dependent 
contractors was said to make the personal scope “slightly wider than otherwise had been the 
                                                                                                                                                        
550 SOU 1987:17 p. 185. 
551 Sometimes, the dependent contractors are described in terms that indicate that they should be considered as 
employees under the regulations with extended scope. Here, however, they will be considered as a separate category, 
inside of the personal scope alongside employees. 
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case”.554 Less than three years later, in the government bill concerning the first equal 
opportunities act, the responsible cabinet minister concluded that the category of dependent 
contractors found in the Co-determination Act most likely was included in the concept of employee, 
without the need for any special provisions.555 Adlercreutz holds that the workers who in 1945 
were considered dependent contractors today to a large extent will be considered employees.556 In 
a case from 1985, the Labour Court questioned whether there still is, due to the extension of the 
concept of employee, any room left for the dependent contractor category.557 The decision, and 
the idea that the dependent contractor category has been subsumed by the concept of employee, 
has however been criticised.  In the preparatory works of the 1979 Equal Opportunities Act it was 
assumed that dependent contractors fell inside the concept of employee which is why no special 
provisions concerning that category was needed.558 According to Sigeman, there are nevertheless 
indications in the preparatory works that the dependent contractor still is a distinct category. In 
addition, Sigeman introduces the idea that the dependent contractor concept, like the concept of 
employee, is dynamic and has developed to include some workers earlier considered as 
independent contractors, for example franchisees.559 
3.5 United Kingdom 
3.5.1 A Diversified Personal Scope 
Compared to other countries, the United Kingdom labour market regulations have a rather 
diversified personal scope.560 As Deakin and Morris have pointed out, “the self-employed are 
                                                                                                                                                        
552 Prop. 1945:88 p 21, C.f. also AD 1980 nr 24 (salesmen of sewing machines) AD 1969 nr 31 (collective rights of 
gas station managers). 
553 SOU 1975:1 p 725ff. 
554 “Genom andra meningen utvidgas lagen tillämpningsområde något.” Prop. 1975/76:105 Bilaga 1 p. 323. 
555 Prop. 1978/79:175 p. 110. 
556 Adlercreutz (2000) p. 25. 
557 AD 1985 nr 57. The case concerned four persons who were under a contract with the local authority to take care 
of mentally disabled children in their own homes.  
558 Prop. 1978/79:175 p. 110. 
559 Sigeman (1987) p. 613f. Sigeman’s view has been supported e.g. by Källström (1994) p. 70. For a summary on this 
debate, c.f. SOU 1994:141 pp. 80ff. 
560 For an early critical analysis of the personal scope of UK labour law, c.f. Hepple (1986a). 
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very far from being excluded completely from labour law regulation.”561 Three different concepts 
are used to define the personal scope of labour law in the United Kingdom – employee, worker and 
employment. While the concept of employee will be treated in this chapter, the two latter will be 
dealt with extensively in the next chapter.562 Already here, however, the statutory definitions of all 
three will be presented. Definitions of  “employee” and “worker” can be found in the Employment 
Rights Act of 1996 (ERA).563 
 
(1) In this Act “employee” means an individual who has entered into or works under (or, where the 
employment has ceased, worked under) a contract of employment. 
(2) In this Act “contract of employment” means a contract of service or apprenticeship […]. 
(3) In this Act “worker” […] means an individual who has entered into or works under (or, where the 
employment has ceased, worked under) –  
(a) a contract of employment, or 
(b) any other contract […] whereby the individual undertakes to do or perform personally any work 
or services for another party to the contract whose status is not by virtue of the contract that of a 
client or customer of any profession or business undertaking carried on by the individual […] 
 
The category of worker encompasses both employees and some, but not all, individuals who 
personally perform work. Excluded from this definition of worker are individuals who do not 
contract to supply personal services, but who sell an end product or a service which does not 
necessarily consist of their own work. Anti-discrimination legislation applies to all who are in 
employment, including also professionals who sell their services to the general public. The 
definition can be found for example in the Sex Discrimination Act 1975: 
                                                 
561 Deakin and Morris (2001) p. 148. 
562 C.f. below 4.4.2. 
563 Employment Rights Act 1996 s 230 (1)-(3). 
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In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires –  
“employment” means employment under a contract for service or of apprentice-ship or a contract 
personally to execute any work or labour.”564 
 
Many statutes, like the Employment Rights Act 1996, have a personal scope that varies between 
different sections.565 The provisions of the act pertaining to dismissal protection,566 parental 
rights, and the right to guarantee payments apply to ‘employees’, while all ‘workers’ are protected 
from unauthorised wage deductions. The National Minimum Wage Act 1998 apply to workers, with 
exception of the part concerning dismissals which is only applicable to employees. The Trade 
Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act of 1992, concerned with collective labour law, applies 
to ‘workers’, even though certain immunities are reserved for employees. The Health and Safety Act 
of 1971 applies to ‘workers’ with some extensions to persons who are not under a contract to 
perform work personally. The Working Time Regulation 1998 and the Part Time Workers (Prevention of 
less favourable treatment) Regulation 2000, which both have their roots in European Union directives, 
apply to workers.  
 
Often, being an employee, a worker or in employment, is not enough to be protected by the legislation. 
Thresholds as to length and regularity of employment limit the personal scope of certain 
employment rights. All dismissal protection apart from dismissals for inadmissible reasons such 
as discrimination or trade union membership, is, for example, conditional on one year of 
continuous service.567 Another example is the Disability Discrimination Act 1995, the scope of 
which is limited to employers with more than 15 employees.568 Other excluded categories are 
those workers who traditionally have not been seen as working under a contract of employment, 
                                                 
564 Sex Discrimination Act 1975 s. 82(1). The same definition can be found in the Race Relations Act 1976 s. 78(1); 
Disability Discrimination Act 1995 s. 68(1); and Equal Pay Act 1970 s. 1(6). 
565 For an overview of which statutory right apply to employees and what rights apply to workers, c.f. Department of 
Trade and Industry (2002) pp. 14f. 
566 The common law of wrongful dismissals is also limited to employees, while discriminatory dismissals, regulated by 
the anti-discrimination acts, apply to all in employment. 
567 Unfair Dismissal and Statement of Reason for Dismissal (Variation of Qualification Period) Order 1999. 
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for example “office holders” such as members of the armed forces, police officers, company 
directors, trade unions officers and some clergy. 569 
 
Historical Development 
In the National Insurance Act 1946, old distinctions between manual and non-manual workers, and 
workers on different earning levels, were finally abolished, putting all persons occupied in gainful 
employment under a contract of service in the same category of contributors. They were 
distinguished from the other class of contributors, those employed on their own account, who 
paid lower contributions and were excluded from unemployment insurance.570 As the same 
distinction was adopted for taxation, and, in the early 1960s, for employment protection, a 
unitary contract of employment developed, making the division between employee and self-employed 
the fundamental division in defining the personal scope of labour law and social security 
regulation.571 
 
The courts’ adapted to the new unitary concept of employee by developing new tests. According 
to Deakin “[t]he control test itself came to be regarded as excessively artificial, and gave way to 
the tests of ‘integration’ and ‘business reality’. These stressed economic as opposed to personal 
subordination as the basis of the contract of employment.”572 Through two cases from the late 
1960s, Ready Mixed Concrete and Market Investigation573, a multi-factor approach, resembling the 
multi-factor tests found in US and Swedish law, was established. 
 
As mentioned, even though the distinction between employees and self-employed workers has 
been, and still is, the most important line drawn between those covered by labour law and those 
                                                                                                                                                        
568 Disability Discrimination Act 1995 s. 7(1). 
569 Burchell, Deakin and Honey (1999) pp. 13f. 
570 Deakin (1998) p. 221. 
571 Deakin (1998) p. 221. 
572 Deakin (1998) p. 222. 
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excluded from its scope of application, the United Kingdom has not relied solely on this 
distinction. Already factories and wage legislation dating from the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries “accepted the idea that protective legislation should apply to certain workers 
who were nominally self-employed, in the sense that they were not employed under a contract of 
service or employment.”574 
 
In the mid-1970s, new legislation against racial and sex discrimination was given a personal scope 
wider than previous labour law, using the broader ‘employment’ notion rather than ‘employee’.575 
An explanation that has been offered for this shift is that the legislation was drafted not in the  
Department of Employment but in the Home Office, where traditional labour law approaches 
held less sway.576 The new legislation also covered employment agencies and temporary work 
agencies, as well as discrimination by a “principal” towards contract workers employed by 
someone else.577 Two decades later, another important development took place, when the New 
Labour government made extensive use of the, not entirely new,  ‘worker’ concept, for example 
in the Minimum Wage Act 1998 and the Working Time Regulation 1998.578 In the Employment Relations 
Act 1999 the British parliament granted a “power to confer rights on individuals” giving the 
Secretary of State the right to extend by regulation the coverage of employment rights to 
specified categories of individuals.579 The possible uses of this power will be dealt with below.580  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
573 Ready Mixed Concrete v. Minister of Pensions and National Insurance [1968] 2. Q.B. 497; and Market Investigation Ltd v. 
Minister of Social Security [1969] 2 QB 173. 
574 Deakin (2001a) p. 146. 
575 Sex Discrimination Act 1975 s. 82(1); Race Relations Act 1976 s. 78(1); and Equal Pay Act 1970 s. 1(6). 
576 Davies and Freedland (2000b) p. 87. 
577 Wedderburn (1986) p. 124. 
578 Davies and Freedland (2000b) p. 87. 
579 Employment Relations Act 1999, Section 23(1) – 23(5) and Employment Relations Act 1999 – Explanatory 
Memorandum, London: Para 232. 
580 C.f. below 4.4.3. 
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3.5.2 The UK Concept of Employee 
As in the United States, the statutory definition of employee found in British labour law give very 
little guidance as to the real content of the concept, leaving it to the courts to decide the issue. 
Like in Sweden and the United States, courts have taken a multi-factor approach, taking a large 
number of factors into account and weighing them together to decide whether a worker is an 
employee or not. In the United Kingdom, however, there is no generally established list of 
factors that courts invariably take into account, in the way that is the case in the United States 
and Sweden. 
 
A frequent starting point for UK courts faced with the question of whether a person is an 
employee or not is the following passage by MacKenna J. in Ready Mixed Concrete v. Minister of 
Pension and National Insurance:581 
A contract of service exists if these three conditions are fulfilled; 
(i) The servant agrees that, in consideration of a wage or other remuneration, he will provide his 
own work and skill in the performance of some service for his master. (ii) He agrees, expressly or 
impliedly, that in the performance of that service he will be subject to the other’s control in a 
sufficient degree to make that other master. (iii) The other provisions of the contract are consistent 
with its being a contract of service. 
 
For a person to be considered an employee there must thus be an obligation to perform work 
personally and a certain degree of control by the employer over the worker. As will be shown 
below, both these conditions are necessary for the existence of a contract of service, that is, for 
the worker to be an employee. According to the formula of Ready Mixed Concrete, the obligation to 
perform work and the employer’s control is nevertheless not sufficient, as also the other 
provisions of the contract, taken together, must be consistent with its being a contract of service.  
 
                                                 
581 Ready Mixed Concrete v. Minister of Pensions and National Insurance [1968] 2. Q.B. 497 (HC), at 515. 
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The year after Ready Mixed Concrete, the High Court developed its position in Market Investigation 
Ltd v. Minister of Social Security where it held, with a reference to the US Supreme Court’s economic 
realities test as outlined in the Silk-decision, that “the fundamental test to be applied is this: ‘Is 
the person who engaged himself to perform these services performing them as a person in 
business on his own account?’”582 
No exhaustive list has been compiled and perhaps no exhaustive list can be compiled of 
considerations which are relevant to determining that question, nor can strict rules be laid down as 
to the relative weight which the various considerations should carry in particular cases. The most 
that can be said is that control will no doubt always have to be considered, although it can no longer 
be regarded as the sole determining factor […]583 
 
After having established that an obligation personally to perform work existed, Cooke J 
proceeded by asking two questions: “First, whether the extent and degree of control exercised by 
the company, if no other factors were taken into account, be consistent with her being a 
employed under a contract of service. Second, whether when the contract is looked upon as a 
whole, its nature and provisions are consistent or inconsistent with its being a contract of service, 
bearing in mind the general test I have adumbrated.”584 
 
Performing Work Personally 
The obligation to perform work personally is in fact a necessary condition for a contract of 
employment to exist. Whereas Swedish and US courts seldom look into the obligation to perform 
work personally, even though it has to be considered a necessary condition also in those two 
countries, UK courts often dwell at length over the issue. In practice, two issues have come to be 
decisive when considering whether there is an obligation to perform work personally: whether 
                                                 
582 Market Investigation Ltd v. Minister of Social Security [1969] 2 QB 173, at  184.   
583 Market Investigation Ltd v. Minister of Social Security [1969] 2 QB 173, at  184-185. 
584 Market Investigation Ltd v. Minister of Social Security [1969] 2 QB 173, at  185. 
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the worker has the right to substitute his labour for that of another worker and whether the 
substitute has to approved by the employer. 
 
In Ready Mixed Concrete, MacKenna J. found that the “[f]reedom to do a job either by one’s own 
hands or by another’s is inconsistent with a contract of service, though a limited or occasional 
delegation may not be.”585 The case concerned a driver making deliveries for a company 
marketing and selling concrete in a truck he had bought under a financing agreement with the 
company. Together with eight other owner-drivers operating from the same plant he employed a 
relief truck driver who took over when one of the owner-drivers was sick, on holiday or absent 
for some other reason. Under the contract, the employer was nonetheless “entitled to require the 
owner-driver himself to operate the truck on every or any day [unless the owner driver] have a 
reason for not so doing which would have been valid had he been the employed driver of the 
company.”586 Further, the owner driver was to produce evidence to substantiate his excuses and 
take his holidays and vacations only as agreed in writing with the company. The court, therefore, 
found an obligation to perform work personally to be present in the case. 
 
Important in this respect seems to be whether the worker has the right to substitute himself for 
any reason or, as in Ready Mixed Concrete, for reasons resembling those that would excuse an 
employee from work. In a later case, Express Echo Publication v. Tanton, the Court of Appeal found 
an obligation to perform work personally as lacking when the contract provided that “in the 
event that the contractor is unable or unwilling to perform his services personally he shall arrange 
at his own expense entirely for another suitable person to perform the service.”587 In the case, the 
                                                 
585 Ready Mixed Concrete v. Minister of Pensions and National Insurance [1968] 2. Q.B. 497, at 515. 
586 Ready Mixed Concrete v. Minister of Pensions and National Insurance [1968] 2. Q.B. 497, at 511. 
587 Express & Echo Publications Ltd v. Tanton [1999] ICR 693, at 696. 
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right to provide a substitute was utilised from time to time and, exceptionally, for six months 
when the worker was ill.588 
 
In a recent case, an Employment Appeals Tribunal distinguished the case before it from Express 
Echo by the fact that the workers in the case could not simply choose not to work in person. 
Further, the worker could not just provide anyone who was suitable as a replacement for her but 
only someone from a list drawn up by the employer. In addition, the substitute was paid directly 
by the employer and it was sometimes the employer who organised the substitute.589 The court 
considered these circumstances to be expressions of the limited or occasional power of delegation 
mentioned in Ready Mixed Concrete.590 
 
As concerns working owners of limited companies,  there is no rule of law that the presence of a 
limited company between the worker and the employer prevents the worker from being 
considered an employee. “If the true relationship is that of employer and employee, it cannot be 
changed by putting a different label upon it.”591 In a case where the managing director and owner 
of 100 percent of the shares in a limited company filed for redundancy payment to himself to be 
paid by the Secretary of State when the company went into voluntary liquidation, the 
Employment Appeal Tribunal found the worker to be an employee and entitled to redundancy 
pay. 
The shareholding of a person in the company by which he alleges he was employed is a factor to be 
taken into account, because it might tend to establish either that the company was a mere 
simulacrum or that the contract under scrutiny was a sham. In our judgement it would be wrong to 
                                                 
588 According to Davies and Freedland, one effect of the decision was that  employment lawyers advising employers 
began advising their clients to insert such substitution clauses in work contracts in order to ensure that the workers 
in question would be viewed as self-employed. Davies and Freedland (2000b) p. 87, note 3. 
589 MacFarlane v. Glasgow City Council [2001] IRLR 7, at 10. 
590 MacFarlane v. Glasgow City Council [2001] IRLR 7, at 10. 
591 Catamaran Cruisers Ltd v. Williams [1994] IRLR 386, at 388. C.f. also Hewlett Packard Ltd v. O’Murphy [2002] IRLR 4, 
at 8. 
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say that a controlling shareholder who, as such, […] was outside the class of persons given rights 
under the Act on an insolvency.592 
 
Control or Integration into the Business of the Employer 
Like the obligation to perform work personally, control has been described as a “necessary, 
though not always sufficient, condition of a contract of service.”593 In Ready Mixed Concrete, a 
traditional notion of control was outlined, focusing on the what, how, when, and where of the 
work.  
Control includes the power of deciding the thing to be done, the way in which it shall be done, the 
means to be employed doing it, the time when and the place where it shall be done. All these 
aspects of control must be considered when deciding whether the right exists in a sufficient degree 
to make one party the master and the other the servant. The right need not be unrestricted. 594 
 
As in other countries, British courts have had to adapt this notion of control in order to address 
skilled workers. In Market Investigation, Cooke J. held that “when one is dealing with a professional 
man, or a man of some skill and experience there can be no question of an employer telling him 
how to do work.”595 In Lee v. Chung, the Privy Council found the fact that a construction worker 
was not directly supervised to be of no importance as he was a skilled worker. He exercised no 
skill or judgement as to which beams to cut or how deep: “He was simply told what to do and 
left to get on with it.”596 In a case concerning a journalist, it was held that “the greater the skill 
required for an employee’s work, the less significant is control in determining whether the 
employee is under a contract of service.”597 
 
                                                 
592 Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v. Bottrill [1998] IRLR 120, at 124. 
593 Ready Mixed Concrete v. Minister of Pensions and National Insurance [1968] 2. Q.B. 497, at 517. 
594 Ready Mixed Concrete v. Minister of Pensions and National Insurance [1968] 2. Q.B. 497, at 515. For a similar definition in 
a more recent case c.f. Lane v. Shire Roofing Company [1995] IRLR 493, at 495. 
595 Market Investigation Ltd v. Minister of Social Security [1969] 2 QB 173, at  183. 
596 Lee Ting Sang v. Chung Chi-Keung [1990] ICR 409, at 414. 
597 Beloff v. Pressdram Ltd [1973] 1 All ER 241, at 250. 
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In the light of changes in the organisation of work, with employers relinquishing direct control 
and not just over skilled professionals, integration into the business of the employer has been used as an 
alternative to control, viewing the essence of employment as the employee’s subjection to the 
rules and procedures of an organisation, rather than as subjection to personal command.598 In 
Market Investigation it was acknowledged that “the test of being a servant does not rest nowadays 
on submission to orders. It depends on whether the person is part and parcel of the 
organisation.”599 The advantage of this approach is that is has made it easier to find managers and 
skilled professionals to be employees. Despite autonomy as to the details of their work, these 
workers are well integrated into the business of their employer. Another way of describing the 
integration factor is in terms of Collins’ concept of bureaucratic power. “It does not matter […] that 
the employee enjoys considerable independence from control or scrutiny by his supervisors in 
the organisation, provided that the rules of the organisation ultimately determine the content of 
the relationship.”600 
 
Another category of workers which evades control as traditionally understood is homeworkers, 
who work without the direct supervision of their employer. In Market Investigation, which 
concerned part-time interviewers working from home for a market-research company, the 
workers were issued detailed instructions on how to perform the interviews, lists of who to call, 
and how to report their results back to the market research company. Despite freedom as to 
when to do the work and no contractual provisions prohibiting the workers from doing similar 
work for other employers, the court found that “the control which the company exercised in this 
case was […] so extensive as to be entirely consistent with [the worker] being employed under a 
contract of service.”601 Similarly, a worker who in her home assembled shoe parts was found to 
fall under the control of the alleged employer. Shoe parts to be assembled were delivered to her 
                                                 
598 Deakin & Morris (2001) p. 159. 
599 Market Investigation Ltd v. Minister of Social Security [1969] 2 QB 173, at  184.   
600 Collins (1986) p. 10. 
Engblom, Samuel (2003), Self-employment and the personal scope of labour law : comparative lessons from France, Italy, 
Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States 
European University Institute
 
 
DOI: 10.2870/68969
 173
at a specific time every day, she was told by the company how to do the work and to ensure 
adequate ventilation.602 Investigating the degree of integration into the business of the employer 
has been said to be “appropriate to situations in which managerial authority is exercised in a de-
personalised way, and subjected to bureaucratic rules and procedures. The test is arguably of less 
use in situations where the boundaries of the organisation are diffuse and unclear, as in the cases 
of sub-contract or agency labour.”603 
 
Other Factors 
As mentioned, the formula of Ready Mixed Concrete stated that, apart from the performing 
personally work criterion, the other provisions of the contract, taken together, must be consistent 
with its being a contract of service. In British law, we find no established list of what these other 
provisions, or factors, are. While US courts run down the list of whichever test they are applying, 
British courts vary greatly in which other factors they consider. From the cases of the past three 
decades, it is nonetheless possible to identify a number of factors that courts tend to appraise in 
their assessment of a given relationships. Some of these factors – whether or not the worker has 
invested any capital, whether the worker has any opportunity for profit or runs the risk of loss, 
and the permanency of the relationship – are more important than other factors, which courts 
tend to disregard or only afford limited importance. In the second category of factors we find the 
type of remuneration, the tax treatment, the provisions of benefits typical for employees, industry 
practice and the label the parties have put on the contract. 
 
In Ready Mixed Concrete, MacKenna J. gave two examples of situations where the worker should 
not be considered an employee, despite being personally obliged to perform work and under the 
control of the employer. Both examples concerned the ownership of the means of production. “A 
                                                                                                                                                        
601 Market Investigation Ltd v. Minister of Social Security [1969] 2 QB 173, at  186. 
602 Airfix Footwear Ltd v. Cope [1978] ICR 1210, at 1212-1213. 
603 Burchell, Deakin and Honey (1999) p. 6. 
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contract obliging one party to build for the other, providing at his own expense the necessary 
plants and material […] is not a contract of service but a contract to produce a thing (or a result) 
for a price.”604 Further, a contract which “obliges one party to carry the other’s goods, providing 
at his own expense everything needed for performance […] is not a contract of service, even 
though the carrier may be obliged to drive the vehicle himself and to accept the other’s control 
over his performance: it is a contract of service.”605 In many UK cases, the fact that the worker 
has invested no or only very limited capital has been considered as weighing in favour of the 
worker being considered an employee.606 
 
Another commonly used factor, related to the capital investment factor, is the worker’s opportunity 
to make a profit and risk of making a loss. In the words of Cooke J. “what degree of financial risk he 
takes, what degree of responsibility for investment and management he has, and whether and 
how far he has an opportunity to profiting from sound management in the performance of his 
task.”607 
 
As in the United States and Sweden, courts in the United Kingdom have looked at the length and 
stability of the relationship between the worker and the employer. In Airfix Footwear, the fact that 
the worker had worked for the employer five days a week for the past seven year was used as a 
sign that the worker was an employee.608 Likewise, in Nethermere, the fact that the relationship 
between the worker and the employer had a history going back several years was counted in 
favour of the worker being an employee.609 As will be dealt with in greater detail below, the status 
                                                 
604 Ready Mixed Concrete v. Minister of Pensions and National Insurance [1968] 2 QB 497, at 516. 
605 Ready Mixed Concrete v. Minister of Pensions and National Insurance [1968] 2 QB 497, at 516. 
606 E.g. Market Investigation Ltd v. Minister of Social Security [1969] 2 QB 173; Beloff v. Pressdram [1973] 1 All ER 241; 
Airfix Footwear Ltd v. Cope [1978] ICR 1210; O’Kelly v. Trusthouse Forte Plc [1984] 1 QB 90 and Lee Ting Sang v. Chung 
Chi-Keung [1990] ICR 409. 
607 Market Investigation Ltd v. Minister of Social Security [1969] 2 QB 173, at 185. 
608 Airfix Footwear Ltd v. Cope [1978] ICR 1210, at 1215. 
609 Nethermere Ltd v. Gardiner [1984] ICR 612, at 634 
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permanency and other economic dependence factors in the UK multi-factor test are highly dependent 
on the purpose of the regulation, in some cases seen as necessary for employee status. 
 
The type of remuneration, despite often being mentioned by the courts, seems to have little impact 
on the decision whether the worker is an employee or not. Already in the late 1960s it was held 
that an “appointment to do a specific task at a fixed fee [was not] inconsistent with the contract 
being a contract of service.”610 Later, another court found the method of calculating the 
employees remuneration as not being an essential part of the employment relationship.611 In Lee v. 
Chung, the Privy Council shortly mentions what could be a more advanced approach in deciding 
the importance of the type of remuneration to the question whether the worker is an employee 
or not: “There is no suggestion in the evidence that he priced the job which is normally a feature 
of the business approach of a subcontractor; he was paid either a piece-work rate or a daily rate 
according to the nature of the work he was doing.”612 
 
Like in the United States, the worker’s skill has been a factor considered by courts in determining 
whether a worker is an employee or not. A high level of skill and status as a ‘professional’ has 
been taken as an indication of the worker being self-employed, whereas a low level of skill and 
more manual work has indicated employee-status. Like the form of remuneration, skill has over 
time become a less and less important factor. In Sellars Arenascene Ltd v. Connally the Court of 
Appeal held that if a person’s skills “were qualities which prevented a person in [a 
managerial/entrepreneurial] position from enjoying the status of employee, it would be a severe 
and unwarranted deterrent to business enterprise.”613 In Hall v. Lorimer, the Court of Appeal held 
that skill cannot be a decisive factor as “a brain surgeon may very well be an employee; a window 
                                                 
610 Market Investigation Ltd v. Minister of Social Security [1969] 2 QB 173, at 187. 
611 O’Kelly v. Trusthouse Forte Plc [1984] 1 QB 90, at 105. 
612 Lee Ting Sang v. Chung Chi-Keung [1990] ICR 409, at 413. 
613 Sellars Arenascene Ltd v. Connolly [2001] IRLR 222, at 226. 
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cleaner is commonly self-employed.”614 The worker’s level of skill can, however, still influence 
how other factors, in particular the control factor, is to be interpreted.615  
 
In British law, there is “lack of a precise fit between the status of individuals for employment 
purposes and their position under income tax and social security legislation.”616 Statutory 
intervention has been made to make, for example, agency workers akin to employees for tax and 
social security purposes. This does not change their status under labour law, as was made clear in 
O’Kelly v. Trusthouse:  “The industrial tribunal accepted that the tax and social security 
contributions are deducted as a requirement imposed upon the company by the [tax authorities] 
and that this is not, of itself, indicative of the legal basis of the relationship between the company 
and the casual staff, for employment protection purposes.”617 
 
In several instances, when assessing the status of a worker, the British courts have looked at 
whether the employer provides benefits typically awarded to employees, such as holidays and sick-pay. 
Even though it is an often cited factor, its actual importance can be questioned. In Market 
Investigation, the Employment Tribunal dismissed the fact that the employer provided no time-off, 
sick pay or holidays to the worker as a mere reflection of the fact that there were no fixed hours 
of work.618 In O’Kelly, differences in terms and conditions of employment were not considered 
indicative of whether the worker was an employee or not.619 
 
Like in Sweden, whether it is practice in the industry to classify a certain type of worker as an 
employee or an independent contractor might carry some weight. In O’Kelly the court found 
                                                 
614 Hall v. Lorimer [1994] IRLR 171, at 174 (per Lord Justice Nolan). 
615 C.f. Lane v. Shire Roofing Company [1995] IRLR 493, at 495. 
616 Burchell, Deakin and Honey (1999) p. 10.  
617 O’Kelly v. Trusthouse Forte Plc [1984] 1 QB 90, at 102. According to Burchell et al, this leaves certain workers in a 
position where they have none of the potential tax advantages of being self-employed while they still suffer from not 
being covered by large parts of labour law. Burchell, Deakin and Honey (1999) p. 10. 
618 Market Investigation Ltd v. Minister of Social Security [1969] 2 QB 173, at 187. 
619 O’Kelly v. Trusthouse Forte Plc [1984] 1 QB 90, at 105. 
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industry practice to be “a factor, although not a particularly important factor, which the industrial 
tribunal were entitled to take into account as part of the background against which the parties 
regulated their relationship.”620 
 
In line with labour law being of a mandatory nature, the label the parties put to their contract does not 
usually decide whether the contract is one of service or not. In McMeechan v. Secretary of State for 
Employment, the Court of Appeal held that the label put on the contract by the parties does not 
change the outcome when the general impression which emerges from weighing all factors 
together is that the worker is an employee.621 The weight of the label might nonetheless depend 
on the circumstances. In Massey v. Crown Life Insurance, the fact that the parties had agreed to label 
the worker self-employed in order to obtain tax benefits was considered to afford strong 
evidence that the worker was in fact self-employed. In the words of Lord Denning MR, the 
worker “gets the benefit of it by avoiding tax deductions and getting his pension contributions 
returned. I do not see that he can come along afterwards and say it is something else in order to 
claim that he has been unfairly dismissed. Having made his bed as being ‘self-employed’, he must 
lie on it.”622 
 
3.5.3 “To paint a picture from the accumulation of detail” 
Like their counterparts in Sweden and the United States, British courts have taken a multi-factor 
approach to decide whether a worker is an employee or not. In a recent labour law textbook, Pitt 
writes that  “there is no definitive list of necessary or sufficient conditions for the identification 
of a contract of employment. Nor is it clear how many have to be present before one could 
conclude that the contract exists. The contract of employment is a cluster concept. If one 
conceives of the factors as a list A-E, one contract might have A, B and C but not D and E, 
                                                 
620 O’Kelly v. Trusthouse Forte Plc [1984] 1 QB 90, at 117. 
621 McMeechan v. Secretary of State for Employment [1996] ICR 549, at 565. 
622 Massey v. Crown Life Insurance Co [1978] 2 All ER 576, at 581 (Lord Denning MR). 
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another might have D and E or A and C but not the others. All could be capable of being 
contracts of employment.”623 Even though the claim to no definite list of factors is made in 
Swedish and US labour law as well, it is probably more well founded in the United Kingdom, 
where there really is no generally established list of factors that courts invariably take into 
account.  
 
The fact that higher courts are only allowed to overturn decisions of lower courts if they have 
erred in the application of law adds to the uncertainty of the factors and which weight they 
should be given. As Burchell, Deakin and Honey point out, “the determination of employment 
status is said to be a question of ‘mixed law and fact’ on which tribunals faced with the same or 
very similar facts could, legitimately, disagree. It is only if the tribunal makes an error of law – in 
the sense of applying a completely wrong test, or arriving at a conclusion on the facts which is 
‘perverse’, in the sense of being a conclusion which no tribunal could reasonable reach – that an 
appellate court has the right to intervene and reverse the judgement.”624 
 
Apart from no generally established list of factors, British courts have also expressively rejected 
the idea that there is only one test of employee regardless of the facts of the specific situation and 
the purpose of the statute. On the contrary, both the circumstances of the specific case and the 
purpose of statute is to be afforded great importance. In Hall v. Lorimer, a 1994 income tax case, 
the Court of Appeal held that:  
In cases of this sort there is no single path to a correct decision. An approach which suits the facts 
and arguments of one case may be unhelpful in another. […] ‘This is not a mechanical exercise of 
running through items on a checklist to see whether they are present in, or absent from, a given 
situation. The object of the exercise is to paint a picture from the accumulation of detail. The overall 
effect can only be appreciated by standing back from the detailed picture which has been painted, 
by viewing it from a distance and by making an informed, considered and qualitative appreciation of 
                                                 
623 Pitt (2000) p. 83. 
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the whole. […] Not all details are of equal weight or importance in any given situation. The details 
may also vary in importance from one situation to another.’625 
 
The obligation to perform work personally and a certain degree of subordination are, as 
mentioned, necessary factors for a worker to be found to be an employee in the UK. Beyond 
these two basic requirements for a contract of service, it is difficult to foresee what factors a 
British court will find relevant, and which weight it will give them. Largely, this is due to the 
purposive interpretation of the concept of employee adopted by the courts.626 According to Pitt, 
“[i]t may be felt […] that the decisions of courts are sometimes swayed by what is at stake, and 
that they are more likely to hold that the plaintiff is an employee where health and safety are at 
issue.”627 In Lee v. Chung, the Privy Council expressly linked its interpretation of the concept of 
employee to the purpose of the industrial injury ordinance before the court. 
But to apply the test whether a person is ‘part and parcel of the organization’ is likely to be 
misleading in the context of the statute which expressively contemplates that causal workers and 
workers working for two or more employers concurrently may be employed under a contract of 
service. In the building and construction industry the test may lead to the error of only considering 
those on the permanent staff as employed under a contract of service and thus excluding all those 
from the protection of the Ordinance who are taken on for a particular project[…]. 628 
 
As early as in 1985, Leighton found the courts’ purposive interpretation of the concept of 
employee and the inclusion of those who contract personally to execute any work or labour to 
imply “that many of the two million-plus self-employed workers in this country are covered by 
                                                                                                                                                        
624 Burchell, Deakin and Honey (1999)  p. 11. For a similar view, c.f. Wedderburn (1986) p. 127. 
625 Hall v. Lorimer [1994] IRLR 171, at 174 (per Lord Justice Nolan agreeing with the views of Mummery J) 
626 Not all authors share this view. Steven Anderman argues that “[t]he use of the same test for a wide range of 
statutes has meant that there is insufficient heed paid to the particular purpose of the statute.” Anderman (2000) p. 
237. 
627 Pitt (2000) p. 85. Burchell, Deakin and Honey are of the same opinion finding “that the economic reality test is 
more likely to be applied in favour of employee status in cases involving health and safety.” Burchell, Deakin and 
Honey (1999) p. 9. 
628 Lee Ting Sang v. Chung Chi-Keung [1990] ICR 409, at 418. 
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some protective legislation.”629 In addition, on at least one occasion, a court has acknowledged 
that changes on the labour market have to influence its decision.  In Lane v. Shire Roofing Company, 
the Court of Appeal held that the increase in self-employment and the many advantages for both 
the employer and the worker in avoiding the employee-label had to be taken into account when 
the authority of older case law was examined. As the Court found “good policy reasons in the 
safety at work field to ensure that the law properly categorises between employees and 
independent contractors” it held that the worker was an employee.630  
 
“Mutuality of Obligation” 
On one point, British courts’ treatment of the concept of employee deviates quite markedly from 
their US and Swedish counterparts, and even more so from the French courts. In some cases, 
particularly concerning the termination of contracts, either unfair dismissal cases or claims for 
redundancy pay, the courts give great weight to whether or not there is “mutuality of obligation” 
between the worker and the employer.631  Mutuality of obligation has been described as “the 
presence of mutual commitments to maintain the employment relationship over a period of 
time.”632 Courts look for an obligation on the one party to offer work and on the other to accept 
and do work if offered. Cases have commonly concerned casual workers and others who are 
engaged by the employer for a number of shorter engagements. Are they hired under one, 
‘umbrella’ or ‘universal’, contract of employment or under several short time contracts covering 
only a single engagement?633 
 
                                                 
629 Leighton (1985) p. 55. 
630 Lane v. Shire Roofing Company [1995] IRLR 493, at 495 (per Lord Justice Henry). 
631 C.f. O’Kelly v. Trusthouse Forte Plc [1984] 1 QB 90 (unfair dismissal); Nethermere v. Gardiner [1984] ICR 612 (unfair 
dismissal); Boyd Line Ltd v. Pitts [1986] ICR 244 (redundancy pay); Hellyer Brothers Ltd v. McLeod [1987] ICR 526 
(redundancy pay); and Clark v. Oxfordshire Health Authority [1998] IRLR 125 (unfair dismissal). 
632 Deakin and Morris (2001) p. 162. 
633 For a critique of the test of mutuality of obligation, in particular its interplay with thresholds of continuity of 
employment, c.f. Burchell, Deakin and Honey (1999) pp. 13f. 
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In fact, mutuality of obligation has in many cases been treated like a necessary factor alongside 
the obligation to perform work personally and control.634 The House of Lords, in a 2000 case 
concerning on-call workers held that their claim to employee status lacked “that irreducible 
minimum of mutual obligation necessary to create a contract of service.”635 Mutuality of 
obligation does, however, only seem to apply in cases concerning statutes aimed at regulating the 
termination of employment contracts, whereas it is seldom mentioned in cases concerning for 
example health and safety or industrial injuries. In Market Investigation, which concerned the 
National Insurance (Industrial Injuries) Act, the court expressed its doubt that the alleged employer’s 
claim that continuity was lacking as the work was performed under a series of contracts made any 
difference.636 
 
O’Kelly v. Trusthouse Forte concerned wait staff that a hotel company kept on a list and relied upon 
to do work regularly. In exchange, the company assured theses “regular casuals” preference in the 
allocation of available work. The Court of Appeal found that  “[t]he ‘assurance of preference in 
the allocation of any available work’ which the ‘regulars’ enjoyed was no more than a firm 
expectation in  practice. It was not a contractual promise.”637 As no mutuality of obligation 
existed, the workers claim for unfair dismissal when the company took them off the list and 
stopped offering them work failed. This position of the court has been criticised for giving too 
much weight to formal contractual obligations instead of the reality of the relationship between 
the parties.638 
 
                                                 
634 Under British law, most claims concerning unfair dismissal or severance pay require the employee to have a 
period of qualifying continuos employment, for example, 52 weeks. Protections against dismissals for inadmissible 
reasons, such as discriminatory dismissals or dismissals due to membership in a trade union, however, do not have 
any qualification period. This was the case in O’Kelly v. Trusthouse Forte [1984] 1 QB 90. 
635 Carmichael v. National Power [2000] IRLR 43, at 45 (per Lord Irvine). 
636 Market Investigation Ltd v. Minister of Social Security [1969] 2 QB 173, at 187. 
637 O’Kelly v. Trusthouse Forte Plc [1984] 1 QB 90, at 116. 
638 Anderman (2000) p. 239. 
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In the same year, however, in Nethermere, the Court of Appeal could not “see why well founded 
expectations of continuing homework should not be hardened or refined into enforceable 
contracts by the regular giving and taking of work over periods of a year or more, and why 
outworkers should not thereby become employees under contracts of service like those doing 
similar work at the same rate in the factory.”639 The court then went on to apply a multiple test 
under which it found the workers to be employees.  
 
The result of the mutuality of obligation requirement has many times been to exclude causal 
workers from protection.640 “In general, the mutuality test is an exclusionary one – the absence of 
mutuality will most likely defeat a claim of employee status, without in itself being a sufficient 
condition.”641 For temporary agency workers, the mutuality of obligation doctrine can make it 
difficult to establish employee status vis-à-vis the temporary work agency. In Clark v. Oxfordshire 
Health Authority, which concerned a nurse tied to a “nurse bank”, the Court of Appeal 
nonetheless accepted “that the mutual obligations required to found a global contract of 
employment need not necessarily and in every case consist of an obligation to provide and 
perform work. To take one obvious example, an obligation by the one party to accept and do 
work if offered and an obligation on the other party to pay a retainer during such periods as work 
was not offered would […] be likely to suffice.”642 
3.6 France 
French labour law covers all private employees, while workers in the public sector and the 
employees of certain government owned companies have their employment relationships 
governed by administrative law. In addition, workers in managerial positions are frequently 
excluded from the personal scope. Compared to the other countries represented in this study, the 
                                                 
639 Nethermere v. Gardiner [1984] ICR 612, at 626-627 (per Stephenson LJ). 
640 Burchell, Deakin and Honey (1999) p. 8. 
641 Deakin & Morris (2001) p. 162. 
642 Clark v. Oxfordshire Health Authority [1998] IRLR 125, at 130. 
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concept of employee in French labour law does not stand out as either the widest or the most 
narrow. It does, however, distinguish itself as the concept of employee most dominated by the 
worker’s subordination to the orders and directives of the employer. The employer’s control and 
disciplinary powers are given a pre-eminence not found in Swedish, British or US labour law. 
This focus on subordination over other factors serves both to extend and limit the reach of the 
concept of employee.   
 
In addition to employees, the personal scope of French labour law has been extended by 
legislation to cover eight other categories of workers. These workers – defined  in terms of their 
profession, the nature of their work or its location – have as their common denominator the fact 
that they are economically dependent while their subordination to the employer’s managerial 
powers are too weak for them to be covered by the concept of employee. These categories of 
workers will be dealt with extensively below.643 
 
Historical Development 
After the establishment, at the beginning of the 20th century, of the contrat du travail as the 
personal scope of labour law, as elsewhere, it fell to the courts to work out the details of the 
concept of employee. Initially, the contrat du travail was viewed as a contract in traditional terms. 
The worker’s subordination to the employer was a consequence of the employment contract.  
The important feature was the legal classification of the contract for work, not the factual nature 
of the work. If the contract was for any reason invalid, the conditions of work, such as the degree 
of subordination, were of no importance: there was no contract of employment and the worker 
was thus not entitled to the protection of social legislation. Under this doctrine, workers under 
the legal minimum age and foreign workers without valid residence permits fell outside the 
                                                 
643 C.f. below 4.2.2. 
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personal scope of social legislation.644 Step by step, however, the contrat du travail came to be seen 
as a relation de fait, a factual relationship where the contract du travail was a consequence of the 
worker’s subordination to the employer instead of vice-versa. This development was particularly 
accentuated in the field of industrial accidents, where a 1938 act expressively stated that it applied 
regardless of the validity of the contract and gave pre-eminence to the actual relationship 
between the parties.645 
 
Another issue was whether the concept should have the same meaning when used in lois 
d’assistance – social security legislation – and in lois de justice – labour law. The two types of 
legislation were perceived as having rather different objectives. Lois de justice dealt with the legal 
relationship between the worker and the employer, whereas concerns about economic 
dependence formed the base for lois d’assistance.646 From the point of view of the Cour de cassation it 
was nevertheless important to uphold the coherence of the law, which is why a unitary concept 
of contrat du travail was preferred.647 
 
It did, however, take a while for the jurisprudence to settle. Some cases from the early twentieth 
century indicate that the courts did place considerable weight on a worker’s economic 
dependence, also in labour law cases. If one of the parties to the contract drew the bulk, if not its 
entire, income from the work performed for the other party, this could make the party an 
employee. Under this jurisprudence, in 1909, taxi drivers were found to be employees of the taxi 
companies despite a lack of direct orders on which routes to take.648   
 
                                                 
644 Aubert-Monpeyssen (1988) pp. 31f. 
645 Aubert-Monpeyssen (1988) pp. 32ff. 
646 Aubert-Monpeyssen (1988) pp. 12f. and p. 25. 
647 Aubert-Monpeyssen (1988) p. 25. 
648 Le Goff (2001) p. 119.  
Engblom, Samuel (2003), Self-employment and the personal scope of labour law : comparative lessons from France, Italy, 
Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States 
European University Institute
 
 
DOI: 10.2870/68969
 185
By the early 1930s, legal subordination had been established as the main criterion. The economic 
dependence criterion was perceived as having become too all encompassing. Arguably,  managing 
directors of companies ought to have been considered employees, as they too were economically 
dependent on the company.649 In a landmark 1931 decision, the Cour de Cassation therefore 
reframed the notion making the worker’s legal subordination to the employer the principal 
criterion. The status of employee necessarily implies the “existence of a legal bond of 
subordination between the worker and the person who employs him.”650 
 
In a series of cases the year after, the Cour de Cassation nuanced its 1931 decision. Still claiming  
adherence to a doctrine with legal subordination as the decisive criterion, the court adopted a 
multi-factor test, once again broadening the notion.651 Legal subordination was not just a question 
of whether the worker was under the orders and control of the alleged employee: other factors 
also had to be taken into consideration, such as the ownership of the tools or machinery used; 
whether the worker could hire other workers to help him; and whether the working hours were 
decided by the worker or the employer. 
 
Defining the personal scope of social legislation in terms other than legal subordination did, 
however, enjoy considerable political support.652 Through legislative intervention in 1935, the 
existing social security legislation was given a personal scope that went beyond employees, 
making insurance mandatory for all employees and all French citizens working for one or several 
employers regardless of the nature of their relationship.653 The restrictive interpretation of the 
concept of employee by the Cour de cassation was thus pushed aside and the personal scopes of 
                                                 
649 Le Goff (2001) p. 123. 
650 “…l’existence d’un lien juridique de subordination du travailleur à la personne qui l’emploie…” Civ. 6 juillet 1931, 
quoted in Le Goff (2001) p. 124. 
651 Aubert-Monpeyssen (1988) pp. 26f. 
652 Aubert-Monpeyssen (1988) p. 26. 
653 Decret-loi du 28 octobre 1935. “[…] assurés obligatoires tous les salariés et d’une facon générale, toutes les personnes de nationalité 
francaise, de l’un ou l’autre sexe, travaillant à quleque titre que ce [fut] et en quelque lieu que ce [fut], pour un ou plusieurs employeurs”. 
Cited in Aubert-Monpeyssen (1988) p. 27. 
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labour law and social security law separated. Existing and subsequent social legislation adopted 
the one of these two personal scopes depending on whether they were considered as lois 
d’assistance (social security) or lois du justice (labour law).654  
 
Horizontal and Vertical Extensions of the Personal Scope 
In the mid-1930s, the personal scope of labour law was enlarged to include categories of workers 
whose activity required a degree of liberty viewed as incompatible with legal subordination as 
understood at the time. Journalists and travelling sales representatives, and later models and 
performing artists, were given the protection of the entirety of labour legislation.655 Other 
categories, such as gas station tenants and persons running supermarkets on behalf of a chain of 
stores were to enjoy the protection of parts of labour law. A consequence of the partial 
application of labour law to certain categories of workers was the severance of the link between 
labour market regulation and the concept of employee, opening a breach for applying labour law 
to non-employees.656 This was manifested in labour legislation with general applicability, such as 
the right to receive a payslip, and labour legislation with a personal scope tied to the worker’s 
belonging to an enterprise rather than status as an employee, such as occupational health and 
safety and collective labour law. 
 
The fact that the Cour de cassation insisted on legal subordination as the key to the employee status 
did not stop the concept from developing.657 While the assimilation of workers in a similar 
economic position as employees represented a “horizontal” extension of the personal scope of 
labour law, the evolution of the concept of employee in the second half of the twentieth century 
represents a “vertical” extension, reaching workers higher up the social echelon.658  White collar 
                                                 
654 The line between the labour law and social security law was not, however, very well defined. A 1932 law on family 
allowances was given the more narrow scope. Aubert-Monpeyssen (1988) p. 29. 
655 C.f. below 4.2.2. 
656 Aubert-Monpeyssen (1988) p. 60. 
657 Revet (1992) p. 47. 
658 For the notions of horizontal and vertical extensions of the personal scope c.f. Aubert-Monpeyssen (1988) p. 62. 
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workers and some members of the liberal professions thus came to enjoy the protection of 
labour law. The extension was contested and prompted legislative intervention to keep company 
directors and lawyers in private practice from being classified as employees.659 
 
The Relationship with the Concept of Employee in Social Security Law 
From the mid-1930s, French social security law developed its own concept of employee, breaking 
with contract law doctrines on the nature, form or validity of contract, instead focusing on the 
employee’s dependency on the employer.660 The concepts of employee in French labour law and 
social security law respectively were thus separated, giving social security law a wider concept, 
based on the worker’s economic dependence rather than on the nature, form or validity of the 
contract between the worker and the employer. This separation was also reflected in the 
jurisprudence, where courts held the fact that a worker was registered for social security not to be 
proof of employee status.661 There are also examples of situations were the same worker was 
treated differently in disputes concerning labour law and social security law respectively.662  
 
The separation did nonetheless not hold up against the unifying logic calling for a single coherent 
concept of employee. Already in the early 1960s, courts started to accord relevance to social 
security registration when deciding labour law cases. In 1966, social security cases were 
transferred to the Chambre sociale of the Cour de cassation. With the same body in charge of both 
social security and labour law cases, the concepts became ever more unified, giving social security 
registration value as a presumption of employee status.663 The effect of the harmonisation of the 
concepts of employee in labour law and social security law was a widening of the personal of 
                                                 
659 Aubert-Monpeyssen (1988) pp. 64ff. 
660 Aubert-Monpeyssen (1988) p. 80. 
661 Aubert-Monpeyssen (1988) p. 80. 
662 In two cases dating from 1958 and 1962, the same shop assistant was considered to belong to the personal scope 
of social security law but not to that of labour law. Camerlynck (1982) p. 67. 
663 Aubert-Monpeyssen (1988) p. 81. 
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labour law.664 As late as 1982, however, a prominent French legal scholar described the notion of 
subordination used in social security law as “a notion less purely legal, with socio-economic 
concerns about the protection of categories of individuals deemed ‘vulnerable’”665 In works from 
recent years, the consensus nonetheless seem to be that the concept of employee is the same in 
both labour law and social security law. Pelissier, Supiot and Jeammaud describe the relationship 
between the two as “despite the obvious differences between labour law and social security law, 
the Chambre social of the Cour de cassation has given the same definition of a subordinate relation 
for the two disciplines”.666  
 
As the development in past decade, dealt with below, shows, the concept of employee is subject 
to a constant debate and constant developments. The persistence of the concept of employee in 
labour law as a relationship characterised by legal subordination has been described as purely 
formal. In the words of Monpeyssen “the only persistence in the notion of subordination is 
terminological”.667 
 
3.6.1 The Multi-factor Test of Legal Subordination 
A worker who works under a contract of employment (contrat de travail) is an employee (salarié). 
The Code du travail does not contain any definition of neither of the two and it has been left to the 
courts and the doctrine to develop the concept of employee. In a 1931 ruling, the Cour de 
Cassation held that the status of employee necessarily implies the “existence of a legal bond of 
subordination between the worker and the person who employs him”, a  bond of subordination 
which is “an element specific to the contrat de travail deriving from the fact that the employee finds 
                                                 
664 Morin (1998) p. 135. 
665 “[U]ne notion moins proprement juridique, qu’à des préoccupations socio-économique de protection de 
catégories d’individus ‘vulnerable’”. Camerlynck (1982) p. 62. 
666 “Malgré cette apparente différence entre le Droit du travail et le Droit de la Sécurité sociale, la Chambre sociale de 
la Cour de cassation donne le même définition du lien de subordination dans le cadre des deux disciplines”. Pelissier, 
Supiot and Jeammaud (2000) p. 151.   
667“Le critere de subordination n’a d’autre permanence que terminologique”  Aubert-Monpeyssen (1988) p. 315. 
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himself subject to the authority and to the direction of his employer who gives him orders as to 
how the work should be performed and controls and supervises its accomplishment.”668 
 
Three Constitutive Elements 
In the doctrine, a contract of employment is commonly considered to have three constitutive 
elements: the performance of work by a human being; the fact that the work is remunerated; and 
the worker’s subordination to the authority of the employer.669 To qualify as work performed by a 
human being, the work can take many different forms and be of a manual, intellectual or artistic 
nature, as long as the contract concerns a human being putting her labour at the disposal of the 
employer, and not the provision of a finished product. The work must take place under a 
contract, and work must be the principal purpose of the contract.670 The contrat de travail is an 
onerous contract and conditioned, explicitly or implicitly, on a remuneration of some kind.671  It 
imposes mutual obligations and, if the employer is not paying the worker has no obligation to 
work, and vice-versa. To count as remuneration for work, the payments have to go somewhat 
beyond just reimbursing expenses.672 As the Cour de cassation pointed out in its 1931 decision, the 
status of employee necessarily implies the existence of a bond of legal subordination between the 
worker and the person who employs her.673 Legal subordination places the employee under the 
authority of the employer, who gives orders, controls the work process and the result of the 
work. As in many other countries, it is the employees submission to the authority of the 
employer that distinguishes employees from independent contractors. 
 
                                                 
668 “…l’existence d’un lien juridique de subordination du travailleur à la personne qui l’emploie…” and “…élément 
spécifique du contrat de travail dérivant de la circonstance que la salarié se trouve soumis à l’autorité et à la directive 
de son employeur qui lui donne des ordres relatifs à l’exécution de son travail, en contrôle et surveille 
l’accomplissement…” Civ. 6 juillet 1931, cited in Le Goff (2001) p. 124. 
669 C.f. Camerlynck (1982) pp. 52ff;  Teyssié (1992) p. 211; Del Sol (1998) p. 29f;  and Pelissier, Supiot and 
Jeammaud (2000) pp. 145f; and Cohen and Gamet (2001) pp. 792ff. 
670 This means that persons performing work under other arrangements than contract, in French law for example 
civil servants, soldiers and prisoners, cannot be counted as employees. C.f. Savatier (1997) 643. 
671 Soc. 8 févr. 1972 Bull. civ. V.102. 
672 C.f. Soc. 29 janv. 2002, RJS 4/2002 no 387 and Soc. 22 mars 1989, Bull. civ. V.139. 
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Relevant Factors to Assess Legal Subordination 
The French multi-factor test is used to decide whether the third of the constitutive elements, a 
bond of legal subordination, is present in the relationship, thereby separating employees from 
independent contractors. In the jurisprudence of the Cour de cassation, and in the doctrine, the 
following factors have commonly been used as indications of employee status: i) the work is 
being performed under the orders and control of the employer; ii) the work takes place on the 
employer’s premises or at a place decided by the employer;  iii) the employer has control over the 
hours of work; iv) the remuneration is defined in terms of time rather than for a given task; v) the 
employer provides the necessary material and machinery;  vi) the worker does have any 
employees of her own; vii) the worker works exclusively for the employer; and vii) the employer 
behaves as such, for example, by issuing payslips or paying social security contributions.674 
 
Orders and Control 
In the 1996 Société Générale case, the Cour de cassation held that the employee’s subordination is 
“characterised by the execution of work under the authority of an employer who has the power 
to give orders and directions, to control the execution and to sanction breaches of duty by his 
subordinate”.675 As the French multi-factor test essentially is a test of the worker’s degree of 
subordination, the jurisprudence concerning the employer’s orders and control, as well as other 
subordination factors, is particularly rich, which is why they will be given a rather extensive 
treatment. 
 
The employer’s orders can take different forms and can come in the implicit form of constraints 
on the worker’s freedom of action. The tenant of a newspaper kiosk was found to be an 
                                                                                                                                                        
673 “[L]’existence d’un lien juridique de subordination du travailleur à la person qui l’emploie.” Civ. 6 juillet 1931 
(Recueil Dalloz 1931, p. 131). 
674 For listings of factors in the doctrine, c.f. Le Goff (2001) p. 126; Pelissier, Supiot and Jeammaud (2000) pp. 145ff; 
Teyssié (1992) pp. 222ff; Camerlynck (1982) p. 54. 
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employee as she was receiving precise instructions “not leaving any room for initiative,” and had 
her prices set by the distributor and her stand inspected twice daily.676 A sales representative was 
deemed an employee as he was given precise instructions on sales, advertising and invoicing; and 
had the duty to report frequently his sales and to make monthly plans for his future activities.677 A 
contract between the parties stating the place and time of work is, however, not enough to 
constitute orders or directives. In three 1982 cases concerning conference interpreters, the Court 
de cassation rejected employee status for the plaintiffs as the only constraint put on them was the 
place and time of work.678 Neither do explanations and instructions as to how technical 
equipment should be used qualify as orders leading to the worker’s subordination.679 
 
For the employer’s control to give rise to a state of subordination, the orders and control have to 
go further than just general instructions specifying a task, something to which many independent 
contractors are subject. A gardener receiving only general instructions about his task, but in 
whose contract the court could find no clause according to which the gardener “must, in the 
execution of his task, submit himself to the surveillance, the control, directives or orders of any 
sort” of the employer, was found to be an independent contractor.680 Along the same lines, a 
construction worker was found not to be an employee, as he had not in any way been under the 
supervision of the alleged employer. 681 Further, a physician serving as a company medical officer 
left free to determine how and when he should work was found to be an independent 
contractor.682 
                                                                                                                                                        
675 “…caractérisé par l’exécution d’un travail sous l’autorité d’un employeur qui a le pouvoir de donner des ordres et 
des directives, d’en controler l’exécution et de sanctionner les manquements de son subordonné…” Soc. 13 nov. 1996, 
Droit Social 1996 p. 1069. 
676 Soc. 28 avr. 1960, Bull. civ. IV.316. 
677 Soc. 9 mai 1979 Bull. civ V. 286. 
678 Soc. 14 janv. 1982 Bull. civ. V.13 and Soc. 14 janv. 1982 Bull. civ. V.14; Soc. 14 janv. 1982 Bull. civ. V.18. 
679 Soc. 14 janv. 1982 Bull. civ. V.18. 
680 “…dût, dans l’exécution de sa tâche, se soumettre à une surveillance, à une contrôle, à des directives ou à des 
ordres quelconques…” Soc. 29 janv. 1970 Bull. civ. V.50.  
681 Soc. 3 févr. 1965, Bull. civ. IV.82. In the case, it was the worker who claimed not to be an employee, in order to 
have the Conseil des prud’hommes declared incompetent for the case. 
682 Ch. Reun 21 mai 1965, Bull. civ. IV.6, c.f. also Soc. 19 déc. 1990, RJS 2/1991, no 144, concerning an academic 
giving lectures to the clients of a company without the company having any hierarchical power over him. 
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The orders and control can leave some degree of discretion to the worker, in particular if the 
worker is in possession of expertise or special skills or if a degree of independence is inherent in 
the nature of the work. In a case concerning a researcher working in the laboratory of a company, 
the Cour de cassation found that the “liberty inherent in the activity of a researcher” was not of the 
nature to exclude the worker from employee status.683 The Cour de Cassation found a diver 
prospecting natural resources off Colombia to be an employee even though he necessarily 
enjoyed some liberty as to how to perform his work due to the distance between him and the 
employer and the technical nature of his work.684 Likewise, a film director was found to be an 
employee of the producer of the film, despite a certain degree of artistic freedom.685 Further, in a 
1978 case concerning a medical doctor, the Cour de cassation found that the professional 
independence enjoyed by a doctor was not incompatible with the existence of a bond of legal 
subordination vis-à-vis the direction of the clinic at which he worked. In the case, the doctor did 
not have the right to chose his own patients and had to work according to a schedule determined 
by the direction of the clinic.686 The crucial point, pronounced in a case the year after, seems to 
be whether the liberty of action exceeds what necessarily follows from the doctor’s professional 
expertise or not.687 
 
The employer’s disciplinary powers can play a significant role and has occasionally been at the 
centre of the court’s attention. A football player, remunerated but not a full-time professional, 
was found to be an employee as his contract obliged him to subject himself to the rules and 
discipline of the club.688 In a 1997 case, the Cour de cassation found the fact that the directors of a 
                                                 
683 Soc. 14 mars 1991, Bull. civ. V. no 138. 
684 Soc. 14 avr. 1976 Bull. civ V.179. In addition, the fact that he, on top of his salary, had all his expenses covered by 
the employer seems to have been important for the court. 
685 Soc. 29 nov. 1962,Bull. civ. IV.713. 
686 Soc. 27 oct. 1978, Bull. civ. V.544. 
687 Soc. 7 mars 1979, Bull. civ. V.145. In the case, the doctor was found not to be an employee. 
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mother company had dismissed the manager of a subsidiary for not having followed their 
instructions as evidence that the worker was in fact an employee of the mother company.689  
 
Place of Work 
The employer’s “impératif géographique”, the right to decide the location where the work is to 
be performed, is considered as a typical characteristic of the worker’s subordination, however not 
decisive in itself.690 Thus, the fact that a worker receives clients or patients on the business 
premises of the alleged employer is considered to weigh in favour of the worker being an 
employee.691 In a 1982 case, the fact that a person working for a real estate agent was obliged to 
receive clients at a place and time determined by the employer was mentioned as a fact counting 
towards employee-status.692 Further, a regional director of a company was found to be an 
employee, among other things because his place of business was being rented by the alleged 
employer.693 On the contrary, a collector of insurance premiums working from his own premises 
was found to be an independent contractor.694 Further, if the nature of the activity calls for an 
independent contractor to be present on the employer’s premises or at a site decided by the 
employer, this does not necessarily make the worker an employee, as has been shown, for 
example, by cases concerning conference interpreters.695 
 
Working Hours 
The employer’s control of the hours of work is considered as an important sign of the worker’s 
subordination. Presented as a separate factor, it is nonetheless a part of the employer’s right to 
give orders and control.696 The control of working hours can express itself either as a schedule 
                                                 
689 Soc. 4 mars 1997, Bull. civ. V. no 91. C.f. also Soc. 16 juin 1965, Bull. civ. IV.391 
690 Pelissier, Supiot and Jeammaud (2000) pp. 154f. 
691 Soc. 27 oct. 1978, Bull. civ. V. 544; and Soc. 11 oct. 1961, Bull. civ. IV.672 
692 Soc. 12 juin 1963 Bull. civ. IV.401. 
693 Soc. 17 juin 1982, Bull. civ. V no 403. 
694 Soc. 27 oct. 1978, Bull. civ. V.545. 
695 Soc. 14 janv. 1982 Bull. civ. V.13, 14 and 18. 
696 C.f. Pelissier, Supiot and Jeammaud (2000) p. 156. 
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fixed by the employer, or as an obligation to show up for work on the employer’s request.697 A 
newspaper vendor obliged to start her distribution of newspapers to subscribers at 5 am was 
found to be a employee698, as was a cyclist, obliged to show up when convened by the team and 
to participate in all races indicated by the team.699 The fact that a medical doctor was not free to 
set his working hours counted in favour of his being considered an employee.700 Likewise, the 
fact that a person working for a real estate agent was obliged to receive clients at a place and time 
determined by the employer was mentioned as a fact counting towards employee status.701 
 
The Method of Remuneration 
Like in other countries, the fact that a worker is remunerated proportionally to the time period 
worked and regardless of the result has traditionally been a sign of employee status, while 
independent contractors have been paid by the task, regardless of the time spent thereon. Thus, 
the fact that a cyclist was paid a fixed sum per year and a monthly training allowance influenced 
the decision to grant him employee status.702 Today, remuneration by the hour, day or month can 
serve as a sign of employee status, even though many independent contractors use time as a basis 
for their billings as well, while the fact that a worker is paid by the task does not prevent her from 
being considered an employee.703 In a 1995 case concerning lorry drivers, the fact that it was the 
employer who sent invoices and received payments from clients, and then paid the drivers at the 
end of each month, after having made reductions for the renting of vehicles, was important for 
finding the worker to be employees.704 In a 1979 case, however, a similar arrangement was found 
                                                 
697 Teyssié (1992) p. 222. 
698 Soc. 3 déc. 1959, Bull. civ. IV.959. 
699 Soc. 8 juill. 1960, Bull. civ. IV.593. 
700 Soc. 30 janv. 1980, Bull. civ V.64. 
701 Soc. 12 juin 1963 Bull. civ. IV.401. 
702 Soc. 8 juill. 1960, Bull. civ. IV.593. 
703 Le Goff (2001) p. 129. 
704 Crim 5 janv. 1995 RJS 3/95 no 317. 
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to be without influence on the status of the worker, who in the end was found to be an 
employee.705 
 
The position that the worker’s risk of losses and chance of profit is more indicative than whether 
the pay is a function of time or not has been picked up by some French scholars but has still not 
made it to the Cour de cassation or to standard textbook accounts of the concept of employee. 
According to Gerhard Lyon-Caen, the independent contractor works for his own account, facing 
the risk of losses and the chance of profits while an employee may take part in profits but not 
share in losses.706  
 
Provision of Raw Materials, Tools, Machinery, etc.  
In French doctrine, the relevance of this factor has been explained by the ownership of capital 
being an inherit quality of the employer in a capitalist economy, and by the idea that the 
employer’s authority over the worker is weaker if the worker owns the necessary materials, tools 
or machinery.707 The Cour de cassation has thus denied employee status to a building worker who 
used his own tools and concrete mixer,708 while granting employee status to a team of masons 
who the employer furnished with mortar.709 Likewise, a medical doctor who paid for his use of a 
clinic’s equipment was found to be an independent contractor and not an employee of the 
clinic.710 Interpreters using equipment provided by the alleged employer were, however, still 
categorised as independent contractors.711  
 
                                                 
705 Soc. 7 mars 1979, Bull. civ. V.145. 
706 Lyon-Caen(1990) pp. 33 and 37. Similar views have been expressed by Fabre-Magnan (1998) p. 121. 
707 C.f. Pelissier, Supiot and Jeammaud (2000) p. 157 and Camerlynck (1982) p. 72. 
708 Soc. 11 oct. 1973, Bull. civ. V.441. 
709 Soc. 6 juill. 1966, Bull. civ. IV.578. 
710 Soc. 7 mars 1979, Bull. civ. V.145. 
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In the transport sector, persons collecting milk from farmers on behalf of a dairy were found to 
be independent contractors on the ground inter alia that they were using their own truck712 For 
taxi drivers who do not own their own vehicles, this fact has been of importance for granting 
them employee status, as it gives the employer the possibility to deprive the workers of their 
instrument of work.713 Likewise, the Cour de cassation has found lorry drivers renting their vehicles 
from the alleged employer to be employees.714 For salesmen, for example newspaper vendors, the 
fact that a worker bought the goods he had to sell from the employer did not matter as he had 
the right to return unsold goods and, moreover, the employer decided the price to the public.715  
 
The Worker Has No Other Workers Employed 
If a worker has other workers employed, this tends to indicate that the worker is not an 
employee. In a case concerning a construction worker, the fact that he hired other workers to 
help him was important in denying him employee status.716 Similarly, a medical doctor who hired 
and paid the nurses who worked for him was found to be an independent contractor and not an 
employee of the clinic where the work was carried out.717 Using the staff provided by the clinic 
does not, however, count against employee status.718 A worker does not automatically lose her 
employee status upon the hiring of a helper. The fact that an artisan is working together with a 
business partner does not necessarily make him an independent contractor.719 Likewise, a real 
estate agent who had other real estate agents working for him was found to be an employee of 
the company he worked for, as were the agents working for him.720 
 
                                                 
712 Soc. 25 févr. 1960, Bull. civ. IV.175; and Civ. 2e, 25 févr. 1965, Bull. civ. II.142. 
713 Civ. 2e, 6 déc. 1963, Bull. civ. II.606.  
714 Crim 5 janv. 1995 RJS 3/95 no 317. 
715 Soc. 28 avril 1960, Bull. civ. IV.316. 
716 Soc. 11 oct. 1973, Bull. civ. V.441.  
717 Soc. 7 mars 1979, Bull. civ. V.145. 
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Exclusivity 
If the worker reserves his work for one employer, this exclusivity is an indication of employee 
status.721 The exclusivity can be stipulated in the contract between the parties, as in a case 
concerning an accountant obliged by the contract between himself and the employer to devote 
his entire professional activity to the employer’s company. 722 Likewise, a cyclist who was under 
an obligation not to compete for any other team was found to be an employee.723 Exclusivity can, 
however, also be a matter of fact, as in a case concerning construction workers working 
exclusively for one building company724, or when two medical doctors were found to be 
employees of a rehabilitation centre as the centre was the only place they worked.725 
 
In situations where exclusivity has been lacking, the Cour de cassation has found this relevant in 
denying employee status. In a 2000 case, the fact that the alleged employer was not the only 
company using the services of the worker inclined the court to hold against recognising employee 
status.726 Along the same lines, milk collectors who, during or outside of their rounds, had the 
possibility to carry goods for others apart from the alleged employer were found to be 
independent contractors.727 Some cases come very close to economic dependence reasoning, for 
example a 1989 case where the occasional nature of the work and the small amounts of 
remuneration paid played a role in denying the workers employee status.728 The fact that a worker 
works for several different employers does nevertheless not exclude employee status, for example 
if a worker works only part-time for the alleged employer.729 A midwife was found to be an 
                                                 
721 Pelissier, Supiot and Jeammaud (2000) p. 158. 
722 Civ. 4 juin 1959, Bull. civ. II.274. 
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724 Soc. 29 oct. 1985, Bull. civ. V.858. 
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employee of a clinic despite the fact that she also worked as an independent contractor out of her 
own home.730  
 
The Buyer of Labour Behaving Like an Employer 
If the buyer of labour is a ‘professional’ employer, this is considered as a sign that the relationship is 
one between an employer and employee, whereas the fact that the worker is selling her services 
to the general public counts in the opposite direction.731 A lawyer, doctor or tailor would, for 
example, offer their services to customers who are not in the business of buying legal services, 
medical treatment or the manufacturing of clothes. The criterion has in practice become one of 
whether the buyer of labour is “behaving like an employer” or not.732 Typical employer 
behaviour, according to this doctrine, is the payment of holiday pay or social security 
contributions, issuing payslips, and advertising the position as a job offer rather than a business 
opportunity.733 The importance of the factor should not be overstated. In a case concerning a 
group of construction workers, the fact that the alleged employer had issued payslips and paid 
social security contributions was not enough to grant the workers employee status, as they could 
show no other signs of subordination.734 
 
Gauging Legal Subordination 
The purpose of the test is, as already mentioned, to determine whether a lien de subordination, a 
bond of subordination, exists between the worker and the employer. As can be deduced from the 
list of factors just presented, subordination in the strict sense of the word, is nonetheless not the 
only circumstance that has had an impact on courts’ decisions.  
 
                                                 
730  Soc. 6 janv 1961, Bull civ IV.14. 
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As indicated in the overview of the historical development of the concept of employee in French 
law, the notion of legal subordination has changed over time. In the late 1970s, the Cour de 
cassation adopted a rather broad notion of bond of subordination. A bond of subordination was 
present if the worker was integrated into the structure of a service or an enterprise,  making part of a service 
organisé, a service organised by the employer.735 First used in social security law and later in labour 
law, the new doctrine meant that the courts went beyond the worker’s subjection to the authority 
of the employer and asked whether the worker was integrated into the employer’s organisational 
structure, contributing to its normal functioning.736 The crucial point became the employer’s 
control over the conditions of work – such as the time, place and equipment necessary for work 
– not the subordination to orders and control.737 In a 1981 case concerning two doctors and a 
psychologist working for private education establishments, the Cour de cassation held that the facts 
that the alleged employers could call them to work; put premises at the school at their disposal; 
provided the patients; and paid their remuneration resulted in the “existence of a service 
organised in the interest of the establishment for which they worked”.738 In the case, no reference 
was made to the legal subordination of the worker to the employer’s authority. Two years later, in 
another plenary session, the court found a teacher at a private school to be an employee as he 
worked “within an organisation under the direction and responsibility” of the school and as his 
activity took place “under the dependence of the employer”.739 A woman selling cosmetics 
through sales meetings in the homes of her clients, responsible for taking orders, delivering the 
goods and receiving payments, and who was paid by a mix of fixed salary and commission, was 
found to be in a state of subordination due to the obligations imposed on her by the employer 
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within the framework of an organised service.740 The service organisé doctrine was consistently 
applied into the mid 1990s.741 
 
In 1996, however, the Société Générale decision by the Cour de cassation re-emphasised the 
importance of legal subordination. A lower court’s decision to grant employee status to workers 
who it had found within the framework of a service organisé was overturned with the argument that 
the workers had neither been subject to orders, directives nor control, why no bond of 
subordination existed.  
The bond of subordination, criteria for [the concept of employee], is characterised by the 
performance of work under the authority of an employer who has the power to give orders and 
directives, control the performance and sanction breaches. That work makes part of a service 
organised by the employer  may serve as an indication of a bond of subordination in case the 
employer unilaterally decides the conditions of work. 742 
 
In the case, which concerned lecturers, the court found that the topic of the lectures and the 
remuneration had not been decided unilaterally, but agreed between the employer and the 
workers. Further, the workers had not been subject to any orders or directives, and not to any 
control of their work. Thus, no bond of subordination existed between the workers and the 
employer. The formula from Société Générale, including the remark that making part of a service 
organised by the employer  can be an indication, but not in itself create, a bond of subordination, 
has been repeated by the court in later decisions.743 Le Goff describes the decisions as a “return 
to orthodoxy” and Pelissier et al remark that the Cour de cassation, through this decision, has 
                                                 
740 Soc. 24 fév. 1977, Bull. civ. V. No 149. 
741 Soc. 22 févr 1996, Bull. civ. V. No 65. 
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indicated that service organisé does not replace legal subordination.744 Jeammaud, analysing the case 
further, has pointed out that the Société Générale decision served as a reminder that subordination 
is the result of the employer’s power over the employee.745 
 
In a more recent decision which has been given great publicity, the Cour de cassation seems to have 
nuanced slightly its jurisprudence. The case concerned a taxi driver who was tied to the alleged 
employer by a rental contract for the vehicle he was driving, paying a fixed fee each month.746 
The driver was free to chose his working hours, his routes and his clients, but the rental contract 
imposed a number of other obligations. He had to drive the vehicle personally; keep the vehicle 
in a good state (for example, by checking oil and water levels daily); and subject it to weekly 
inspections by the owner. The rental contract ran for a month at a time and could be renewed by 
tacit agreement. The court, after having rejected the driver’s economic dependence as a basis for 
granting him employee status, looked to the terms of the contract and the practice between the 
parties to determine whether or not there existed a bond of subordination between the worker 
and the employer. Going about this, the court took a traditional multi-factor test approach, citing, 
on top of the already mentioned obligations to drive personally and take care of the vehicle, the 
employer’s payment of the driver’s social security contributions and the employers possibility to 
end the monthly contracts on short notice. In the end, the court found the worker to be an 
employee. Jeammaud, in an analysis of the case, has taken it as evidence that the contract of 
employment in French law has not undergone any radical narrowing down and instead sees it as 
an expression of the Cour de cassation’s readiness to react to certain forms of abusive 
outsourcing.747 
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Subordination 
French jurisprudence and doctrine seem to afford the factors directly concerned with the 
worker’s subordination to the hierarchical powers of the employer an extraordinary significance. 
Teyssié divides the factors into two categories, giving the subordination factors – orders and 
control; the place of work; and the working hours – pre-eminence as “critères principaux”  while 
the remaining factors only offer complementary information.748 Pelissier et al start their account 
of the factor concerning the employer’s orders and control of the work with “C’est là un facteur 
décisif”,749 while describing the place of work and working hours factors as not in themselves 
decisive, but important.750 Arguably, the strongest sign of subordination, which sometimes seems 
to be a sufficient, even though not a necessary criterion, is actually exercised disciplinary power. 
In several recent cases, the court has held that the fact that a worker has been dismissed or 
disciplined for not having followed the instructions of the alleged employer makes a clear case for 
the existence of a bond of subordination.751 
 
An illustration of the predominance of subordination can be taken from a 2002 case concerning 
an insurance agent.752 The Cour de cassation found the agent to be an employee as her work took 
place under the employer’s orders and directives, as it was planned by the insurance company and 
she was obliged to take part in certain meetings at the company. Further, she was subjected to 
supervision, as there were certain business operations that she needed the authorisation of the 
regional sales supervisor to perform. Finally, the employer could take, and had taken, disciplinary 
action against the worker, as she could lose some of her right to commission if she did not follow 
the company’s directives and had, after a conflict with a manager, been removed from the 
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management of certain clients. In the case, a full account of the insurance agents subordination is 
given, while no mention is made of other factors. 
 
Economic Dependence 
Economic dependence has, repeatedly, been dismissed as a decisive criterion by the Cour de 
cassation.753 Of the factors commonly listed as signs of the existence of a bond of subordination, 
only exclusivity qualifies as an outright economic dependence factor. Le Goff makes the 
argument that economic dependence, despite having lost its status as a decisive criteria, still is 
used by the courts to separate employees from independent contractors.754 Economic 
dependence can, in his view, play a role in two situations. In situations where legal subordination 
can be placed in doubt, but where there is no doubt about the economic dependence of the 
worker, economic dependence can play a subsidiary role. An example of this is taken from a case 
concerning an anaesthetist, where the fact that he worked exclusively for the employer weighted 
in when the issue of legal subordination was in doubt.755 Further, economic subordination can 
play a complimentary role in cases where the legal subordination has been blurred and 
fragmented in order to avoid the application of labour law. To Teyssié, even before the Société 
Générale decision, if the facts of the case indicate economic subordination, this can contribute to 
the judge’s decision, but it cannot, by itself, dictate it.756 
 
This disinterest in the worker’s economic dependence serves both to narrow and to extend the 
reach of the concept of employee in French law. On the one hand, workers who are 
economically dependent but who do not show strong enough signs of subordination are 
excluded. On the other, French labour law does not concern itself with the length or stability of 
the relationship. As Gerhard Lyon-Caen has pointed out, there is no equivalent to the 
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permanency criterion which in the UK has served to exclude casual workers from employee 
status.757 In France, a short term of engagement does not prevent a worker from being 
considered an employee. 
 
Other Factors 
As to the remaining factors, these tend to carry little weight. Having a registered business or 
being registered as an independent contractor with the tax authorities has not stopped workers 
from being awarded employee status if the employer has a sufficient degree of control.758 The 
same is true for the ownership of tools and machinery.759 In the past, the mode of remuneration 
was awarded a great significance, a point that can be illustrated by a 1955 case where the Cour de 
cassation found that the lower court had erred when it had not investigated whether a newspaper 
vendor was being remunerated by commission or by the profits from selling the newspapers.760 
Over the past decade, the mode of remuneration has been less and less frequently cited by the 
Cour de cassation, and its importance is being questioned. Pelissier et al speak of a “rejection of the 
mode of remuneration as a significant factor”.761 Likewise, Le Goff refers to the method of 
remuneration as one factor among others, no longer with any special status.762 As late as in 1995 
however, the method of remuneration – lorry drivers paid monthly after reductions for the rent 
of their vehicles – was important for finding the workers to be employees.763 
 
Compared to the other studied countries, the concept of employee in French labour law thus 
stands out for its strong focus on the worker’s subordination to the employer’s hierarchical 
powers. It is probably safe to say that a relationship showing no or only weak signs of employer 
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control over how, when and where the work is carried out would not qualify as an employer-
employee relationship under French law, even if all other signs of employee status where present. 
It is even possible to argue that a high degree of subordination is sufficient to grant a worker 
employee status. In a 1998 case from the Chambre criminelle of the Cour de cassation, a construction 
worker used his own tools and van; had another worker employed; received his remuneration 
after billing the alleged employer; did work for other employers as well; and was registered as an 
independent contractor with the tax authorities.764 Despite all these factors pointing in the 
direction of the worker being an employee, the court decided in favour of employee status as they 
found the alleged employer to have sufficient control over the work to constitute a bond a 
subordination. 
 
3.6.2 The Loi Madelin 
As in other countries, the mandatory nature of labour law makes it necessary for judges to re-
qualify contracts when the reality of the relationship points to an employee-employer 
relationship.765 This was clearly spelled out by the Cour de cassation in a 1983 decision where the 
court held that the existence of an employment relationship did not depend either on the 
intention of the parties, or on the label they have chosen for their relationship, but on the actual 
conditions under which the activity of the workers takes place.766 Decisions from recent years 
often starts by noticing that “the existence of a contract of employment depends neither on the 
will expressed by the parties nor by the label that they have put on their relationship, but on the 
conditions under which the activities of the worker are exercised.”767 The burden of proof lays 
with the party wishing to re-qualify the contract.768 
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In 1994, the Loi Madelin769 – named after Alain Madelin, at the time minister for small and 
medium sized businesses – created a presumption against the existence of a contrat du travail in 
cases where the worker was registered as an independent contractor in the social security registry. 
The Loi Madelin was in response to criticism from employers that judges’ re-qualification of 
contracts inserted an uncertainty into the relationship between employers and independent 
contractors.770 The provision in the Code du Travail stipulated that “natural persons registered in 
the Registre du commerce et des sociétes […] are presumed not to be under a contract of employment 
for the activity for which they are registered.” The existence of a contract of employment could, 
nonetheless, be established if the person provided services to an employer “under conditions 
which created a bond of permanent legal subordination” vis-à-vis the employer.771 
 
In the courts, the issue quickly became one of how the words “bond of permanent legal 
subordination” should be interpreted. Did the inclusion of the word “permanent” indicate that 
the relationship between the worker and the employer had to be of a permanent duration, making 
it practically impossible to break the presumption? Or did “permanent” refer to the legal 
subordination, in which case the law would not have changed compared to earlier?772 In 1998, the 
Cour de cassation decided in favour of the second option, rending the presumption created by the 
Loi Madelin meaningless.773 The presumption created by the Loi Madelin was formally abrogated in 
2000.774 
                                                                                                                                                        
767 “L’existence d’une relationde travail ne dépend ni de la volonté exprimée par les parties ni de la dénomination 
qu’elles ont donnée à leur convention mais des conditions de fait dans lesquelles est exercée l’activité des 
travailleurs.” Soc. 19 déc. 2000, Bull. civ. V no 437. 
768 Soc. 18 juin 1996, Bull. civ. V no 245 and Soc. 7 nov. 2001, RJS 1/2002 no 2. 
769 Loi du 11 février 1994. 
770 Le Goff (2001) p. 148. 
771 Les personnes physiques immatriculées au Registre du commerce et des sociétés, au répertoire des métiers, dispose ce texte, sont présumes 
ne pas être liées par un contrat du travail dans l’exécution de l’activité donnant lieu à cette immatriculation. Toutefois, l’existence d’un 
contrat du travail peut être établie lorsque les personnes citées au premier alinéa fournissent directement ou par une personne interposé des 
prestations à un donneur d’ouvrage dans des conditions qui les placent dans un lien de subordination juridique permanent à l’egard de 
celui-ci. Old Article L 120-3 Code du Travail, cited in Le Goff (2001) p. 148. 
772 Le Goff (2001) p. 148. 
773 Crim. 31 mars 1998, D.1999, p. 137. 
774 Loi du 19 janv. 2000, art 34. 
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3.7 Comparative Analysis of the Concept of Employee 
3.7.1 Differences and Similarities in the Concept of Employee 
Taking Otto Kahn-Freund’s words of warning to the comparative legal scientist, “not to be lured 
by homonyms”, seriously, it is necessary to compare the concepts of employee in the four studied 
countries.775 What similarities and differences are there between the concepts of employee used in 
French, Swedish, British and US labour law and to what extent does the differences amount to 
differences in the personal scope of labour law? 
 
Given that all four countries employ a multi-factor test to decide whether a worker is an 
employee or not, it is probable that this is the case in most western countries.776 As can be seen in 
Table 3.7.1, courts in all four countries use lists of factors that are largely identical and whose 
content is quite similar but for the weighting of the factors. In all four countries, the obligation to 
perform work personally, in some form, is a necessary condition for employee status, that is, such 
obligation must always be present in order for a worker to be considered an employee. In France 
and the United Kingdom, the obligation to perform work personally has been explicitly identified 
as a necessary criteria for a worker to be considered an employee. In reality, this is the case in 
Sweden and the United States as well, even though this has not been stated explicitly in the 
jurisprudence. 
 
In the UK, France and the US the worker’s subordination to the employer’s hierarchical powers is  
a necessary criterion for employee status. In France and under the US control test, subordination, 
if strong enough, can even serve as a sufficient criterion. Sweden is, however, different. Despite 
the fact that subordination factors do carry a considerable weight in the integrated consideration, 
                                                 
775 Kahn-Freund (1978) p. 285. 
776 Multi-factor tests are, for example, used in all the Nordic countries, regardless of whether they have statutory 
definitions of the concept of employee (Finland) or not (Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Iceland). Källström (2002) 
pp. 78 and 84. 
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courts can find in favour of employee status based on other factors in cases where the worker’s 
organisational ties to the employer do not amount to outright subordination.  
 
Economic dependence is not a necessary criterion in any of the studied countries, with the exception 
of the areas of UK labour law which fall under the mutuality of obligation doctrine. In Sweden, 
economic dependence can be a sufficient factor for employee status. Least concerned with the 
worker’s economic dependence is French labour law. 
Table 3.7.1 Categorisation of Factors of Multi-factor Tests 
United States 
(Control test as expressed in 
Reid) 
Sweden 
(As expressed in SOU 1975:1) 
United Kingdom France 
Performing Work Personally 
(Assumed) 
The hired party’s role in hiring 
and paying assistants. 
[The worker] is obliged to 
perform work personally. 
[The worker] has in fact, 
completely or almost 
completely, performed the 
work personally. 
Obligation to provide his own 
work. 
The performance of work by a 
human being (basic condition 
for an employment relation). 
The worker has no other 
workers employed. 
Subordination 
Hiring party’s right to control 
the means and manners by 
which the product is 
accomplished. 
The extent of the hired party’s 
discretion over when and how 
long to work.. 
Right to assign additional 
projects to the hired party. 
Location of the work. 
[The worker] is in the 
performance of the work 
subject to specific orders or 
control as to how the work is 
performed, the working time 
or the place of work. 
[The worker’s] contract 
includes putting his labour to 
the disposal of the other party 
for arising tasks. 
In the performance of service, 
the worker will be subject to 
the employers control. 
Integration into the 
organisation of the employer. 
The work is performed under 
the orders and control of the 
employter. 
The employer decides the 
place of work 
The employer controls the 
working hours 
 
Economic Dependence 
Duration of the relationship 
between the parties. 
Whether the party [worker] is 
in business for himself. 
The relationship between the 
two parties has a more lasting 
character. 
[The worker] is prevented 
from performing similar work 
of any significance for 
someone else, whether this is 
due to a restrcition in the 
contract or a practical 
consequence of the actual 
conditions of work, such as 
the lack of time or energy for 
other work. 
Number of employers. 
Permanency 
 
Exclusivity 
Other factors 
Method of payment. 
Source of the instrumentalities 
and tools. 
The provisions of employment 
benefits.  
The remuneration of the 
performed work is, at least in 
part, paid as a guaranteed 
salary. 
[The worker] is compensated 
for his expenses. 
Type of remuneration. 
Opportunity for profit/Risk of 
loss. 
Capital investment/ 
Ownership of tools and 
Method of remuneration. 
Provision of raw materials, 
tools, machinery, etc. 
The employer behaves as such, 
e.g. through paying benefits.  
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Skill required. [The worker] is supposed to 
use machinery, tools or raw 
materials provided by the 
other party to the contract. 
[The worker] has economically 
and socially the same status as 
an employee. 
machinery. 
Treatment for purpose of 
taxes and benefits. 
Skill 
Industry practice 
 
 
The concept of employee in Swedish labour law stands out as the broadest of the concepts 
presented in this study. The width of the Swedish concept can be attributed to the technique of 
integrated consideration of all circumstances with no single factor being necessary. As 
subordination is not a necessary criterion, it has been possible to bring workers previously put in 
the dependent contractor category under the concept of employee. At the same time, workers 
showing a sufficient degree of subordination do not have to be economically dependent to 
qualify for employee status. 
 
This can be compared to the United States where the control factor dominates the common law 
control test and where other factors, including economic dependence, can tip the balance in close 
cases. If the employer’s control is low, a high degree of economic dependency does not help to 
make a worker an employee. The same is true for France where the subordination criteriaon may 
be even stricter than in the US, in particular since the Cour de cassation’s 1996 rejection of the service 
organisé doctrine. In the US, but not in France, performing work integral to the business of the 
employer can still substitute for a high degree of control. On the other hand, however, the 
French test is more inclusive when it comes to casual workers, as the duration of the relationship 
is left outside of the multi-factor test. 
 
Comparing the similar tests of France and the United States it is also important to take into 
account the extent to which courts can and do let the purpose of the statute influence their 
interpretation. Purposive interpretation seems to make for a wider concept of employee. The fact 
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that the French multi-factor test is used only in labour law and social security law, while the US 
common law test serves in tax and copyright law as well, would thus tend to make the French test 
more inclusive. In addition, the French multi-factor test is interpreted by the labour courts in the 
first instance and by the social chamber of the Cour de cassation in the last, while the US test is 
applied by ordinary courts of general jurisdiction, at least on the appeals and supreme levels. 
According to Hyde “US courts [of general jurisdiction] typically are more willing to define an 
individual as self-employed, and thus outside regulatory coverage, than the relevant regulatory 
agencies.”777 If it is generally true that specialised courts or agencies are more willing to make 
purposive interpretations and find employee status, this is another indication that the concept of 
employee in US law could be more narrow than that of French labour law. 
 
In the United Kingdom, the worker’s subordination to the employer’s control is necessary but 
not sufficient for the worker to be an employee. It is also necessary that the contract looked at as 
a whole is consistent with employee status. While the control factor – through its broadening to 
“integration into the business of the employer” – is fairly generous, British courts have limited 
the reach of the concept of employee by establishing relatively high standards to find the contract 
as a whole consistent with employee status, in particular as concerns the workers economic 
dependence. The outcome is a concept of employee limited both on the side of subordination 
and on the side of economic dependence. The argument that the UK concept of employee is 
more narrow can also draw support from the fact that it has been considered necessary to use 
broader language than ‘employee’ to implement European directives (see below). 
 
3.7.2 European Law and the Concept of Employee 
Having identified the similarities and differences between the concepts of employee used in 
labour law in France, Sweden, the United Kingdom, members of the EU, and the United States, 
                                                 
777 Hyde (2000) p. 53. 
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it is interesting to take a look at how the concept of employee has been handled in European 
Law. The idea that national concepts of employee are similar but not identical gets further 
support from the fact that the EU has come to use both national concepts of employee and a 
special community concept. In broad terms, EU labour law aimed at the harmonisation of 
national laws, such as provisions concerning the free movement of workers, anti-discrimination 
and occupational health and safety, has come to use a Community Law concept of employee, 
while measures that only aim at the approximation of laws as a general rule use the national 
concepts of employee.  
 
In its 1986 Lawrie-Blum decision, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) held that the term ‘worker’ 
in Article 39(1) [Ex-art 48(1)] of the Treaty,778 which lays down the principle of free movement of 
workers, has a Community meaning, which applies regardless of national definitions of the 
Member States.  
Since the freedom of movement for workers constitutes one of the fundamental principles of the 
Community, the term ‘worker’ in Article 48 may not be interpreted differently according to the law 
of each Member State but has a Community meaning. Since it defines the scope of the fundamental 
freedom, the community concept of a ‘worker’ must be interpreted broadly[…]. That concept must 
be defined in accordance with objective criteria which distinguish the employment relationship by 
reference to the rights and duties of the persons concerned. The essential feature of an employment 
relationship is that a person performs services of some economic value for and under the direction 
of another person in return for which he receives remuneration. The sphere in which they are 
provided and the nature of the legal relationship between employee and employer are immaterial as 
regards the application of Article 48.779 
 
                                                 
778 Different language versions of the treaty use terms with quite different everyday connotations. Whereas the 
French (travailleurs), the Italian (lavoratori) and Spanish (trabajadores) versions carry more or less the same connotations 
as the English (workers), the Swedish (arbetstagare) and German (arbeitsnehmer) texts use words more corresponding to 
the English word ‘employee’ while the Danish version speaks of arbejdskraften, i.e. ‘labour power’. 
779 Case 66/85 Lawrie-Blum v. Land Baden-Württemberg [1986] ECR 2121, at 2144, para 16-17. 
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In this statement, by the references to remunerated work performed “for and under the direction 
of another person” and that the nature of the relationship must be decided according to the 
“rights and duties of the parties concerned” the ECJ captures the core features of the concept of 
employee as we have seen it in the three studied member states. Still, as the free movement of 
workers is a fundamental principle of Community law, and an area in which the community aims 
at the harmonisation of national laws, its personal scope must not be defined by national legal 
concepts of varying width.780 In fact, the Court has gone further than national legislators and 
courts, establishing a community concept of employee which includes workers that would not be 
covered by the concept of employee in at least some of the member states. Under the community 
concept, it does not matter whether the worker’s employment is based on a private law contract 
or public law status.781 Further, the ECJ has found that the limited extent of the work, if not 
purely marginal and ancilliary, does not prevent workers from being covered by free movement 
provisions. Thus, the Court has found part-time workers to be covered by the free movement of 
workers despite the very limited extent of their activity.782 Further, the Court has held that on-call 
workers can be covered, despite no guarantees of work or obligation to accept work if offered.783 
  
As mentioned above, in areas where the Community only aims for the approximation of national 
laws (also referred to as partial harmonisation) without going as far as full harmonisation, the 
main rule is that the concept of employee in national law defines the scope also of provisions 
adopted at the European level. In Danmols Inventar, the ECJ found that as the Acquired Rights 
Directive was “intended to achieve only partial harmonization” and “not however intended to 
establish a uniform level of protection throughout the Community on the basis of common 
criteria”, “[i]t follows that Directive No 77/187 may be relied upon only by persons who are, in 
                                                 
780 C.f. also Case 53/81 Levin v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie [1982] ECR 1035. 
781 Case 152/73 Sotgiu [1974] ECR 153. 
782 Case 139/85 Kempff v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie [1986] ECR 1741. 
783 Case C-357/89 Raulin v. Minister van Onderwijs en Wetenschappen [1992] ECR I-1027. 
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one way or another, protected as employees under the law of the Member State concerned.”784 In 
later directives, and in amendments to some older directives, provisions have been included 
stating that the directives “should be without prejudice to national law as regards the definition of 
contract of employment or employment relationship.”785 The absence of such provisions should 
nonetheless not be seen as an indication that the community law concept of employee is to be 
used.786  
 
Commonly, approximation directives have their personal scope defined as “contracts of 
employment or employment relationships.”787 According to some authors, this could imply 
something broader than the UK concept of employee, which, as we noted above, is rather 
restrictive. “The implications of this phrase for the law of the UK appears to be that some 
contractual relations, though not fitting exactly within the definition of employment should 
nevertheless be included within the scope of the regulation required by the directive.”788 Despite 
the ECJ having insisted that the precise interpretation of such concepts must be a matter for 
national law, it has been argued that “employment” in the Community context is wider than 
“employee” in the British context.789 In recent years, in a number of cases, British 
implementation legislation of some directives has had its personal scope defined in terms of 
“worker” rather than “employee”, for example the Working Time Regulation 1998 and the Part Time 
Workers (Prevention of less favourable treatment) Regulation 2000. 
                                                 
784 Case 105/84 Foreningen af Arbejdsledere i Danmark v.A/S  Danmols Inventar [1985] ECR 2639, at 2653 (para 26-27). It 
should be noted that in the English language versions, the terms used in the Treaty (worker) and in the Directive 
(employee) differ, whereas in most other language versions the same word is used in both instances. The directive was 
later amended to include a provisions that it should be without prejudice to national law as regards the definition of 
contract of employmnet or employment relationship. 
785 E.g. Directive 80/987/EEC on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the protection of employees in the 
event of the insolvence of their employer, Art. 2(2); and Council Directive 2001/23/EC relating to the safeguarding of employees’ rights 
in the event of transfers of undertakings, Art. 2(2). 
786 C.f. Advocate-General Slynn in Case 195/84 Danmols Inventar [1985] ECR 2639, at 2644. 
787 E.g. Directive 80/987/EEC on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the protection of employees in the 
event of the insolvence of their employer, Art. 1(1). 
788 Collins et al (2001) p. 167. 
789 Clifton Middle School v. Askew [2000] ICR 286, at 311. Chadwick L.J. (dissenting) suggested that the term 
“employment relationship” in the Acquired Rights Directive (77/187) extended the reach of the British implementation 
legislation to cover a teacher who technically did not have a contract of employment at the day of the transfer. 
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3.7.3 A Status Notion 
Seen as a whole, more than the differences between the concepts of employee found in the four 
studied countries, it is the similarities between them that have to be considered as the striking 
feature. They are all multi-factor tests, the factors used are largely the same and there are great 
similarities in the technique used for weighing the factors together. It is not unreasonable to 
assume that the outcome in the large majority of cases would be the same regardless of which 
country’s courts were asked to consider them. The similarities become even more striking if we 
take into account the fact that the legal historical roots of the various concepts differ. In the civil 
law countries the concept of employee grew out of the locatio/louage d’ouvrage while in the 
common law countries it was the law of master and servant. Neither, moreover, has the concept 
of employee been the subject of harmonization on the international level. Still, the significant 
similarities should not come as a surprise to the comparative legal scholar. Zweigert and Kötz 
describe as a “basic rule of comparative law” the fact that “different legal systems give the same 
or very similar solutions, even as to detail, to the same problems of life, despite the great 
differences in their historical development, conceptual structure and, style of operation.”790 Kahn-
Freund took this argument one step further suggesting a “very simple, but, I believe, very 
important observation”: 
It is the observation that, under similar social, economic and cultural pressures in similar societies 
the law is apt to change by means of sometimes radically different legal techniques. The ends are 
determined by society, the means by legal tradition.791 
 
In the case of the concept of employee, it is clear that it has been set up with the same, pre-
existing, extra-legal notion in mind. As Aubert-Monpeyssen points out in her study of the notion 
of subordination in French law, the social legislation predates the concept of employee. It is with 
                                                 
790 Zweigert and Kötz (1998) p. 39. They even suggest a praesumptio similitudinis, a presumption that the practical 
results are similar, as a working rule in comparative law. 
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the development of social security and labour law that it becomes necessary to find a legal 
definition for the rather heterogeneous group of workers the reformers had in mind. The concept 
of employee was an attempt to define in law an already existing category of workers, a difficult 
task which is why “the legal notion of employee never exactly corresponded to the sociological 
entity that predated it.”792 
 
This ‘sociological entity’ was the industrial worker as found in the capitalist modes of production. 
Under this mode, ownership of important means of production – such as the premises for work, 
the raw materials, the tools and machinery, intellectual property rights – by the employer is 
coupled with a relationship under which the worker “stands ready to accept authority regarding 
work assignments” making her “subject to […] detailed supervision”.793 Further, the industrial 
worker was being paid a wage which at least in part was dependent on the amount of time 
worked. More importantly, the worker would typically have no alternative source of income to 
turn to but the selling of her labour, the welfare of individuals having come to “depend entirely 
on the cash nexus”.794 In the words of the Supiot-report: 
This concept corresponds to what in the language of industrial relations is called the ‘Fordist’ 
model, that is a large industrial business engaging in mass production based on a narrow 
specialization of jobs and competencies and pyramidal management (hierarchical structure of 
labour, separation between product design and manufacture). This model has been largely dominant 
throughout Europe in various different forms. […] However, the core feature of the model, present 
everywhere to some extent, is the crucial importance of standard full-time non-temporary wage 
contracts (particularly for adult men), centring around the trade-off between high levels of 
subordination and disciplinary control on the part of the employer and high levels of stability and 
welfare/insurance compensations and guarantees for the employee […].795 
                                                                                                                                                        
791 Kahn-Freund (1978) p. 280. 
792 “La notion juridique de salariat n’a jamais exactement recoupé l’entité sociologique qui lui préexistait.” Aubert-
Monpeyssen (1988) p. 11. 
793 Williamson (1985) p. 219. 
794 Esping-Andersen (1990) p. 21. 
795 Supiot et al (2001) p. 1. 
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Even though contracts of employment are entered into and dissolved, being an employee is a 
status in the sense that a more or less fixed set of rules and conditions, laid down in legislation or 
collective agreements, applies to all employees in a certain occupational category. This is 
reinforced as the adherence to social security systems, and sometimes to tax regimes, have been 
tied to the concept of employee. Therefore, as Veneziani has pointed out, “[t]he transition from 
status to contract has been more apparent than real. It would be more accurate to say that in the 
various phases of the economic, social and political evolution of the employment relationship the 
worker’s status has changed.”796 The sociological entity to be captured by the concept of 
employee has been modified and could today be described as the permanent, full-time employee, 
performing work under the supervision and control of her employer, on premises owned by the 
latter.  
 
To capture such a status notion, including changes over time, a multi-factor test makes sense. 
The nature of the multi-factor test dictates that it essentially looks for the overall status of the 
worker, not solely at isolated aspects of the relationship between the worker and the employer. 
The individual factors correspond to characteristics commonly thought typical of an employee 
and their weighting together to the perceived importance of these characteristics. Lord 
Wedderburn, describing the state of affairs in British law, called this the “elephant test”. 
The legal test has splintered in the hands of the judges, leaving them to say […] that ‘it is not 
practicable to lay down precise tests’ or a ‘hard and fast list’, that there are too many variants; so 
‘you look at the whole of the picture’. Most courts now appear to use this ‘elephant-test’ for the 
employee – an animal too difficult to define but easy to recognize when you see it.797 
                                                 
796 Veneziani (1986) p. 70. 
797 Wedderburn (1986) p. 116. 
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3.8 Is the Concept of Employee a Suitable Personal Scope for Labour Law? 
In this last section of the chapter concerning the concept of employee, the key question will be 
asked: Is the concept of employee a suitable personal scope for labour law? Above (2.5), three 
requirements on the personal scope were identified: i) that labour law be of a mandatory nature, 
ii) that uncertainty as to the legal status of the relationships between workers and employers is 
limited as much as possible, and iii) that labour law covers all, or almost all, situations where the 
concerns of labour law are raised. 
 
That the concept of employee generally has a mandatory nature – expressed by the fact that cases 
are being decided on what has actually taken place between the parties, giving little or no 
relevance to the label of the contract – has been demonstrated earlier in this chapter and will not 
be elaborated on further. Instead, the analysis will focus, first, on the conflict between the, in 
many ways beneficial, flexibility of the concept of employee and the desire to reduce uncertainty, 
and then turn to the issue of whether a personal scope defined by the concept of employee 
provides labour law with a coverage sufficient for the concerns it is set to address. 
 
3.8.1 Flexible or Unpredictable? 
The great advantage of the concept of employee in the form we have seen it in France, Sweden, 
the United Kingdom and the United States is its flexibility. The multi-factor technique, together 
with the absence or vagueness of statutory definitions, has given courts possibilities to adjust the 
concept of employee to changes in working life. The test has also been good at adjusting to 
changes in society at large, something of obvious importance to a legal concept that essentially is 
a status test. 
 
The idea that the concept of employee must be dynamic and change over time has been 
embraced by legislators and courts in all four countries. In Sweden, this was done explicitly when 
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lawmakers in the 1940s indicated in preparatory works that the concept of employee was not a 
static, but a constantly developing concept which was to be influenced by social and economic 
developments. In all the countries, the case law bears witness to the impact changes on the labour 
market and in the organisation of work have had on the development of the concept of 
employee. The best example of this is undoubtedly the development of the subordination factors. 
As the organisation of work has changed, with less of direct orders and control, courts have 
taken to look at more indirect forms of control such as the worker’s subjection to the rules and 
procedures of an organisation, or her training in procedures suggested by the employer and their 
actual application. Courts ask questions such as whether the work is ‘integral to the employer’s 
regular business’, whether the worker is ‘integrated into the business of the employer’ being ‘part 
and parcel of an organisation’, or whether the worker form part of a service organisé. 
 
It also seems like that if a form of work arrangement has become common or accepted on the 
labour market, courts are less likely to change the status of a worker under that arrangement. One 
explanation to the comeback of hierarchical control in the US and France in the 1990s, could be 
that courts became less ready to apply doctrines accepting the worker’s integration into the 
organisation of the employer as sufficient subordination, at the time when the occurrence and 
acceptance for subcontracting and other schemes involving independent contractors had risen.798 
In the UK, the Court of Appeal in Lane v. Shire Roofing Company, held that the increase in self-
employment and the many advantages for both the employer and the worker in avoiding the 
employee label had to be taken into account when the authority of older case law was 
examined.799 
 
                                                 
798  C.f. Community for Creative Non-violence v. Reid 490 U.S. 730 (1989), Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company v. Darden 
503 U.S. 318 (1992), and Société Général Soc. 13 nov. 1996, Droit Social 1996 p. 1069. 
799 Lane v. Shire Roofing Company [1995] IRLR 493, at 495 (Lord Justice Henry). As the Court found “good policy 
reasons in the safety at work field to ensure that the law properly categorises between employees and independent 
contractors” it nevertheless held that the worker was an employee. 
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Courts interpreting the concept of employee have also had to deal with changes in society at 
large, notably the progressive blurring of class distinctions throughout the twentieth century. At 
the end of the nineteenth century, employees, to the extent the notion existed, were manual 
industrial workers. Then, through the process of “vertical extension” of the concept of employee, 
it has gone on to cover clerical and salaried workers and, later, managers and members of the 
liberal professions. Being an employee is no longer synonymous with being working class but 
incorporates a large part of the middle and upper classes as well. In the words of a prominent 
Italian legal scholar, labour law lost its character of “droit ouvrier” and came to cover an “area 
interclassista”.800 In the multi-factor tests this is visible in the lessened importance given to factors 
that can be said to pertain to the social status of the worker. The level of skill required for the 
position, a factor often coinciding with social status, today only plays a minor roll. In addition, as 
already mentioned, the notion of subordination has been adapted to include highly skilled 
workers as well.  
 
The flexibility of the concept of employee has, however, also been a reason for critical views of 
its suitability as the personal scope of labour law. The vagueness of the concept, together with, in 
some countries, the existence of different concepts of employee for labour law, social security 
and tax purposes, has been perceived as subjecting employers and workers to uncertainty as to 
the status of their relation. The Dunlop Commission found that even the relative homogenity of the 
concept of employee in US law presented “employers with an unnecessarily complicated 
regulatory maze”.801 This concern can also be seen in attempts to reduce this uncertainty, such as 
the Loi Madelin.802 Another source of uncertainty, and of criticusm, is that the multi-factor test is a 
rather complicated legal technique. Westerhäll argues that the method makes the decisions of the 
courts less useful as precedents since it is hard to distinguish what circumstances were decisive in 
                                                 
800 Gino Giugni, Lavoro (diritto del) Enciclopedia del novecento, Roma 1978, vol. III, p. 947, cited in Santoro Passarelli 
(1979) p. 13. 
801 Dunlop Commission (1994) p. 64. 
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each case. She also argues that it is not possible for administrative agencies and others who have 
to draw the line between employees and self-employed workers on a daily basis to use the time 
consuming technique of the multi-factor test.803 
 
At first glance, statutory definitions of the concept of employee can seem to increase legal 
certainty, as courts and agencies are left with less room for interpretation. The experience from 
the US and the UK (the two of the studied countries with statutory definitions) do not, however, 
lend any support to this view. It has still been left to the courts to work out the essential content 
of the concept of employee, largely due to the vague or circular nature of the definitions. The 
problem is that a more precise statutory definition would risk making the concept of employee 
less flexible and thus less capable of adapting to the constant changes in working life and 
industrial organisation. Statutory definitions can nonetheless be useful for legislators wishing to 
indicate that the word ‘employee’ is to have different meanings in certain statutes than in others. 
An example, even though it can be questioned whether this was the intent of the legislator, is the 
United States where differences in the statutory definitions of ‘employee’ and ‘employ’ have been 
used by courts to give a wider meaning to the concept of employee in the Fair Labour Standards 
Act and the Equal Pay Act, and earlier to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.804 
 
3.8.2 Coverage Sufficient to Address the Concerns? 
The most important test of the concept of employee’s suitability for determining the personal 
scope of labour law is without doubt whether it covers all, or almost all, situations where the 
concerns of labour law are raised. This is partially determined by whether a legal order contains 
one or several different concepts of employee and if and how the flexibility inherent in the 
                                                                                                                                                        
802 C.f. above 3.6.2. 
803 Westerhäll (1986) p. 24. 
804 C.f. above3.3.1. In its 1992 Darden decision, the court explicitly referred to the differences in language between the 
FLSA and ERISA to motivate their choice of test. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company v. Darden 503 U.S. 318, at 326 
(1992). 
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concept of employee is used. Apart from its key function in labour law and social security law, 
the term ‘employee’ often occurs in taxation and copyright law. As we have seen, in Sweden and 
France, labour law and social security law have come to use the same concept of employee while 
in the UK there is no perfect fit between the two concepts and the United States uses the 
economic realities test to decide over adherence to its pension system while the common law 
control test is used for the most of labour, taxation and copyright law. Further, the willingness of 
courts to take the concerns of the regulation they are to adjudicate into account varies. In 
Sweden, the lawmakers, through the preparatory works, have on several occasions expressly 
instructed the courts to take the legislation’s purpose into account when adjudicating the personal 
scope. In the United Kingdom, the influence from what is at stake is clear in the decisions of the 
courts. 
 
An apparent advantage of a unified concept of employee is that it provides a terminological 
coherence across the legal system, with increased legal certainty as a result. A worker will not be 
classified as an employee under one statute and as an independent contractor under another.805 
There are nonetheless good reasons to doubt whether this perceived advantage of a unified 
concept actually exists. In reality, only the very small fraction of workers and employers who have 
had their relationship classified by a court in the past would enjoy increased certainty. The vast 
majority who had not put their relationship before a court would still be in doubt about their 
status. An alternative could be to let ex-ante registration for tax or other purposes determine the 
proper classification under labour law as well. The problem is that such a solution could come in 
conflict with the mandatory nature of labour law as circumstances other than the actual nature of 
the relationship between the worker and employer would decide employee status. A good 
illustration of this problem is the French Loi Madelin806. 
 
                                                 
805 For this position, c.f. e.g. Dunlop Commission (1992) pp 62ff. 
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The main disadvantage of a unified concept is equally obvious. A unified concept will necessarily 
be less adapted to the concerns of the legislation for which it defines the personal scope. The 
purpose of distinguishing employees from independent contractors in labour law are different 
from that of the same distinction in tax law, which is still different from that in copyright law 
where the stakes are inverse and it is the worker who claims to be an independent contractor. 
Critique aimed at the US common law control test’s multi-function nature, can be used to 
illustrate the potential drawbacks of a concept of employee that is to define not just the personal 
scope of labour law statutes with diverse purposes, but also to fill other roles. The test loses its 
focus and runs the risk of not fulfilling its function in any of the situations it is applied. It is thus 
not strange that the common law control test has been criticised both for not providing an 
adequate definition for the purpose of labour law and for not providing a good fit in the 
copyright context.807 Alan Hyde, commenting on what he sees as a trend towards a single 
employee test used in labour, social security, copyright and tax law, speaks of “the advantage of a 
unified approach, and the disadvantage of an approach divorced from the purposes of 
employment law.”808 
 
More fundamental than the question of whether a legal order should have one or more concepts 
of employee, and how this or these concepts should be interpreted, is the question of whether 
the concept of employee is at all suitable for defining the personal scope of labour law, or 
whether the coverage should extend beyond those who even under a liberal interpretation would 
not be considered as employees. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
806 C.f. above 3.6.2. 
807 For the view that the common law control test does not serve the purpose of labour law, c.f. Linder (1999). For 
the view that it does not provide a good fit in copyright cases either, c.f. Dumas v. Gommerman, 865 F.2d 1093, at 1104 
(9th Cir. 1989). 
808 Hyde (2000) p. 81. 
Engblom, Samuel (2003), Self-employment and the personal scope of labour law : comparative lessons from France, Italy, 
Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States 
European University Institute
 
 
DOI: 10.2870/68969
 223
Critique to this effect has been pertinently formulated by the American legal scholar Marc Linder. 
According to Linder, “[t]he root problem with U.S. labor law defining covered employees is the 
purported denial of socioeconomic purpose.”809 The legislators have, in Linder’s eyes, despite the 
fact that many acts have as their purpose to combat ills not only confined to employees, 
“generally failed to consider the socioeconomic consequences of excluding millions of workers 
from protections.”810 Another target for Linder’s criticism is the administrative agencies and 
courts, which he considers to have made the ill worse by taking even less consideration of the 
purpose of the statutes and being even more restrictive than they have to be. Administrative and 
judicial adjudicators have added to the irrationality of the personal scope “by arrogating to 
themselves the power to uncouple the scope of coverage from the statutory purposes, freeing 
themselves to apply a very narrow definition of covered employees the legislatures never 
imposed.”811 The adoption of the common law control test as the standard for most labour law 
statutes812 and the control factor’s dominance, makes the denial of the statutes’ socioeconomic 
purpose even worse. Through its decision in Darden, the “Supreme Court unanimously enshrined 
such purposelessness as principle.”813 
To interpret the definition of the class of workers protected by modern labor legislation without 
mentioning the statutory purpose, but solely by reference to eighteenth- and nineteenth-century 
judicial doctrine determining the scope of liability of coach owners for the injuries inflicted by horse 
owners’ drivers on third parties, may seem like a hell of a way to run a twenty-first century railroad, 
but a method, albeit obscure, does inhere in this madness.814  
 
According to Linder, the purposelessness of interpretation can be found also in the National 
Labor Relations Board’s decisions, as the board has adopted the common law control test. For 
the NLRB, “control has become a talismanic object that totally displaces the NLRA’s policy of 
                                                 
809 Linder (1999) p. 187. C.f. also Linder (1989a). 
810 Linder (1999) p. 190. 
811 Linder (1999) p. 190. 
812 A process Linder refers to as “Dardenization.” Linder (1999) pp. 195f. 
813 Linder (1999) p. 187. 
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encouraging [collective bargaining] and full freedom of association.”815 Control, as Linder sees it, 
is a bad determinant for which workers need to bargain collectively with their employer. Finally, 
Linder makes a connection between the way courts and legislators define the personal scope of 
labour laws and developments in the labour market. “Pseudo-purposeless approaches facilitate 
and are, in turn, reinforced by the accelerating trend toward pseudo-self-employment. The result 
is a massive deregulation of the labour market.”816 
 
Even though Linder’s critique concerns the concept of employee in federal US labour law, and 
the interpretation given by US courts and agencies, some of his critique is also valid for the other 
studied countries. Despite courts in the three European countries, in particular in the UK and 
Sweden, being more ready to be swayed by what is at stake, the issue of the connection between 
the concept of employee and the concerns of labour law has been raised in the debate in Europe 
as well. In its overall guidelines, the Supiot-group advocated “[t]he application of certain aspects 
of labour law to workers who are neither employees nor employers. The need for protection 
tailored to the special situation of these workers has been covered in labour law in several 
countries […]. Those workers who cannot be regarded as employed persons, but are in a 
situation of economic dependence vis-à-vis a principal, should be able to benefit from the social 
rights to which this dependence entitles them.”817  
 
Seeing the concept of employee as a status concept gives a further focus to this criticism. The 
benefits of the flexibility provided by the multi-factor test has largely been limited to adjustments 
necessary to keep those perceived as members of the core workforce inside the concept of 
employee and thereby included in the personal scope of labour law. The individual factors are 
defined in terms of what is commonly thought typical of an employee, not in terms of indications 
                                                                                                                                                        
814 Linder (1999) p. 188. 
815 Linder (1999) p. 198. 
816 Linder (1999) p. 188. 
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that a certain worker is in need of the protection the statute at issue has to offer. The level of 
skill, the type of remuneration or the payments of taxes are relevant factors for identifying an 
employee in the every day use of the word, but less relevant for identifying workers covered by 
the concerns that form the base of occupational health and safety, dismissal protection or anti-
discrimination statutes. Likewise, the weighing together of the factors have the purpose of 
identifying an overall status. This is further accentuated in cases where the same concept of 
employee is to be used not just in labour law or the in related field of social security, but is to play 
an important role in copyright law and other fields with no relation to labour law as well. 
 
Simply put, the problem can be described as a worker having the question whether she qualifies 
for employee status under a particular labour law statute decided by factors that have no 
connection to the concern addressed by that particular statute. In the worst cases, one worker 
will be excluded from the scope of occupational health and safety regulation due to the short 
duration and casual nature of her employment, another worker denied redundancy pay due to the 
freedom she enjoys as to how and when to perform her work, and a third worker left without 
recourse against discrimination because she works for several different employers. Support for 
the view that the exclusion of workers who do not fit the concept of employee is a real problem 
can also be drawn from the fact that lawmakers in all the studied countries have felt a need to 
extend the personal scope of at least parts of labour law to cover workers other than just 
employees. These extensions will be dealt with in depth in the next chapter.  
                                                                                                                                                        
817 Supiot et al (2001) p. 220. 
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4. EXTENSIONS OF THE PERSONAL SCOPE 
4.1 Motives and Techniques 
Even though the concept of employee without doubt has been the most important determinant 
of the personal scope of labour law, there is also a long history of extensions taking labour law 
beyond the boundaries of the concept of employee, some of which are almost as old the concept 
of employee. In this chapter, different techniques for extensions, primarily taken from labour law 
in France, Italy, Sweden and the United Kingdom will be examined. Focus will be on the legal 
aspects of the extension tehniques, but, where available, research concerning the actual outcome 
of the extensions, in terms of covered workers, will be presented. 
 
A common motive for extending the personal scope of labour law seems to be the desire to 
include economically dependent workers.818 This should come as no surprise, considering how 
subordination dominates the concept of employee, leading to the exclusion of workers who are 
economically dependent but not sufficiently subordinated. Economic dependence is, nonetheless, 
not the only motive to extend the personal scope beyond employees. The part of labour law most 
commonly extended to self-employed workers is occupational health and safety regulations. 
Here, the concern is rather that the employer’s can exercise control over the physical work 
environment of workers other than the employer’s own employees. Finally, extensions of the 
personal scope of anti-discrimination legislation are based on concerns that workers, regardless 
the nature of their relationship with their employer, have the right not to suffer discrimination in 
the labour market. 
 
                                                 
818 The EIRO, concluded, after having listed existing extensions, that “[i]t is interesting to note that in all these cases, 
the rationale for legislative intervention can be found (among other reasons) in the protection of work situations 
which can be regarded as ‘economically dependent’.” EIRO (2002). 
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In this chapter, we will look at four different techniques for extending the personal scope of 
labour law, each represented by one example. The first technique for extension is the assimilation 
of certain categories of workers with employees. This can be done either through statutory 
declarations that they are to be considered as employees, or through declaring labour law 
applicable to the relationship between these workers and their employers. This technique is 
represented by Livre VII of the French Code du travail, where a multitude of more or less ad hoc 
extensions of labour law can be found. The second technique is to create a third category of 
workers, a tertium genus, who are neither employees nor self-employed, and to which parts of 
labour law are applicable. This technique is represented by a worker category, lavoratori 
parasubordinati, found in Italian law. The third extension technique is a diversified personal scope, 
defining the personal scope in different ways depending on the part of labour law and its 
particular purpose. An example of this exists in British labour law, where a large number of the 
labour law provisions apply to a broader category of workers. The fourth technique for extension 
is to define the responsibilities of the employer. This approach has been used in occupational 
health and safety legislation in several countries. Here Sweden and the United Kingdom will be 
used as examples. 
 
Apart from extending labour law as such to cover self-employed workers, lawmakers have also, 
occasionally, come to use principles typical of labour law in regulation certain commercial 
relationships. One such example is the European directive on self-employed commercial agents 
which regulates commercial agents’ right to remuneration and the conclusion and termination of 
agency contracts, including minimum notice periods.819 In some national legislation, there are also 
special provisions concerning franchising.820  
                                                 
819 Directive 86/653/EEC on self-employed commercial agents. 
820 C.f. Joerges (1991) pp. 23 ff and Sciarra (1991) p. 249. 
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4.2 Assimilated Workers 
4.2.1 ‘Statutory Employees’ and Labour Law Declared Applicable 
This category of extension could arguably be split into two different categories: one for ‘statutory 
employees’, workers who by statute have been declared to be employees, regardless of the further 
details of their relationship; and another for workers who have had labour law declared applicable 
to the relationship between them and their employer. Even though the legal technique for 
extension between the two categories differ, the distinction between the two is, however, not as 
clear cut as it might first seem. More importantly, the practical consequences and the legal issues 
raised by the two techniques are broadly the same, which is why they nevertheless will be treated 
together. 
 
One legal category already mentioned, the dependent contractors of Swedish law, arguably belongs in 
this category, at least if one subscribes to the positions that dependent contractors still exists as a 
separate category outside of the concept of employee.821 As mentioned, an alternative name for 
this category is jämställda uppdragstagare, indicating that they have been put on an “equal footing” 
with employees. The most important difference between the Swedish dependent contractor 
category and the French law which will provide the main examples of this type of extension is 
that the Swedish category, aimed at a wide range of economically dependent workers, is much 
more broadly defined than the French extensions which are narrowly defined and aimed at 
particular occupational categories.  
 
4.2.2 Livre VII of the Code du travail. 
The French approach to workers falling outside of the concept of employee can be described as 
casuistic, applying labour law or parts of labour law to narrowly defined groups of workers. Some 
more general extensions do exist. From the point of view of the inclusion of independent 
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contractors in the personal scope of labour law, the most interesting is however, Livre VII of the 
Code du Travail, which contains provisions “particular to certain professions”, some of which 
concern workers falling outside of the concept of employee as described earlier. Through 
legislative intervention certain categories of workers, whose status as employees would at least be 
in doubt if the concept of employee is applied strictly, have been given status as employees. 
Covered by the extensions of Livre VII is a rather diverse group of workers, defined in terms of 
their profession, the nature of their work or the place where it is carried out. In common, they 
have two characteristics: the absence of a bond of legal subordination and their economic 
dependence on the employer.822 They are economically dependent in that “their activity is 
economically tied to that of another, dominating, activity and thereby absorbed by a more 
powerful company.”823 
 
This extension came about in the mid-1930s, when the personal scope of labour law was enlarged 
to include categories of workers whose activity required a degree of liberty viewed as 
incompatible with legal subordination as understood at the time. The first two groups to enjoy 
the benefits of being salariés assimilés were journalists and sales representatives, the result of 
pressure from professional organisations.824 In 1935, journalists working on a regular basis, and 
for whom their journalistic activity represented the main source of the “resources necessary for 
their existence” were given the benefit of a presumption of employee status, despite their lack of 
subordination.825 Sales representatives were given the same status in 1937. Initially, a formalist 
view by the courts, stressing the text of the contract and not the de facto relationship kept the 
latter category contained, a problem remedied by subsequent legislative intervention – only the de 
                                                                                                                                                        
821 C.f. above 3.4.3. 
822 Lyon-Caen(1990) pp. 43f. 
823 “L’activité est économiquement liée à une autre activité dominante, et comme absorbée par celle d’une entreprise 
plus puissant.” Lyon-Caen(1990) p. 44. 
824 Aubert-Monpeyssen (1988) p. 56. 
825 Loi du 29 mars 1935 “…tir[aient] le principal ressources nécessaires à leur existence, de leur activité 
journalistique.” Cited in Aubert-Monpeyssen (1988) p. 58. 
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facto relationship was to count.826 In 1969, a status equivalent to that of journalists was given to 
performing artists and models.827 
 
Some of the categories are fully included in the personal scope of labour law, while only parts of 
labour law are applicable to others. The legal techniques used for the extensions vary. In some 
cases, the Code du travail stipulates that a given type of relationship is to be considered as a 
contract of employment despite the absence of legal subordination. In other categories, the code 
declares that labour law, or parts of it, is to be applied to a certain type of relationship, without 
classifying the relationship as such as a contract of employment. It is the actual conditions of 
work that decide whether a worker is to be classified as an employee, be covered by one of the 
special statuses or be considered a truly independent contractor. The label of the contract, 
registrations and the intentions of the parties are generally of no or only limited importance.828  
 
Frequently, the workers covered by these extensions end up having a mixed status: vis-à-vis their 
employers they are considered as employees, or are at least given partially the same status, 
whereas vis-à-vis their customers and clients they are businessmen and the relationship governed 
by general contract law or special regulation pertaining to their branch of business. 829 Finally, in 
cases where they have others working for them, they are considered as employers vis-à-vis their 
own employees. 
 
Sales Representatives  
In French, this category of workers are known under the acronym VRP (voyageurs, répresentants, 
placiers). Under Art. L 751-1 Code du travail, contracts between a sales representative and her 
                                                 
826 Aubert-Monpeyssen (1988) p. 57. 
827 Aubert-Monpeyssen (1988) p. 59. 
828 C.f. Soc. 25 avr. 1990 Bull. civ. V no 196 and Soc.. 11 déc. 1990 Bull. civ. V. no 632 (sales representatives); Art. L. 761-2 
Code du travail (journalists);  Art. L. 762-7 Code du travail (performing artists); Soc. 28 oct. 1980, Bull. civ. V no 782 and 
Soc. 6 janv. 1966, Bull. civ. IV no 17 (homeworkers). For workers covered by Art. L. 781-1 Code du travail, c.f. 
Jeammaud (2002) p. 161. 
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employer are, regardless of the provisions of the contract, to be considered as a contract of 
employment if the sales representative: 
1. is working for one or more employers; 
2. is working exclusively and continuously as a sales representative; 
3. does not perform any commercial transactions for their own account; and 
4. have the nature of the goods or service they offer, the region in which the work or the category 
of clients they are to target, and their level of remuneration decided by their relationship with the 
employer.830 
 
Further, Art. L. 751-1 stipulates that the absence of contract clauses prohibiting the sales 
representative from exercising another profession or to perform commercial transactions for 
their own account does not prevent the worker from enjoying the protected status of travelling 
sales representative. 
 
The Code du travail does not, however, contain any definition of the concerned profession. In 
practice, to enjoy the protected status, the sales representative must have a professional identity 
card.831 It is also necessary that the work includes taking orders from clients.832 Simply arranging 
meetings between sellers and buyers is not enough.833 Further, the sales representative may not 
employ under-agents.834 Most importantly, there is no requirement that the worker be in any state 
of subordination to the employer.835 If a bond of subordination does exists between the worker 
and the employer, the worker should be classified as an employee directly without any detour 
over status as a sales representative. At the opposite end of the spectrum, workers who are 
                                                                                                                                                        
829 C.f. Lyon-Caen(1990) pp. 42f. 
830 1. travaillent pour le compte d’un ou plusieurs employeurs; 2. exercent en fait d’une façon exclusive et constante leur profession de 
représentant; 3. ne font effectivement aucune opération commerciale pour leur compte personnel; 4. sont lies à leurs employeurs par des 
engagements déterminant la nature des prestations de services ou des marchandises offertes a la vente ou a l’achat, la région dans laquelle 
ils doivent exercer leur activité ou les catégories de clients qu’ils sont charges de visiter, le taux de rémunérations.   
831 Soc. 24 janv. 1974, Bull. civ. V no 71 and  Soc. 2 mars 1989, Bull. civ. V no 177. 
832 Soc. 26 févr. 1986, Bull. civ. V no 42. 
833 Soc. 27 févr. 1992, RJS 4/1992 no 541. 
834 Soc. 30 mai 1979, Bull. civ. V no 487. 
835 Soc. 15 janv. 2002 RJS 5/2002 no 637. 
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neither subordinated nor fulfil the requirements for statutory protection as sales representatives 
are pure independent contractors. This is, for example, the case for those who receive 
merchandise to sell for their own account.836 Together, the requirements spelled out in Art. L. 
751-1 project the image of a worker who is economically dependent, working exclusively and 
continuously as a sales representative, and who works for someone else’s account. 
 
As contracts between sales representatives and their employers are to be considered as contract 
of employment, those aspects of labour law which apply to employees also apply to sales 
representatives. There are however, due to the nature of sales representatives’ work, some 
particularities in its application. It is, for example, established jurisprudence of the Cour de cassation 
that the minimum wage, SMIC, only applies to sales representatives who are subject to a working 
time schedule controlled by the employer.837 
  
Journalists 
Under Art. L 761-2 Code du travail, all contracts by which a newspaper, magazine, news agency or 
other entreprise de presse, come to enjoy, for remuneration, the collaboration of a professional 
journalist are presumed to be employment contracts. Under the same article, a professional 
journalist is defined as someone who has as her principal occupation, and main source of income, 
the exercise of the journalism profession, on a regular basis, for one or several newspapers, 
periodicals or news agencies.838 Put in the same category with professional journalists are 
correspondents receiving a fixed salary and editorial staff such as translators, proof-readers, and 
photographers. Explicitly excluded from the assimilated editorial staff are workers who 
contribute only occasionally. 
                                                 
836 Lyon-Caen(1990) p. 49. 
837 Soc. 10 nov. 1993, RJS 12/1993 no 1245; and Soc. 22 mai 1996, RJS 7/1996 no 857. 
838 Art. L. 761-2 Code du travail. Le journalist professionel est celuiqui a pour occupation principale, régulière et retribuée l’exercise 
de sa profession dans une ou plusieurs publications quotidiennes ou périodiques ou dans une ou plusieurs agences de presse et qui en tire le 
principal de ses ressources. 
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For the employer to be considered as an entreprise de presse, it must have as its principal activity the 
production or publishing of printed or broadcasted media. Thus, a person working as an editor 
of a magazine published by the French consumer protection agency did not have the status of a 
professional journalist.839 Likewise, a person working with the monthly publication of a chain of 
consumer electronics’ stores was denied status as a journalist, as the publication was distributed 
for free, lacked financial or technical autonomy, and had marketing of the chain stores as its sole 
purpose. The publishing of the monthly could not be seen as separate from the main commercial 
activity of the company.840 Similarly, the editor of the membership magazine of a farmers’ union 
was not considered a journalist.841 In the broadcasting sector, a company producing material for 
television was considered an entreprise de presse, despite not being involved in the actual 
broadcasting of the material.842 
 
Secondly, the work has to be of a journalistic nature and have an intellectual content. A person 
supplying a magazine with games and tests was, despite holding a professional identity card, 
found not to be a journalist.843 To qualify for status as professional journalists, editorial staff has 
to be involved in the “dissemination of facts and ideas”.844 An illustrator working for a gardening 
magazine creating illustrations demonstrating different methods of gardening was found to be a 
professional journalist, as her work was sufficiently connected to the magazines reporting of 
news.845 
 
                                                 
839 Soc. 17 mars 1999, RJS 5/1999 no 760. 
840 Soc. 24 févr 1993, Bull. civ. V no 68. 
841 Soc. 10 oct. 2001, RJS 12/2001 no 1467 
842 CE 5 avril 2002, RJS 7/2002 no 909. 
843 Soc. 1 avr. 1992, Bull. civ. V no 221. 
844 Soc. 9 févr. 1989, Bull. civ. V no 109. In the case, the Cour de Cassation found that the lower court had erred when 
not investigation thoroughly enough whether the work of a typographic designer qualified as dissemination of facts 
and ideas or was of a purely technical nature. 
845 CE 24 oct. 1997, RJS 12/1997 no 1451. 
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The economic dependence character of the extension of the personal scope to journalists is clear 
both in the text of the statute and in the jurisprudence. The Code du travail indicates that 
journalism has to be the worker’s principal occupation and main source of income, and explicitly 
excludes from the status those who only work occasionally.846 At the same time, however, 
freelancers showing sufficient signs of economic dependence can be granted the status of 
professional journalist.847 The fact that a local correspondent did not receive a fixed salary did not 
prevent her from being considered a professional journalist, as the work for the newspaper 
constituted her principal occupation and main source of income.848 There is no specific threshold 
amount that has to be surpassed for the remuneration to qualify as the worker’s “main source of 
income.” A decision where the appeals court had found the amounts received by the journalist as 
too low to qualify as the main source of income was quashed by the Cour de cassation.849 
 
The Code du travail also contains special provisions concerning the dismissal and resignation of 
journalists. Journalists with more than fifteen years seniority have the right to have their 
entitlement to compensation tried by a special tripartite arbitration body, la commission arbitrale des 
journalistes.850 In addition, a ‘conscience clause’ stipulates the use of the arbitration commission, 
and the possibility for damages, when a journalist resigns due to a change of ownership or of the 
character or orientation of the newspaper or periodical which threatens the honour, reputation or 
moral interests of the journalist.851 
 
Performing Artists 
Performing artists are included in the personal scope of labour law according to yet another 
formula. In Art. L. 762-1, the Code du travail stipulates that any contract by which a natural person 
                                                 
846 For jurisprudence confirming this, c.f. Soc. 8 mars 1995, RJS 4/1995 no 452. 
847 Soc. 1 févr. 2000, RJS 3/2000 no 345. 
848 Soc. 14 mai 1997, Bull. civ. V no 174. 
849 Soc. 7 févr. 1990, Bull. civ. V no 47. 
850 Art. L. 761-5 Code du travail.  
851 Art. L. 761-7 Code du travail. 
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or a legal entity secures, in return for remuneration, the collaboration of a performing artist (artiste 
de spectacle) is presumed to be a contract of employment unless the artist is in fact an organiser or 
co-organisers of shows.852 
 
The statutory text does not give any definition of artiste de spectacle. Instead it provides a list of 
performing artists that, among others, are to be considered as artistes de spectacle, including actors, 
musicians, singers, dancers, conductors and, for the part of their work which has to do with their 
artistic expression, directors.853 Jurisprudence has confirmed that this list is not closed, by 
affording artist status to sound and light technicians.854 An appeals court which had to decide 
whether a worker participating in a commercial was a performing artist or a model held that the 
case turned on whether the work involved any artistic interpretation or not. As the worker used 
techniques typical of the theatre, she was found to be an artist, despite the fact that she was 
silent.855 
 
As with journalists, the presumption holds up regardless of the mode or amount of 
remuneration, or the label put by the parties. Moreover, the presumption cannot be rebutted by 
proof that the artist has retained her artistic freedom, that she owns all or parts of the equipment 
used, or that she employs one or more persons to help her, as long as she participates personally 
in the show. 856  Thus, the absence of employer control and the fact that the artists used their own 
tools and equipment did not stop them from enjoying the benefits of working under a contract 
of employment.857 Further, a festival organiser was found to be the employer of the artists 
performing at the festival despite his lack of control over the artists’ work and despite having 
                                                 
852 Concerning artist who are co-organisers of shows, c.f. Soc. 31 oct. 1991, Bull. civ. V no 470. 
853 Art. L. 762-7, alinéa 3, Code du travail. 
854 Soc. 8 juillet 1999, RJS 10/1999 no 1310. 
855 CA Paris 27 janv. 1995, RJS 4/1995 no 448. 
856 Art. L. 762-7, alinéa 2, Code du travail. 
857 Soc. 19 mai 1998, Bull. civ. V no 270. 
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contracted with ensembles of artists and not with the artists individually.858 The contract of 
employment has to be individual, unless the performing artists are presenting themselves as a 
group, act or number.859 If the artist has another artist working with her, it is the first artist’s 
employer rather than the first artist who is considered to be the employer of the second artist.860 
Among circumstances that can break the presumption of a contract of employment is the fact 
that the worker has a stake in gains and losses.861 
 
Models 
Models also enjoy a presumption that any contract under which they are hired is a contrat du 
travail. The presumption holds up regardless of the mode or amount of remuneration and 
regardless of the label to the contract. Further, the presumption can not be destroyed by the fact 
that the model enjoys full liberty of action as to the performance of her work.862 Considered as 
models are all persons posing as models or charged with presenting a product, service, or 
promotional message to the public, either directly or indirectly through the use of their image, 
even if they only work as models occasionally.863 
 
Despite the rather wide phrasing of the presumption, it has proved rather easy to rebutt. In a 
1997 case, the question was asked whether a contrat du travail existed between a professional tennis 
player and a company sponsoring her, on the ground that she worked as a model for the sponsor. 
The Cour de cassation, pointing to the facts that the tennis player’s obligations were limited to 
certain publicity campaigns and occasional meetings, and that her principal activity was tennis, 
not modelling, found that the lower court had not erred when denying her status as a model.864 
Despite the provision that the model’s liberty of action should not rebutt the presumption, and 
                                                 
858 Soc. 14 nov 1991, Bull. civ. V no 506. 
859 Art. L. 762-7, alinéa 4, Code du travail.  
860 Soc. 28 janv. 1997, Bull. civ. V no 34. 
861 Soc. 31 oct. 1991, Bull. civ. V no 470. 
862 Art. L. 763-1, alinéa 1, alinéa 2, Code du travail. 
863 Art. L. 763-1, alinéa 3, Code du travail. 
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despite no mention of principal activity as a criterion for models, the court seem to have afforded 
great weight to these two factors.  
 
Homeworkers  
Homeworkers, like sales representatives, journalists, performing artists and models, are fully 
assimilated into the personal scope of labour law. The technique used is different however. 
Firstly, homeworkers are brought under the protection of labour law not by the creation of a 
presumption that their contracts are contracts of employment, but by declaring labour law 
applicable to homeworkers as an independent category. Under Art. L. 721-6, “homeworkers 
enjoy the same legislative and regulatory arrangements that are applicable to employees.”865 In 
addition, certain special provisions, notably concerning the employer’s duty to notify the labour 
inspector about the location, number of homeworkers and the nature of their work, apply.866 
 
Secondly, to be a homeworker is not a profession, which is why the category is defined not in 
terms of the content of their professional activity, but through the geographic location of their 
work and the mode of remuneration.867 Art. L. 721-1 Code du travail defines homeworkers 
(travailleurs à domicile) as those who perform work for one or several industrial establishments; 
receiving a fixed remuneration; and working either alone or together with family members or an 
assistant. If this is the case, the code stipulates that there are no reasons to investigate the 
existence of any bond of subordination; whether or not the employer supervises the work; the 
ownership of the tools and materials, whether the worker himself provides accessory equipment; 
or the number of hours worked. Thus, the work does not have to be of any specific nature. It 
does not have to concern the production of goods868, it can be of an intellectual nature869, and 
                                                                                                                                                        
864 Soc. 16 janv. 1997 RJS 3/97 no 326. 
865 “Les travailleurs à domicile bénéficient des disposition législatives et réglementaires applicable aux salariés.” 
866 C.f. Art. L. 721-7. 
867 Lyon-Caen(1990) p. 46. 
868 Soc. 31 janv. 1968, D.1968.492. 
869 Soc. 22 janv. 1981, Bull. civ. V no 60. 
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leave the worker significant autonomy.870 Apart from the work being carried out in the worker’s 
home, the mode of remuneration is the only other criterion.  
 
The requirement that the remuneration should be fixed is used in order to distinguish those who 
work from home for their own account from homeworkers working for someone else. Thus, a 
worker writing historical articles without any prior agreement with a publisher, leaving the 
publisher free to accept or refuse his work, was denied status as a homeworker.871  Likewise, an 
illustrator who was to be paid a higher amount in cases where his illustrations were accepted than 
if they were refused fell outside of the homeworker category.872 To be considered as fixed, the 
remuneration can be fixed at an hourly rate,873 per task874 or calculated on some other base as 
long as it is fixed in advance.875 In one case, a worker whose remuneration in reality did not vary 
much was found to fulfil the requirement.876 
 
The threshold for economic dependence seems to be lower for homeworkers than for sales 
representatives and journalists. The accessory nature of work must not be an obstacle for 
homeworker status.877 Further, homeworkers can work for several different enterprises without 
losing their status, but only as long as they do not show particularly pronounced signs of being in 
business on their own account.878  The fact that a milliner had her own clientele of private 
individuals, besides working for a company, was crucial in denying her status as a homeworker.879 
Finally, the fact that the raw materials needed for the work are provided by the worker is of no 
                                                 
870 Soc. 28 oct. 1980, Bull. civ. V no 782. 
871 Soc. 22 janv. 1981, Bull. civ. V no 62. 
872 Soc. 22 janv. 1981, Bull. civ. V no 61. 
873 Soc. 23 nov. 1978, Bull. civ. V no 797. 
874 An arrangement by which a publisher paid a worker a fixed sum per book for advice on whether to publish them 
in France was found to fulfil the requirement. Soc. 22 janv. 1981 Bull. civ. V no 60.  
875 Soc. 5 janv. 1995, RJS 2/1995 no 166. 
876 Soc. 28 oct. 1980, Bull. civ. V no 782. 
877 Soc. 23 nov. 1978, Bull. civ. V no 797. 
878 Soc. 5 janv. 1995, RJS 2/1995 no 166. 
879 Soc. 14 oct. 1970, Bull. civ. V no 530. 
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significance if the worker bought the raw materials from an employer who later acquired the 
processed goods, or from a provider indicated by the employer.880  
 
Childminders 
The first category of workers to whom labour law is to be partially applied mentioned by the Code 
du travail is childminders. Childminders (assistantes maternelles) are defined as workers who, in their 
own home, regularly and for remuneration accommodate children left in their care by physical 
persons or by private legal entities.881 The Code du travail supplies a list of its provisions applicable 
to childminders.882 On the list are, among others, regulations concerning sexual harassment, 
equal-pay, parental leave, wage protection, holidays, and collective agreements and trade unions. 
Childminders are also included in the competence of the labour courts.883 The most significant 
exemption from the list is occupational health and safety. In addition, the Cour de cassation has 
found that the provisions requiring just cause for dismissals, as general principles of labour law, 
can be applied to child minders as well, despite not being listed in Art. L. 773-2.884 They do, 
however, only apply between childminders and legal entities, not between a childminder and a 
private individual.885 Private individuals cannot, however, dismiss their child minder for illicit 
motives. Discriminatory dismissals are not permitted and in March 2002 the Cour de cassation 
agreed that a private individual did not have the right to withdraw her children from an 
childminder due to the latter’s pregnancy.886 
 
                                                 
880 Art. L. 721-2 Code du travail. 
881 Art. L. 773-1 Code du travail. 
882 Art. L. 773-2 Code du travail. 
883 Soc. 28 juin 1995, RJS 8-9/1995 no 962. 
884 Soc. 21 mars 1996, RJS 6/1996 no 729. 
885 Soc. 31 mars 1993, RJS 5/1993 no 555. 
886 Soc. 26 mars 2002, RJS 6/2002 no 744. C.f. also Soc. 17 juin 1997, RJS 1997 no 1168 and Soc. 17 juin 1997, RJS 
1997 no 1169. 
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Article L.781-1 Code du travail 
Article L. 781-1 Code du travail provides for the partial application of labour law to a group of 
workers more loosely defined than those of the other extensions. Covered by this article are 
persons whose profession essentially consists of selling merchandise of any kind, which is being 
provided exclusively or almost exclusively by one single commercial or industrial enterprise. 
Further, the article covers persons who take up orders or receive goods for process, handling or 
transport on behalf of a single commercial or industrial enterprise. In both cases, the work has to 
be exercised under conditions and prices imposed by the enterprise, and at a place of work 
owned or approved by the enterprise. Initially, this partial extension of the personal scope of 
labour law was aimed in particular at kiosk tenants and persons selling lottery tickets.887 Through 
the jurisprudence of the Cour de cassation, it has come to include, among others, gas station tenants 
and franchisees.  
 
For the article to be applicable there has to be exclusivity or quasi exclusivity. The goods sold, 
processed, handled or transported must come from one single commercial or industrial 
enterprise. In a case concerning gas station tenants, the fact that 65 percent of their sales came 
from goods other than those provided exclusively by the petroleum company served to deny 
them protection under Art. L. 781-1.888 The conditions and prices must be imposed by the 
enterprise, but do not have to be so explicitly. It is enough that the worker is in a situation where 
it is impossible for her to exercise a personal pricing policy, for the prices to be considered 
imposed by the other party.889 Workers covered by Art. L. 781-1 can have their own employees.890 
In a 2001 case, a franchisee in the transportation business, who worked from premises rented by 
the franchisor, had his working hours and routes imposed by the commercial policies of the 
                                                 
887 Lyon-Caen (1990) p. 52. 
888 Soc. 28 nov, 1984, Bull. civ. V no 461. 
889 Soc. 18 nov. 1981, Bull. civ. V no 895. 
890 Soc. 23 nov. 1978, Bull. civ. V no 795. C.f. Jeammaud (2002) p. 159.  
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franchisor, and his prices supervised by the franchisor and largely determined by the royalties 
due, was found to be covered by Art. L. 781-1.891 
 
All provisions applicable to “apprentices, manual workers, employees, [and] workers” apply to 
the relationship between the persons covered by article 781-1 and their employers, with the 
exception, however, of the provisions concerning for example occupational health and safety, 
working time, and annual leave found in Livre II Code du travail.892 Workers corresponding to the 
definition in Art. L. 781-1 are thus covered by for example legislation concerning minimum 
wage,893 dismissal protection,894 and the jurisdiction of the labour courts.895 
 
Non-salaried Managers of Supermarkets 
Persons who, remunerated as a proportion of their sales, run branches of supermarket chains are 
qualified as “non-salaried managers” (gérants non salariés), as long the contract between the parties 
does not fix the conditions of work and leaves them free to hire personnel or to substitute 
themselves at their own expense and under their own responsibility.896 Non-salaried managers 
are, as the term implies, not employees of the companies they are under contract with. They do, 
nevertheless, “enjoy the benefit of all the advantages afforded employees by social legislation, in 
particular as concerns paid leave.”897 The occupational health and safety, working time and leave 
provisions found in Livre II of the Code du travail are, however, only applicable to the extent that 
they apply to managers.898 Taken together, this means that non-salaried managers are, among 
other things, covered by minimum wage legislation, working time, and dismissal protection.899 
                                                 
891 Soc. 4 déc. 2001, Dr. Soc. 2/2002. 
892 Art. L. 781-1 alinéa 1 et 4, Code du travail. 
893 Soc. 5 mars 1981, Bull. civ. V no 195. 
894 Soc. 17 juin 1982, Bull. civ. V no 404. 
895 Soc. 4 déc. 2001, Dr. Soc. 2/2002. 
896 Art. L. 782-1 Code du travail. 
897 Art. L. 782-7 Code du travail. Les gérants non salariés visés par le present titre bénéficient de tous les avantages accordé aux 
salariés par la legislation sociale, notamment en matière de congés payés. 
898 Art. L. 782-2 Code du travail. 
899 Soc. 28 oct 1997, RJS 12/1997 no 1450. 
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There are two essential differences between employees and non-salaried managers. Firstly,  non-
salaried-managers do not have their conditions of work fixed by the contract between them and 
the supermarket chain. In a 1993 case, the Cour de cassation found a contract clause whereby the 
supermarket chain decided the opening hours of the store to be compatible with status as a non-
salaried manager, as it was a clause common to commercial contracts and not a clause fixing the 
conditions of work. Further, the fact that the supermarket chain provided all the goods as well as 
the premises of the store, did not serve to qualify the manager of the individual supermarket as 
an employee.900 Secondly, non-salaried managers are free to hire personnel or to substitute 
themselves. Le Goff describes the situation of non-salaried managers as “generally ambiguous, 
characterised by a real economic subordination.”901 
 
4.2.3 Analysis 
The assimilation of workers, either through the creation of statutory employees or through 
declaring labour law fully or partially applicable to certain kinds of relationships, appears to be an 
easy solution to the problem of categories of workers not fitting the concept of employee but still 
working under conditions raising the concerns of labour law. A general extension through 
assimilation of workers in “essentially the same position as employees”, like that intended by the 
dependent contractor extension in Swedish labour law, has the advantage of establishing a cordon 
sanitaire around the concept of employee, extending the boundaries of labour law, and thereby 
making it more difficult to circumvent. Finding the right reach of such an extension is, 
nonetheless, a rather difficult task. If the cordon sanitaire is kept very narrow, like in the Swedish 
case, it will only apply to a small number of workers, leaving many in a grey area without 
protection. If it is made broad, the risk is that it becomes over-inclusive, covering workers who 
are genuinely self-employed. These risks can even appear simultaneously, as the organisation of 
                                                 
900 Soc. 15 déc. 1993, RJS 1/1994 no 90. 
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work and business varies for different sectors of the economy and for different workers within 
the same sector. Another disadvantage is that a general assimilation of a vaguely defined group of 
workers easily becomes rather elusive, exposing workers and employers to uncertainties 
concerning the status of their relationship. 
 
The more casuistic extensions in Livre VII of the French Code du travail have the advantage of 
being targeted at narrowly defined categories of workers found in particular professions, work of 
a particular nature, or – in the case of homeworkers – in a particular geographical location. This 
approach provides both the possibility to draft the extensions to the needs of a certain field or 
type of work, and a higher degree of legal certainty, especially as custom in the business has come 
to be important in the jurisprudence. The disadvantages of this approach is that it only covers 
narrowly defined categories of workers who by tradition have been considered in need of 
protection despite not fitting the concept of employee. The personal scope of labour law has 
become inconsistent and ad-hoc, running contrary to its mandatory nature. The casuistic 
assimilation of certain groups of workers will have difficulties amounting to anything more than a  
partial solution.  
4.3 ‘Tertium Genus’ 
4.3.1 A Third Type of Workers 
Another way in which legislators have tried to deal with the fact that not all workers fit neatly 
into either side of the employee/self-employed dichotomy is through creating a third type of 
worker, a tertium genus, neither employee nor self-employed. Thus, “a distinction is made between 
completely independent entrepreneurs subject to civil or commercial law and self-employed 
professionals who are financially dependent on one or more principals”.902 This results in three 
categories of workers: employees, tertium genus, and more or less genuinely self-employed workers. 
                                                                                                                                                        
901 Le Goff (2001) p. 123. 
902 Supiot et al (2001) p. 7. 
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The tertium genus can be regulated either through regulation specific for this category, or through 
applying parts of labour law to it.  
 
Two countries where a form of tertium genus has been inserted into labour law are Italy and 
Germany. The main example here will be taken from Italian law, but a short mention should be 
made of the German regulation. In Germany, the category arbeitsnehmerähnliche Personen, 
(employee-like persons) encompasses self-employed workers that are economically dependent on 
one employer and considered to be in need of social protection comparable to that of 
employees.903 The concept was first developed by the courts, and then given a statutory definition 
in the 1974 Act on Collective Agreements (Tarifvertragsgesetz). The decisive criterion for separating this 
group from other self-employed workers is that they perform the contracted work themselves or 
essentially without the help of employees, and that the major part of their work must be 
performed for one employer. Arbeitsnehmerähnliche Personen only enjoy the benefits of a rather 
limited range of labour law, mainly the jurisdiction of the labour courts, regulation of annual 
holidays, and the possibility to have their working conditions regulated by collective agreements. 
On the international level, the draft convention on Contract work, proposed but not adopted at 
the 1998 International Labour Conference, has been described as an attempt at a third 
category.904 
 
4.3.2 Lavoro parasubordinato 
In 1973, a provision was inserted into the Italian Codice di procedura civile (Code of Civil Procedure), 
which extended the rules concerning individual employment disputes to cover “agency 
relationships, commercial representatives and other relationships of collaboration which have as 
their object the continuous and co-ordinated performance of work, performed predominantly 
                                                 
903 C.f. Weiss (2000) pp. 45f. 
904 Among authors categorising contract labour as an attempt at a tertium genus are Biagi and Tiraboschi (1999) p. 584. 
For the content of the draft convention, c.f. below 5.2.  
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personally, even if the relationship does not have a subordinated character.”905 In Italy, the 
workers under these contracts are known as lavoratori parasubordinati (para-subordinated workers). 
Another term often used, in particular to denote self-employed workers other than members of 
the liberal professions is CoCoCo, an abbreviation stemming from the words collaborazione, 
continuativa and coordinata found in the Codice di procedura civile definition.906 The notion of 
parasubordinazione was not completely new, but had developed in Italian doctrine for some years 
before its inclusion in the Codice di procedura civile, as a way of dealing with workers who did not 
show the typical features of either employees or genuinely self-employed workers.907 Together 
with the extension of the employment dispute procedure, the parasubordinati also came to be 
covered by Art. 2113 of the Codice civile with the effect that they cannot waive statutory rights.908 
In 1995, the parasubordinati were given a special status in the pension system, under which they 
have their own pension fund, with lower contributions (12-14 percent on wages as opposed to 33 
percent for employees) and lower entitlements, a fact that has come to have important 
consequences for the development of this type of work in Italy.909 
 
What distinguishes lavoratori parasubordinati is the combination of economic dependence with a 
degree of subordination lower than that of employees. The jurisprudence and doctrine on lavoro 
parasubordinato has come to focus on three requisites, separating parasubordinati from employees 
and genuinely self-employed workers: the extent to which the work performed personally must 
dominate the relationship; what is to be considered continous; and drawing the line between co-
ordination and subordination.910 As to the first requisite, the lavoratore parasubordinato is allowed to 
                                                 
905 “…rapporti di agencia, di rappresentanza commerciale ed altri rapporti di collaborazione che si concretino in una prestazione di opera 
continuativa e coordinata, prevalemente personale, anche se non a carattere subordinato…” Art. 409, comma 3, Codice di procedura 
civile. 
906 It has been argued that the term “lavoratori parasubordinati” is misleading and should be replaced by something 
more proper, e.g. “lavoro coordinato”. De Luca Tamajo (2000) p. 264. 
907 Ballestrero (1986) p. 42. 
908 Santoro Passarelli (1979) pp. 11f. 
909 Legge 8 agosto 1995, n. 335. 
910 The three requisites have been listed as such by the Corte di cassazione e.g. in Cass. sez. lav. 20 agosto 1997, n. 7785. 
For a comprehensive and influential account of the three requisites, c.f. Santoro Passarelli (1979) pp. 59ff. For more 
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use assistants, as long as the work performed by her personally is the dominating element of the 
contract, more important, quantitatively or qualitatively, than the work performed by others or 
the capital applied.911 The requisite that the collaboration must be continuous can be fulfilled both 
through working continuously and through work repeated on several occasions for the same 
employer. The work does not have to take place under the same contract, but can be performed 
under several different contracts, concluded separately.912 The Corte di cassazione has spoken of 
“the continuity (or the periodicity)”, as something which can be fulfilled through several separate 
engagements which are repeated in time.913 As an example, a person who, under directions from 
the user enterprise, had prepared the public relations of four consecutive fashion collections was 
found to be covered by the provision, even though the collections were months apart.914 Outside 
of the scope fall situations where the work is only occassional and the time periods in between 
are long and irregular.915 
 
As the category lavoratori parasubordinati is to be a subspecies of autonomous self-employed 
workers, there is a thin line to walk between co-ordination and subordination. The work has to 
be co-ordinated with the activities of the employer, but without the co-ordination involving the 
employer giving directions, as it then would be a contract of employment. The Corte di cassazione 
has come to use the notion of ‘functional connection’ (connessione funzionale), “deriving from a 
protracted insertion into the business organisation, or, more generally, into the ends pursued by 
the [employer].”916 The employer can not give the worker instructions as to how and when work 
is to be performed, only how and when the worker’s product or services is to be inserted into the 
                                                                                                                                                        
recent accounts, c.f. Ferraro (1998) pp. 458ff, Leonardi (1999) pp. 518ff, and Casotti and Gheido (2001) pp. 16ff., 
Cardoni (2001) pp. 626ff., and Ghera (2002) pp. 74ff. 
911 Cass. sez. lav. 20 agosto 1997, n. 7785, Cass. sez. lav. 20 gennaio 1992, n. 652. 
912 Cass. sez. lav. 18 febbraio 1997, n. 1459. 
913 “…la continuitá (o la periodicità)…” Cass. sez. lav. 18 febbraio 1997, n. 1459. 
914 Cass. sez. II. 21 settembre 1977, n. 4033. 
915 Cass. sez. lav. 20 agosto 1997, n. 7785. 
916 “…derivante da un protratto inserimento nell’organizzazione aziendale o, più in generale, nelle finalitá perseguite 
dal committente…” Cass. sez. lav. 20 agosto 1997, n. 7785. The notion of ‘functional connection’ appeared already 
in the 1970s and is reported by Santoro Passarelli (1979) pp. 66f. 
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employer’s organisation. Further, the lavoratore parasubordinato is only hired for a specific task, 
whereas the employee has to be available for arising tasks.917 
 
The co-ordination requisite is crucial for drawing the line between parasubordinati and employees. 
It is not, however, very useful for distinguishing between parasubordinati and other self-employed 
workers. Many self-employed workers perform defined tasks at the time and place dictated by 
their user enterprise. What is in reality decisive as regards deciding what self-employed are to be 
classified as as parasubordinati is the degree of economic dependence, expressed in the continuity 
requisite, and the obligation to perform work personally. Explaining the distinction between 
parasubordinati and other self-employed, Santoro Passarelli pointed to the parasubordinato’s  
economic dependence and inferior power in the contractual relationship.918 
 
In contrast to the assimilated workers in French law, lavoro parasubordinato is an open category. 
Any worker fulfilling the criteria of the definition can be considered a lavoratore parasubordinato, 
regardless of the branch or business or type of work.919 Among the categories of workers who 
according to established jurisprudence have come to be considered as lavoratori parasubordinati 
rather than employees or genuinely self-employed are, door-to-door and home salespeople; 
telephone surveyors and telemarketing personnel; and journalists contributing to newspapers, 
magazines and encyclopaedias on a regular basis without qualifiying for employee status.920 Also 
members of the liberal professions can be lavoratori parasubordinati, in cases where they have put 
themselves at the disposal of a client in a such a way as to have “almost completely […] lost their 
                                                 
917 Cardoni (2001) pp. 626f and Ferraro (1998) p. 460. 
918 Santoro Passarelli (1979) p. 90. 
919 Cass. sez. lav. 4 aprile 1992, n. 4152. 
920 Leonardi (1999) pp. 525f. 
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position of liberty and independence, finding themselves economically dependent on a single 
client, which has assumed a position analogous to that of an employer.”921  
 
The provisions on labour disputes is, in fact, the only part of labour law that has been extended 
to cover lavoro parasubordinato. In a 1997 case, the Corte di cassazione pointed out that the 
“relationship of lavoro parasubordinato remains subject to the regime for self-employed workers”, 
and that “parasubordinazione is relevant exclusively in procedural law”.922 The Corte di cassazione has 
also found lavoro parasubordinato to be exempt from constitutional provisions concerning the right 
to a “a remuneration commensurate with the quantity and quality of their work, and in any case 
sufficient to ensure to them and their families a free and honourable existence”.923 In addition, 
the constitutional provisions concerning the freedom to join a trade union cover parasubordinati, 
as well as other self-employed workers. In a 1975 case, the Corte costituzionale (Italian constitutional 
court) held that the Italian constitution guarantees the freedom to organise in trade unions for all 
workers, regardless of whether they are subordinated employees or autonomous self-employed 
workers. Certain connected rights found in labour law statutes are, however, constitutionally 
possible to limit to employees.924 Later, the Corte constituzionale, has found that the right to strike, 
guaranteed in the Italian constitution, also covers attorneys and other members of the liberal 
professions.925 
 
Since 1998, all the three major Italian trade union confederations organise CoCoCo-workers 
through special organisations – Nidil (Nuove identita di lavoro) for Cgil; Alai (Associazione 
                                                 
921 “…abbia quasi del tutto perduto la sua posizione di libertà e di indipendenza, e si trovi ad essere economicamente 
dipendente da un cliente, che abia assunto nei suoi confronti una posizione analoga a quella del datore di lavoro…” 
Cass. sez. II. 21 maggio 1979 n. 2918. 
922 “Il rapporto di lavoro parasubordinato resta soggetto all disciplina sostanziale dettata per il lavoro autonomo, 
essendo la parasubordinazione rilevante esclusivamente ai fini processuali ex Art. 409 n. 3 c.p.c.” Cass. sez. lav. 18 
febbraio 1997, n. 1459. 
923 Il lavoratore ha diritto ad una retribuzione proporzionata alla quantità e qualità del suo lavoro e in ogni caso sufficiente ad assicurare 
a sé e alla famiglia un'esistenza libera e dignitosa. Art. 36, comma 1 Costituzione della Repubblica Italiana. Cass. sez. lav. 26 
luglio 1990, n. 7543.  
924 Corte cost. 17 dicembre 1975 n. 241. The case concerned the right to hold union activites on the employer’s premises.  
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lavoratori atipici e interinali) for Cisl; and Cpo (Coordinamento per l’occupazione) for Uil.926 In 
some cases, these organisations have managed to conclude agreements on minimum standards 
with public employers, establishing “type contracts” to be used as a basis for the individual 
contracts.927 
 
Lavoro parasubordinato has been the subject of an at times heated debate among legal scholars. As 
Ballestrero has pointed out, it has the potential to serve either as an antichamber to the 
application of labour law or as a way to stem the tide expanding the scope of labour law beyond 
employees as traditionally understood.928 Similar thoughts have been expressed by Biagi and 
Tiraboschi, seeing the tertium genus technique as per se neutral and possible to use both to extend 
and limit the personal scope of labour law.929 Already in the 1970s, it was pointed out that the 
category could be used to circumvent labour law applicable to employees.930 This has also been 
the main point of criticism in recent years. As a formally recognised but unregulated form of 
labour, which in addition is cheaper from the point of view of pension contributions, employers 
may have reasons to prefer this form of contract to proper employment contracts, a point which 
may also lure some workers, at least in the short term. Ferraro reports that “rather surrealistic” 
contractual clauses has been used to construct “schizofrenic work” guaranteeing employer’s 
significant control while at the same time classifying the workers as parasubordinati rather than 
employees.931 In contrast with employment contracts, the contracts for lavoro parasubordinato are 
most often written, a practice which could be dictated by the interest of the employer to provide 
herself, ex-ante, with a document that can be useful in case an attempt is made by the worker or a 
                                                                                                                                                        
925 Corte cost. 27 maggio 1996, n. 171. 
926 Scarponi and Bano (1999) p. 544. On the strategy of these organisations c.f. Gottardi (1999). 
927 Scarpelli (1999) p. 563 and Vettor (1999) pp. 629f. 
928 Ballestrero (1987) pp. 48 and 57. 
929 Biagi and Tiraboschi (1999) p. 584. 
930 Santoro Passarelli (1979) p. 132. 
931 “Clausole peraltro abbastanza surreali giacché disegnano rapporti di lavoro schizofrenici.” Ferraro (1998) p. 468. 
Leonardi claims that, reading between the lines of the contracts, one can often find ample possibilities for the 
employer to impose rather precise rules over the work, included working hours, the locality of work, and the use of 
the employer’s physical capital. Leonardi (1999) p. 522. 
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third party to re-classify the contract as one of employment.932 Even though courts should 
disregard or afford only very limited significance to the label or wording of the contract, it still 
greatly influences the everyday relationship between the parties and third parties such as the 
labour inspectorate or social security authorities. To one author, the lavoro parasubordinato is a 
“trojan horse” and its introduction a “grave error”.933 Also a more moderate author maintains 
that lavoro parasubordinato, even when it is not used for the purpose of circumventing regulation, 
undermines the coherence of labour law.934  
 
To what extent lavoro parasubordinato deserves this criticism is not easy to say, not least due to the 
difficulties involved with measuring whether parasubordinati have in fact substituted employees or 
not.935 Available statistics, mainly from the Istituto Nazionale della Previdenza Sociale (INPS) do 
nonethless offer some important insights into lavoro parasubordinato. In the INPS statistics a 
distinction is made between three categories of parasubordinati: collaboratori, professionisti and 
collaboratori/professionisti. The latter two categories refer to professionals registered in registries of 
professionals, such as attorneys and medical doctors. The most interesting category is the 
collaboratori, commonly seen as including some workers that closely resemble employees or who 
could best be described as employees in disguise, for example call-center workers with little 
autonomy.936 The collaboratori make up over 90 percent of those registered with INPS as 
parasubordinati. Between 1996, the first year of the new pension rules, and 2001, the number of 
registered collaboratori more than doubled , increasing from 856.000 to 1.890.000.937 The 
statistics confirm the economic dependence nature of parasubordinati. Of those classified as 
collaboratori, in 1999, more than 91 percent worked for only one employer, with an additional 7 
                                                 
932 Leonardi (1999) p. 522. 
933 Leonardi (1999) p. 535. 
934 Ferraro (1998) p. 505. 
935 On the methodological difficulties of this type of research, c.f. Borgarello and Cornaglia (2002) pp. 29f. 
936 C.f. CNEL (2002) p. 130 and Borgarello and Cornaglia (2002) p. 12. 
937 CNEL (2002) p. 130. 
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percent working for only two employers.938 The statistics also reveal signs that parasubordinazione 
does not function as transitory stage that a worker goes through to become later employed as an 
employee. The parasubordinati are largely concentrated in the same age groups as the employed 
population in general, with almost one third of workers in the 30-39 years age-bracket.939 It is also 
interesting to note that almost half of the collaboratori are women and that in the south of Italy, 
women make up a majority.940 As self-employment traditionally has been a predominantly male 
activity, the fact that women have caught up with men could be viewed as an additional sign that 
these workers are distinct from, and probably more precarious, than traditional autonomous self-
employed workers. Cited as evidence to the contrary – that lavoro parasubordinato does not 
represent precarious employees in disguise – has been the fact that it is more widespread in the 
dynamic economy and labour market of northern Italy than in the south.941 
 
In recent years, several proposals to reform the institution by including lavoratori parasubordinati in 
a wider range of labour laws have been discussed in the Italian parliament. In 1999, a proposal by 
Senator Carlo Smuraglia to extend parts of labour law was passed by the Italian Senate, but not 
by the Chamber of Deputies.942 At the time of writing, a government proposal to reform the 
institution of lavoro parasubordinato, replacing it with a new type of temporary contract, lavoro al 
progetto has been put before the Italian parliament.943 
 
                                                 
938 Borgarello and Cornaglia (2002) pp. 23f. 
939 Borgarello and Cornaglia (2002) p. 7 and 10. 
940 In 2001, women made up 47.4% of the collaboratori in Italy as a whole and more than 55% in southern Italy. 
CNEL (2002) p. 131. 
941 De Luca Tamajo (2000) p. 266. 
942 Disegno di legge n. C.5651, approved by the Italian Senate February 4, 1999. Available at 
http://www.camera.it/_dati/leg13/lavori/stampati/sk6000/articola/5651.htm For a summary of the proposal, c.f. 
De Luca Tamajo (2000) pp. 267ff. 
943The new lavoro al progetto category would encompass persons who, without a bond of subordination to the 
employer, perform a project or a defined program of work to accomplish a specified result.     
http://www.welfare.gov.it/aree+di+interesse/occupazione+e+mercato+del+lavoro/servizi+impiego/documenti/d
ecretobiagi.htm  
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4.3.2 Analysis 
Having three different categories of workers does, arguably, capture better the emergent realities 
of post-fordist organisations than a binary divide.944 It has also been held, however, that the 
group covered by a tertium genus necessarily is too heterogenous, socially and legally, to be of any 
use to labour law, as there are no common interests dictating common needs for regulation.945 
The pivotal question is whether a tertium genus serves to give some protection to workers who 
otherwise would be left outside the personal scope of labour law entirely, or whether it makes it 
easier and more attractive to try to escape employee-status, thus undermining the mandatory 
nature of labour law. According to the optimistic view, the concept of employee is not affected 
by the introduction of a formal third category, and the borderline between employees and self-
employed workers is neither moved nor blurred. In addition, the existence of a third category 
does not lead to any change in employer and worker behaviour away from contracts of 
employment.  
 
In the pessimistic view, tertium genus can contribute to an escape from employee status, and thus 
from at least part of labour law, in two ways. Firstly, courts could, arguably, become less reluctant 
to find against employee status if they are offered a formal third category in which to put difficult 
cases. Ballestrero has claimed that the Italian legislator, through the creation of the parasubordinato 
category, has retained as self-employed, workers who otherwise could have been classified as 
employees.946 Secondly, it could provide employers with a possibility to combine the lower costs 
and level of regulation associated with using independent contractors with the longer and deeper 
relationships sought from employees. Further, a tertium genus, unless the borders towards the 
concept of employee are adequately policed, could contribute to the institutionalisation of a two 
                                                 
944 De Luca Tamajo (2000) p. 266. 
945 Ferraro (1998) pp. 469 and 506. 
946 Ballestrero (1987) p. 48. 
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tier labour market, where the non-core workforce has less rights than the core, employee, 
workforce. 
 
To a high degree, this depends upon what regulation is applied to the tertium genus. If tertium genus 
workers are covered by large parts of labour regulation, the risk that it is used as a refuge from 
labour law should be less. In the German and Italian examples, the labour law coverage offered is 
marginal. The social security regulations applied to the category also plays an important role, in 
particular if there is a difference in the coverage or the size contributions.  
 
An advantage of the tertium genus technique for extending the personal scope of labour law is that 
it could provide a fairly good fit between the concern of regulation and the personal scope, 
however depending on the legal design of the category and what parts of labour law are extended. 
If a tertium genus, like in the German, but to a large extent also the Italian, example, is defined in 
terms of economic dependence, regulation concerned with this could have its scope extended. 
This is, however, not the way the tertium genus technique has been used. Neither in Italy nor in 
Germany are tertium genus workers covered by, for example, dismissal protection. Arguably, 
neither the Italian nor the German legislation are good examples of a tertium genus, as they do not 
really offer any labour law coverage, apart from procedural rules. As far as social security goes, 
the claim that they represent a tertium genus is more substantial. 
4.4 The Targeted Approach 
4.4.1 Diversifying the Personal Scope According to Concern 
The third technique for extension is to diversify the personal scope, giving different parts of 
labour law different scopes. At the heart of this technique is the identification of regulations that 
ought to have a broader scope than just employees. In a recent discussion document, the British 
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Department of Trade and Industry outlined the rationale behind the diversified personal scope: 
the “targeted approach”. 
Employment rights apply to differently defined groups of people, depending on the aims of the 
right in questions. Different working people may require different levels of protection, depending 
on the nature of the relationship with their work provider, in particular the degree of control the 
working person has over how they do their work and when they do it and the degree of mutual 
obligation between them and their work provider. The government considers that certain rights, 
such as the rights to receive the national minimum wage and not to suffer unlawful deductions from 
wages should apply to a broad category of working people, in order to ensure that work pays for all. 
[…] By contrast, other rights, such as the right to minimum notice periods and the right not to be 
unfairly dismissed, provide protection for employees with a contract of employment placing 
particular duties on them and their employers. The advantage of this approach is that it ensures that 
the framework of statutory employment rights reflects the variety of different arrangements 
between work providers and working people. However, this ‘targeted’ approach invariably means 
that the coverage of rights varies.947 
 
The United Kingdom is not the only example of this technique for extension. For quite some 
time, it has also been used on the European level. “The labour law of the EU, by virtue of the 
principles of freedom of movement and freedom of establishment, has the advantage of 
beginning with a broad concept of work and economic activity which potentially embraces both 
these categories of worker. The application of EU social and labour law to self-employed persons 
was always on the agenda, as illustrated by the careful attention paid to this category of workers 
with respect to EU law on sex discrimination, where special Directives were approved 
concerning self-employed workers.”948 The framework directive for equal treatment in 
employment and occupation applies to “all persons” in relation to “conditions for access to 
employment, self-employment and to occupation including selection criteria and recruitment 
                                                 
947 Department of Trade and Industry (2002) pp. 6f.  
948 Bercusson (1996) p. 478.  
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conditions [and] promotion”.949 This is echoed in directives implementing the principles of the 
framework directive.950 
 
In the United States, the personal scope of anti-discrimination law is generally more restricted. 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 only covers employees of employers with fifteen 
employees or more. The Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts, however, has been found to have a 
broader personal scope. In 1999, the First Circuit Court of Appeals found that the so-called 
Section 1981951 – which bans racial discrimination in the “making, performance, modification and 
termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of 
the contractual relationship” – covers independent contractors.952 In the case, an incorporated 
business and its working owner and sole shareholder sued a company for which they were 
performing services for racial discrimination due to a hostile work environment. The court found 
that “Section 1981 does not limit itself, or even refer, to employment contracts but embraces all 
contracts and therefore includes contracts by which a corporate independent contractor […] 
provides services to another corporation.”953  
 
4.4.2 ‘Worker’ and ‘Employment’ in UK Labour Law 
Employee status is still what determines the personal scope of the greater part of labour law in 
the United Kingdom. Dismissal protection (apart from protection against discriminatory 
dismissals covered by anti-discrimination legislation), redundancy pay, parental leave and the 
majority of collective rights are among the important regulations which apply to employees only. 
Other parts of British labour law such as the minimum wage, working time and some collective 
rights, apply to workers. In the Employment Rights Act of 1996 the definition of worker is as follows: 
                                                 
949 Council Directive 2000/78/EC establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation. Art. 3(1).  
950 C.f. Council Directive 2000/43/EC implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic 
origin, and Council Directive 76/207/EEC on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women as regards 
acces to employment, vocational training and promotion, and working conditions, as amended by Directive 2002/73/EC. 
951 42 U.S.C. § 1981. 
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(3) In this Act “worker” […] means an individual who has entered into or works under (or, where 
the employment has ceased, worked under) –  
(a) a contract of employment, or 
(b) any other contract […] whereby the individual undertakes to do or perform personally any work 
or services for another party to the contract whose status is not by virtue of the contract that of a 
client or customer of any profession or business undertaking carried on by the individual[…]954 
 
The definition excludes three groups of workers: “those who do not contract to provide personal 
service (this leaves out those who contract to supply a certain end product); those who contract 
as professionals; and, […] those who have an undertaking of their own through which they 
contract with a ‘client’ or ‘customer’.”955 Essentially, the definition is intended to exclude those 
who could be viewed as genuinely self-employed workers.956 Some of these, are nonetheless 
included in the concept of employment found in anti-discrimination legislation, which unlike worker 
includes also professionals who sell their services to the general public.  
In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires –  
“employment” means employment under a contract for service or of apprentice-ship or a contract 
personally to execute any work or labour.”957 
 
For a person to be considered a worker or in employment under these definitions, she must work 
under “a contract the dominant purpose of which is the execution of personal work or labour.”958 
The work does not have to be the sole purpose of the contract, but if the personal performance 
of work is only a minor part of the contract, the person is not considered to be under a contract 
personally to execute work.959 In a case concerning a sub-postmaster, the Employment Appeal 
                                                                                                                                                        
952 Danco, Inc v. Wal Mart Stores, Inc 178 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 1999), certiorari. denied 528 U.S. 1105. 
953 Danco, Inc v. Wal Mart Stores, Inc 178 F.3d 8, at 14. (1st Cir. 1999) 
954 Employment Rights Act of 1996 s 230 (1)-(3). 
955 Deakin (2001a) p. 147. 
956 Davies and Freedland (2000b) p. 88. 
957 Sex Discrimination Act 1975 s. 82(1). The same definition can be found in the Race Relations Act 1976 s. 78(1); 
Disability Discrimination Act 1995 s. 68(1); and Equal Pay Act 1970 s. 1(6). 
958 Mirror Group v. Gunning [1986] ICR 145, at 152. 
959 Mirror Group v. Gunning [1986] ICR 145, at 156. 
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Tribunal applied this ‘dominant purpose’ test in two steps. First, it asked whether there was any 
obligation under the contract for the sub-postmaster to do any work himself. Having found such 
an obligation, the appeal tribunal went on to ask whether the work which was demanded of the 
sub-postmaster himself was the dominant purpose of the contract.960 
 
In Mirror Group v. Gunning, the Court of Appeal found that the responsibility to get work done is 
not the same as performing work personally. The fact that the alleged employer held an agent it 
had appointed responsible and found it desirable, on grounds of efficiency, that the agent 
personally participated in the business was not considered to be the same as a requirement that 
the work be done personally.961 The same path was followed in Sheehan v. Post Office Counters, 
where the appeal tribunal found the dominant purpose of the contract to be the “regular and 
efficient carrying out of the post office services” and that even though the sub-postmaster had to 
take responsibility for the delivery of the services, he was only required to perform a limited 
range of activities personally.962 
 
The ‘dominant purpose’ test suggest that also small employers, i.e. persons who perform work 
alongside people employed by them, can fall under the concepts of worker or employment, as 
long as the main purpose of the contract is for the small employer to perform work personally.963  
In a case concerning a solicitor – sole proprietor of a firm employing himself, a secretary and an 
assistant solicitor – the House of Lords found that a person can still be a worker or fall under the 
definition of employment found in anti-discrimination legislation even though some work was 
delegated to assistants. “Plainly, it does not cease to be a contract ‘personally to execute any work 
                                                 
960 Sheehan v. Post Office Counters Ltd [1998] ICR 734, at 744. 
961 Mirror Group v. Gunning [1986] ICR 145, at 153 
962 Sheehan v. Post Office Counters Ltd [1998] ICR 734, at 744-745. 
963 Collins et al (2001) p. 178. 
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or labour’ because his secretary types and posts [a defence] and his assistant solicitor goes along 
to file such a defence. The dominant purpose is that he will do the essential part of the work.”964 
 
Neither did it matter that he had his own firm as the House of Lords found that “the definition 
of employment is clearly wide enough to cover the provision of services by a professional man 
[…] Whatever he called himself, he was the individual seeking employment in the sense of 
offering to enter into a ‘contract personally to execute any work or labour’.”965 In the same case, 
another solicitor, practising in a partnership, was also considered to fall within the scope of the 
legislation. The House of Lords found the definition of employment clearly and deliberately to 
have been made to include contracts to provied services, a type of contract that can be entered 
into also by firms.966 Having outlined two possibilities, Lord Slynn held that “[t]he intention of 
the statute […] is in favour of the wider definition. […] The intention of the act is clearly to 
outlaw discrimination on the grounds of religious or political opinion in the employment sphere. 
[…] It is factually [as] possible to discriminate against the partners of a firm or against the firm 
itself as it is against a sole practitioner.”967 
 
One view of the ‘worker’ concept is that it, where applied, has moved the crucial dividing line so 
that it now goes between economically dependent workers and those more genuinely in business 
on their own. “By substituting a test of economic dependence for personal or formal 
subordination, the worker concept could be said to preserve the binary divide between employees 
and the self-employed, but with an improved functional test for distinguishing between the two 
groups. From this perspective, the ‘worker’ concept could be thought of as updating the concept 
of employee.”968  
                                                 
964 Loughran and Kelly v. Northern Ireland Housing Executive [1998] IRLR 593, at 597. 
965 Loughran and Kelly v. Northern Ireland Housing Executive [1998] IRLR 593, at 597. 
966 Loughran and Kelly v. Northern Ireland Housing Executive [1998] IRLR 593, at 597. 
967 Loughran and Kelly v. Northern Ireland Housing Executive [1998] IRLR 593, at 597. 
968 Deakin (2001a) p. 147. C.f. also Davies and Freedland (2000b) p. 90. 
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4.4.3 The Power to Confer Rights to Individuals – UK Employment Relations Act 1999 
In the Employment Relations Act 1999 the British parliament granted a “power to confer rights on 
individuals” giving the Secretary of State the right to extend by regulation the coverage of certain 
employment rights to specified categories of individuals.969 Section 23(4) of the Act states that an 
order under the section may: 
a) provide that individuals are to be treated as parties to workers’ contracts or contracts of employment; 
b) make provision as to who are to be regarded as the employers of individuals; 
c) make provision which has the effect of modifying the operation of any right as conferred on 
individuals by the order; 
d) include such consequential, incidental or supplementary provisions as the Secretary of State thinks fit. 
 
The power applies to any right conferred on an individual under the Trade Union and Labour 
Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992, The Employment Rights Act 1996, The Employment Relations Act 
1999, The Employment Act 2002 and any instrument made under section 2(2) of the European 
Communities Act 1972. The last refers to legislation implementing Community law. The power 
does not apply to the anti-discrimination acts.970 
 
Deakin, in an analysis of the Employment Relations Act 1999, refers to Section 23 as “potentially the 
most important measure [and] also the most obscure – the power to extend the coverage of 
statutory employment rights through ministerial order[…].”971 The power can be used to bring 
under the scope of labour law statutes workers who today are explicitly exempted from coverage 
or workers who are excluded due to the legal status of their relation, for example office holders. 
The most likely use, foreseen already in the UK Government’s 1998 Fairness at Work white paper 
                                                 
969 Employment Relations Act 1999, Section 23(1) – 23(5) and Employment Relations Act 1999 – Explanatory 
Memorandum, para 232. 
970 Department of Trade and Industry (2002) p. 8. 
971 Deakin (2001a) p. 137. 
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is to extend the use of the ‘worker’ concept.972 In July 2002, the Department of Trade and Industry 
published a discussion document asking for views on the potential use of this provision. In the 
document, four different options were outlined:973 
• Maintain the status quo and consider the scope of new rights on a case-by-case basis. There may be a 
case for regulatory approaches to any lack of clarity in employment law or lack of awareness of 
employment status definitions. 
• Extend the scope of some existing employment rights, on a case-by-case basis, to some or all of the 
groups of working people described in section 2, keeping coverage under review. 
• Extend the coverage of all existing statutory employment rights across the board to the same group of 
working people, abandoning the ‘targeted’ approach to coverage, with the aim of simplifying the scope 
of employment law. 
• Conduct a broader review of employment status and definitions, looking at the relationship between 
status for employment law and tax purposes. […]  
 
The discussion document also contained an outline of the case for and against extending 
statutory employment rights.974 Among the arguments in favour of extension were “concerns that 
some working people are being excluded from employment rights due to technicalities relating to 
the type of contract or other engagement they are engaged under”, one example being labour 
only subcontractors. “These working people may, in practice, do the same type of work as 
employees, may be subject to similar demands in that they may have equally little autonomy over 
when and how they do their work in practice and may be economically dependent on a single 
source of work. There may be a fairness case for giving them the same protection as employees.” 
Extending the personal scope of labour law is also mentioned as a way of increasing people’s 
willingness to take up atypical work, “knowing their rights are secured”. Further, “[e]xtending 
rights to all workers may also increase certainty and clarity for working people who are on the 
employee/non-employee borderline and their employers if a single definition were used in 
                                                 
972 Deakin (2001a) p. 144. 
973 Department of Trade and Industry (2002) p. 26. 
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employment rights legislation, or fewer different definitions used. This may in particular help 
small businesses.” Many of the arguments against extending statutory employment rights focus 
on the increased administrative burdens any extension of the personal scope would put on 
employers, in particular smaller businesses, that today rely on less regulated non-employees. 
Additional employment rights could make atypical work less attractive to employers, but also to 
workers who seek a lower level of commitment towards their employer. Finally, extending the 
personal scope would not necessarily solve problems of legal uncertainty over worker status as 
they would simply move the contested borderline. 
 
4.4.3 Analysis 
The use of the ‘worker’ and ‘employment’ concepts have been seen as evidence “that statutory 
intervention can be used to overcome some of the limitations of the common law concept of the 
employee.”975 In a 1999 empirical study, Burchell, Deakin and Honey estimated the number of 
workers covered by the extended personal scope provided for by the concept of worker. In the 
first, quantitative wave of the study, a traditional self-assessment survey, asking the respondents 
for their own assessment of their employment status, was complemented by questions designed 
to reproduce the factors used by courts to determine employment status. On the basis of the 
quantitative data, the authors estimated that between 80 and 92 percent of all those in 
employment in the UK work under conditions that would lead a court to find them within the 
category of workers.976 Compared to the concept of employee, “the use of the worker definition 
might protect up to a further 5 per cent of all those in employment. It is not possible to be more 
precise about the numbers who would be affected by this change because of the difficulties of 
attempting to assess employment status without examining each case individually.”977 In the 
                                                                                                                                                        
974 Department of Trade and Industry (2002) pp. 26ff. 
975 Deakin and Morris (2001) p. 128. 
976 Burchell, Deakin and Honey (1999) p. 46. The study made no difference between worker and employment. The 
estimate would seem to encompass both categories. 
977 Burchell, Deakin and Honey (1999) pp. 48f. 
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second, qualitative, wave of the study, in-depth interviews with a subsample of the respondents 
were made. As far as the numbers covered by the concept of worker is concerned, the qualitative 
wave confirmed the results of the quantitative one.978 
 
The most important advantage of the targeted approach is that makes it possible to tailor the 
personal scope to the concern of the regulation in question. The way it has been used to give a 
broader scope to anti-discrimination legislation is a good examples of this, even if it has not been 
used consistently, as noted by Collins, Ewing and McColgan: 
It may be possible to argue that when the legislation is primarily directed at the possible misuse of 
managerial authority, the legislation is confined to contracts of employment, because those contracts 
contain the implied terms of the requirement of obedience and performance in good faith. When 
the legislation is directed primarily at the operation of the labour market, however, as in the case of 
wages and hours regulation and laws against discrimination, the scope is broader because it is 
recognised that the market for performance of work extends beyond traditional contracts of 
employment. But this pattern behind the legislation is certainly not followed consistently. […] 
Furthermore, we must doubt whether the singling out of the contract of employment as the unique 
site where the risk of abuse of managerial power is present relies upon a satisfactory analysis of the 
construction of power relations in the labour market979 
 
The targeted approach also has the advantage, in particular as compared to the tertium genus 
technique, that it does not establish any new full fledged status to which an exodus from 
employee status can occur. This can also be a disadvantage, though, as the this rather subtle 
extension may escape the notice of workers and employers and thus have less of an impact in the 
everyday workplace. This is also important from the perspective of certainty concerning the legal 
classification of work relationships, a point which has been conceded by the UK Department of 
Trade and Industry: “The result of this targeted approach is that employment rights legislation 
                                                 
978 Burchell, Deakin and Honey (1999) pp. 75f. 
979 Collins et al (2001) p. 170. 
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contains a variety of different definitions (which determine the working people rights apply to) 
and the differences in coverage between different rights may cause confusion.”980 
4.5 Defining The Responsible Employer 
4.5.1 The Functions of the Employer 
The fourth, and final, technique for extending the personal scope that we will treat in this study 
works through defining the responsible employer, rather than categorising workers. As Deakin 
has pointed out “[i]t is a striking feature of modern labour law that the volume of material 
devoted by courts and commentators to refining the concept of the ‘employee’ (and, now, the 
‘worker’) completely overshadows the few attempts which have been made to address the nature 
of the employer.”981 The legal nature of the employer can often be inferred from the concept of 
employee, simply being the entity for which the worker is performing work, to whom she is 
subordinated, most oftenly economically dependent, and who owns the means of production. 
Having acknowledged the troubles of the existing personal scope of labour law, we must, 
nonetheless go further. 
What is required is an understanding of how particular rights and liabilities are to be allocated when 
the traditional functions of the employer – in particular coordination, in the sense of managerial 
decision-making, and the assumption of certain social and economic risks – are divided among a 
number of different entities.982 
 
Deakin suggests three criteria for defining the employer, or rather the enterprise of the employer: 
coordination, risk and equity. The first, coordination, associates the “concept of the employer” with 
the exercise of bureaucratic powers, the “implied ‘authority relation’ which granst the employer a 
certain discretion to direct the factors of production, including labour, without the need for 
                                                 
980 Department of Trade and Industry (2002) p. 12. 
981 Deakin (2001b) p. 319. 
982 Deakin (2001b) p. 319. 
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express contracting.”983 The second, risk, is derived from the enterprise as a mechanism for 
absorbing and spreading certain economic and social risks. The third, equity, refers to the 
enterprise as “a space within which the principle of equal treatment must be observed”.984 
 
Good examples of the actual use of the technique of defining the responsible employer rather 
than using one or more categories of workers to define the personal scope can be taken from the 
field of occupational health and safety. Here, responsibilities have been assigned to employers 
based on their possibility to influence the physical safety for all working on their premises or on a 
worksite controlled by them, “coordination” in Deakin’s words. Under French law, employers 
have a general responsibility for the working conditions (occupational health and safety, working 
time etc.) of the personnel of sub-contractors working on their premises.985 Further, when 
workers from several different enterprises are present at the same work site, their respective 
employers are obliged to co-operate in order to ensure the observance of occupational health and 
safety regulations.986 Under the UK Health and Safety at Work Act 1974, “it shall be the duty of 
every employer to conduct his undertaking in such a way as to ensure, so far as reasonably 
practical, that persons not in his employment who may be affected thereby are not thereby 
exposed to risks to their health and safety.”987 This responsibility extends to independent 
contractors who work on the employer’s premises or a place of work assigned by the employer, 
but only as far as their work can be described as part of the employer’s undertaking. Auxilliary 
activities, such as deliveries, repairs and cleaning are not covered.988 
 
The technique has also been used, to a limited extent, in Community law. The framework 
directive on the safety and health of workers only requires employers to give information 
                                                 
983 Deakin (2001b) p. 320. 
984 Deakin (2001b) p. 322. 
985 Art. L. 200-3 Code du travail. 
986 Art. L. 230-2, alinéa 2 Code du travail. 
987 Health and Safety at Work Act 1974, Section 3(1). 
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concerning work hasards to workers who are not their own employees,.989 The directive on the 
implementation of minimum safety and health requirements at temporary or mobile construction 
sites goes further, giving co-ordination responsibilities to the client for which the construction 
work is carried out and to “project supervisors.”990 This is, however, not the main rule of 
Community occupational health and safety law, which in general only covers employees. This has 
caused concern, and there is a proposal pending from the European Commission for a Council 
recommendation concerning the extension of the personal scope of health and safety legislation 
to include self-employed workers.991  
 
The main example of this technique will be taken from Swedish law, where some health and 
safety responsibilities for workers other than for an employer’s own employees are allocated in 
situations where one of more employers are performing work at a common worksite, to persons 
controlling a worksite common to several enterprises, to property owners providing premises for 
work and to the user enterprises of temporary agency workers. 
 
4.5.2 Swedish Occupational Health and Safety Regulation 
The personal scope of the Swedish Work Environment Act (Arbetsmiljölagen) varies between the 
different provisions. From the principal field of application – “every activity in which employees 
are used for work on an employers account”992 – a number of exemptions and extensions are 
made. In the discussion of the personal scope found in the preparatory works of the original 
                                                                                                                                                        
988 R v. Associated Octel Co. Ltd [1996] 1 WLR 1543. 
989 Council Directive 89/391/EEC on the introduction of measures to encourage improvements in the safety and health of workers at 
work. Art. 10(2) and 12(2). 
990 Council Directive 92/57/EEC on the implementation of minimum safety and health requirements at temporary or mobile 
construction sites. 
991 Proposal for a Council Recommendation concerning the application of legislation governing health and safety at work to self-employed 
workers COM(2002) 166 final.  
992 Arbetsmiljölagen 1 kap. 2§. The English translation of Swedish statutory texts found in this section are taken from a 
translation and commentary of the Work Environment Act (1977:1160) and the Work Environment Ordinance 
(1977:1160) found on the web site of the Swedish Work Environment Authority. 
http://www.av.se/english/legislation/legislation.shtm (Visited: July 27, 2001). 
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1976 legislation, the purpose of the legislation took main stage.993 The protective character of the 
legislation, aimed at guaranteeing worker health and safety, was said to require a wide scope for 
many of its provisions, which is why an extension of the personal scope to all professional 
activities had to be considered. At the same time, it was nonetheless considered natural that the 
legislation focused primarily at situations where the worker’s work environment is dependent on 
the actions of someone else, as is the case with employees. The possibility actually to influence 
the working environment of the worker has been one of the more important factors in allocating 
responsibility under the Work Environment Act.  
 
The Work Environment Act contains no special provisions concerning dependent contractors.994 The 
preparatory works indicate that the category is considered to be already included in the concept 
of employee.995 Before the 1978 Work Environment Act, Swedish occupational health and safety 
regulation exempted so called “uncontrollable work” (okontrollerbart arbete), work performed in 
circumstances where the employer cannot be expected to monitor the work, from the personal 
scope. The exception was mainly applicable to homeworkers, but also to service mechanics and 
engine fitters working away from their employers premises, and domestic helpers. Even though 
this kind of work is difficult to supervise, a fact that will in practice affect the employer’s 
responsibility, it was not considered reason enough to leave it outside the personal scope of the 
act.996 
 
Under the Work Environment Act,  the employer is to “take all precautions necessary to prevent 
the employee from being exposed to health hazards and accident risks”997 and “systematically 
plan, direct and control activities in a manner meeting the requirements of [the Work Environment 
                                                 
993 SOU 1976:1 pp. 273ff. 
994 C.f. above 3.4.3. 
995 SOU 1976:1 pp. 276f. 
996 SOU 1976:1 pp. 277f. 
997 Arbetsmiljölagen 3 kap. 2 §. 
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Act] and provisions issued by authority of the same.”998 Further, the employer has the 
responsibility to investigate health hazards and industrial injuries, to document the working 
environment and to inform the employees of potential hazards. The employer also has to make 
sure that there are occupational health services and possibilities for rehabilitation of injured 
workers.999 
 
Apart from responsibility for the employer’s own employees, (and those held responsible under 
product safety rules), some responsibility is also given in the following cases: i) two or more 
persons (legal or natural) simultaneously engaged in activities at a common worksite; ii) persons 
controlling a worksite common to several enterprises; iii) landlords and other property owners 
who provide premises for work or as personnel facilities; and iv) user enterprises of temporary 
agency workers. The first three concern rather specific situations and are more or less fashioned 
on construction sites or similar situations. Commonly, independent contractors are captured by 
these extensions. The fourth aims at a wider range of situations, but applies to temporary agency 
workers only. 
 
When two or more persons (legal or natural) are simultaneously engaged in activities at a 
common worksite, they are to consult each other and co-operate to achieve satisfactory safety 
conditions. In addition, each of them is responsible for not exposing any person working at the 
site to the risk of ill-health or accident, including self-employed workers.1000 A common worksite 
can be described as more than one undertaking at a time carrying on activities which are not 
physically segregated. If two undertakings share the same premises or devices, as happens at 
construction sites, certain department stores or when a cleaning company or transport company 
enters a factory or office to work there, a common worksite exists. 
                                                 
998 Arbetssmiljölagen 3 kap. 2a §. 
999 Arbetsmiljölagen 3 kap. 2b§ and 3§. 
1000 Arbetsmiljölagen 3 kap 6§. 
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If a work site is permanent and common to several enterprises and the site is under the control of 
one of them, the person controlling the worksite will be responsible for co-ordinating safety 
measures. The same is true for someone who commissions construction or heavy engineering 
work. Co-ordination responsibility may by agreement be transferred to one of the other persons 
conducting work at the worksite. In other cases, for example when there is no permanent 
worksite or when none of the employers is in control of the worksite, the employers can agree 
that one of them will assume the co-ordination responsibility. If no such agreement has been 
reached, the Work Environment Authority may ordain who is to have such responsibility, or if 
there are special grounds, ordain co-ordination responsibility on a person other than the one 
agreed by the parties.1001 
 
The responsibility to co-ordinate health and safety measures is defined by the Work Environment 
Act and concerns ensuring the co-ordination of the work to prevent risks of ill-health and 
accidents – including timetables, general and special safety devices and personnel facilities and 
sanitary devices.1002 Other employers and persons working at the common worksite shall comply 
with the directions issued by the person responsible for co-ordination. The co-ordination 
responsibility is not the same as the employer’s responsibility and the co-ordination responsibility 
does not relieve the other employers present from their responsibilities under occupational health 
and safety legislation. The line between the two is, however, difficult to define. The point of 
departure is that the person who legally and factually has the best possibilities to take measures to 
protect workers and promote a good work environment is the one who should be responsible for 
them.1003 
 
                                                 
1001 Arbetsmiljölagen 7 kap. 6§. 
1002 Arbetsmiljölagen 3 kap 7§. 
1003 Prop. 1993/94: 186 pp. 28f. 
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In addition to the co-ordination responsibility, a person controlling a worksite “shall ensure the 
existence on the worksite of permanent devices of such kind that a person working there without 
being an employee in relation to him is not exposed to the risk of ill-health or accident”.1004 The 
provision is aimed at protecting visiting personnel, involved with, for example, distribution, 
transportation and cleaning; and persons carrying out inspections. It was introduced on the 
grounds that someone who can influence the health and safety situation of a worker, will have 
the responsibility to do so, even if she is not under her supervision.1005 Naturally, this includes 
responsibility vis-à-vis self-employed workers. 
 
Finally, landlords and other property owners “who provide premises, land or a space below 
ground for work or as personnel facilities” who do not have any direct responsibility for the work 
environment can be subject to inspections or even to prohibitions against continued letting if 
they do not rectify deficiencies.1006  
 
In 1994, a responsibility for the user enterprises of temporary agency workers was introduced. 
The employer – i.e. the temporary work agency – has the primary responsibility for the health 
and safety of the worker, in particular for long term measures such as training and rehabilitation. 
Under the Work Environment Act, the user enterprise is nonetheless responsible to “take the safety 
measures which are needed in that work.”1007  This means that the user enterprise will have to 
take the same safety precautions as she would have taken for employees, but the responsibility is 
limited to the work in question.1008 The background to the provision was that temporary work 
agencies were considered to lack the control necessary to take responsibility for the work 
                                                 
1004 Arbetsmiljölagen 3 kap 12 §. 
1005 Prop 1993/94: 186 p. 31. C.f. also Directive 89/391/EEC and 92/57/EEC. 
1006 Arbetsmiljölagen 7 kap 13§. c.f. Prop. 1993/94: 186 pp. 36f. 
1007 Arbetsmiljölagen 3 kap 12§. 
1008 Prop. 1993/94:186 pp. 33f. 
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environment of the user enterprise, while the responsibility for persons controlling a worksite 
was not considered enough to cover the needs of temporary agency workers.1009 
 
In the government bill introducing these changes, the question was raised whether user 
enterprises of self-employed contractors should be given the same kind of responsibility for the 
work environment of the self-employed workers.1010 The idea was rejected by the government on 
the grounds that the concept of employee had developed to include workers previously not 
covered and that the responsibilities already being assigned by the act would cover many self-
employed workers. Further, the government held that there typically were significant differences 
between self-employed contractors and temporary agency workers. Temporary agency workers 
were considered to be more “physically integrated” into the user enterprises, being subject to the 
managerial prerogatives of the user enterprise and working under conditions resembling the user 
enterprise’s own employees. Self-employed contractors, the argument went, were often hired to 
do work that was not part of the user enterprise’s normal operations. In addition, an important 
reason for using self-employed contractors was to perform work for which the employer lacked 
the necessary skills or know-how, including how best to protect the worker from the hazards of 
the work. Finally, the government did not want private persons buying services from self-
employed contractors to become responsible under occupational health and safety legislation. 
 
4.5.3 Analysis 
The technique of defining the responsible employer has the potential to provide a good fit 
between the personal scope and the concerns of labour law. In the example above, we have seen 
how the concern addressed by health and safety legislation – the employers control of the 
                                                 
1009 Prop. 1993/94:186 p 34. For other Swedish regulations of temporary agency work, c.f. Prop. 1990/91:124 and 
Bet. 1990/91:AU20. C.f. also Directive 91/383/EEC supplementing the measures to encourage improvements in the safety and 
health at work of workers with a fixed- duration employment relationship or a temporary employment relationship. 
1010 Prop. 1993/94:186 pp. 35f. 
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physical work environment – has been used to define the employer responsible under certain 
physical health and safety provisions.  
 
The technique also has the advantage of being, at least in one sense, difficult to circumvent, as 
the personal scope is defined not in terms of workers having a particular status, but by the 
employer’s functional powers. As the employer’s responsibility extends to all “who may be 
affected thereby”1011 or to “ensure the existence on the worksite of […] devices of such kind that 
a person working there […] is not exposed to the risk of ill-health or accident”,1012 it cannot be 
avoided through changing worker status through clever drafting or labelling of contracts. 
 
At the same time, however, in some common worksite situations it might be unclear which one 
of several different employers present is responsible. Main contractors may even try to unload 
deliberately responsibility on subcontractors. Another problem can be that the responsbile 
employer is unaware of the responsibilities and, therefore, neglects to take required precautionary 
measures. A survey performed in the early 1990s by a Swedish government committee indicated 
that while employers responsible for larger commons worksites, such as large construction 
companies, were well aware of their responsibilities, worksites common to a number of smaller 
companies were more problematic.1013 
                                                 
1011 United Kingdom, Health and Safety at Work Act 1974, Art 3(1). 
1012 Sweden, Arbetsmiljölagen 3 kap. 18§. 
1013 SOU 1993:81 pp. 59f. 
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5. REFORMING THE PERSONAL SCOPE 
There are, as the previous chapter has shown, many different ways that the personal scope of 
labour law has been reformed to extend beyond employees. In this chapter the possibilites for 
reforming the personal scope will be investigated, using the analyses of the concept of employee 
and the existing extensions of labour law, together with some of the more elaborate reform 
proposals found mainly, but not solely, in academic literature. Three main options for reform will 
be investigated. The first option is to recast the concept of employee (5.1). The second option is 
to extend parts of labour law to other workers than employess, creating concerntric circles of 
labour law coverage (5.2). The third and final option is to tie the personal scope to the three 
concerns of labour law, organising the personal scope as overlapping circles of coverage (5.3). 
5.1 Recasting the Concept of Employee 
One of the observations earlier made about the concept of employee is that it is flexible and has a 
proven record of adapting to changes in the organisation of work, on the labour markets and in 
society at large. As employers’ bureaucratic powers have taken on new and less hierarchichal 
forms, new notions of subordination, replacing hierarchical control with looser organisational 
criteria such as integration into the employer’s organisation, have developed. Similarly, in some 
countries, economically dependent workers have been included in order to cover arrangements 
where formal subordination is weak or absent, but where a need for regulation has been 
considered to be present nonetheless. The concept of employee, as we have seen, is not static, 
and will follow socioeconomic developments, albeit with a certain lag. Given this, it would be 
neglectful not to investigate the proposition that a recasting of the concept of employee is 
enough to overcome at least some of the challenges self-employment poses to labour law.  
 
A frequently suggested reform is to replace subordination with economic dependence as the 
most important or decisive factor of the concept of employee. This idea is far from new. As we 
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saw in the account of the historical development of the concept of employment above, already in 
the first half of the twentieth century it was questioned whether subordination to someone else’s 
orders really matched the personal scope of labour law to the actual need for protection, and 
whether economic dependence would not provide a better fit. 
 
Along these lines, in the United States, the Dunlop Commission proposed a wider application of the 
economic realities test.1014 Concerned with employers using independent contractors solely to 
avoid labour and tax regulation, the commission held that while this did not render the use of 
independent contractors or other forms of contingent work inherently illegitimate, the goal of 
public policy should be “to remove incentives to use them for illegitimate purposes.”1015 The 
substance of the law – “based on a nineteenth century concept whose purpose is wholly 
unrelated to contemporary employment policy”1016 – together with the formalism of the 
employee tests were considered a problem as they provided employers and workers with “a 
means and incentive to circumvent the employment policies of the nation.”1017 The definition of 
employee in labour and tax law should, it followed, be “modernized, simplified and 
standardized.”1018 Congress was advised to “adopt a single, coherent concept of employee and 
apply it across the board in employment and labor law.”1019 The test of choice was the economic 
realities test. 
The determination of whether a worker is an employee protected by federal labor and employment 
law should not be based on the degree of immediate control the employer exercises over the 
worker, but rather on the underlying economic realities of the relationship. Workers should be 
treated as independent contractors if they are truly independent entrepreneurs performing services 
for clients – i.e. if they present themselves to the general public as an established business presence, 
have a number of clients, bear the economic risk of loss of their work, and the like. Workers who 
                                                 
1014 C.f. above 3.3.3. 
1015 Dunlop Commission (1994) p. 62. 
1016 Dunlop Commission (1994) p. 64. 
1017 Dunlop Commission (1994) p. 65. 
1018 Dunlop Commission (1994) p. 63. 
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are economically dependent on the entity for whom they perform services generally should be 
treated as employees. Factors such as low wages, low skill levels, and having one or few employers 
should all militate against treatment as an independent contractor.1020 
 
Through applying the economic realities to all tax and labour laws, the commission hoped to 
“eliminate the incentives to use the independent contractor form to evade the obligations of 
national workplace policy while leaving it fully available where its use is truly appropriate.”1021 
 
Another option for recasting the concept of employee is to increase the flexibility of the multi-
factor test even further, holding no single factor to be solely decisive. Such a reform was, for 
example, included in the guidelines from the Supiot group of experts: “The technique of an array 
of possibilities, tried and tested in case law, must allow for the scope of labour law to be adapted 
to the new ways in which power is exercised in companies. At the same time it must ensure [that] 
no restrictive definition of subordination is formulated on the basis of a single criterion 
(including ‘economic dependence’ or ‘integration into someone else’s company’).”1022 The group 
also emphasised the importance of upholding the mandatory nature of the concept of employee, 
piercing corporate or contractual veils if necessary. The group saw a need for a “reassertion of 
the essential principle whereby the parties to an employment relationship are not vested with the 
power to establish the legal status of the relationship.”1023 Labour law is mandatory regulation, 
ordre public, and it must not be possible to contract out of it.  
 
Neither the proposal of the Dunlop Commission nor that of the Supiot group, as far as the 
concept of employee is concerned, amounts to any extensive broadening of the personal scope of 
                                                                                                                                                        
1019 Dunlop Commission (1994) pp. 65f. 
1020 Dunlop Commission (1994) p. 66. 
1021 Dunlop Commission (1994) p. 66. 
1022 Supiot et al (2001) p. 220. 
1023 Supiot et al (2001) p. 219. 
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labour law.1024 Both groups would probably be content with the width of, for example, the 
concept of employee in Swedish labour law.1025 In fact, flexibile as it is, there are limits to how far 
the concept of employee can be stretched. The most important limit comes from the relation 
between flexibility and legal certainty. If the concept is made more flexible, for example through 
the inclusion of more factors or through embracing the view that no sole factor should be 
necessary, this naturally means that the outcome of any adjudication will be more difficult to 
predict. As one author puts it, an “ever-expanding catalogue of ‘factors’” have resulted in a 
complex multi-factor analysis with a less than predictable outcome: “After nearly two hundred 
years of evolution, the [multi-factor test] begs the question as much as it answers it.”1026 
 
In addition, as ‘employee’ is a well established concept not just legally, but in everyday life, any 
bending or  stretching to cover workers that fall outside popular notions of who can reasonably 
be considered an employee do not only add uncertainty, but may lack support in public opinion. 
Over time, popular notions may change, possibly even as an effect of actions taken by courts and 
legislators, but this process is rather slow. Even if the concept of employee is stretched to its 
limits, it will not include all workers working in relationships and under conditions with which 
labour law concerns itself, as noted already in Chapter 3.  
5.2 Concentric Circles of Labour Law Coverage 
If it is not possible to capture all workers to whom one or more of the concerns of labour law 
apply under the concept of employee, even in a recasted fashion, another possibility is to organise 
the personal scope in different layers. An attempt to visualise this is made in Figure 5.2.1. At the 
core of this model we have subordinated, economically dependent, workers performing work 
                                                 
1024 As noted above, it is highly questionable whether the economic realities test is actually any broader than the 
common law control test. C.f. 3.3.5. 
1025 From the Swedish horizion, the rapporteurs of Ds 2002:56 conclude that the debate in some other western 
European countries to a certain extent can be interpreted as a quest for a method reminicent of the one established 
in Sweden already through the Supreme Court’s decision NJA 1949 p. 768. Ds 2002:56 p. 128. 
1026 Carlson (2001) p. 299. 
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personally, to which all of labour law applies (I). Then, depending on how much a group of 
workers deviate from this core, which more or less corresponds to the traditional concept of 
employee, we have other groups of workers, arranged in concentric circles with an ever-
diminishing application of labour law the further we move out from the core (II and III). 
 
Figure 5.2.1 Concentric Circles of Labour Law  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Of the existing extensions of labour law presented in Chapter 4, the tertium genus as found in Italy 
and Germany can be described in terms of concentric circles of labour law, but only constituting 
a single extra circle, and a rather thin one at that, with very little content in terms of labour law 
coverage. The model can also be used to describe the targeted approach found in British labour law. 
Most of labour law applies only to the core of employees as defined in the common law, while 
extensions have brought anti-discrimination law, minimum wage, working time and some 
collective right to bear also on a second layer (worker) and, as far as anti-discrimination is 
concerned, a third layer of workers (employment). In the debates among labour law scholars and 
policy makers, in recent years, various ideas along the lines of a personal scope organised in 
concentric circles have been fielded. Here, three of these will be presented, taken from the Supiot 
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report, a proposed (but never adopted) ILO convention, and a scholarly work by Davies and 
Freedland. 
 
The Supiot group of experts expressed a “desire to extend the scope of labour law to cover all 
kinds of contracts involving the performance of work for others, not only strict worker 
subordination.”1027 The group advocated that certain aspects of labour law be applied to workers 
other than employees. In particular, economically dependent workers “should be able to benefit 
from the social rights to which this dependence entitles them.”1028  
Generally speaking the group believes that it is advisable to prevent a gulf from forming between 
employees protected under contract and persons working under other kinds of arrangement that 
afford less protection. One of the historical functions of labour law has been to ensure social 
cohesion. It will only be able to continue to fulfil that function if it is able to accommodate new 
developments in the way that work is organized in contemporary society and does not revert to 
covering just the situations it was originally intended to address, which are becoming less typical.1029 
 
Some years earlier, the head of the group, Alain Supiot, had in an article suggested that social law 
protection should be “indexed” in accordance with the need for protection and outlined “four 
circles of social law”.1030 While the outermost circles, with the widest coverage, concerned 
“universal social rights” such as health insurance and family benefits, the personal scope of 
labour law was divided between the two circles at the centre. At the core were employees, 
covered by all of labour and social law, and the only ones to be covered by regulation directly 
linked to their subordination to the employer. In the first circle outside of the core, Supiot placed 
all who perform professional activities, covered by the freedom to organise and bargain 
collectively, anti-discrimination law,  and occupational health and safety regulations. This 
reasoning could also be found in the recommendations of the Supiot group.  
                                                 
1027 Supiot et al (2001) p. 219. 
1028 Supiot et al (2001) p. 220. 
1029 Supiot et al (2001) pp. 22f. 
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[T]he expert group supports the veiw that it is appropriate to extend coverage in some 
circumstances to other kinds of work contracts and relationships. The approach then, is to favour 
the establishment of a common, broadly-based labour law, certain branches of which might, in turn, 
be adapted to cover many and varied kinds of labour relations (subordinate work in the traditional 
sense; ‘para-subordinate, that is financially dependent work).1031 
 
At the International Labour Conference held in June 1998, a proposal for an ILO convention on 
contract labour was presented but in the end not adopted. “Contract labour” is a notion covering 
situations “in which the substance of the relationship appears to be similar to an employment 
relationship while the form is a commercial one, or at least where there seems to be some 
combination of employment and commercial aspects to the relationship established.”1032 The 
proposed Article 1 of the convention defined ‘contract labour’ as workers who were performing 
work personally and in a state of dependency or subordination similar to that of employees, 
without being classified as employees under national law.  
For the purposes of this Convention: 
(a) the term ‘contract labour’ means work performed for a natural or legal person (referred to as a ‘user 
enterprise’) by a person (referred to as a ‘contract worker’) where the work is performed by a worker 
personally under actual conditions of dependency on or subordination to the user enterprise and these 
conditions are similar to those that characterize an employment relationship under national law and 
preactice and where either: 
(i) the work is performed pursuant to a direct contractual arrangement between the worker 
and the user enterprise; or 
(ii) the worker is provided for the user enterprise by a subcontractor or an intermediary.1033 
 
In the Proposed Recommendation Concerning Contract Labour, presented together with the draft 
convention, it was stated that in determining whether the conditions concerning dependency and 
                                                                                                                                                        
1030 Supiot (1997) p. 241. 
1031 Supiot et al (2001) p. 22. 
1032 ILO (1998) p. 6. 
1033 Proposed Article 1 of the draft contract labour convention. 
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subordination were met, members “could consider one or more criteria”. A statement followed 
by a non-exhaustive list of factors, all, with the exception of “the user enterprise provides 
substantial job-specific traning to the contract worker”, well known from the multi-factor tests 
for employee status.1034 This definition would include those independent contractors most closely 
resembling employees, together with employees of subcontractors and intermediaries.1035 In 
particular, the proposed convention could have had an effect on economically dependent 
workers who for the moment are excluded from labour law on the ground that they are not 
working under a sufficiently high degree of subordination. 
 
Materially, the proposed convention tried to put contract labour on an equal footing with 
employees, including a provision obliging member states to “promote equality of treatment 
between contract workers and workers with a recognized employment relationship, taking into 
account the conditions applicable to others performing work which is essentially similar under 
similar conditions”.1036 The proposed convention expressedly mentioned that contract workers 
should be given the same protection as employees concerning right to organise and bargain 
collectively, freedom from discrimination, and child labour.1037  Further, measures should be 
taken to ensure contract workers “adequate protection” as regards working time, maternity 
protection, occupational health and safety, remuneration and statutory social security.1038 The 
notable exception from these lists is dismissal protection, on which both the proposed 
convention and the proposed recommendation are silent. The content of the proposed 
convention can be described as inserting a rather narrowly conceived tertium genus between 
employees as traditionally conceived and genuinely independent contractors. Workers in this 
                                                 
1034 Proposed Section 2 of the draft contract labour recommendation.  
1035 The proposed Article 2 would exempt employees of private employment agencies from the scope of the 
convention. 
1036 Proposed Article 5 of the draft contract labour convention. 
1037 Proposed Article 6(1) of the draft contract labour convention. 
1038 Proposed Article 6(2) of the draft contract labour convention. 
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cordon sanitaire would be covered by parts of labour law, and have their own regulation concerning 
other parts, but would be exempted from the crucial area of dismissal protection. 
 
Building on the targeted approach in British law, but taking it further, Davies and Freedland 
develop a “typology of work contracts”, identifying four different groups of workers.1039 The first 
group are employees as traditionally understood, dependent or subordinated workers working 
under a contract of employment. The second group are “employee-like” workers, such as 
German arbeitsnehmeränhliche personen or Italian para-subordinati, but also British workers, who are not 
in a position of legal subordination but who do perform work personally and are highly 
economically dependent upon one or a small number of employers. The third group consists of 
persons “who have contracted to render a personal service, but who, unlike the second group run 
an identifiable business of their own.”1040 They usually, but not always, avoid a high level of 
economic dependency. Characteristic of the fourth group is that they have not contracted to 
render a service personally, but simply to produce a result. This four-fold categorisation is not 
exclusive and many variations of the four are possible. 
 
Davies and Freedland argue that, for each of the four types of work, a different mix of labour law 
and commercial law regulation should be applied. While the first category might be governed 
entirely by labour law principles, and the fourth almost entirely by commercial law principles, the 
second and third category will have to be governed by a combination of labour law and 
commercial law. To explore this, they start from the proposition that the decisive test for the 
application of labour law is to be economic dependency. 
[T]he single test for the application of labour law should be the criterion of whether the worker is 
economically dependent upon the employer. This test would operate both positively and negatively: 
                                                 
1039 Davies and Freedland (2000a) pp. 34f. 
1040 Davies and Freedland (2000a) p. 35. 
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if there was economic dependence, the whole of labour law would apply; if there was no economic 
dependence, none of it would apply. 1041 
 
This would result in the application of labour law to the second category in their typology, 
employee-like workers, a proposal which Davies and Freedland claims not to be as radical as it 
might seem, if one considers that some economically dependent workers already have been 
included in the personal scope of labour law, or parts thereof, through legislative extensions or 
broadened concepts of employee.1042 The authors also investigate the negative side of the 
proposition, i.e. to exclude from labour law those who are not economically dependent. They 
admit that this, if rigorously applied, would risk excluding some workers currently covered by 
labour law from protection, and conclude that “economic dependence is a sufficient reason to 
give a worker the protection of labour law, but it is not the exclusive reason.”1043 Instead, they 
turn their attention to the relationship between the personal scope of labour law and the 
“functions” of the regulation. “The functions of labour law which are not related (or not directly 
related) to the economic dependence may also provide […] a basis for extending some parts of 
labour law to workers in the third category.”1044 
 
Davies and Freedland provide two examples. The first example is labour law which “role is that 
of the protection of human rights in the workplace”, notably anti-discrimination law.1045 Also 
workers who work for many different employers or customers and, therefore, show a low degree 
of economics dependence vis-à-vis each individual employer or customer, can be discriminated 
against. The second example is occupational health and safety law which, as has been shown 
above, in many cases already has been extended beyond employees. The conclusion is that there 
                                                 
1041 Davies and Freedland (2000a) p. 36. 
1042 Davies and Freedland (2000a) pp. 37f. As examples the authors take the ‘worker’ extension in the UK, German 
and Italian third category workers and the broadening of the concept of employee in Swedish labour law to cover 
dependent contractors. 
1043 Davies and Freedland (2000a) p. 40. 
1044 Davies and Freedland (2000a) p. 40. 
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are good reasons for extending the personal scope of some parts of labour law to relationships 
falling in the third category, persons who have contracted to render a personal service, but who 
run an identifiable business of their own. 
We have suggested two categories of labour law which it might be appropriate to apply to such 
workers, namely human rights law and health and safety law. In both cases the existence of a 
dependent work relationship does not form a crucial part of the arguments in favour of the 
imposition of liability.1046 
 
Finally, Davies and Freedland consider whether their fourth category, individuals who have not 
contracted to render a service personally, should have any aspect of their relationship with the 
buyers of their services regulated by labour law. In other words, should an obligation to provide 
personal service be the outer boundary of labour law. Davies and Freedland answers this 
question in the affirmative – “the intutive reaction that labour law has a limited role to play with 
our fourth category of contracts is no doubt correct”1047 – but lists three reasons why labour law 
does not necessarily have to accept personal service as its outer boundary. Firstly, this boundary 
is open to manipulation by the contracting parties who can put an incorporated business between 
the worker and the employer or insert contract clauses allowing for substitution even though thus 
in reality would be very difficult or impossible. Secondly, “it is far from clear that the freedom 
not to do work personally is a fully reliable indicator of non-dependent work relationships”, 
illustrated by the case of homeworkers who have had the possibility of employing assistants. 
Thirdly, commercial law might benefit from the application of certain labour law principles. 
Summing up their position, Davies and Freedland stress the necessary connection between the 
personal scope and the substantive content of labour law. 
[T]he personal scope of any particular labour law must be a matter of discussion and decisions as 
much as is the substantive content of the law. Indeed, the two issues interact with one another; a 
                                                                                                                                                        
1045 Davies and Freedland (2000a) p. 40. 
1046 Davies and Freedland (2000a) p. 42. 
1047 Davies and Freedland (2000a) p. 43. 
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broad personal scope may suggest a relatively light regulatory structure; a more focussed personal 
scope may permit tougher regulation.1048  
 
Davies and Freedland visualise their idea through a graph were the x-axis represents the degre of 
similarity with an employee as traditionally understood and the y-axis the extent to which labour 
law (lower part) or commercial law (higher part) should govern the relationship between the 
parties. Here, however, their idea will be expressed in terms of concentric circles (Figure 5.2.2). At 
the core (I) we find employees, whose relationships with their employer are governed entirely by 
labour law. Outside of the core we have the “employee-like” (II) covered by large parts but not 
all of labour law. Moving out we then find the “genuinely self-employed” characterised by having 
contracted to perform work personally (III) covered by anti-discrimination law and occupational 
health and safety regulation. Finally, in the outermost circle, we have workers who have not 
contracted to perform work personally (IV), who have their activities governed almost entirely by 
commercial law applies, but where some principles from labour law might be applied. 
 
Figure 5.2.2 The Davoes-Freedland Proposal as Concentric Circles 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1048 Davies and Freedland (2000a) p. 45. 
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Advantages and Disadvantages of the Concentric Circle Model 
Organising the personal scope of labour law in concentric circles has several advantages, 
provided it is done in a prudent fashion. Going back to the three concerns of labour law – 
subordination, economic dependence and the fact that a worker is a human being – we can 
construct a personal scope in three layers. At the core, we place workers who are performing 
work personally, economically dependent and subordinated to the bureaucratic powers of the 
employer (I). In the second layer, we place those who are performing work personally and who 
are in a state of economic dependence (II). In the third layer, we place those under a contract to 
perform work personally, but who are neither subordinated nor economically dependent (III). 
 
We then use the three circles as boundaries for the personal scope of different parts of labour 
law, dependening on the concern the regulations are to address. The outermost circle, thus 
encompassing workers in all three layers, we use to determine the personal scope of those parts 
of labour law concerned with the worker as a human being, such as anti-discrimination 
legislation, freedom of association and other civil and political rights. The second circle marks the 
boundary for labour law concerned with the worker’s economic dependence, defining the 
personal scope of, among others, dismissal protection, minimum wage and collective bargaining. 
Finally, the innermost circle defines the personal scope of labour law concerned with the 
subordination of the worker to the bureaucratic powers of the employer, notably regulation of 
the employer’s monitoring and disciplinary powers, working time and occupational health and 
safety. 
 
Organising the personal scope in concentric circles, could, just like the tertium genus, lead to an 
exodus from employee status, employers being inclined to hire workers under contracts which, at 
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least on the face of it, would place the workers in the second or third layers. The stronger 
connection between the concern which a particular piece of legislation is to address and its 
personal scope should by itself make this strategy less succesful. An employer attempting to place 
a worker in the second layer rather than at the core would only escape those parts of labour law 
concerned with subordination, not, as in the case of the parasubordinati, virtually the whole 
package of labour regulation. 
 
Organising the personal scope of labour law in terms of concentric circles does, however, fail to 
take into account the fact that more combinations of performing work personally, economic 
dependence and subordination are possible than what can be accounted for in the concentric 
circle model. A worker can be subject to the employer’s bureaucratic powers without being 
economically dependent. An example would be a worker who comes in does the odd job or two 
for an employer, taking instructions or abiding to rules decided by the latter. If the personal 
scope of labour law is organised in concentric circles, there is an obvious risk that this worker 
would end up in the outermost category and thus not be covered by, for example, health and 
safety regulations. This problem has been acknowledged in the existing law of many countries, 
where the personal scope of occupational health and safety regulation has been extended.1049 
Davies and Freedland acknowledge this problem when they write that “economic dependence is 
a sufficient reason to give a worker the protection of labour law, but it is not the exclusive 
reason.”1050 Thus, despite the many advantages of organising the personal scope in concentric 
circles, it is nonetheless necessary to explore further possibilities for the organisation of the 
personal scope of labour law.  
                                                 
1049 C.f. above 4.5. 
1050 Davies and Freedland (2000a) p. 40. 
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5.3 Overlapping Circles of Labour Law Coverage 
Having considered the possibilities represented by an extended concept of employee and a 
personal scope organised in concentric circles, we now move on to a third option which, or so it 
will be argued, has better possibilites of providing labour law with a suitable personal scope. 
Remaining with the circle metaphor, this option can be described as a personal scope organised 
in overlapping circles. An important part of the argument in favour of this way of organising the 
personal scope is that the same model of overlapping circles can be used both to visualize 
different kinds of contracts for work, and to describe an ideal personal scope of labour law. 
 
In this model, there are three circles, each representing one of the three concerns of labour law, 
which also correspond to the three characteristics of work contracts (Figure 5.3.1). The top circle 
represents the personal performance of work, the left circle economic dependence and the right 
circle subordination. In the areas where two or three circles overlap both or all three of the 
concerns/characteristics are present. 
Figure 5.3.1 
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By performing work personally is to be understood situations in which the party performing the work 
is a human being. The dominant purpose of the relationship is that a certain human being is to 
perform a given task or amount of work, or at least most of it. In some situations, this human 
being may be hidden behind a legal entity, as when a person sells labour only services through a 
company of which she is the owner. Still, this is a human being performing work personally, 
falling inside of the circle. Outside the circle, we find relationships in which the genuine parties to 
the contract are companies or organisations, and where the person who performs the work has 
another identifiable employer. 
 
Economic dependence occurs when an individual draws all or a significant part of her income from an 
employer. Even though a lengthy duration of the work relationship is an important sign of 
economic dependence, it can occur also in situations where the worker only works for a short 
period, such as a couple of weeks, if the worker during that period draws all or a significant part 
of her income from the employer. Work of a genuinely casual nature, distinguished by its short 
duration and limited extent, does not, however, make the worker economically dependent, and 
fall outside of the circle. Finally, subordination signifies the worker’s subjection to the bureaucratic 
powers of the employer. This is expressed in her obligation to follow orders, be the subject of the 
employer’s monitoring and discipline, and to abide by rules laid down by the latter. Outside the 
circle we find situations where the worker controls the how, when and where of work, and where 
the employer cannot unilaterally change the rules governing the relationship. 
 
First, we use the model to visualise different kinds of contracts for work, letting the circles 
represent characteristics of contracts for work (Figure 5.3.2). In the area marked I, we find work 
contracts characterised by all three traits – the personal performance of work, economic 
dependence and subordination – that is, employees as traditionally understood. In area II we 
have individuals who perform work personally and who are economically dependent. Examples 
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could be the dependent contractors in Swedish labour law and Italian parasubordinati, as long as 
they are not in fact sufficiently subordinated to end up in area I. In area III we have workers who 
are subordinated but not economically dependent, for example construction workers working for 
several different contractors or consultants with many different clients. In area IV, we find 
genuinely independent contractors who are neither economically dependent nor subordinated to 
the employer’s hierarchical powers. Finally, in areas V, VI and VII, work is not being performed 
personally. Examples would be subcontractors of different kinds, where the service rendered is 
impersonal or aimed at producing a result and the person performing work has another 
identifiable employer. An advantage over the concentric circle model is that all possible 
combinations of the three characteristics of work contracts can be accounted for. 
 
Figure 5.3.2. The Location of Work Contracts in the Overlapping Circle Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Secondly, we let the circles represent the three concerns of labour law and fill them with the parts 
of labour law corresponding to each concern. In the top circle, we place those regulations which 
we identified as concerned with the worker as a human being.1051 Here we find anti-
discrimination law (including equal pay and legislation aimed at combatting sexual harassment); 
                                                 
1051 C.f. above 2.4. 
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regulation protecting workers’ exercise of free speech and other political rights; and the freedom 
of association, the right to organise and participate in trade union activities. Finally, the category 
also includes the regulation of things harmful to the human being in a less philosophical sense, 
such as physical dangers not related to the nature of the relationship between the worker and her 
employer, such as the use of toxic substances. Logically, these parts of labour law should apply to 
all who perform work personally, found in the shaded area in Figure 5.3.3. 
 
Figure 5.3.3 The Personal Scope of Labour Law Concerned With the Worker as a Human Being 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We then move on to labour regulation concerned with the workers dependence, such as dismissal 
protection; the right to bargain collectively and to strike; and minimum wage and other 
regulations concerning worker’s remuneration.1052 These are to apply to all who are in a situation 
of economic dependence, but only if they are also performing work personally. Graphically, this 
is represented by the shaded area in Figure 5.3.4, thus leaving out subcontractors who are 
economically dependent but who are not performing work personally. This would mean an 
extension of large and important tracts of labour law to cover economically dependent workers, 
such as the Italian parasubordinati.  
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Figure 5.3.4 The Personal Scope of Labour Law Concerned With Economic Dependence  
 
 
Finally, we deal with labour law concerned with the worker’s subordination to the employer’s 
bureaucratic powers. Here, we have to construct the personal scope in a somewhat more 
complicated fashion than in the two prior cases. As far as individuals who are both in a state of 
subordination and performing work personally – found in the shaded area of Figure 5.3.5 – all 
labour law concerned with subordination should apply, including those basic principles of labour 
law defining and limiting the employer’s prerogatives, such as regulation of the employer’s right 
to monitor and discipline workers. As for occupational health and safety legislation and working 
time regulations concerned with the workers health, safety and the safety of others, matters are 
more complex. The principal concern labour law is trying to address goes beyond just those 
workers who are performing work personally, evidence of which is given in the common practice 
of extending the personal scope of occupational health and safety legislation beyond 
employees.1053 Also subcontractors and the employees of subcontractors ought to be covered by 
regulation pertaining for example to the safety conditions at common worksites. This is 
represented by the striped area in Figure 5.3.5. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
1052 C.f. above 2.3.2. 
1053 C.f. above 4.5. 
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Figure 5.3.5 The Personal Scope of Labour Law Concerned With Subordination 
 
 
 
A document which, at least to some extent, takes an approach similar to this model is a proposal 
presented in 2002 by the Italian centre-left Ulivo-alliance, written by senators and legal scholars 
Giuliano Amato and Tiziano Treu, former prime minister and minister of labour respectively.1054 
Their proposal contains a radical overhaul of the personal scope of Italian labour law dividing it 
into three parts: Title I, Diritti fondamentali e norme di sostegno per i lavori autonomi, applicable to all 
who contract to perform work personally; Title II, Diritti delle lavoratrici e dei lavoratori economicamente 
dipendenti, applicable to economically dependent workers; and Title III, Statuto delle lavoratrici e dei 
lavoratori subordinato, applicable to subordinated workers. 
 
Title I would cover all contracts that have as their object the performance of work, also if of an 
intellectual nature, with a predominantly personal contribution by the worker, but without a bond 
of subordination.1055 This personal scope would be assigned to legislation concerning the exercise 
in the workplace of the freedom of expression, freedom of association, equal pay, basic 
occupational health and safety, maternity and paternity rights, the right to notice periods in case 
of termination of contract, and rights concerning employment services, training and pensions.1056  
                                                 
1054 La Carta dei diritti delle lavoratrici e dei lavoratori.  
1055 “…una prestazione di opera, anche intellettuale, con apporto prevalentemente personale, senza vincolo di 
subordinazione.” Carta dei diritti…, Art. 2(1). It would also be applicable to e.g. apprentices, volonteers, and members 
of the employers’ family and persons in training. 
1056 Carta dei diritti…, Art. 3-12. 
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The proposal’s Titolo II, Diritti delle lavoratirce e dei lavoratori economicamente dipendenti, would apply to 
“work relationships characterised by a situation of economic dependence on the side of the party 
performing work”1057 Considered as such are relationships “having as their object the 
predominantly personal performance of co-ordinated and continuous work, even without a bond 
of subordination.”1058 With this personal scope, we find, among others, anti-discrimination 
regulation, regulation concerning sexual harassment, the right to a fair wage, the right to carry out 
trade union activites in the work place, and the right to strike.1059 The third title of the proposal – 
statuto delle lavoratrici e dei lavoratori subordinati – is to supplement the current legal regime for 
subordinate work found elsewhere in the law, by adding a small number of new provisions 
concerning, among others, the implementation of European directives concerning information 
and participation in cases of collective dismissals or collective transfers of workers, and the right 
to redundancy pay in case of involuntary unemployment.1060 The proposal, which has the 
advantage of being formulated as a proposed statutory text, demonstrates that even a radical 
rethinking of the personal scope is feasible. Perceiving the personal scope in terms of overlapping 
circles could add clarity to such a project and provide a coherent framework for a reform of the 
personal scope of labour law, adjusting it to the needs of various types of atypical workers, not 
just the self-employed. 
 
Finally, we turn our attention to how a reform such as the one outlined here could be realised in 
legislation. A personal scope organised as overlapping circles could, if it is to be stringent, be 
designed in one of two different ways. The first option, and maybe the easier as it does not 
require giving up the concept of employee all together, is to equip each statute with a personal 
scope consisting of “employees” and all other workers who are covered by the relevant concern. 
                                                 
1057 “…rapporti di lavoro caratterizzati da una situazione di dipendenza economica del prestatore di lavoro.“ Carta dei 
diritti…, Art. 13(1). 
1058 “…i rapporti di collaborazione aventi a oggetto una prestazione d’opera coordinata e continuative, 
prevalentemente personale, svolta senza vincolo di subordinazione…” Carta dei diritti…, Art. 13(2). 
1059 Carta dei diritti…, Art. 16, 18, 19, 26 and 27. 
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This would give three formulae: a) employees, and others who perform work personally; b) 
employees, and others who perform work personally and are in a state of economic dependence 
vis-à-vis the employer; and c) employees, and others who perform work personally and who are 
in a state of subordination. This technique is possible, as all parts of labour law would apply to 
Area I in Figure 5.3.2, where we find employees as traditionally conceived. As we have seen, a 
similar formula has been used in the United Kingdom, where “worker” is defined as all who 
“works under a contract of employment or any other contract whereby the individual undertakes 
to do or perform personally any work or service for a third party.”1061 
 
The second option, and more radical as it requires the abandonment of the concept of employee 
altogether, is to define the personal scope solely in terms of the personal performance of work, 
economic dependence and subordination. In both cases, a fourth formula would have to be 
constructed to cover those parts of occupational health and safety law that would cover also 
subcontractors and others who are not performing work personally. One advantage of the first 
option, keeping the concept of employee but adding extensions, is that such a reform clearly 
marks an enlargement of the personal scope, not just a reorganisation. On the other hand, the 
second option, starting anew with unadulterated concepts, could be more appropriate for dealing 
with new forms of work. 
 
In terms of legal certainty, the overlapping circle model for the personal scope has the 
disadvantage, shared with other ‘fragmentations’ of the coverage, that there is no one sole gate to 
labour law protection. On the other hand, the model has the advantage that the applicability of 
the law will depend on only one of the concerns at a time. Even though courts very likely would 
have to develop tests where a number of different circumstances are taken into account to assess 
whether a person is subordinated, economically dependent or performing work personally, these 
                                                                                                                                                        
1060 Carta dei diritti…, Art 28-33. 
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tests would be less complicated and more focused than the present multi-factor test for the 
concept of employee. Subordination could be an issue of the worker following orders or abiding 
by rules laid down by the employer and being subjected to the employer’s monotoring and 
disciplinary powers. Economic dependence could be decided based on whether the worker draws 
all or most of her income from one employer. In the case of performing work personally, courts 
could look to the conctract but also be prepared to ‘pierce the corporate veil’ to find the worker 
actually performing work. A fragmentation of the personal scope would thus not necessarily be 
of detriment to legal certainty. 
 
Organising the scope in overlapping circles, also has apparent advantages when it comes to 
upholding the mandatory nature of labour law. As in the case of a personal scope defined by 
employer’s responsibilities, this approach has the advantage of tying labour law coverage to 
functional criteria rather than a particular status.1062 Employers looking to enter contractual 
relationships with certain characteristics, for example a high degree of control over how and 
when the work is done, will have to take the legal regulation that comes with that characteritic 
and cannot avoid it through keeping the worker at arms-length in some other respect, such as 
only offering casual employment. A similar proposition has been made by Deakin, who 
concerning the allocation of employer responsibility in the case of temporary agency work, 
suggests that  “one route for the legislator is to ensure that if the ‘risk’ and ‘coordination’ 
functions of the employer are to be split […] between the agency and the user, the obligations 
which would normally attach to the exercise of these functions are to be imposed upon the 
relevant parties in each case.”1063 This approach obviously lessens the risk of manipulation, even 
though it can never eliminate it totally. 
                                                                                                                                                        
1061 C.f. above 4.4.2 
1062 C.f. above 4.5.3. 
1063 Deakin (2001b) p. 322. 
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5.4 The Legal Construction of the Personal Scope 
In this study, we have arrived at some important insights regarding the legal construction of the 
coverage of labour law, valuable for any attempt at reform of the personal scope. Most 
importantly, the mandatory nature of labour law carries certain implications for the construction 
of the personal scope. Implications that at times come into conflict with the desire to avoid 
uncertainty as to the legal nature of the relationship between worker and employer. If workers 
and employers were allowed to contract freely over the status of their relationship, uncertainty 
would not be a problem. At the same time however, if the mandatory nature of labour law is to 
be upheld, courts must have the power to make the final decision concerning the true nature of a 
contested relationship. 
 
The personal scope must be built on the actual relationship between the parties. For several 
reasons, the real content of the relationship between a worker and an employee can only be 
assessed ex-post. The relational nature and inherent incompleteness of contracts for work, as well 
as the often unequal bargaining powers of the parties, provides ample possibilities for 
discrepancies between the contract as expressed ex-ante and the subsequent reality of the 
relationship.1064 One consequence of this is that courts must have the power to requalify 
relationships that have been wrongfully labelled, or where practice between the parties have 
changed during the duration of the relationship. This makes ex-ante certification procedures, 
which from the point of view of legal certainty can seem attractive, problematic, even if they only 
provide a presumption of a certain employment status, such as under the now repealed French 
Loi Madelin.1065 The creation of legal presumptions concerning the status of workers, either 
through classification or registration, may compromise the mandatory nature of labour law as it 
can be used to reinforce wrongful, or fraudulent, classifications of workers. This conflict between 
the desire for legal certainty and the mandatory nature of labour is present also in the case of 
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tertium genus. As we saw with the Italian lavoratori parasubordinati, the institution of a third category 
can give a definite status to workers in the grey area between employees and genuinely 
independent contractors, but can also contribute to an exodus from labour law as workers are 
hired as parasubordinati rather than employees.1066 
 
Further, the relationship with other fields of law, where homonymous distinctions – materially 
identical or not – are used, can be of great importance for the personal scope. If the same word is 
used in for example social security, copyright or taxation law as in labour law, courts may very 
well come to interpret them in an identical way, despite the difference in regulatory objectives 
between the four fields. Another problem is that the ex-ante decisions by administrative agencies 
which determine a worker’s status for tax or social security purposes, easily comes to influence 
her employment status as well, creating an informal prima facie case for a particular status. If 
labour law is to guard its autonomy and mandatory nature, it better not have its personal scope 
mixed up with that of other fields of law. 
                                                                                                                                                        
1064 C.f. above 2.2.1. 
1065 C.f. above 3.6.2. 
1066 C.f. above 4.3.2. 
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
At the outset of this study, three challenges posed by labour law were identified. Firstly, the 
traditionally binary divide between employees and self-employed workers makes less and less 
sense as many self-employed are in a similar situation of dependency and under the employer’s 
control as are employees, and many employees enjoy a freedom to carry out their work 
traditionally attributed to the self-employed. Secondly, self-employment status has been used as a 
way to circumvent labour law and other social regulations. Thirdly, the concerns that labour law 
is to address are not only raised in connection employee but are sometimes valid also in the 
relationship between genuinely self-employed workers and their employers. 
 
Subsequently, an analytical tool was created through identifying the three concerns of labour law: 
workers’ subordination to the bureaucratic powers of the employer; workers’ dependence on 
remunerated work; and the simple fact that all workers are human beings. In a third triple, the 
requirements that must be put on the personal scope of labour law were laid down. The personal 
scope must be constructed as to guard, as far as possible, the mandatory nature of labour law, 
avoid uncertainty, and be relevant in that each part of labour law covers all who work under 
conditions in which its particular concern is raised. 
 
In a comparative analysis of the concept of employee, we found this concept to be a form of 
status notion, similar across countries and set up with the same extra-legal notion in mind: the 
industrial worker in a fordist corporation. In all the studied countries, the concept of employee 
took the form of a multi-factor test, in which several different circumstances were weighed 
together, with the personal performance of work was a necessary factor and subordination crucial 
for separating employees from self-employed workers.  The concept of employee has proved to 
be a very flexible legal concept and has managed to accommodate great changes in the 
Engblom, Samuel (2003), Self-employment and the personal scope of labour law : comparative lessons from France, Italy, 
Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States 
European University Institute
 
 
DOI: 10.2870/68969
 298
organisation of work and society at large. Still, it has not come to cover all situations in which the 
concerns of labour law are raised. 
 
Due to this deficiency of the concept of employee, lawmakers have, since the early days of labour 
market regulation, tried to extend labour law coverage to at least some self-employed workers. 
One technique is to assimilate certain categories of workers to employees, either through 
declaring them to be employees or through stipulating that the same regulation should apply. 
Another technique is to create a third category of workers, a tertium genus, to which some part of 
labour law applies. Further, lawmakers have diversified the personal scope defining the personal 
scope in different ways depending on the part of labour law and its particular purpose. In the area 
of occupational health and safety, the coverage has been defined in terms of employer 
responsibility rather than the status of the worker. 
 
Finally, we investigated different possibilities for a reform of the personal scope. The most 
obvious solution – to use the flexibility of the multi-factor test to recast the concept of employee 
– was rejected as it cannot reasonably be stretched to encompass all who ought to be covered by 
labour law. The personal scope must be diversified, defined depending on the concern addressed 
by the regulation. One way of doing this, suggested by a number of authors, would be to arrange 
the personal scope in several layers, laid out as concentric circles. At the core, we would have 
individuals performing work personally, in a state of economic dependence and subordinated to 
the bureaucratic powers of the employer, to which all of labour law would apply. In a second 
layer we would place economically dependent workers and in a third layer those who perform 
work personally without being either subordinated or economically dependent, with a declining 
quantity of labour law applicable. Such a reform would have many advantages, but suffer from 
the flaw that it does not take into account all the different combinations of subordination, 
economic dependence and obligation to perform personally work that exist. We, therefore, 
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outlined a third possibility, arranging the personal scope as three overlapping circles, representing 
subordination, economic dependence and the personal performance of work respectively. This 
would make it possible to give every part of labour law a personal scope which corresponds to 
the concern it is aimed to address. 
 
There are, naturally, a number of outstanding questions which have not been dealt with in this 
study, but which could be the subject of future research. In general, the field would benefit from 
more empirical research into the actual working conditions in the grey area between employees 
and genuinely self-employed workers. The study by Burchell, Deakin and Honey on the 
employment status of individuals in non-standard employment in the United Kingdom should 
inspire followers in other countries. Such studies, and other empirical research into the 
contracting practices between employers and formally self-employed workers, could serve to 
deepen our understanding of the connection between the contents of contracts for work and the 
concerns of labour law. Such research could also further our understanding of the firm. Implicit 
in the preference for a  personal scope organised as overlapping rather than concentric circles, is 
the argument that the ‘flexible firm’ should not be seen just as a ‘core’ and various layers of 
‘periphery’, as famously described by Atkinson. Instead, a model of the firm must distinguish 
between the different kinds of ties between the employer and the worker, acknowledging that 
there are different implications of being tied to the firm by a bond of subordination and being 
bound through economic dependence.   
 
Another area for future research would be to look at how legal classifications of work contracts 
affect the everyday reality in the workplace. The daily relations between workers and employers 
take place against the backdrop of the legal framework they perceive as governing their 
relationship. It is this perception, and not the actual regulation, which in reality governs 
relationships in the workplace. Upholding the mandatory scope of labour law is thus not only a 
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question of allowing workers who bring their grievances to court to have their relationships 
classified correctly, but to make sure that it informs the everyday employer-worker relations. 
Apart from the ever important task of informing the parties of their rights and obligations, this 
also raises the question of how labour law can be better policed ex-ante. Are there ways in which 
labour inspectorates and trade unions can work pre-emptively with the issue of employment 
status, the same way as is done in the field of occupational health and safety? 
 
Finally, as reported in the opening chapter, self-employed workers tend not to be unionised, for 
various reasons. In times when union membership is declining in most countries, it might seem 
over-optimistic to ponder on the possibilities of unionising self-employed workers. Still, as 
unions in some countries are making efforts to organise self-employed workers, the subject 
deserves attention, not least because the issue constitutes an interesting future subject for 
research, policy making and trade union strategy. Under the existing personal scope, as well as 
under any reformed scope, unions are crucial in policing the borders of labour law. In this, 
unions must aim to fulfil a two-fold strategy. On the one hand, they must take action to requalify 
wrongfully labeled contracts, returning some independent contractors to employee status. On the 
other, they must try to organise and represent also those workers that still fall outside the concept 
of employee.1067 The latter of these tasks will require creative legal solutions, as evidenced by the 
Italian trade unions negotiating standard contracts between parasubordinati and public 
employers.1068 Unionisation, and the still distant prospective of collective bargaining, would open 
up new regulatory avenues, at least for some self-employed with a latent collective dimension in 
their relation with their employer. As Sciarra has pointed out in the case of franchisees, “[o]nly 
‘procedural’ law is capable of following subjective positions in their constant evolution and 
                                                 
1067 This approach has, for example, been adopted by the French CFDT-Cadre. http://www.professionnels-
autonomes.net/actualites.php?op=edito [Visited 27 March 2003]. 
1068 C.f. above 4.3.2. 
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ensuring their place in the universe of contractual relationships which require constant control 
from without and within.”1069  
 
Hopefully, this study has contributed to proving the fruitfullness of using comparative methods  
in labour law research, both as a tool to analyse particular legal concepts and to investigate how 
specific problems can most appropriately be solved. There is a vast research agenda in comparing 
legal concepts and legal solutions, in a way that goes beyond the mere description of different 
legal systems, into real microcomparisons. This is particularly true in the European Union, where 
employment policies are to be forged through the open-method of coordination, an organised learning 
process promoting the exchange of experiences and best practices.  
                                                 
1069 Sciarra (1991) p. 246. 
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